guilt. As a matter of fact, in the history of law of all countries, the socalled criminal responsibility for the effects of crime without actual guilt was very soon replaced by the principle of responsibility for guilt only and thereby that state was reached which is alone compatible with, the dignity of man. The regulation provided by Article 9 of the Charter signifies not only a deplorable contribution to the apparently irresistible trend of herding together of man, but it is moreover a return to the first beginnings of concepts of criminal law. Considering these facts it cannot be acknowledged that this provision of the Charter is in agreement with prevailing law as it is derived from the common legal convictions of all the members of the community of international law and from the general principle of criminal law of all civilized nations.
Rudolf Hess is finally accused as a member of the Reich Cabinet. In regard to his belonging to the Secret Cabinet Council, the following may be said. The presentation of evidence has shown that this Secret Cabinet Council was only created to avoid the resignation of former Reich Foreign Minister von Neurath appearing to public opinion as a breach between him and Adolf Hitler. Actually no session of this Secret Cabinet Council ever took place. The Council did not even convene in a constitutional session. the results of the presentation of evidence that no cabinet meetings took place since 1937 at the latest. The tasks to be fulfilled by the Reich Cabinet, especially the legislative functions, were taken care of by the so-called circulating procedure. The presentation of evidence has shown further that from 1937 on at the latest, the great political and military decisions of Adolf Hitler were takne exclusively by him alone without making them known beforehand to the members of the Reich Cabinet. The Reich Cabinet, as an institution since Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor, has probably not made any decisive decision on politically or militarily important questions already very long before 1937.
It would be completely misleading to assume that the members of the Reich Cabinet in the National Socialist State had even an approximately similar position as it is a matter of course in a state governed by parlimentarian principles. Just as little as there was a common plan of conspiracy among the men sitting in the prisoner's dock, was there something similar within the Reich Cabinet. the Reich Cabinet which by themselves alone would make it impossible to arrive at an agreement for a common plan, as it was expressed in the Indictment. It is sufficient here to point to the testimony of the witness Lammers and to the fact that Adolf Hitler, from whom such facts could not remain hidden, finally issued even a prohibition with the contents, that the individual Reich Minister had no right to assemble any more for conferences on their own.
In this connection, something else cannot be left unmentioned. If the presentation of evidence in this trial produced anything with certainty, then it is the proof of the position of enormous political power and the unimaginable authority which Hitler had within the German governmental system.
When General Jodl testified on the witness stand that there was no one who could contradict Hitler in the long run and that there could not exist anyone, then one may say that he hit the nail right on the head with a few words. This may perhaps be regrettable, but one cannot alter anything of the fact as such. If one now keeps also in view that this dominant position of Hitler became always greater during the years, then this alone should be sufficient to exclude the assumption of a common plan, as it is asserted in the Indictment.
In any case, the following must be said: The former party leaders, generals and members of the cabinet indicted before this Tribunal are accorded in this trial an importance because of Hitler's death which they actually did not have in public life of the past. while the entire political life was overshadowed in Germany during the past twelve years by the overwhelming influence of Hitler's personality, the absence of this man from the prisoners' dock affects this trial in a manner which undoubtedly must result in an entirely distorted picture of the political reality of the past twelve years. career of the defendant Rudolf Hess -- his flight to England on 10 May 1941. This enterprise is of considerable importance as relevant evidence in this trial. As is shown by the presentation of evidence, the defendant Rudolf Hess had made the decision for this flight as early as June 1940 -- that is, immediately after the surrender of France.
The execution of the plan was delayed for a number of reasons: especially certain technical conditions had to be fulfilled in advance. Besides, considerations of political nature played a part, namely, that such an enterprise could be accompanied by success only when political situations and especially the military position appeared favorable for the preliminary arrangements of peace negotiations, for reestablishment of peace was undoubtedly the aim which Hess pursued by his flight to England.
day after his landing, he explained to the latter, "I come on a mission of humanity." During the conversation which the defendant had with Mr. Kirkpatrick of the Foreign Office on 13, 14 and 15 May, he explained to him in detail the motives which had induced him to take this extraordinary step. At the same time, he brought to his knowledge the conditions under which Hitler would be prepared to make peace. Simon, who appeared on the instructions of the British Government. I submitted the transcript of this conversation to the Tribunal as evidence and am referring to it. flight was the intention to avoid further bloodshed and to create favorable conditions for the introduction of peace negotiations. During the course of this conversation, the defendant Hess handed a document to Lord Simon which stated the four conditions under which Hitler would have been prepared at that time to conclude peace with England. The conditions were:
"1. In order to prevent future wars between the Axis and England, a delimitation of spheres of interests is proposed. The sphere of interests of the Axis powers is to be Europe, and that of England its Colonial Empire.
