As the Tribunal will recall, there was considerably controversy about this relationship which we claimed between Funk and the SS. We called another witness, puhl, and still another witness who was his subordinate, and I would assume that counsel would prefer to cross-examine Pohl. We are perfectly happy to have him do that; and then at a later date, if Funk has an opportunity, as I am sure he will, to make his statement, he could make his denial I don't know what more he could say except that it isn't so and I thought he had said that rather fully when, he was on the stand and rather fully denied that he had really any relationship with Himmler or with the SS. I am also fearful, Mr. President, that if the Court permits this procedure in this case, there may have been some other instances where other defendants will want to be heard fully and the thing will go on with sur-rebuttal and I am afraid it will take much of the Tribunal's time.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Sauter, we have heard you fully upon the subject already.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I point out one fact ? This witness Pohl, arrived at the Nurnberg Prison on the 1st of June and was questioned for the affidavit on the 15th ......
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you have expressed yourself that you do not want to cross-examine him. What is the relevance of the fact that he arrived here at a certain time if you don't want to cross-examine him ?
DR. SAUTER : Mr. President, my point of view is that on principle it cannot be permitted for the prosecution to present further evidence against a defendant whose case is closed. The Witness Pohl arrived on the 1st of June and on the 15th of July, six weeks later, he was examined for the affidavit. That was the same day on which I made my final plea for the defendant Funk and again, several weeks later, the affidavit was submitted. I do not believe that this corresponds to the demands of justice, that after a case is completely closed the prosecution submits further evidence against a defendant, without the defendant having an opportunity to comment on it on the witness-stand. In the Pohl Affidavit completely new facts are alleged. For example, Pohl, says that at a dinner in the presence of ten or twelve persons, this gold tooth question was discussed.
That is something entirely new and of course completely improbable and that is why I ask, Mr. President, that you permit us to have the defendant Funk examined on this point on the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: You must understand that it is a matter for the discretion of the Tribunal at what time they will end the evidence and it is necessary that the evidence should be ended at some time. The Tribunal has heard fully what you have had to say and they will now consider the matte
DR. SAUTER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT : With reference to the application by Dr. Sauter, the affidavit by Pohl, will not be struck out. It will remain upon the record. But in view of the particular circumstances of this case, the defendant Funk may be recalled to give evidence upon the subject and he will be recalled after the evidence has been given on behalf of the Organizations.
With reference to the objection of Dr. Laternser to the use of the statement made by Major General Walter Schreiber, the Tribunal is not inclined to admit any evidence so late as this, or to reopen questions which have been gone into fully before the Tribunal; but on the other hand in view of the importance of the statement of Major General Schreiber, and its particular relevance not only to the case of certain of the individual defendants but also to the case of the High Command, the Tribunal will allow General Schreiber to be heard as a witness if he is produced before the end of the hearing of the case. Otherwise no use can be made of this statement.
brought here if he is to be heard as a witness, the Tribunal thinks that it will be proper to order that he might be heard as a witness if he is brought here at any time before the final speeches with reference to the organizations are concluded. And, of course, counsel for the organization would have an opportunity of commenting upon any evidence which General Schreiber might give. That is all.
********** Dr. Laternser, will you call your other witness?
DR. LATERNSER: With the approval of the Tribunal, I call as my last witness Field Marshal von Runstodt.
**********
GERT VON RUNSTEDT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY TIE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. LATERNSER: What was your last position?
A I was a soldier for over fifty-four years. My last position was Commander-in-Chief West, until the 9th of March, 1945.
Q During what period of time were you Commander-in-Chief in Berlin? foreign politics?
A We generals did not concern ourselves with politics. We did not take part in any political discussions, and we did not hold any political discussions among ourselves. who said, "as a servant of the nation, the Army is above all politics, and that must remain so."
Q Did the Reichswehr, in 1933, help Hitler into power? methods ?
A The generals either rejected the Party or were indifferent. As for the methods regarding the Jewish question, they absolutely rejected them, particularly because many comrades were severely affected by the Aryan laws.
The so-called "Master Race" is nonsense. Germany is a mixture of races, partly Slavic and mixed races. a chaplain in the Army up to the end. the course of the war, came into positions falling under the Indictment? anything in regard to the punishment of the murderers of Schleicher?
A No. Reich President von Hindenburg was still at the head of the State. In the second place, I was not the senior officer, We had a commander chief of the army and a minister of war, whose duty that would have been. 1935, indicate any intention or plan for wars of aggression?
A No, in no way. The big maneuvers on the General Staff or Fuehrer trips always dealt with war in our own country. to do with the declaration of Wehr Hoheit (Armed Sovereignty)?
