12 Aug M LJG 4-4 Cumoletti
THE PRESIDENT: Where is he?
GENERAL ALEXANDROV: I can find that out and I can report on it. The former Major General Walter Schreiber is now in the Soviet Union as a Prisoner of War. If the Tribunal thinks it necessary to have Walter Schreiber testify Lore as a witness in connection with the request of the defense, the prosecution will not object.
DR. LATERNSER: It is my opinion that for such a serious statement, he should be here.
THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, could you inform the Tribunal how long it would take to get this witness, Walter Schreiber, brought here for the purpose of cross-examination ?
GENERAL ALEXANDROV: We shall take all measures to get the witness here in the minimum possible time, but I cannot guarantee or state the number of days, since the distance is rather great. I would like the tribunal to take into consideration the great distance, however, I do request, regardless of the fact whether the witness is brought here or not, the permission of the Tribunal to have this Document presented in the cross examination.
DR. LATERNSER: I beg to be allowed to define my attitude to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you can make your objections if you wish to do so new and the Tribunal will consider the Document when they adjourn. We don't propose to allow the Document to be presented now at this moment. We will consider the matter when we adjourn.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely wish to say that I beg the Tribunal to decide that the Document not be read unless I can have Walter Schreiber as a witness here.
THE PRESIDENT: Your application is that the Document should not be admitted unless the witness is brought here for further examination ?
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to go even further, Mr. President, and apply that the reading of the Document should not be permitted unless the witness is brought here, so that the witness himself can say before the Tribunal what he certified to in the Document.
GENERAL ALEXANDROV: Permit me. Mr. President, to object to the statements of the defense. It seems to me that the affidavit of Walter Schreiber should have its place here and be used during the present cross-examination as it does not have any direct relationship as to whether Walter Schreiber will or will not appear here as a witness. His affidavit is certified by the Extraordinary State Commission, which is the Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Government. It seems to me that regardless of what the Tribunal may decide about calling Walter Schreiber here, that the Document which is submitted here as U.S.S.R. 510 should be accepted here for the purposes of my cross-examining this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: No, General Alexandrov, the Tribunal has said that they will not admit the Document here at this stage. We propose to adjourn at 11:30 and will then consider the application. I observe that the application was made in April of 1946.
GENERAL ALEXANDROV: The matter of bringing the witness here has not been considered up to now, but if the Tribunal commands me not to use the Document, I will not be able to ask the witness the question which arises out of the affidavit of Walter Schreiber.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you may ask him the question after the Tribunal had decided on the admissibility of the Document, if it is decided to admit the Document. You can ask him the question then, but he has already said he knows nothing of biological warfare.
GENERAL ALEXANDROV: He does not know the facts which appear in the affidavit of Dr. Schreiber. Until that is decided, I have no further questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination ? BY DR. LATERNSER: Quarter Master General Wagner, about which the question was put to you, namely, that prisoners should not be fed from supplies belonging to the armed forces. I would like to ask if Colonel General Holder, in particular, on the occasion of his visit to the front at Orcha had in fact ordered that the food supplies of the troops should be shortened in order to make it possible to feed the prisoners of war ?
A. This fact is not known to me because the conference did not take place in my headquarters. I know in the case of my army in the winter of 1941 and 1942 in the Krimea I had to reduce the rations because of the shortage of railroad transportation and also because we did not wish to strip the country of all food reserves in the interests of the population.
As far as I can recollect, at that time, we had to reduce the rations and I expressedly prohibited that the last car, which the farmers had owned on his own property should be taken away from him, even though the army needed the wheat. I also remember that when the food situation became critical during that winter, we sent supplies down to them, although there was a shortage of transport space. At the same time hundreds, in fact thousands of forces, belonging to the army went wheatless because we did not have the whe* for them.
Q. The Russian Prosecution has submitted Document USSR 155. By whom is that ordered ?
A. I don't know which one you man.
Q. I refer to Document USSR 115
A. I am afraid I do not have the number.
THE PRESIDENT: We need not waste time on that now. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. I merely want to ask by when it is signed.
A. It is signed by Adolf Hitler.
Q. Yes, that is it. You have also been questioned with regard to Paragraph 2-g in this same document., "The enemy must take ever completely useless, uninhabitable, waste territory where mine detonations will occur for months hence." Do you know, Feld Marshall, if that was carried out in that way ?
