I replied to him that I could not contradic this statements but that one defeat could not be considered the reason for the war lost and that a war was only lost if you yourself considered it lost. I went on to say that I had so many worries at my Front that ZI could not begin a lengthy discussion about these matters. Now, afterwards, it has become clear to me that several additional attempts to make contact were made in order to find out my attitude. On one occasion, General von Gersthoff visited me and, as he told me afterwards, he had letters on him from Topitz and Gertner, which he was supposed to show to me if he gained the impression that I could be signed up for a coup d'etat. Since it has always been my point of view, however, that the removal or the pushing aside of Hitler during war would lead to chaos, he never showed me these letters at all. That these were supposed to be attempts to make contact with me is something which I have only now begun to understand. I had never, therefore, made a promise to anyone to participate in such affairs
Q Did you receive any donations, any gifts?
Q When and why were you relieved of your post?
A I was relieved of my post at the end of March, 1944. The reason given to me by Hitler was that large-scale operations during which he could use me were no longer going on and that it was merely a question of tenacity now and a newman would have to occupy my position. I never believed that this was the true reason. The true reason was no doubt contained in the fact that he distrusted me too. After all he was the revolutionary and I was the old Prussian officer. Then too, as the Chief of the General Staff, General Breitler told me at the time, a continuous campaign of hatred against me was started on the part of Himmler, and all sorts of statements made, namely that a christian like I could not be faithful; that campaign of hatred presumably originated from other sources, too.
Q I shall now come to my last question, Field Marshal. When can you say against the accusation on the part of the prosecution that the military leadership should be held responsible?
A I have been a soldier for forty years. I come from a family of soldiers and I have grown up holding the military conception of a soldier.
The example most nearly relative I can think of is the old man Hindenburg. We, as young officers naturally considered the glory of war as something great and I do not wish to deny that I was proud that during this war an army was entrusted to me. But our ideal, and that applies to my comrades, too, we did not think would lie in conducting of war but we thought would be the education of our youth to honorable citizens and decent soldiers. That youth of ours went into death under our orders, millions of them. If I may say something personal, it is this: My oldest son died as an Infantry man, as a Lieutenant, when he was 18; two foster sons of min, who grew up in my house, died as officers; my best comrade in this war, my young adjutant and my young chaffeur, died. Nearly all the sons of my brothers and sisters died. That was the old soldiers, should have sent into war that youth of ours to whom our hearts belonged, goes beyond anything which even the most outstanding imagination could attribute to a man. It is possible that a man without a family and without tradition, who has a fanatical belief in a higher mission, may go beyond the limits of human law, but we, the old soldiers, purely from a human point of view, would not have been in a position to do so. We could not lead our youth into crime.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
(A recess was taken).
BY DR. GAWLIK (Counsel for the SD):
Q Mr. Witness, you have repeatedly mentioned the SD. What is your conception of the SD? framework of the SS, which came under Himmler, having special police tasks. the RSHA are being indicted, then I also want to ask you, did you understand by the SD just those organizations? known to most Germans; that is to say, that it is some sort of a special police I do not know what departments in the RSHA belonged to it, because the organization and tasks of the RSHA are unknown to me. departments in the RSHA were dealing with those tasks?
A No, I have no idea of that; nor did I interest myself in it at any time. Departments III and VI of the SD? gruppen of the SD here. Was that designation correct, or what were these Einsatzgruppen called?
A The description became clear to me only here. Previously - that is to say, as long as I was a supreme commander, -- I only knew that Higher SS and Police Leaders existed, and that sections of the SD had been given the special task of training the population. Let us say, therefore, that the conception of the Einsatzgruppen as such, as their tasks are becoming known now, only became perfectly clear to me here. the correct description of these Einsatzgruppen must have been.
A It may be, certainly. And it may be that I already know the name Einsatzgruppen. But I never thought that it was anything special. I merely considered it to be a part of the SD, which was under Himmler, and which had been given special tasks.
Einsatzgruppen A, B, C. and D?
A No. I knew nothing at all previously of Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D. And whether one of the Einsatzgruppen in my territory was called "D" or not, I cannot say today possibly. It may be or it may not be. I just do not know.
Q Did you not knew either which title Ohlendorf had?
A Ohlendorf? I cannot tell you today whether he was an SS Gruppenfuehrer or Oberfuehrer, or what.
Q No, I do not mean that. I mean, which title he had in his capacity as the leader of Einsatzgruppen D. Police, NSDAP, attached to Army Group D? at the time at all, as far as I know.