Q Did you know Colonel General von Fritsch well?
A Very well; he was my subordinate for a time.
Q As his representative, after 1937, did he tell you of Hitler's intent to wage wars of aggression?
secret. he went on leave to Egypt. On that occasion did he tell you of Hitler's intention, contained in the minutes of the meeting of the 5th of November 1937?
A I represented Colonel General von Fritsch; his official representative was Chief of the General Staff Beck. At that time General von Fritsch did not give me or General-oberst Book any information. February, 1938, in the military field? himself and the Wehrmacht; thus, he now had command over all three branches of the Wehrmacht. He took advantage of the opportunity to dismiss higher military leaders whom he did not like. What did he tell you about the attitude of the German generals?
A He complained about the supreme military leaders. He alone was the one who forced rearmament through. The supreme loaders had always said it was going too fast. In the occupation of the Rhineland, he charged the leaders with a certain cowardice when they asked for withdrawal of the troops behind the Rhine because France was not taking up a threatening attitude.
Q In this talk was the secession of Fritsch discussed? I refused him, in the name of the Army, He then suggested General von Brauchitsch, whose appointment I approved in the name of the Army. planned march into Austria? edebration, and it was only there that I learned of the actual occupation of Austria.
Q He were the commanders-in-chief informed of intentions?
Commander-in-Chief, von Brauchitsch, but he was only allowed to tell us what concerned us.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should now like to examine the witness on affidavits 3 and 5 of Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Blaskowitz. They are USA 536 and 537, and they are in the first document books of the prosecution. affidavits in the paragraphs in question agree, word for word, although they were made on various days by different persons. BY DR. LATERNSER: and Colonel General von Blaskowitz, they say that the group of German staff officers considered the solution of the Polish question by war necessary, which, was the reason for secret armament. Is this true?
Q What is meant by staff officers? and colonel. Then colic the generals. part against Poland was indispensable, that is not true. On the other hand, if he means that we had to expect an attack from Poland at any time, I can say that in the first years after the World War, I counted on this possibility. That is the reason for the border protection and fortifications on the eastern border of the Reich against Poland. But as I said, no sensible person though of a war of aggression. We were in no position for such a war.
Q General von Blaskowitz then, at the end of this affidavit No. 5, USA Exhibit 537, says that the front commanders in chief were the actual supervisors in the OKW, and as an example gives the battle of Kudno. Is this true?
A This is not true. The commanders in chief never played a supervisor role. Only our commander in chief of the army was the one who had to give advice to the supreme authorities. As for the battle of Kudno, advice to Hitler was absolute nonsense. The orders for the battle of Kudno I gave as commander in chief of army group west according to the instructions which I had from General von Brauchitsch and General von Blaskowitz only had to obey orders and could not have given any advice to Hitler. That must be a mistake. on you -- the conference at the Obersalzberg? taking would end just like the so-called Sudeten war in 1938. That is primarily because Russia was on our side. When on the 26th of August suddenly the movement was stopped, and on the first of September was to begin again, we said, "Aha, that is a bluff, just like in 1938." We did not take the decision for war seriously. commanders? Did you exchange ideas on the impressions created by this discussion?
about it. I left the Obersalzberg very quickly. I talked to von Harms to in and later with my staff and exchanged the same opinion which I have just mentioned.
Q Did you have knowledge of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station? Norway?
Q How about the entry into Yugoslavia and Greece? of the necessity of attacking the Soviet Union?
Q What was told you about Soviet deployment? preparations for the Russians I had no knowledge whatever. At the conference to our surprise, we were told that the Russians were very strongly armed, were preparing to attack us. If I am not mistaken, information from the Japanese military attache was referred to, and a map of the Russian distribution of forces on the borders of Poland was shown to us, so that we had to assume that these facts were true.
Q Was this impression confirmed after the entry?
A Yes. The resistance at the border was not too great. It became stronger more and more in the interior. Very strong tank forces of a better type far superior to ours appeared and an enormous number of airfield troops. Newly built roads were found and maps were also fund, showing German territory such as Silesia, so that we had the impression that Hitler must have been right. order. What was your attitude toward this order?
A Our attitude was unanimously against it. Immediately after the conference we approached Brauchitsch and said that this was impossible.
Our commanders in chief of the armies were of the same opinion. The order was simply not carried out, and as I learned later, the order was later rescinded. General von Brauchitsch, to make this order more or less inactive, issued a very strict order on the correct conduct of German soldiers in the coming war. He issued this order to the troops. I know of no case in which this order was. used in any way.
Q. At this conference was the intention announced to remove the Jewish population in the East?
A No. Hitler would never have expressed such intentions to officers.