A. That I cannot say, because I was not there, it was cut of my area
Q. We are here concerned with 1943, were explosives and mines available to the troops at that time ?
A. Yes, certainly we had mines and explosives, but not to any great extent as they were certainly very short at that time. In fact, we never had enough mines to lay field mine ahead of our positions,
Q. Then, the Russian Prosecutor went on to ask you with reference to paragraph 3-c, of that document, that is :"The ruthless conscription of the civilian population -uninfluenced by any false softness - for this task, their speedy commencement of work and incorporation into construction, battalions (including female constriction battalions) must be secured".
You did not answer the question of the Russian Prosecutor, namely whether you knew that someone had introduced similar measures with reference to German women ? Did you know anything of the ruthless exploitation of Russian labor ?
A. It was not known to me that that happened during the war, but women were used and they were even used to look for insets amongst potatoes. That happened in East Prussia in 1944. I cannot say from my own personal observation as I was not there, by certainly the civilian population had nothing much to laugh about.
Q. The American Prosecution has submitted to you Document 459-PS. Will you please have a look at Figure 6 ? Are we here concerned with an instruction or an order ?
A. That is a directive, but not an order.
Q. That the measures should be enforced, as this order says, there was need for the commanding officer to pass the order on to the security police. Do you know how it was passed, on these orders ?
A. No, I cannot remember any such order that might refer to that, or which might be issued on the strength of, it.
Q. Now, we come to Document 442. I have one question regarding that. Please look at Page two and look at 2-b. Do you know if the Reichsfuehrer SS was given special tasks in the operations zone and secondly, that he was acting independently and on his own authority ?
A. Yes, that is clearly defined in that order.
Q. Then, that would mean that the is special action group, the Einsatzgruppen technically speaking would not come under the supreme command of the army?
A. No, technically, they might come under the local commander and be used in the fight against the partisans, but quite expressedly they were used in the battle zone at the front, but insofar as the supreme command was concerned, they certainly did not come under him.
Q. The Document R-102 was submitted to you -- that is a secret Reichs matter, what does that mean ?
A. A secret Reichs matter, in my opinion, signifies an order or instructions, which only goes to the highest forces in the Reich or certain personn and it was not allowed to be generally known.
Q. Would this document have been sent to all departments of the army ?
A. No, it would have to be noted on the end and it is not.
Q. So you cannot find out if this document went to all departments of the army?
A. No, that cannot be and it quite certainly did not go to the Service Department of the army because such a report was never received.
Q. During your examination last Saturday, you said that you, because of your own convictions, and the other field commanders, would have taken steps against mass shootings had they been reported to you ?
A. Yes, naturally.
Q. Is it known to you that Field Marshall Van Kuechler, during the Polish campaign, when the shooting of Jews became known to him used every means at his disposal to prevent this ?
A. That I only learned in Nurnberg. I did not knew of the shootings at the time.
Q. Is it known to you that the German National Buergermeister of Marinka had to be sentenced by court martial because of his persecution of the Jews ?
A. I cannot recollect it. If it had happened in my area, it would have been known to me.
Q. Was it known to you that General von Knobelsdorf had ordered an SS leader to be arrested when he wanted to order shootings ?
A. That I learned afterwards, I did not hear of it during the war.
Q. Do you know of any other cases where the Supreme Commanders took such steps against particularly outstanding perpetrators of war-fare action?
A. I knew that Colonel General Blaskowitz, who succeeded Field Marshal von Rundstedt as supreme commander in the East, that is in occupied Poland, objected and that there was some sort of a riot about that, whereupon he was relieved.
Q. Now, I come to the last point, regarding the subordination of the Einsatzgruppen. The American Prosecution has referred to Affidavit 12 of Schellenberg, USA Exhibit 557. You don't consider that affidavit correct, I believe, because the practice did not correspond to the order, is that correct ?
with the Quartermaster General? like that in practice, and I cannot imagine either that that was the type of agreement reached, because according to our convictions, as I have said, there was either the question of tactical subordination or the matter of supplies, accommodations, and so forth and so on. There were those two types of subordination. In the case of a battle, then there was a third possibility regarding discipline, training, and so forth, and that simply did not take place in that manner.
Q. I shall now show you the affidavit which I propose to introduce in evidence presently, from Judge General Mantel, who, fortunately, had discussed just that point with General Wagner, Following that, I should like to ask you whether the contents of the affidavit would correspond with the practice.