"2. Return of the Germancolonies.
"3. Indemnification of German nationals who were domiciled prior to or during the war in the British Empire and who suffered damage to life or property because of measures taken by a government in the Empire, or through incidents such as pillage, riots, etc. Indemnification to British nationals on the same basis by Germany.
"4. Conclusionof an armistice and peace treaty with Italy at the same time."
Rudolf Hess explained to Mr. Kirkpatrick, as well as to Lord Simon, that such were the terms on which Hitler was prepared to make peace with Great Britain immediately after the conclusion of French Campaign and that this position of Hitler had undergone no further change since completion of the campaign against France. There are no indications of any kind why this account of the defendant should not appear plausible. On the contrary. it tallies very well withmany declarations which Hitler himself had made on the subject of relations between Germany and England. In addition to that, the defendants Goering and von Ribbentrop confirmed also while in the witness box that the terms which Hess disclosed to Lord Simon corresponded with Hitler's views. sphere of interest of the Axis powers should not result in the conclusion that this was to mean Europe's domination by the Axis powers. The declarations made by Hess, rather, demonstrate -- they are included in written notes on the conversation between him and Lord Simon -- with all clarity that this was merely meant to eliminate England's interference in Continental Europe.
What legal consequences result from these-facts ? defendants -- with having cooperated in the psychological preparation of the German people for war. To the extent that the charge of psychological preparation for war is part of the common plan, it may suffice to refer to the remarks I have made in that connection. Hess went further and personally engaged in. this psychological preparation for war, proof to the contrary is at least offered - disregarding his numerous speeches in favor of peace - by this flight to England and the intentions responsible for it. personal relations between Hitler and the defendant Hess, one thing can be said with, certainty:
with his flight to England the defendant Hess accomplished a deed which in view of his position in the Party and in the State, and especially because of the fact that after Goering he was to become the Fuehrer's successor, can only be called a sacrifice, a sacrifice which Hess made not only for the sake of the German people and for the resumption of peace, but for the entire world. whose relation to Hitler was based on intimate personal confidence. If nevertheless the defendant decided to stake his position in the Party and everything that meant a personal bond with Hitler for the reestablishment of peace.
this must lead to the conclusion that the defendant Hess likewise saw in war the ghastly scourge of manking and that even if this were the only reason, the results little likelihood that it was his intention to prepare the German people for war. questions are to be drawn from the flight of the defendant Hess to England and in regard to his participation in the common plan alleged by the Prosecution, particularly in view of the attitude of the defendant, to what extent penal responsibility was incurred after the flight to England. The defendant himse does not wish to have any favorable conclusions drawn for him in this trial from this flight and the intentions connected with it. He has therefore aske me to omit a part of the following statement. Nevertheless, I consider it my duty as the defense counsel to draw all the legal conclusions resulting from t fliqht of the defendant Hess and the intentions connected with it and to point out the facts and points of view which, speak in favor of the defendant. evidence presented, that the plan claimed by the Prosecution did not exist. I case, however, the Tribunal should judge the results of the testimony differently and in application of article 6, paragraph 3 of the Charter, should accept the existence of such a plan, directed towards the beginning of a war o aggression, it becomes necessary to examine the question of what legal consequences the flight of the defendant Rudolf Hess to England and what the aims it contemplated had on his participation in the common plan as asserted by the Prosecution.
To this the following can be said: Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Charter extends the criminal responsibility of the defendant to include all acts committed by any person while carrying out the common plan maintained by the prosecution. The Charter itself contains no provisions as to whether and under what conditions withdrawal from a common plan is possible. This does n justify the conclusion, however, that such a withdrawal should be excluded as matter of principle. That assumption is out of the question for the very reason that the Charter quite clearly does not purport to give an exhaustive ruling on all questions of substantive and procedural law. If a withdrawal i permitted in Anglo-American law as a matter of fundamental principle, this should be possible with even greater reason under the Charter.