Q. According to the Russian Prosecution, in November 1941, in Kiev 33,000 Jews are said to have been shot. Where was the army of Army Group West in November, 1941? east of Kharkov. The limits of the army district was east of Kiev and along the Dnieper. Beyond that was civilian administration. command? any powers outside of this district?
Q Was the operational area kept as small or as large as possible? the first place, so that the army would have as little to do with affairs in the rear, and also so that the civilian district of the Ukraine would be as large as possible and would be removed from the influence of the army.
Q And now for the commando order. What was your attitude toward the commando order? and in oral discussions with our staff made it ineffective. order was applied?
asked about it here in Nuremberg also knew of no case. I must assume that this commando order had not been in effect on the enemy, for I know of no case in which any commando undertaking took place aside from the island of Sar* but where we took no prisoners.
Q What side committed offenses?
Q Now, the invasion came, or it was expected. Document 531 PS showsthat you wished to have the Commando Order rescinded. For what reason? as for as Paris, had to be expected. The distinction between commando troops would not have been possible. In addition, it was a good opportunity finally to receive this order, all the more, since the majority of the new division did not have it. obeyed up to that time. How about that?
A I had to express it in that way. I had evaded the order. I could not say, "I have not carried out the Commando Order." It was an excuse which had to be made.
the resistance movement in France. what agencies were responsible for peace and order in the occupied territories in France? responsible. South France had a special general who worked closely with Petain. The resistance movement in southern France became stronger and it became a great threat for the troops fighting on the Mediterranean, In the winter of 1943 and 1944, the Commander-in-Chief was made responsible for the southern part of France. Thereupon I appointed a special general in Lyons. He was under the command of the Army Group Gustav at Toulon. He was responsible for creating order in the South of France.
Q Was the French Government and the French population warned? movement with all its strength, The warnings to the French People were always. submitted to the French Government for examination, first. When the invasion threatened, I, personally, asked the old gentleman to speak himself on the radio to warn his people not to do such things in his own interests. He promised to do so. Whether he did, I do not know.
Q Were these warnings observed?
A Unfortunately, no. Finally the French Police, whom we had armed better to combat the movement, even went over to the enemy, that is to the revolutionists.
AAs far as we could. For example, full bombs were never destroyed from the air. Single planes were sent against single places of resistance. Mass uses of artillery, tanks, did not take place. The excesses such as at Oradur, we regretted greatly. At that time, I immediately demanded a report since I could not order a judicial investigation. I reported this unfortunate occurrence to the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.
Q Why could you not order a judicial investigation?
A The troop units of the SS were subordinate only to Himmler. I had no disciplinary power nor judicial power over them. I could not give them leaves or issue awards. I was responsible only for the technical employment of these divisions, much as I might use an Italian, Hungarian or Slovakian Division.
Q Was the legality of the resistance movement recognized?
A General Eisenhower and De Gaulle declared it by radio. We inquired of the High Commander of the Wehrmacht as to their attitude. Only after the allied troops had landed on the Mediterranean coast was it recognized.
Q What is your attitude toward illegal warfare? feeling: Behind the front of the enemy army, unregulated war is started which brings great misery on the population of the country in question. No army in the world can, in the long run, permit such a thing. In the interest of its own security and possibility of existence, it must take sharp energetic measures. My comrades and I sharply condemn that. We did not like to see the attempted German Weirwolf movement. If it had been carried out, it would have brought enormous misery on our Fatherland, unjustly. I would consider it good fortune for humanity if through international agreement for the future, such illegal wars were made impossible. That is my point of view. French population during the war?
A I can speak only briefly on that point. I cannot give many detail. Marshal Petain, with whom I had a very confidential relationship, did everything to help. I asked Hitler what position France was to have in the future Europe. I tried to create a new army form. Unfortunately it did not become more than a regiment. The French railroad men who were in charge of all our transports, I introduced measure to give them more food and I tried to get back their relatives who were prisoners of war. This was just after the Dieppe undertaking. It was approved. We did what we could to supply the city of Paris with coal and food, and a transportation situation which was almost unbearably poor for us Germans, militarily. These are the main points.
Q I should like, to ask one other question: In the last few days, a witness said that from 1944 on, the concentration camps were manned by soldiers from all branches of the Wehrmacht. How do you explain this?
A I know nothing about that. Himmler was Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army. He could issue such an order. If he did issue it, my feeling is that he wanted to charge the Army with all these incidents. offensive. Before or during this offence, was an order issued to shoot prisoners?
