DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have a sketch regarding the powers and responsibilities, which I have had prepared, and I should like to submit it to the Tribunal when I submit my documents. It is Mil 3. I should merely like to show this sketch to the witness in order to ask him whether the sketch is accurate and later on I shall explain the sketch and submit it to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Fieldmarshal, I am going to have a sketch, Mil 3, brought up to you a I will ask you whether that sketch is accurate and correct.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you are showing it to the prosecution no doubt.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, sir.
THE WITNESS: In my opinion, this sketch is correct. Naturally, deta regarding levels and subordination, regarding the Occupied Territories, which came under military commanders and which changed in the course of the war a at mentioned. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q But these subjects don't concern the defendant Sauckel's person ?
A. Yes, sir; that is right.
Q. In which spheres was the ideological warfare conducted by others ?
A. There you have to differentiate between two matters; outside the military conduct of the war carried out by us, the soldiers, the war way conduct with economic means; in other words, for the economic exploitation for Occupied Territories for our warfare: that is to say, in the sense of the slogan "total war". That, in my opinion, was a novelty from the point of view of international war but it wasn't a crime. The second, the ideological sphere, as such, is connected with special measures introduced against the population and carried out by other forces which in turn had nothing to do with the economic exploitation as such.
Q. What do you mean "under special methods"?
A. There are means, in the first place or, shall we say, exclusively, the methods, of the so-called "special action groups" -- "Einsatzgruppen" -- all the methods, in other words, due to Himmler's influence.
Q. Wasn't the Commissar Commando order part of that ideological fight in the military sector ?
A. The Commissar order does come under that, in my opinion, but that is the reason why we didn't carry it out. In my opinion, the commando order didn't the commando order was a reprisal, possibly subject to argument -- reprisal against a method of warfare which was new.
Q. Now, let us come to the Einsatzgruppen, special action groups, What did you knew about the tasks given to these groups ?
A. I knew about the tasks of these Einsatzgruppen that they were working to prepare the political administration. They were carrying out the politic investigations of the population in the Occupied Territories of the East and they were acting by special instructions under Himmler's responsibility.
Q. Did you ever know of the intention and the order for the extermination of Jews in other parts of the population ?
A. No, I didn't knew of that: in fact, the witness Ohlendorf said that the order was given orally and by Himmler and directly to the special action groups.
Q. When you took over the command of the 11th Army, were you informed of the existence of the special action group ?
A. When I took over the army at Nikolajev in September 1941, I was only a the army headquarters for two or three days and I then occupied an advance battle station with a small part of my staff. During these two or three day I spent at Nikolajev, the various department chiefs, with the army supreme command, informed me of their tasks. I assumed that on that occasion it was also reported to me that sections of the SD would be carrying out special tasks from Himmler in the operational zone but the organization of the Einsatzgruppen, such as it was explained to me today, certainly did not become clear to that extent at that time and their tasks in no case were certainly not.
Q. Did you personally have dealings with Ohlendorf ?
A. It may be that Ohlendorf may have reported to me on one occasion and his reports always took place towards mid-day and it is quite possible that I invited him to lunch. If he does visit me, then it was certainly only in the presence of my chief of staff, because anyone who didn't belong to the army was only received by me in the presence of my special staff. I want to add that I had already spent several weeks in prison here when one day General Westphal told me that there is Ohlendorf who maintains eh was in the Ukr ne. I asked Westphal to show him to me and I said I may have seen him once but I don't know, I don't remember. That would elucidate the type of contact which I might have had with him.
Q. Witness, Ohlendorf, has said that during the march he had talked with you and your chief of staff.
A. He couldn't have talked to me during the march at all because a supreme commander doesn't join the marches of the troops, where I might have met him. If I changed my command post, then I did do that by airplane or an ordnance officer and I travel by car. We don't march and if I do it then my chief of staff would be there because in the event of such changes, the chief of staff always remains in the old command post until the supreme commander has reach the new command post, so that at the time the leading of the army was interr ted -- it is quite out of the question, practically speaking, therefore, that Ohlendorf could have talked to me and my chief of staff during the march.
Q. Fieldmarshal, how do you explain it, that the murder of ninety thousand Jews could have escaped your attention ?
A. These ninety thousand Jews, which were quoted, were by no means murdered in my zone of command. As Ohlendorf has stated, his zone reached from Schalowitz, that is, the Carpathian Mountains to Rostov; that equals approximately twelve thousand kilometers and the rest of that consists probably from three to four hundred kilometers. In this huge zone, not only the 11th army was operating but in that area, the first armored army, the third and the fourth Roumanian army were operating; that is to say, altogether, four armies and these ninety thousand persons which are supposed to had been murdered in the course of a year, are therefore distributed over an area as large as that, an area only a small portion of which was occupied by the 11th army at the Krimm.