For the Charter represents a compendium of principles in which well recognized institutions of Continental European law are also given consideration. Continental European law proceeds quite unequivocally from the idea that the responsibility of the perpetrator before the penal law reaches no further than the extent to which his actions or omissions are embraced by his will. The withdrawal from the attempt, as a reason for acquittal, has therefore become an institution which can be found in almost all European codes of law. If, according to AngloAmerican Law, withdrawal from the conspiracy is possible, there can be no doubt as to that possibility's existing, in principle, according to the Charter. There is all the more reason for that assumption, in that it has been a practice to apply German Law in cases where the Charter fails to establish a binding rule. As regards the defendant Rudolf Hess, there should be even less reason for doubt, because the deeds charged against the defendant Rudolf Hess took place on German Reich territory. According to generally accepted principl of law, as they find expression in particular in the so-called International Penal Code of all nations, the so-called lex loci, i.e. the law of the place where the action took place, will be binding in this case. to his flight to England of 10 May 1941, it follows, and the evidence did not in any case produce anything to the contrary, that no subsequent developments can be embraced by his will. His influence on the events within the scope of war developments as a whole ceased, at the latest, with his flight to England. It contradicts all principles of penal law as they derive from the codes of law of all civilized nations to hold someone responsible, according to principles of penal law for a happening over which he had no influence and was no longer able to exert influence and which his will did not adopt. In this connection reference should also be made to the Prosecution's contention that the defendant Hess did not undertake his flight to England in order to create thereby favorable conditions for peace negotiations. That, on the contrary, it was his intention -- this is the argument of the Prosecution -- thus to protect Germany's rear in its planned campaign against the Soviet Union. The documents submitted by the Prosecution do not permit establishment of that assumption.
To begin with, this is contradicted by the fact that as early as June 1940, the defendant Hess had already decided on the flight; in other words, at a time when no one in Germany thought of a campaign against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, from the letter which the defendant Hess left behind and which was handed to Adolf Hitler at a time when Hess had already landed in England, it becomes perfectly clear that Hess had no knowledge of the imminent campaign against the Soviet Union. In this letter the defendant Hess did not state by a single word -- and this is established by testimony of the witness Fath -- that the purpose of his flight was to cover Germany's rear for the forthcoming campaign against the Soviets. In that letter Hess did not mention the Soviet Union by a single word. There is reason for the probability which almost amounts to certainty, that if Hess had had knowledge of the proposed attack, and if he had intended to combine with his flight the intention which the Prosecution new claims, Hess would have dealt with, that question. In this connection I should like to refer to the Exhibit USA 875 PS 3952, which also clearly shows that Hess had no knowledge of the campaign against the Soviet Union. the Soviet Union, this would not oppose the reason for penal acquittal in regard to the later period of time. Evidence has shown that in ordering the attack against the Soviet Union, the idea of anticipating a forthcoming attack on the part of the Soviets was by no means last in Hitler's mind. I refer to the report of the American General, which I have already read. whether such an attack was actually planned by Soviet Russia and wouldhave taken place. Statements made by the defendant Jodl while in the witness box make this appear very likely, if not even certain. The point at issue here is merely that on the basis of the reports he had before him, Hitler himself was of that opinion.
Had the defendant Rudolf Hess been successful in creating in England the prerequisites for armistice and peace negotiations, the political and military situation *---* Europe would have been so fundamentally changed that under these modified conditions an attack by the Soviet Union on Germany would have appeared most unlikely, and the apprehensions entertained by Hitler would have become untenable. The attempt made by the defendant Hess by his flight to England would also maintain its character where by penal, acquittal for all that happened after May 10, 1941, incidental to the execution of the common plot claimed by the prosecution is in order, if it were argued that it was not the fear of an imminent Soviet attack which prompted Hitler in his decision, but economic pressure resulting from the situation in which Germany found herself as a result of failure of the invasion of England. With the end of the war, this embarrassing economic situation would also have come to am end; at least it would not have been so stringent.
In conclusion it may be said: in undertaking his flight to England, and considering the intentions therein bound up with the re-establishment of peace, the defendant Hess made an attempt by which he pledged his entire personality to bring about the re-establishment of peace, an attempt which obviously sprang from the desire to avoid further bloodshed at all costs. Applying principles of law such as derive from the penal codes of all nations, and especially applying German penal law -- which if doubt arises will be taken as a basis for this question -- the conclusion must be accepted that the defendants Hess's responsibility according to penal law will in any case be confined to deeds which took place prior to the flight to England. to an almost unimaginable extent; it has made Europe into a continent bleeding from a thousand wounds and left Germany a field of ruins. It appears certain that at the present stage of modern technique, humanity would not survive another world war. This would, as far as it is humanly possible to foresee, utterly annihilate civilization, which has already suffered to an inexpressible extent in this war. It appears therefore only too understandable when under these circumstances the endeavor should be made in the name of humanity struggling for its existence, to leave no method untried from the legal standpoint as well, to prevent the repetition of such a catastrophe.