Q Do you know what designation of the armies was there?
Dr. GAWLIK. Thank you BY BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: 1938?
A May I ask you to repeat the question? I am afraid that I did not understand.
Q Did you leave the General Staff of the OKH in February, 1938?
A Whether I was a member of the OKH? Yes, yes.
Q What was your rank when you left the OKH General Staff in 1938? is it not? divisional commander?
A Yes.
of the Sudetenland, were you not?
A Yes. My position in the service in peace time was divisional commander. At that time, when the Sudetenland was actually occupied, I was temporarily chief of the General Staff of that army which was marching in through Bavaria. slovakia was occupied, were you not? Poland was being planned?
Q Where was your division situated? in Lignitz. February, 1938, until the outbreak of the war?
A No; I was only in the OKH until the Anschluss in Austria, because in order to hand over the affairs to my successor, General Halder, I remained in the OKH for a little while. very beginning, were you not, beginning in June, 1941? of General von Schubert?
Q And that was about the middle of September of 1941?
A Yes. I believe I took over command on the 21st or the 22nd of September. commanded, was situated at the extreme southern end of the front, was it not?
Q That is at the region north of the Black Sea?
Q And your headquarters, when you took command, was at Nikolajev? had some very particular ideas concerning the methods by which warfare on the Eastern Front would be carried on?
Q Yes. Hitler thought that the occupied Russian territories could best be subdued and pacified by the widespread use of terror, did he not?
AAt the time, that was not clear to me by any means. It was only during the trial that I learned that. were to be used to keep order in the occupied territories? the army at all. And I have no recollection of an order of terrible methods. either. through the OKH, could it not?
Q Will you please look at the document which is being handed to you?
BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: Your Lordship, that will be 459 PS, and the USA number will be 926. BY BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR; the OKW on the 23rd of July , 1941.
A Yes. But that, in my opinion, is a decision of the OKW, because the letter says, "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces." That is the OKW.
Q Will you explain it? This is a document mentioned by the OKW.
DR. LATERNSER: I beg to apologize, but I shall have to interrupt here. I ask that a German copy be submitted to the witness. I have just gathered from his reply that he is in the possession of an English document. BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: The witness has a German copy, I am told
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got a German copy?
THE WITNESS: Yes. A German copy is underneath. BY BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: about it.
"On the 22nd of July, the Fuehrer, after receiving the C-in-C of the Army, issued the following orders with a view to supplementing and enlarging directing Number 33." Paragraph 6? Do you find it?
Q "In view of the vast size of the conquesred territories in the East, the forces available for establishing security in these areas will be sufficient on if instead of punishing resistance by sentencing the guilty in a court of law to occupying forces spread such terror as is likely, by its mere existance, to cru every will to resist amongst the population. "The respective commanders, together with available troops, should be made responsible for maintaining peace within their areas, The commanders must find the means of keeping order within their areas, not by demanding more security forces but by applying suitable, drastic measures." Signed by the defendant Keitel.
Did such an order never reach you, Witness?
A I cannot remember the order. After all, it was long before I become the commander; and naturally not every order that was issued before I became a leader was submitted to me. At any rate, I can't recollect it.
Q At the time this order was issued, you were a corps commander, weren't you
Q Isn't it plain on the face of this order that it could only be carried out by wide distribution to troops and the leaders to all the formations? Northeastern Front, the Navy, and Air Force, and also for the securing in of the rear areas/ At that time I went ahead, and particularly in July I was partly cut off and surrounded; and that an order could be sent to me. brought to me over the entire front, that is out of the question; so that if at all then I would only ha had extracts referring to my area. But here the orders under Figure 6 were conce*--* ned with the securities of all of the rear areas; and the other corps which went ahead of the front line of the infantry armies then would have had nothing to do with these matters.
Q The order plainly is meant to apply generally over the entire front, isn't armored corps which would have gone ahead of the front and which is continous engaged in the battle with enemy forces had nothing more to do; and even if the order had been sent to me, dispatched to me, then it doesn't mean as all that it would have reached me because I remember that particularly in July when I was encircled and cut off, a very considerable portion of our supplies from headquarters, including very important documents, fell into enemy hands, so that not to the best of my ability can I remember having received this order.
In fact, I don't believe it was dispatched at all. by distributing it down to his lower formations; isn't that right? That's the only way he could carry it out?