Q. But would have you not have had to hear about it if in the Ukraine for instance, a few hundred Jews re murdered ?
A. No, I did not have to hear of that. In that year I occupied, I think twelve or thirtheen different command posts, always in the fighting zone. When I was at my headquarters at Samalus -- it was a small village about twenty kilometers from the main city, the capitol -- practically speaking only tactical reports reached my command post and there were only one or two occasions every week when the quartermaster and the chief medical officer came to see me in order to report to me the most important matters; it has also got to be considered, that situation for us, that a supreme commander was completely taken up by the worries of battle and that was quite rightly so and only the most important points of other matters were reported to him Point two is, that our troops, nearly to the last man, in the Ukraine particularly, were being used in the battle at the Front; even our clerks were sometimes sent into battle -- for instance, all the rear area was more or less devoid of troops and only the most important supply points were guarded by troops; everything taking place outside the view points in practice never reached the ears of military sources.
Q. Have you ever received a report of the shooting of Jews ?
A. I have not received a report of the shooting of Jews, no. I once heard of the rumors.
Q. And what are we concerned with in that case ?
A. When I took over the army, which took place the day before I left the Ukraine for my command pest, it was said that the SS was out there, without details given, and were supposed to have murdered in Kischilev, In Bessarabia, sometime in the past, a few Jews by shooting them. That was a rumor about one individual case. Since I was leaving the following morning, I gave the orders to my ordnance officer that the leader of the SS was to be told in the area, where I was to be supreme commander, I wouldn't tolerate any such monkey business and since we were only concerned with the rumor and since are order of mine that an investigation should be made did not produce any witnesses who had seen it, the matter was in fact over. I was immediately joining the most serious fighting am since then, I received no further reports about the shooting of Jews.
10 Aug M LJG 5-1 Cumoletti of Jews, and the Armed forces were supposed to have participated in it. Was your Headquarters at Simfropol? I was myself at about 20 kilometers away from Simfropol. That a unit of my Army could have participated in the shooting of Jews, I consider it out of the question. Ohlendorf was perhaps speaking of Army followers, police or others like that. If an Officer of my Army had participated in anything like that, it would have meant his end. the SD, and which were taken from Jews. Do you know about that?
A That I do not know. An Army Quartermaster Officer visited me once and reported that he had obtained a large number of watches from Germany. He showed me a watch which was manufactured in Germany.
Q What was the channel of command for Einsatsgruppen? command tactically, for the purpose of fighting at the front. Or the economic subordination, an organization for the purpose of supplying food, petrol, and like that. Thirdly, subordination from the point of view of discipline, which includes also subordination for training equipment, personnel questions, discipline and legally. The latter subordination was in no case ever granted, not even for the units of the SD. Economically and tactically, subordination was possible. Economically, from the point of view of transportation and supplies, the SD did come under us. From the employment view point, it did not exist at all. It only existed in the case of medical officers for instance. A small medical division might have come under it, but from the point of employment, we were not concerned with that. From the point of view of subordination for marching and supplies, we were concerned with matters only by the Chief 10 Aug M LJG 5-2 Cumoletti Quartermaster.
A Supreme Commander would never bother about marching orders for very small units. commander, according so which, the shooting of Jews, were taking place only 21/2, to according to other testimony, 200 kilometers from the Army Headquarters, is that correct?
A No, and such an order would be complete nonsense. 21/2 kilometers from the army Supreme Command Headquarters C What sense would that mean? It would have to be outside the operational al zone. He has no right to give orders there. Such an order was not given - at least, I never gave it at any rate. Einsatzgruppen?
A Hoeppner was with the Einsatzgruppen. I was in command of a Panzer Corps. This happened during the first month of the Russian Campaign and some times the Corps was stationed 100 kilometers ahead. In my own case, the Infantry Armies which follow they were two retreating Russian armies, in a case like that where the Russians were following us so closely, that a shooting of Jews was occurring, is out of the question,
Q Do you know Colonel General Hoepper?
Q What was his attitude in regard to such actions? minded soldier. That he could have cooperated in such matters, I consider it absolutely out of the question. Apart from that, everything shows he was not taking the side of these people. gruppen, on the part of the Eleventh Army?