A Such an order was not given by Hitler. On the contrary, he considered it important to take as many prisoners as possible in the offensive. A subordinate military office is said to have issued such an order. I consider that impossible. That is contrary to our ideas.
Q Did you not oppose this offensive?
A I opposed the offensive for the following reasons: The operational ideas can almost be called a stroke of genius, but absolutely all condition for the possible success of an offensive were lacking. Field Marshal Mode and I suggested attacking the American troops cast of Aachen from several sides. Then one could think over what to do next. These suggestions were not listened to by anyone. We had inadequate forces on the ground and in the air. It was thought we could only fail.
Q Did you oppose Hitler on other occasions also?
A Not Hitler personally, because I had no opportunity to do so; but to his staff I repeatedly objected to measures ordered from above, especially in the case of the Normandy invasion and the Ardennes offensive after it failed and operations in Holland. All of those undertakings were in vain.
Q When did you consider the war lost?
A In my opinion the war could not be went after Stalingrad. I considered the war lost after the Allies succeeded in establishing a strong beachhead on French soil. Then it was finished. continuation of this war?
to change the conduct of the war or to put an end to it, especially for a change in the evacuation, a withdrawl on the front to the German border; and as could not otherwise be expected, these suggestions were not listened to. bringing about a violent overthrow?
A I would never have entertained such thoughts. That would have been absolute treachery, and could not have changed the facts. The army and the population still believed in Hitler at that time. Such an overthrow would not have been successful; and even if I, perhaps with the aid of the allies, had brought about an overthrow, the conditions of the German people, according to the statement of the Big Three, would have been exactly the same as it is now, and I would have been considered for all tire as a traitor to my fatherland.
Q You lost your position three times during the war. What were the reasons? above, which would have led to the destruction of the entire Kleist Panzer Army near Rostov. I objected to it, and asked for the recall of the order, because otherwise I would have considered that there would be no confidence in my leadership. I asked that another commander be selected. And thereupon in the light of my request as such, I was removed from my post on the 1st of February. That was the first case. letter, because of the state of my health, I was replaced by another commander.
The third case was on the 9th of March, 1945. I could not be expected, as an old general, to continue to perform the duties of the commander-in-chief.
Q And you found one of these cases against the will of Hitler?
A In the first case one could say so. But he did not hold it against me for in the following March I was made commander-in-chief in France.
Q Now I come to the last question. You know, Field Marshal, that the Prosecution has asked that the military leaders should be declared criminals. As a general officer of the German Army, you know the attitude of these leaders toward international law.
Please tell the Court about it briefly. Convention and the Hague Rules on Land Warfare were always binding on us older leaders. Their strict observance by the troops was demanded, and steps were taken against excesses which appear in war in all armies., The court-martial records of the various divisions can give information on this point. Property of the inhabitants was to be protected against plundering; strict punishments were given out to keep up discipline. Severe punishments were also declared against atrocities. war was done as far as possible. The wounded or conquered enemy was no longer considered such, but had a claim to decent treatment. Despite our effort to be chivalrous, We old officers who had lived through the cavalry, infantry and bayonet battles saw with regret the increasing mechanization of warfare. Today the greatest man is helpless against the force of material. All the more were we leaders of the opinion that while there was fighting on land, the old forms of battle should be maintained, and this had to be told to the troops again and again.
As senior soldier of the German Army, I will say this. We accused leaders were trained in the old tradition of the soldier, the old chivalrous traditions. We lived according to them, and endeavoured to pass then down to the younger officers. DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. BY MR. CALVACORESSI: close touch, must he not, and know the opinions of his immediate subordinates, is that right?
A That is not necessary to that extent. My subordinates only had to know my operational and tactical, opinion. They were free as army leaders within their sphere. given by your former commander-in-chief. The translators already have it. It is on page 2 of Affidavit No.4:
"During operations, the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with Army Groups by means of telephone, radio and code. The commander-in-chief of the army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them."
Is that, generally speaking, correct?
A That is absolutely correct. And another thing concerning the conduct of the war -- that is, operations and tactical actions -- is that such an exchange also took place from the army groups to the commander-in-chief of the
Q I shall read you one more sentence. From the evidence that has been given by Colonel General Blaskowitz. He has said -- and I want you to tell me whether you agree with this -- that it was common practice that the commanders of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of a situation, and for their recommendations, by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as by personal records.
A It is not quite true that they had to. They could.
Q Now I have sons questions on the Russian campaign. You yourself at a conference with Hitler and your Army colleagues raised a question of a gap which existed between your army group and that of Field Marshal von Bock is that right? was shown as swamp land, it could be used by troops; and you therefore offered advice about the steps that should be taken to prevent its exploitation by the enemy? Russia, the Russians could operate unhampered in this swamp area, and for that reason it would be practical for German troops to be moved through this area. This suggestion was not listened to. As the operations later showed, the Russians had strong forces in the area, and from there they constantly threatened the left wing of my army.