A He didn't necessarily have to distribute it, no, because Figure. 6 after all mentioned conquered territories, that is to say, rear areas; and the armor group which I was supporting certainly had two armoured corps in the front left and would not necessarily and unconditionally have dispatched this order to the corps because the securing of the rear areas would have had to be carried out by them without the two corps. In any case the effect was done. time it was issued, didn't any of your follow generals in the other areas in the Prussian military tradition ever speak to you about this order and indicate they had received it?
A None of them has discussed the order with me. As supreme commander, for instance, one can only talk to other supreme commanders in the rear on the rare st occasions, whether they received the order, that is really something could nt tell you.
Q We'll pass from that document. Now, Hitler regarded the war on the Eastern Front as ideological war and a race conquest, didn't he? the Soviet political system, isn't that true? occupied territories should be used for our warfare.
Army had captured?
A I don't understand what you mean exactly by "a new system." That is, referring to industries, or what are you referring to? administration. of administration under the Soviet Government, didn't he? was diffirent from the Soviet system, so we made these necessary attempts to establish the administration. that would operate peaceably so the territory could be exploited, Hitler was very anxious to stamp out those parts of the population who would oppose his aims, wasn't he, those elements in the population?
A I don't know whether that was his plan from the start. At any rate, When the military, were never told of the plan.
Q In order to help in carrying out these plans, didn't the OKW issue several orders to the commanding generals that were quite extraordinary? I reference among other things, to the Commissar order that you have mentioned. who, shall we say, were of the Soviet and had been carrying on the were beyond the military into the ideological sphere. That has nothing to do, therefore, with the extermination of portions of the population, being the removal of a certain class of followers of enemy armed forces.
Q I refer also to Hitler's well-known order of the 13th of May, 1941, which restricted the use of courts-martial in cases where German soldiers committed crimes against the civilian population. Wasn't that part of this same plan? but we didn't follow that plan. As I said, we, on the basis of the order from the supreme commander of the Army, employed cur legal system in order to prevent perpetuation of this system and I mentioned to you the example of the two instances.
orders very well known to you and the other commanding generals on the Eastern Front?
A No, any further purpose of that order was not known to us; for instance, the purpose of exterminating people. In fact, that thought never struck us at the time. would be most likely to oppose their economic and political aims in occupied territory?
AAbout that I didn't worry at the time. I didn't worry about the economic plans by terrorists nor the political plan from which they were excluded. I could only say that we, the soldiers, had the thought that the population in occupied territories by means of a reasonable treatment should be kept quiet; and over and above that our considerations didn't so at all.
Q Whether you worried about it or not, didn't you know whi Hitler and the other political leaders thought were the elements in the Soviet population most likely to be obstructive? I'm asking you; didn't you know?
A We didn't consider that they were enemies as damaging as Hitler. He considered them to be our enemies, that in natural; and that was expressed by him in the Commissar order. However, apart from the Commissar order what was the meaning of destroying and decimating such elements, I don't know, I told you we never received an order to that effect.
Q Didn't he also think the Jews should be exterminated for exactly the same reasons
A That may be; but, for instance, with me he did not on any occasion discuss the Jews.
Q You didn't know anything about that?
Q I'd like to ask you a few more questions about the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos. Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that one of the most important missions of those units was to assist in exterminating the Commissars and the Jews in accordance with these policies?
A. That I do not know.
Q. Was there an Einsatzgruppe attached to your Army, the Eleventh Army ?
A. Yes. It was Rudolph Hess's Einsatzgruppe operating in the area of my army.
Q. I think you told us earlier that the Einstzgruppe was entirely under the orders of Himmler for operational purposes. I think you also told us that Himmler was a bitter enemy of the Army. What did you do when you learned there was an Einstzgruppe attached to the Army ? What were you told about it ?
A. At that time it was reported to me than an organization in the operation zone was investigating the population from a political point of view, and that the orders for that had one Himmler to them. I could not do anything against that because I could not possibly assume that these units of the SS were following criminal tasks.
Q. Is the Commander-in-Chief pleased to have an independant unit operating in his area which he cannot order around ? Is that customary ? Do you like it ?
A. No, Of course, I do not like it, but then there were numerous other independant units, the Air Force, for instance, which aid not come under our Command in any way when we were fighting together. We had to make arrangements with them. Legally, it did not come under cur jurisdiction either. The same applied to the Economic Staff East, and the same applied to the Police. In short, we were confined to military leadership. That is the best thing that can happen to a soldier because of other matters he knows very little according to popular judgment.
Q. Did it not even arise your curiosity to have an independant unit under Himmler's orders operating in your area ? Did it not stimulate you to find out what he was doing ?