A Yes. The SS, SD, or the Police, furnished us as far as possible, a number of auxilliaries for our operations. For example, in the Jaila mountains of the Krimm, there were two small inaccessible parts of the mountains where there were bandit We couldn't get to them. We had no mountain troops. All that 10 Aug M LJG 5-3 Cumoletti was left was to starve these bandits, and they would try to come out and raid a village for food.
There were Tartar villages and armed Tartars. In order to reconnoiter, the SD assisted us.
THE PRESIDENT: This is going into the matter in great detail. Has it not been gone into in his evidence before the Commission?
DR. LATERNSER: Very well, Mr. Presedent. With reference to this subject, I have reached my last question and that question had not been put before the Commission, as far as I can recollect.
A They helped us. We had no personnel who could deal with that task. participated in partisan battles and they were 'decorated for that work?
A That is possible. But those were decorations for work in a battle, but not for the killing of Jews.
Q Now let's come to another point. The Armed Forces has also been accused of looting in the occupied territories, what can you tell us about that? looting, and looters were strictly prosecuted. An individual man was not allowed to requisition, only units. A unit was only allowed to requisition what was needed for feeding of the troops. In 1943 we had cooperated in the return transportation of goods which were especially needed for our warfare. By an executive order of mine that was limited to the Ukraine area, grain and a few other thing, as small quantities of cattle, could be taken. On these occasions we were not concerned and did not loot private property, but were concerned with the necessary needs.
Q Were factories dismantled by the Armed Forces? place by orders from the Economic Staff, EAST, because the exploitation of industry, did not come under the command of the Armies.
10 Aug M LJG 5-4 Cumoletti deportation of workers? of labor. During a conversation with Sauckel, he told me, upon my representations that methods of coercion were being used, that he himself was against methods of force. It had been reported to me that there had been supposedly force used. when I made inquiries of Reich Commissioner Koch, he told me it was not true, that he heard these rumors and locked into it, but that it was a bunch of lies. I had no rebutting evidence agains it. The Plenipotentiary of the Reich presented regulations to me according to which, foreign workers in Germany were to be treated in accordance with the wage scale and food scale allotted to German workers.
Q You contacted Sauckel and Koch. Were those different conversations, or were you visiting all together?
A They were different conferences. Koch once came with Rosenberg. Then I mentioned that I heard these methods of force were being used, and it was denied.
THE PRESIDENT: The conversation that occurred with Rosenberg, when did it occur?
FIELD MARSHAL VON MANNSTEIN : That I cannot remember.
THE PRESIDENT: Not the exact date; approximately?
FIELD MARSHAL VON MANNSTEIN: In 1943 Rosenberg and Koch came to visit me. It must have been, I can't say approximately, but it was around September or October, but I can't to the best of my ability give the exact date. It may have been earlier. permit all those violations of international law and law of humanity? such things. In the ideological warfare and outside my sphere of influence, it was something we did not know about. It was 10 Aug M LJG 5-5 Cumoletti taking piece outside our knowledge, and we had no power or the right to prevent it.
In all its dreadfullness, which has since been discovered, we never know of it. everything, and cooperate with everything? The military duty to obey is no doubt valid and cannot be weakened. The right or duty to disobey, does not exist with the soldier. He must obey. But there may a moral duty there some time. That moral duty would have existed in such a case as the execution of Jews. But of course, that we did not know. supreme commanders, cause Hitler to remove you in a half hour?
A That would not have been. In other cases it would have been a reason to remove us all. Apart from that, an open refusal to obediency, would have been different. At the very moment that he allows such a force to be successful, his dictatorship is ended.
Q Did the possibility exist to raise objections? possibility. He announced his decision in the speeches or means of orders, and a discussion did not exist. It was not possible.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness Las been over this subject already.
Q Did you have military influence on Hitler? listened to me up to a point. On the other hand, we had a continued chain of arguments about those matters, and my written suggestions to him, or to the chief of General Staff to put before Hitler, would fill a volume.
In decisive points of the operational leadership I probably succeeded, generally speaking, to put over my points of view. In other cases, as soon as we left the subject of military leadership, any discussion was turned down by him. On three occasions I tried, during personal talks I had with him, to get him to alter the system of the supreme military command, that is, in other words, not formally speaking but saying that actually he ought to surrender the supreme command of the armed forces.