Q Yes. I am not concerned with whether the advice was listened to or not. But you agree that you offered it?
Fuehrer in the description of the intended operation which occurred to me. But that war not advice. a certain amount, and that was the meeting which took place -- I think it was the house of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch -- May, 1938, when there was a question of seizing the Sudetenland. Is it not a fact that at that conference von Brauchitsch asked for the opinion of you and your fellow officers on the proposals which Hitler had laid before you? Staff von Beck had drawn up, which warned against a war over the Sudetenland. It was to be submitted to Hitler later by von Brquchitsch. We were asked for our opinion on this memorandum, and we were unanimously of the opinion that war should hot be waged. war that was likely to happen at that time, if Hitler had his way, should not be waged at that time in that way? to wage this war if France, England, and America would possibly be our enemies. That was the basic thought of the people. We could have dealt with Czechoslovakia but never if the countries just mentioned had turned to the aid of Czechoslovakia. And Hitler was to be warned against this. Beck to support himself in the objections which he proposed to make to Hitler, Brauchitsch assembled a circle of leading generals who were of the same opinion as himself? That strengthened his hand, did it not?
A Yes; one could say that. been given by Generaloberst Book?
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a convenient time to break off?
MR. CALVACORESS: Yes, My Lord.
(The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours of the same day.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 12 Aug. 1946) BY MR. CALVACORESSI: little or no knowledge of such moves as the occupation of the Rhineland and the seizure of the Sudetenland is that correct? knowledge; regarding the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1939, I had no previous knowledge, either. I was inactive at the time, retired. 1938 and the outbreak of the war in 1939? 31st of October, 1933, I was Supreme Commander of Group I, Berlin. And then I was retired. such time as you held the post, and when you received little or no information about what was going on, you were not a member of the indicted group, as defined in the indictment? that time active in a different theater of war, is that right? Supreme Commander of Army Group A stationed at Koblenz of the West. OKH; but of the OKW?
AAbout that I can't give you any information, whether it was a matter for the navy or a matter for the OKW.
Q Now, in general, before the war, you would say your picture is: the generals who left alone to occupy themselves with training exercises and the training of a relatively snail details and units. Is that a fair summary of the evidence you gave before the commission?
A That probably is a misunderstanding. The training exercises were a matter for the divisional commanders and commanding generals, and only Colonel General Von Fritsch asked the Supreme Commanders that they too should concern themselves with smaller details, as I lock at it. rapidly expanding, you say that the problem of defense came first in the minds of the military leadership of Germany?
A That I didn't quite understand. Did you say the borders of Germany were expanding? They didn't do that. It was only in 1938 through the Sudeten affair and until -the outbreak of the war with Poland? time were defensive exercises, defensive maneuvers? '36, I was pensioned. Whether and to what extent exercises were carried out in '38, '39, that I don't know. I understand it, you spoke of these as simply defensive exercises?
A Yes. These were the maneuvers in '36 and 1937. During the latter, myself, as an army commander, was leading a party against an enemy attack against Germany. held with stukas and other weapons at Groenika in Spain?
AAbout that, I can't give you any information because the rearmament in 1933 or '36 had been concluded; and in my opinion, after that the air force introduced stukas, that I don't know. At any rate, at that time any type of weapon was justified to my feeling within the rearmed Army.
Q We will pass on to another point. You told us that German officers were severely aloof from politics? the name of General von Segt?
A General Von Segt was taking; the greatest care in the Reichswehr that no officer was concerning himself with political matters. What he himself did politically, that is another chapter, and about that, I cannot give you any information. determined to keep the army out of politics is the fact that at the time when he took over there had just been the Kapt Putsch?
A That I don't believe. It is a very ancient Prussian tradition that an officer does not concern himself with politics. And Colonel General Von Segt was as loyal a man as possible both as far as the Reich Kapt Putsch as well as the left, as far as the Communists were concerned, and to the constitution supporting the weimar Government. That was cur general conception. you that this whole Prussian policy was revised and insisted upon by Von Segt because as a result of Kapt Putsch, he saw how important it was to keep the army out of entanglements with incompetent politicans?
A That is entirely my view. All the more since Hitler Putsch in 1923 placed the army in a very difficult position because the Bavarian division was commencing to detach itself from Segt.
Q Now, Rapt was a failure, wasn't he? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the republic?
A No. Segt never tried to overthrow the republic.