A. The task of investigating the population for their political reliability was reported to me. I have already said that I would only be at Army Headquarters for two or three days after which I went to the front. And I must say that the military fighting was occuping my time to such an extent during the entire winter when I was a commander, that there was no time to satisfy my curiousity.
Q. You talked to the Chief-of-Staff and other staff officers from time to time, did you not ?
A. The other supreme commanders I only mot when there was some conference at the OKH. I talked to my general staff, naturally. This question of the SD never cropped up because as far as we were concerned, it did not appear as an important question to us.
Q. Did you not ever ask your chief of staff or any staff officer to keep you very carefully informed on what these independent groups under Himmler were doing in your area ?
A. No. This group was comparatively small. It never became obvious. never became apparent. It only became apparent to us when they were supplying us with people and organizations for the partisan fights in the Krimm(Crimea) I know that my staff was negotiating with the SS leader on that occasion.
Q. I have two or three documents dealing with this matter which are already in evidence. I would like to show them to you and ask you a question about it. The first one is the affidavit Number 12, which is already in evidence. It is USA 557. The first part of this affidavit concerns matters which you probably do not know about directly. You should know about the second paragraph, certainly. This is an affidavit by Walter Schellenberg. I would like to read the following paragraphs:
"In the middle of May 1943, as far as I remember, the Chief of Amt 4, of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of the Chief of the RSHA. (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), hold discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the army (General Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the SIPO and SD within the bounds, of the Field Army during the imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send another representative, I was at that time Chief of Section E in Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt protocol to be sent to Heydirch for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement. According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD.
I discussed the problem of this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In accordance with this Discussion I then presented him with the completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941. ly as follows: Its basis was the Fuehrer's command, mentioned at the verybeginning of the agreement, that the SIPO and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply zones by ever means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were the: set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective armies which were to take part in the campaign.
The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in detail:
1) in front-line areas : in complete subordination to the Field administratively;
2) in rear operational in merely administrative subordination areas:
to the Field Army, but under the command and functional control of the RSHA;
3) in rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2;
4) in areas of the civil East:
same as in the Reich. line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification,
THE PRESIDENT: This is already in evidence, so we do not need the details.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: It is in evidence. It was never read before I have just one more paragraph I would like to read with your permission.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: "The agreement made it clear that the administrative subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of supply (Gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the communications network". That is all that needs to be read, Your Honor. BY BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR:
Q. Witness, is it not true that the Army made it possible for these Einstzgruppen and Einstzkommandos to operate; that you furnished them with the supplies and transports and other things they had to have to carry out their mission ?
A. Yes. Certainly we had to do that because of the economic contribution the SS made to cur Army.
Q. Is it not also true, that the Commanding Generals, had to keep track of what these units were doing so that their operations would not interfere With military operations ?
A. No. Actually the commanding general would not have to bother with the Einsatz groups unless they appeared at the front and I, as Commanding General as I have told you, did not meet such an Einstazgruppe in my zone.
Q. Have you told the Tribunal it was only at the front where military operations could be distrubed ? Is it also true rear areas are also import were you not concerned about the rear area, too ?
A. we were interested in securing our supply in the rear area. Roads and rails were important. A disturbance there could only have taken place if, for instance, through mass execution or some such matter as it is now becoming apparent that these things have happened, there was disquiet amongst the population. The commanders of the rear areas would have heard about this, and they would have interferred.
135. May I call your attention to paragraph 2, sub-division A, beginning with "The area of operations." Do you see that?
Q I would like to read two paragraphs:
"The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and armies.
"b) "In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the striggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of those tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independantly and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the army (OKW) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibilty of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operatic shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS." your headquarters to make sure that the operations staff group did not interfere with military operations and that you must have kept yourself fully informed on what they were doing? Commanders would have to be informed, but the fact that the political police were supervising occupied area and in that occupied area the political reliability of people was being investigated is by no reasons means for an assumption that there were mass shootings or that there were shootings at all were taking place in this area. The political supervision by political police is an affair which must exist in every occupied territory. ings in your area, is that right? You did not know of any?
would like to read two paragraphs from the last page of the translation. I think the two paragraphs in question are marked in your copy. They are on pages 17 or 18. You will see the original report covering the activities of the Einsatzgruppe in the U. S. S. R. during the month of October and it covers the activities of all four Einsatzgruppes, including group B. which was attached to your army. The section beginning on page 16 relates to the activities of the Einsatzgruppes C and D, which were in the Ukraine. Undo that you will note Paragraph B, which is headed "Arrests and executions of communists and Officials." Do you find that?