He states:
"Shortly before the beginning of the Russian campaign, I arrived at the headquarters of the OKH and participated in a conference with Quartermaster General Wagner was having with the Supreme Quartermasters attached to the army in the East. Among other things, Einsatzgruppen were discussed on that occasion, and the Einsatz Commandos, the SD and the operational zone of the army, and it was clearly stated that instructions for the activities would be received exclusively from the Reichsfuehrer SS, and that the command authorities of the army from the point of view of discipline and service had no jurisdiction over them, but that equally speaking, they could be attached to these."
I now want to ask you: Did the practice show that Einsatz Groups and their subordinations corresponded to the contents of that affidavit?
A Yes. Quite definitely the practice confirms the contents of that affidavit, and even Ohlendorf's statement confirms that these orders referring to Einsatz Groups at Nikolajev were given to them only orally, directly, and that army command sources had not heard of them.
heard here in Nurnberg. At the time Himmler had been to Nikolajev where the Army Supreme Command was situated, at that time under the command of General von Schobert. At that time he avoided visiting the Army Supreme Command, although he was well acquainted with Herr von Schobert. That shows that intentionally he refrained from mentioning his plans.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you so much.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to hear the submission of the Prosecution with reference to Dr. Sauter's application.
MR. DODD: I have the following statement to make to the Tribunal. I understand that the application asks for the striking of the Pohl affidavit and the permission that Funk again take the stand. I should like to oppose the application to strike the Pohl Affidavit. It seems to us that it is highly material in this case and if anything, although I doubt very much that even the necessity for recalling or calling Pohl for cross-examination is necessary but if anything is necessary that might be it. The defendant funk, it seems to us, has had a rather full opportunity when he was on the stand. I asked him when he started to do business with the SS, if the Tribunal will recall, and I think I went rather fully into all possible phases at that time of relationships between the defendant Funk and the SS and there was a denial on the part of the defendant Funk. Furthermore, he will have an opportunity, I assume, in the last statement, to say something, if the Tribunal saw fit to permit it, with respect to anything new that might have arisen out of the Pohl Affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the Pohl Affidavit is entirely new, is it not
MR. DODD: Well Sir, it is new, but it really covers only one new matter and that is the matter of the textile business that we alleged went on betwhen the SS and the Reichsbank and the Defendant Funk. The matter of the Jewelry and all the other things I think were gone into.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not mean that it dealt with entirely new subject matter but it is the evidence of a new witness upon that subject matter.
MR. DODD: Yes, yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: And as to that, the defendant Funk has not had an opportunity to deny it upon oath, it may be that the Tribunal will think it right to grant him that opportunity. There are two quite distinct questions, first of all, as to whether Pohl's affidavit should be struck out, and secondly whether Funk should be called.
MR. DODD: Well I certainly do not feel that the Pohl Affidavit should be struck out because it seems to us to be material, highly material.
As the Tribunal will recall, there was considerably controversy about this relationship which we claimed between Funk and the SS. We called another witness, puhl, and still another witness who was his subordinate, and I would assume that counsel would prefer to cross-examine Pohl. We are perfectly happy to have him do that; and then at a later date, if Funk has an opportunity, as I am sure he will, to make his statement, he could make his denial I don't know what more he could say except that it isn't so and I thought he had said that rather fully when, he was on the stand and rather fully denied that he had really any relationship with Himmler or with the SS. I am also fearful, Mr. President, that if the Court permits this procedure in this case, there may have been some other instances where other defendants will want to be heard fully and the thing will go on with sur-rebuttal and I am afraid it will take much of the Tribunal's time.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Sauter, we have heard you fully upon the subject already.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I point out one fact ? This witness Pohl, arrived at the Nurnberg Prison on the 1st of June and was questioned for the affidavit on the 15th ......
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you have expressed yourself that you do not want to cross-examine him. What is the relevance of the fact that he arrived here at a certain time if you don't want to cross-examine him ?
DR. SAUTER : Mr. President, my point of view is that on principle it cannot be permitted for the prosecution to present further evidence against a defendant whose case is closed. The Witness Pohl arrived on the 1st of June and on the 15th of July, six weeks later, he was examined for the affidavit. That was the same day on which I made my final plea for the defendant Funk and again, several weeks later, the affidavit was submitted. I do not believe that this corresponds to the demands of justice, that after a case is completely closed the prosecution submits further evidence against a defendant, without the defendant having an opportunity to comment on it on the witness-stand. In the Pohl Affidavit completely new facts are alleged. For example, Pohl, says that at a dinner in the presence of ten or twelve persons, this gold tooth question was discussed.