THE PRESIDENT: What have we got to do with this? What have we got to do with these matters which are matters of strategy? The High Command is not being accused of anything in connection with strategy. BY DR. PELCKMANN: differences of opinion with Hitler? A The number of such differences was no doubt very large indeed. It becomes apparent from the following facts alone. Of 17 Field Marshals who were members of the Army, 10 were sent home during the war and 3 lost their lives in the course of the 20th of July. Only one Field marshal Managed to get through the entire war in his particular position. Of 36 Colonel Generals, 18 were returned and 5 died in the course of the 20th of July or were dishonorably discharged. Only 3 Colonel Generals survived the war in their positions.
Q Out of 36?
A Yes, out of 36. I believe there is no profession which has as many victims of conviction on its records because all these leaders were highly qualified officers, militarily speaking, and they could not have been sent away because they were incapable. They were sent home because Hitler distrusted them and also because he did not think they were hard enough in battle. with you? The witness, Gisevius, has said something about that.
A I did not become aware of that. On one occasion I received a letter from Colonel General Beck. It was in the winter of 1942, and he was discussing the strategical situation on the basis of the experience at Stalingrad. He was saying that it would hardly be possible to bring the war to a victorious end.
I replied to him that I could not contradic this statements but that one defeat could not be considered the reason for the war lost and that a war was only lost if you yourself considered it lost. I went on to say that I had so many worries at my Front that ZI could not begin a lengthy discussion about these matters. Now, afterwards, it has become clear to me that several additional attempts to make contact were made in order to find out my attitude. On one occasion, General von Gersthoff visited me and, as he told me afterwards, he had letters on him from Topitz and Gertner, which he was supposed to show to me if he gained the impression that I could be signed up for a coup d'etat. Since it has always been my point of view, however, that the removal or the pushing aside of Hitler during war would lead to chaos, he never showed me these letters at all. That these were supposed to be attempts to make contact with me is something which I have only now begun to understand. I had never, therefore, made a promise to anyone to participate in such affairs
Q Did you receive any donations, any gifts?
Q When and why were you relieved of your post?
A I was relieved of my post at the end of March, 1944. The reason given to me by Hitler was that large-scale operations during which he could use me were no longer going on and that it was merely a question of tenacity now and a newman would have to occupy my position. I never believed that this was the true reason. The true reason was no doubt contained in the fact that he distrusted me too. After all he was the revolutionary and I was the old Prussian officer. Then too, as the Chief of the General Staff, General Breitler told me at the time, a continuous campaign of hatred against me was started on the part of Himmler, and all sorts of statements made, namely that a christian like I could not be faithful; that campaign of hatred presumably originated from other sources, too.
Q I shall now come to my last question, Field Marshal. When can you say against the accusation on the part of the prosecution that the military leadership should be held responsible?
A I have been a soldier for forty years. I come from a family of soldiers and I have grown up holding the military conception of a soldier.
The example most nearly relative I can think of is the old man Hindenburg. We, as young officers naturally considered the glory of war as something great and I do not wish to deny that I was proud that during this war an army was entrusted to me. But our ideal, and that applies to my comrades, too, we did not think would lie in conducting of war but we thought would be the education of our youth to honorable citizens and decent soldiers. That youth of ours went into death under our orders, millions of them. If I may say something personal, it is this: My oldest son died as an Infantry man, as a Lieutenant, when he was 18; two foster sons of min, who grew up in my house, died as officers; my best comrade in this war, my young adjutant and my young chaffeur, died. Nearly all the sons of my brothers and sisters died. That was the old soldiers, should have sent into war that youth of ours to whom our hearts belonged, goes beyond anything which even the most outstanding imagination could attribute to a man. It is possible that a man without a family and without tradition, who has a fanatical belief in a higher mission, may go beyond the limits of human law, but we, the old soldiers, purely from a human point of view, would not have been in a position to do so. We could not lead our youth into crime.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
(A recess was taken).
BY DR. GAWLIK (Counsel for the SD):
Q Mr. Witness, you have repeatedly mentioned the SD. What is your conception of the SD? framework of the SS, which came under Himmler, having special police tasks. the RSHA are being indicted, then I also want to ask you, did you understand by the SD just those organizations? known to most Germans; that is to say, that it is some sort of a special police I do not know what departments in the RSHA belonged to it, because the organization and tasks of the RSHA are unknown to me. departments in the RSHA were dealing with those tasks?
A No, I have no idea of that; nor did I interest myself in it at any time. Departments III and VI of the SD? gruppen of the SD here. Was that designation correct, or what were these Einsatzgruppen called?