may be in social life, can only play a subordinate part in the prevention of war. This applies with limitation as long as the community of nations is composed of sovereign states acknowledging no legal order derived from a superior authority and as long as no procedure and no organization exists capable, by virtue of its own authoritative power, of legally limiting legitimate claims of nations and bringing them into harmony with one another. As long as these conditions are not fulfilled, justice cannot be in the domain of international relations the regulating force it is in national life, where it rests simply upon the power of the state, which is behind it. Tempting as it may be to try to establish at least an improved and more powerful international law on the ruins left us by the past world war, such an attempt must be doomed to failure from the outset if it does not coincide with a comprehensive new order of all international relations and if international law is not simultaneously an essential component of an order which guarantees the indispensable rights of all nations and which assures in particular the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of every nation to a proportionate share of the material wealth of the world. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal is undoubtedly not part of such a general new order. It was enacted by the victorious powers for a limited duration, namely as a foundation for a criminal trial against the statesmen, military commanders and economic leaders of the defeated Axis powers. The contents of the London Agreement makes the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which constitutes an essential part of the agreement, appear as a legislative measure ad hoc by reason of the very time limit of one year stipulated by Article 7. As a matter of fact, it can scarcely remain doubtful that essential parts of the Charter are not in accordance with the general sentiment of all members of the international legal community and that they do not therefore constitute a really valid international code. Under these circumstances, a conviction for a crime against the peace and for participation in a common plan to initiate a war of aggression could only take place at variance with the prevailing international law if the Tribunal decided, violating the principle Nulla poena sine lege, upon a juridical extension of international law. Great as this temptation may be, its consequences would be incalculable.
Not only a principle would be violated which is derived from the principles of the penal codes of all civilized nations and constitutes in particular an integral component of international law, namely that an act can be penalized only when its penal character has been juridically specified prior to the commission of the act; but above all, in view of the fact that in the present trial the jurisdiction on counts I and II of the indictment excludes the competence of the Tribunal so far, the violation of the principle Nulla Poena sine lege, combined with those special circumstances, must put the concept of law in doubt altogether. be obstructed, then the actual international code which is now valid must exclusively be considered as the legal foundation for the judgment of this Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until Friday 26 July 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Chief Prosecutors, the United States of America.
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Hess is absent.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal: select his closing arguments whore there is great disparity between his appropriate time and his available material. In eight months -- a short time as state trials go -- we have introduced evidence which embraces as vast and varied a panorama of events as has ever been compressed within the framework of a litigation. It is impossible in summation to do more than outline with bold strokes the vitals of this trial's mad and melancholy record, which will live as the historical text of the Twentieth Century's shame and depravity. civilization, from which the deficiencies of preceding ages may patronizingly be viewed in the light of what is assumed to be "progress." The reality is that in the long perspective of history the present century will not hold an admirable position, unless its second half is to redeem its first. These two-score years in this Twentieth Century will be recorded in the book of years as one of the most bloody in all annals. Two World Wars have left a legacy of dead which number more than all the armies engaged in any war that made ancient or medieval history. No half-century ever witnessed slaughter on such a scale, such cruelties and inhumanities, such wholesale deportations of peoples into slavery, such annihilations of minorities. The terror of Torquemada pales before the Nazi Inquisition. These deeds are the overshadowing historical facts by which generations to come will remember this decade. If we cannot eliminate the causes and prevent the repitition of these barbaric events, it is not on irresponsible prophecy to say that this Twentieth Century may yet succeed in bringing the doom of civilization.
of our era. The defendants complain that our pace is too fast. In drawing the Charter of this tribunal, we thought we were recording an accomplished advance in International Law. But they say that we have outrun our times, that we have anticipated an advance that should be, but has not yet been made. The Agreement of London, whether it originates or merely records, at all events marks a transition in International Law which roughly corresponds to that in the evolution of local law when men ceased to punish local crime by "hue and cry" and began to let reason and inquiry govern punishment. The society of nations has emerged from the primitive "hue and cry", the law of "catch and kill." It seeks to apply sanctions to enforce International Law, but to guide their application by evidence, law, and reason instead of outcry. The defendants denounce the law under which their accounting isasked. Their dislike for the law which condemns them is not original. It has been remarked before that "No thief ere felt the halter draw With good opinion of the law."