That is something entirely new and of course completely improbable and that is why I ask, Mr. President, that you permit us to have the defendant Funk examined on this point on the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: You must understand that it is a matter for the discretion of the Tribunal at what time they will end the evidence and it is necessary that the evidence should be ended at some time. The Tribunal has heard fully what you have had to say and they will now consider the matte
DR. SAUTER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT : With reference to the application by Dr. Sauter, the affidavit by Pohl, will not be struck out. It will remain upon the record. But in view of the particular circumstances of this case, the defendant Funk may be recalled to give evidence upon the subject and he will be recalled after the evidence has been given on behalf of the Organizations.
With reference to the objection of Dr. Laternser to the use of the statement made by Major General Walter Schreiber, the Tribunal is not inclined to admit any evidence so late as this, or to reopen questions which have been gone into fully before the Tribunal; but on the other hand in view of the importance of the statement of Major General Schreiber, and its particular relevance not only to the case of certain of the individual defendants but also to the case of the High Command, the Tribunal will allow General Schreiber to be heard as a witness if he is produced before the end of the hearing of the case. Otherwise no use can be made of this statement.
brought here if he is to be heard as a witness, the Tribunal thinks that it will be proper to order that he might be heard as a witness if he is brought here at any time before the final speeches with reference to the organizations are concluded. And, of course, counsel for the organization would have an opportunity of commenting upon any evidence which General Schreiber might give. That is all.
********** Dr. Laternser, will you call your other witness?
DR. LATERNSER: With the approval of the Tribunal, I call as my last witness Field Marshal von Runstodt.
**********
GERT VON RUNSTEDT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY TIE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. LATERNSER: What was your last position?
A I was a soldier for over fifty-four years. My last position was Commander-in-Chief West, until the 9th of March, 1945.
Q During what period of time were you Commander-in-Chief in Berlin? foreign politics?
A We generals did not concern ourselves with politics. We did not take part in any political discussions, and we did not hold any political discussions among ourselves. who said, "as a servant of the nation, the Army is above all politics, and that must remain so."
Q Did the Reichswehr, in 1933, help Hitler into power? methods ?
A The generals either rejected the Party or were indifferent. As for the methods regarding the Jewish question, they absolutely rejected them, particularly because many comrades were severely affected by the Aryan laws.
The so-called "Master Race" is nonsense. Germany is a mixture of races, partly Slavic and mixed races. a chaplain in the Army up to the end. the course of the war, came into positions falling under the Indictment? anything in regard to the punishment of the murderers of Schleicher?
A No. Reich President von Hindenburg was still at the head of the State. In the second place, I was not the senior officer, We had a commander chief of the army and a minister of war, whose duty that would have been. 1935, indicate any intention or plan for wars of aggression?
A No, in no way. The big maneuvers on the General Staff or Fuehrer trips always dealt with war in our own country. to do with the declaration of Wehr Hoheit (Armed Sovereignty)?
Q Did you know Colonel General von Fritsch well?
A Very well; he was my subordinate for a time.
Q As his representative, after 1937, did he tell you of Hitler's intent to wage wars of aggression?
secret. he went on leave to Egypt. On that occasion did he tell you of Hitler's intention, contained in the minutes of the meeting of the 5th of November 1937?
A I represented Colonel General von Fritsch; his official representative was Chief of the General Staff Beck. At that time General von Fritsch did not give me or General-oberst Book any information. February, 1938, in the military field? himself and the Wehrmacht; thus, he now had command over all three branches of the Wehrmacht. He took advantage of the opportunity to dismiss higher military leaders whom he did not like. What did he tell you about the attitude of the German generals?
A He complained about the supreme military leaders. He alone was the one who forced rearmament through. The supreme loaders had always said it was going too fast. In the occupation of the Rhineland, he charged the leaders with a certain cowardice when they asked for withdrawal of the troops behind the Rhine because France was not taking up a threatening attitude.
Q In this talk was the secession of Fritsch discussed? I refused him, in the name of the Army, He then suggested General von Brauchitsch, whose appointment I approved in the name of the Army. planned march into Austria? edebration, and it was only there that I learned of the actual occupation of Austria.
Q He were the commanders-in-chief informed of intentions?