A The description became clear to me only here. Previously - that is to say, as long as I was a supreme commander, -- I only knew that Higher SS and Police Leaders existed, and that sections of the SD had been given the special task of training the population. Let us say, therefore, that the conception of the Einsatzgruppen as such, as their tasks are becoming known now, only became perfectly clear to me here. the correct description of these Einsatzgruppen must have been.
A It may be, certainly. And it may be that I already know the name Einsatzgruppen. But I never thought that it was anything special. I merely considered it to be a part of the SD, which was under Himmler, and which had been given special tasks.
Einsatzgruppen A, B, C. and D?
A No. I knew nothing at all previously of Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D. And whether one of the Einsatzgruppen in my territory was called "D" or not, I cannot say today possibly. It may be or it may not be. I just do not know.
Q Did you not knew either which title Ohlendorf had?
A Ohlendorf? I cannot tell you today whether he was an SS Gruppenfuehrer or Oberfuehrer, or what.
Q No, I do not mean that. I mean, which title he had in his capacity as the leader of Einsatzgruppen D. Police, NSDAP, attached to Army Group D? at the time at all, as far as I know.
Q Do you know what designation of the armies was there?
Dr. GAWLIK. Thank you BY BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: 1938?
A May I ask you to repeat the question? I am afraid that I did not understand.
Q Did you leave the General Staff of the OKH in February, 1938?
A Whether I was a member of the OKH? Yes, yes.
Q What was your rank when you left the OKH General Staff in 1938? is it not? divisional commander?
A Yes.
of the Sudetenland, were you not?
A Yes. My position in the service in peace time was divisional commander. At that time, when the Sudetenland was actually occupied, I was temporarily chief of the General Staff of that army which was marching in through Bavaria. slovakia was occupied, were you not? Poland was being planned?
Q Where was your division situated? in Lignitz. February, 1938, until the outbreak of the war?
A No; I was only in the OKH until the Anschluss in Austria, because in order to hand over the affairs to my successor, General Halder, I remained in the OKH for a little while. very beginning, were you not, beginning in June, 1941? of General von Schubert?
Q And that was about the middle of September of 1941?
A Yes. I believe I took over command on the 21st or the 22nd of September. commanded, was situated at the extreme southern end of the front, was it not?
Q That is at the region north of the Black Sea?
Q And your headquarters, when you took command, was at Nikolajev? had some very particular ideas concerning the methods by which warfare on the Eastern Front would be carried on?
Q Yes. Hitler thought that the occupied Russian territories could best be subdued and pacified by the widespread use of terror, did he not?
AAt the time, that was not clear to me by any means. It was only during the trial that I learned that. were to be used to keep order in the occupied territories? the army at all. And I have no recollection of an order of terrible methods. either. through the OKH, could it not?
Q Will you please look at the document which is being handed to you?
BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: Your Lordship, that will be 459 PS, and the USA number will be 926. BY BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR; the OKW on the 23rd of July , 1941.
A Yes. But that, in my opinion, is a decision of the OKW, because the letter says, "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces." That is the OKW.
Q Will you explain it? This is a document mentioned by the OKW.
DR. LATERNSER: I beg to apologize, but I shall have to interrupt here. I ask that a German copy be submitted to the witness. I have just gathered from his reply that he is in the possession of an English document. BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: The witness has a German copy, I am told
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got a German copy?
THE WITNESS: Yes. A German copy is underneath. BY BRIGADIER GENERAL TAYLOR: about it.
"On the 22nd of July, the Fuehrer, after receiving the C-in-C of the Army, issued the following orders with a view to supplementing and enlarging directing Number 33." Paragraph 6? Do you find it?
Q "In view of the vast size of the conquesred territories in the East, the forces available for establishing security in these areas will be sufficient on if instead of punishing resistance by sentencing the guilty in a court of law to occupying forces spread such terror as is likely, by its mere existance, to cru every will to resist amongst the population. "The respective commanders, together with available troops, should be made responsible for maintaining peace within their areas, The commanders must find the means of keeping order within their areas, not by demanding more security forces but by applying suitable, drastic measures." Signed by the defendant Keitel.
Did such an order never reach you, Witness?
A I cannot remember the order. After all, it was long before I become the commander; and naturally not every order that was issued before I became a leader was submitted to me. At any rate, I can't recollect it.