I shall not labor the law of this case. The position of the United States was explained in my opening statement. My distinguished colleague, the Attorney General of Great Britain, will reply on behalf of all the Chief Prosecutors to the defendants' legal attack. At this stage of the proceedings, I shall rest upon the behalf these crimes as laid down in the Charter. The defendants, who except for the Charter would have no right to be heard at all, now ask that the legal basis of this trial be nullified. This Tribunal, of course, is given no power to set aside or modify the Agreement between the Four Powers, to which eighteen other nations have adhered. The terms of the Charter are conclusive upon every party to these proceedings. and emergent character of this body as an International Military Tribunal. It is no part of the constitutional mechanism of internal justice of any of the signatory nations. Germany has unconditionally surrendered, but no peace treaty has been signed or agreed upon. The Allies are still technically in a state of war with Germany, although the enemy's political and military institutions have collapsed.
As a Military Tribunal, this Tribunal is a continuation of the war effort of the Allied nations. As an International Tribunal, it is not bound by the procedural and substantive refinements of our respective judicial or constitutional systems, nor will its rulings introduce precedents into any country's internal system of civil justice. As an International Military Tribunal, it rises above the provincial and transient and seeks guidance not only from International Law but also from the basic principles of jurisprudence which are assumptions of civilization and which long have found embodiment in the codes of all nations.
Of one thing we may be sure. The future will never have to ask, with misgiving, What could the Nazis have said in their favor. History will know that whatever could be said, they were allowed to say. They have been given the kind of a trial which they, in the days of their pomp and power, never gave to any man.
But fairness is not weakness. The extraordinary fairness of these hearings is an attribute of our strength. The prosecution's case, at its close, seemed inherently unassailable because it rested so heavily on German documents of unquestioned authenticity. But it was the weeks upon weeks of pecking at this case by one after another of the defendants that has demonstrated its true strength. The fact is that the testimony of the defendants has removed any doubts of guilt which, because of the extraordinary nature and magnitude of these crimes, may have existed before they spoke. They have helped write their own judgment of condemnation. put forth by the defendants or their counsel. We have not previously and we need not now discuss the merits of all their obscure and tortuous philosophy. We are not trying them for the possession of obnoxious ideas. It is their right, if they choose, to renounce the Hebraic heritage in the civilization of which Germany was once a part.
Nor is it our affair that they repudiated the Hellenic influence as well.
The intellectual bankruptcy and moral perversion of the Nazi regime might have been no concern of International Law had it not been utilized to goosestep the Herrenvolk across international frontiers. It is not their thoughts, it is their overt acts which we charge to be crimes. Their creed and teachings are important only as evidence of motive, purpose, knowledge and intent. or frustrations which may have led Germany to resort to aggressive war as an instrument of policy. The law, unlike politics, doesnot concern itself with the good orevil in the status quo, nor with the merits of thegrievances against it. It merely requires that the status quo be not attacked by violent means and that policies be not advanced by ar. We may admit that overlapping ethnological and cultural groups, economic barriers, and conflicting national ambitions created in the 1930's, as they will continue to create, grave problems for Germany as well as for the other peoples of Europe. We may admit too that the world had failed to provide political or legal remedies Which would be honorable and acceptable alternatives to war. We do not underwrite either the ethicsor the wisdom of any country, including my own, in the face of these problems. But we do say that it is now, as it was for sometime prior to 1939, illegal and criminal for Germany or any other nation to redress grievances or seek expansion by resort to aggressive war.
Let me emphasize one cardinal point. The United States has no interest which would be advanced by the civilization of any defendant if we have not proved him guilty on at least one of the counts charged against him in the indictment. Any result that the calm and critical judgment of posterity would pronounce unjust, would not be a victory for any of the countries associated in this prosecution. But in summation we now have before us the tested evidences of criminality and have heard the flimsy excuses and paltry evasions of the defendants. The suspended judgment with which we opened this case is no longer appropriate. The time has come for final judgment and if the case I present seems hard and uncompromising, it is because the evidence makes it so. of the morass of detail with which the record is full and put before you only the bold outlines of a case that is impressive in its simplicity.
True, its thousands of documents and more thousands of pates of testimony deal with an epoch and cover a continent, and touch almost every branch of human endeavor.