Commander-in-Chief, von Brauchitsch, but he was only allowed to tell us what concerned us.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should now like to examine the witness on affidavits 3 and 5 of Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Blaskowitz. They are USA 536 and 537, and they are in the first document books of the prosecution. affidavits in the paragraphs in question agree, word for word, although they were made on various days by different persons. BY DR. LATERNSER: and Colonel General von Blaskowitz, they say that the group of German staff officers considered the solution of the Polish question by war necessary, which, was the reason for secret armament. Is this true?
Q What is meant by staff officers? and colonel. Then colic the generals. part against Poland was indispensable, that is not true. On the other hand, if he means that we had to expect an attack from Poland at any time, I can say that in the first years after the World War, I counted on this possibility. That is the reason for the border protection and fortifications on the eastern border of the Reich against Poland. But as I said, no sensible person though of a war of aggression. We were in no position for such a war.
Q General von Blaskowitz then, at the end of this affidavit No. 5, USA Exhibit 537, says that the front commanders in chief were the actual supervisors in the OKW, and as an example gives the battle of Kudno. Is this true?
A This is not true. The commanders in chief never played a supervisor role. Only our commander in chief of the army was the one who had to give advice to the supreme authorities. As for the battle of Kudno, advice to Hitler was absolute nonsense. The orders for the battle of Kudno I gave as commander in chief of army group west according to the instructions which I had from General von Brauchitsch and General von Blaskowitz only had to obey orders and could not have given any advice to Hitler. That must be a mistake. on you -- the conference at the Obersalzberg? taking would end just like the so-called Sudeten war in 1938. That is primarily because Russia was on our side. When on the 26th of August suddenly the movement was stopped, and on the first of September was to begin again, we said, "Aha, that is a bluff, just like in 1938." We did not take the decision for war seriously. commanders? Did you exchange ideas on the impressions created by this discussion?
about it. I left the Obersalzberg very quickly. I talked to von Harms to in and later with my staff and exchanged the same opinion which I have just mentioned.
Q Did you have knowledge of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station? Norway?
Q How about the entry into Yugoslavia and Greece? of the necessity of attacking the Soviet Union?
Q What was told you about Soviet deployment? preparations for the Russians I had no knowledge whatever. At the conference to our surprise, we were told that the Russians were very strongly armed, were preparing to attack us. If I am not mistaken, information from the Japanese military attache was referred to, and a map of the Russian distribution of forces on the borders of Poland was shown to us, so that we had to assume that these facts were true.
Q Was this impression confirmed after the entry?
A Yes. The resistance at the border was not too great. It became stronger more and more in the interior. Very strong tank forces of a better type far superior to ours appeared and an enormous number of airfield troops. Newly built roads were found and maps were also fund, showing German territory such as Silesia, so that we had the impression that Hitler must have been right. order. What was your attitude toward this order?
A Our attitude was unanimously against it. Immediately after the conference we approached Brauchitsch and said that this was impossible.
Our commanders in chief of the armies were of the same opinion. The order was simply not carried out, and as I learned later, the order was later rescinded. General von Brauchitsch, to make this order more or less inactive, issued a very strict order on the correct conduct of German soldiers in the coming war. He issued this order to the troops. I know of no case in which this order was. used in any way.
Q. At this conference was the intention announced to remove the Jewish population in the East?
A No. Hitler would never have expressed such intentions to officers.
Q. According to the Russian Prosecution, in November 1941, in Kiev 33,000 Jews are said to have been shot. Where was the army of Army Group West in November, 1941? east of Kharkov. The limits of the army district was east of Kiev and along the Dnieper. Beyond that was civilian administration. command? any powers outside of this district?
Q Was the operational area kept as small or as large as possible? the first place, so that the army would have as little to do with affairs in the rear, and also so that the civilian district of the Ukraine would be as large as possible and would be removed from the influence of the army.
Q And now for the commando order. What was your attitude toward the commando order? and in oral discussions with our staff made it ineffective. order was applied?
asked about it here in Nuremberg also knew of no case. I must assume that this commando order had not been in effect on the enemy, for I know of no case in which any commando undertaking took place aside from the island of Sar* but where we took no prisoners.
Q What side committed offenses?
Q Now, the invasion came, or it was expected. Document 531 PS showsthat you wished to have the Commando Order rescinded. For what reason? as for as Paris, had to be expected. The distinction between commando troops would not have been possible. In addition, it was a good opportunity finally to receive this order, all the more, since the majority of the new division did not have it. obeyed up to that time. How about that?
A I had to express it in that way. I had evaded the order. I could not say, "I have not carried out the Commando Order." It was an excuse which had to be made.