Q At the time this order was issued, you were a corps commander, weren't you
Q Isn't it plain on the face of this order that it could only be carried out by wide distribution to troops and the leaders to all the formations? Northeastern Front, the Navy, and Air Force, and also for the securing in of the rear areas/ At that time I went ahead, and particularly in July I was partly cut off and surrounded; and that an order could be sent to me. brought to me over the entire front, that is out of the question; so that if at all then I would only ha had extracts referring to my area. But here the orders under Figure 6 were conce*--* ned with the securities of all of the rear areas; and the other corps which went ahead of the front line of the infantry armies then would have had nothing to do with these matters.
Q The order plainly is meant to apply generally over the entire front, isn't armored corps which would have gone ahead of the front and which is continous engaged in the battle with enemy forces had nothing more to do; and even if the order had been sent to me, dispatched to me, then it doesn't mean as all that it would have reached me because I remember that particularly in July when I was encircled and cut off, a very considerable portion of our supplies from headquarters, including very important documents, fell into enemy hands, so that not to the best of my ability can I remember having received this order.
In fact, I don't believe it was dispatched at all. by distributing it down to his lower formations; isn't that right? That's the only way he could carry it out?
A He didn't necessarily have to distribute it, no, because Figure. 6 after all mentioned conquered territories, that is to say, rear areas; and the armor group which I was supporting certainly had two armoured corps in the front left and would not necessarily and unconditionally have dispatched this order to the corps because the securing of the rear areas would have had to be carried out by them without the two corps. In any case the effect was done. time it was issued, didn't any of your follow generals in the other areas in the Prussian military tradition ever speak to you about this order and indicate they had received it?
A None of them has discussed the order with me. As supreme commander, for instance, one can only talk to other supreme commanders in the rear on the rare st occasions, whether they received the order, that is really something could nt tell you.
Q We'll pass from that document. Now, Hitler regarded the war on the Eastern Front as ideological war and a race conquest, didn't he? the Soviet political system, isn't that true? occupied territories should be used for our warfare.
Army had captured?
A I don't understand what you mean exactly by "a new system." That is, referring to industries, or what are you referring to? administration. of administration under the Soviet Government, didn't he? was diffirent from the Soviet system, so we made these necessary attempts to establish the administration. that would operate peaceably so the territory could be exploited, Hitler was very anxious to stamp out those parts of the population who would oppose his aims, wasn't he, those elements in the population?
A I don't know whether that was his plan from the start. At any rate, When the military, were never told of the plan.
Q In order to help in carrying out these plans, didn't the OKW issue several orders to the commanding generals that were quite extraordinary? I reference among other things, to the Commissar order that you have mentioned. who, shall we say, were of the Soviet and had been carrying on the were beyond the military into the ideological sphere. That has nothing to do, therefore, with the extermination of portions of the population, being the removal of a certain class of followers of enemy armed forces.
Q I refer also to Hitler's well-known order of the 13th of May, 1941, which restricted the use of courts-martial in cases where German soldiers committed crimes against the civilian population. Wasn't that part of this same plan? but we didn't follow that plan. As I said, we, on the basis of the order from the supreme commander of the Army, employed cur legal system in order to prevent perpetuation of this system and I mentioned to you the example of the two instances.
orders very well known to you and the other commanding generals on the Eastern Front?
A No, any further purpose of that order was not known to us; for instance, the purpose of exterminating people. In fact, that thought never struck us at the time. would be most likely to oppose their economic and political aims in occupied territory?
AAbout that I didn't worry at the time. I didn't worry about the economic plans by terrorists nor the political plan from which they were excluded. I could only say that we, the soldiers, had the thought that the population in occupied territories by means of a reasonable treatment should be kept quiet; and over and above that our considerations didn't so at all.
Q Whether you worried about it or not, didn't you know whi Hitler and the other political leaders thought were the elements in the Soviet population most likely to be obstructive? I'm asking you; didn't you know?
A We didn't consider that they were enemies as damaging as Hitler. He considered them to be our enemies, that in natural; and that was expressed by him in the Commissar order. However, apart from the Commissar order what was the meaning of destroying and decimating such elements, I don't know, I told you we never received an order to that effect.
Q Didn't he also think the Jews should be exterminated for exactly the same reasons
A That may be; but, for instance, with me he did not on any occasion discuss the Jews.
Q You didn't know anything about that?
Q I'd like to ask you a few more questions about the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos. Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that one of the most important missions of those units was to assist in exterminating the Commissars and the Jews in accordance with these policies?