They illuminate specialities, such as diplomacy, naval development and warfare, land warfare, the genesis of air warfare, the politics of the Nazi rise to power, the finance and economics of totalitarian war, sociology, penology, mass psychology, and mass pathology. I must leave it to experts to comb the evidence and write volumes on their specialities, while I picture in broad strokes the offenses whose acceptance as lawful would threaten the continuity of civilization. I must, as Kipling put it, "splash at a ten-league canvas with brushes of comet's hair." count, which it is the duty of the United States to argue, is in its simplicity. It involves but threeultimate inquiries: First, have the acts defined by the Charter as crimes been committed; second, were they committed pursuant to a common plan or conspiracy; third, are these defendants among these who are criminally responsible? titude of isolated, unplanned, or disputed crimes. The substantive crimes upon which we rely, either as goals of a common plan or as means for its accomplishment, are admitted. The pillars which uphold the conspiracy charge may be found in five groups of overt acts, whose character and magnitude are important considerations in appraising the proof of conspiracy.
1. The Seizure of Power and Subjugation The Nazi Party seized control of the German state in 1933.
"Seizure of power" is a characterization used by defendants and defense witnesses, and so apt that it has passed into both history and every-day speech. (I) Geering, in 1934, pointed out that its' enemies were legion and said:
"Therefore, the concentration camps have been created, and Social democrat functionaries."
In 1933 Goering forecast the whole program of purposeful cruelty and oppression when he publicly announced:
"Whoever in the future raises a hand against a repre a very short while."
(3) New political crimes were created to this end.
It was made a treason, punishable with death, to organize or support a political party other than the Nazi Party. (4) Circulating a false for exaggerated statement, or one which would harm a state or even the Party, was made a crime.(5) Laws were enacted of such ambiguity that they could be used to punish almost any innocent act. It was, for example, made a crime to provoke "any act contrary to the public welfare." (6) viction for acts which no statute forbade. (7) Minister of Justice Guertner explained that National Socialism considered every violation of the goals of life which the community set up for itself to be a wrong per se, and that the act could be punished even though it was not contrary to existing "formal law." (8) which penetrated public life and private life.(9) Goering controlled a personal wire-tapping unit.(10) All privacy of communication was abolished. (11) Upon the strength of this spying individuals were dragged off to "protective custody" and to concentration camps without legal proceedings of any kind,(13) and without statement of any reason therefor.(14) The partison political police wereexempted from effective legal responsibility for their acts.(15) reduced to impotence, the judiciary remained the last obstacle to this reign of terror.(16) But its independence was soon overcome and it was reorganized to dispense a venal justice. (17) Judges were ousted for political or racial reasons and were speid upon and put under pressure to join the Nazi party.(18) After the Supreme Court had acquitted three of the four men whom the Nazis accused of setting the Reichstag fire, its jurisdiction over treason cases was transferred to a newly established "People's Court" consisting of two judges and five party officials.
(19) The German film of this "People's Court" in operation, which we showed in this chamber, revealed its presiding judge pouring partisan abuse upon speechless defendants.(20) courts were created to try political crimes, only party members were appointee judges, (21) and "Judges letters" instructed the puppet judges as to the "general lines" they must follow.(22) to change the government. Having sneaked through the portals of power, the Nazis slammed the gate in the face of all others who might also aspire to enter. Since the law was what the Nazis said it was, every form of opposition was rooted out and every dissenting voice throttled. Germany wasin the clutch of a police state, which used the fear of the concentration camp as a means to enforce non-resistance. The Party was the State, the State was the Party, and terror by day and death by night were the policy of both.
2. The Preparation and Waging of Wars of Aggression. stealthy efforts, in defiance of the Versailles Treaty, to arm for war. In 1933 they found no airforce. By 1939 they had 21 squadrons, consisting of 240 echelons or about 2,400 first-line planes, together with trainers and transports. In 1933 they found an army of 3 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. By 1939 they had raised and equipped an army of 51 divisions, four of which were fully motorized and four of which were panzer divisions. In 1933 they found a navy of one cruiser and 6 light cruisers. By 1939 they had built a navy of 4 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 6 cruisers, 22 destroyers, and 54 submarines. They had also built up in that period an armament industry as efficient as that of any country in the world.(23) series of undeclared wars against nations with which Germany had arbitration and non-aggressiontreaties, and in violation of repeated assurances.(24) On September 1, 1939, this rearmed Germany attacked Poland. The following April witnessed the invasion and occupation of Denmark and Norway, and May saw the overrunning of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Another Spring saw Yugoslavia and Greece under attack, and in June 1941 came the invasion of Soviet Russia.
Then Japan, which Germany had embraced as a partner, struck without warning at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and four days later Germany declared war on the United States.
that can be conjured up about what constitutes aggression in doubtful cases.