Q I quote: "The search for leading communists resulted in the arrest of Kaminski, former GPU chief of Cherson. In the years 1919/21 he had carried out the liquidation of the Czarist officers. The head of the prison work shops of the NKVD was also caught.
"In Kiev a number of NKVD officials and political commissars were rendered innicuous."
"The next sub-head (c). The first two paragraphs relates to cities outside your area I believe. Then there is a paragraph which deals with Cherson. Cherson is about 40 miles from Nikolajev, would you say that 60 Killometers would be right Q. "I quote:
In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area of the Dnjepr the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up energetically by the task forces of the security Police and the SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of Jews. In the course of this action 4891 Jews were liquidated, At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1000 persons." of this Einsatzgruppe under your army? received the report about the shooting of the Jews there, nor did I receive a report of the arrest of the G.P.U. man Kaminski. I remained in that section only until about the 24th of September then I moved to my command post in the Nogar Steppe, which is much further east.
As far as the liquidation of Jews east of the Dnieper is concerned, I know that my army had not been at that operational zone. In our territory most of the population were German militarists as the population had been taken away by the Russian Army. Therefore, the liquidation of Jews could not have taken place at all as there were no Jews there and mere than 4,000 could not have been liquidated, That was the operational zone for the fourth Army. tions to the troops to liqudate the Jews and Commissars?
Q Did General Reichenau issue such an instruction?
A No. I only know of one order of Reichenau, which has been brought up in court, where he discussed the fighting in the east and by Hitler's order it was sent as an example. I personally turned down the order and therefore sis not apply it in any way and I know of no other supreme Commander who used the order revenge on Jews and all elements of Bolshevism, did it not?
A No, I did not know and. I consider it out if the question that he did order that. like General "Reichenau's order?
A "It was not suggested to me. He had it sent to us by order of the fuehrer. I considered the special order as quite wrong because I was interested in the military fight end no other type of fighting.
Q So you did not do anything about it? I will now ask that the Witness be shown document 4046-PS USA 927. Will you look at this document, witness, and tell us if this is not a document issued from your headquarters and signed with your facsimile signature, it is dated November 20, 1941?
A I shall first look at the Document. I do not recollect the contents of it.
Q Is that your signature?
I gave it or not. Ref. IC id the intelligence office, is it not? but it has nothing to do with these matters.
Q. And just below there is a stamp of the 72nd Division, 27 November 1941, Diary Number 10, and at the left it appears to have been issued by Army High Command 11 at Army Headquarters, 20 November 1941. Secret.
"Since 22.6 the German people is engaged in life and death struggle against the Bolshevist system.
"This struggle is not being carried on against the Soviet Armed Forces alone in the established form laid down by European rules of warfare.
"Behind the front too, the fighting continues. partisan snipers dressed as civilians attack single soldiers and small units and tru to disrupt our supplies by sabotage with mimes and infernal machines. Bolshevists left behind keep the population freed from Bolshevism in a state of unrest by means of terror and attempt thereby to sabotage the political and economic pacification of the country. Harvests and factories are destroyed and the city population in particular is thereby ruthlessly delivered to starvation.
"Jewry constitutes the middle man between the enemy in the rear and the still fighting remainder of the Red Armed Forces and the Rod leadership. More strongly than in Europe it holds all the key positions in the political leadership and administration, controls trades and guilds and further forms the nucleus for all unrest and possible uprisings.
"The Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all. Never again must it encroach upon our European living space.
"The German soldier has therefore not only the task of crushing the military potential of this system. He comes also as the bearer of a racial concept and as the avenger of all the cruelties which have been perpetrated on him and on the German people.
"The fight behind the lines is not yet being taken seriously enough. Active cooperation of all soldiers must be demanded in the disarming of the population, the control and arrest of all roving soldiers and civilians and the removal of Bolshevist symbols.
"Every instance of sabotage must be punished immediately with the severest measures and all signs thereof must be reported.
"The food situation at home makes it essential that the troops should as far as possible be fed off the land and that furthermore the largest possible stocks be placed at the disposal of the homeland, particularly in enemy cities a large part of the population will have to go hungry. Nevertheless nothing which the homeland has sacrificed itself to contribute may, out of a misguided sense of humanity, be given to Prisoners or to the population--so long as they are not in the service of the German Wehrmacht.
"The soldier must appreciate the necessity for harsh punishment of Jewry, the spiritual bearer of the Bolshevist terror. This is also necessary in order to nip in the bud all uprisings which are mostly attributable to Jews.