transmitted over the radio to arm all submarines. of the defensive and offensive meaning of such orders. The orders on the use of artillery by merchant vessels, however, make a great differentiation; that is, cannons are to be used only for the defense as long as the enemy on his part adheres to the regulations of international law, and for the offensive only when he does not. The orders covering the practical execution of these directives reveal, however, that there is no difference between defensive and offensive use. Admiral Doenitz explained this in detail when he was heard in court and I do not want to repeat it. Actually from the very beginning of the war merchant vessels were under orders to shoot on every occasion at every submarine which came within range of their runs. And that is what the captain of British merchant vessels did. The reason for this offensive action can certainly not be found in transgressions committed by German submarines during the first weeks of the war, for even the Foreign Office report admits that this conduct was correct. On the other hand the British propaganda may have had great importance which in connection with the mistaken sinking of the "Athenia" on September 3, 1939, disseminated through Reuter on the 9th of September the statement of unrestricted submaring warfare and upheld it, notwithstanding the fact that the conduct by the German submarines during the first weeks of the war proved to be the contrary of this accusation. Together with the announcement of the British Admiralty's ram-order of October 1, 1939, the Merchant Navy was again informed officially that the German U-boats had ceased to respect the rules of naval warfare and merchant vessels should adjust their conduct accordingly. It seems to me of no importance that a written supplement to the Admiralty-orders was issued as late as spring of 1940, because nowadays a naval war is not directed by letters but by wireless. But according to the latter, the British captains were directed to use their guns offensively against the German U-boats in accordance with the Admiralty's instructions contained in its handbook, beginning September 9th, or October 1st at the latest. The German order to attack armed enemy merchant vessels without warning was issued on 4 October only.
Thus it was justified in any case, even if one wanted to acknowledge difference in treatment for vessels with defensive and offensive armament. however, only a part of a comprehensive system for the military use of merchant vessels. Since the end of September 1939, the fastest vessels, that is those ships that were the least endangered by submarines, but were especially suited for chasing submarines, received depth chargesprojectors, that is armaments which make it possible to find the submerged submarines and which thus may be counted as typical weapons for the offensive.
for the submarines was the order to support every enemy ship on sight, giving its type and location. This report was supposed, so said the order, to take advantage of an opportunity which might never recur to destroy the enemy by their own -- the British -- naval and air force. This is an unequivocal utilization of all merchant vessels for military intelligence service to directly injure the enemy. If one considers the fact that according to the hospitalship-agreement even the immunity of hospital ships ceases if they relay military information of such a kind, then one need have no doubts about the consequences of such behaviour on the part of a commercial vessel. Whatever craft puts out to sea with the order and intention of using every opportunity that occurs to send military reports about the enemy to its own naval and air forces, is taking part in the hostilities during the entire course of its voyage. and, based on the afore mentioned report of 1930 of the Committee of Jurists, has no right to be considered as a merchant vessel. Any other conception but this would not do justice to the immediate danger which a wireless report means to the reported vessel and which subjects it, often within a few minutes, to attacks by enemy aircraft. All of the Admiralty's directives from the very first day of the war show that British merchant vessels were firmly organized within the system of the British Navy for combating the enemy's naval forces. They were part of the military communications network of the British navy and air force, and their arming with cannon and depth charge projectors, all the practical training and orders relative to the service were matters that concerned the British Navy. destined and utilized for battle should count among the vessels entitled to the protection of the London Protocol against sinking without warning. On the ground of this conception, in connection with the arming of all enemy merchant vessels which was rapidly being completed , an order was issued on the 17th of October 1939 to attack all hostile merchant ships without warning.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kransbuehler, we may as well break off now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, I am sorry to detain the Tribunal, but I promised to tell the Tribunal about the two affidavits put forward for the defendant Seyss-Inquart.
We have no objection to them. I promised to tell Your Lordship today. I am sorry to have to detain you.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 16 July 1946. at 1000 hours)
DR. HANS KRANZBUEHIER (Counsel for the defendant Doenitz): Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Jury: crimes against enemy merchant vessels: I believe that the German conception of the London Protocol of 1936, according to the position generally taken by the experts of the powers involved as well as according to the wellknown opinion of numerous and competent scientists of all countries, had no trace of dishonesty in it. If I were to express myself with caution, I would say that it is, legally at least, perfectly tenable, and thus not the slightest charge can be raised against the German Naval Command, if it issued its orders on a sensible and perfectly fair basis. We have shown that these orders were given only after such conditions had been created by the exposure of British measures as justfied the orders issued according to the concepts of German law. the special protection which the German orders provided for passenger vessels. These passenger vessels were excluded for a long time from all sinking measures, even when they sailed in an enemy convey and, therefore, could have been sunk immediately, according to the British conception too. These measures point out especially clearly that the accusation of disregard and brutality is unjustified. The passenger vessels were only included in the orders concerning other vessels when in the spring of 1940 there was no more harmless passenger traffic at all, and just these ships, because of their great speed and heavy armaments, proved to be particularly dangerous enemies for submarines. If, therefore, Mr. Roger Allen's report cites as an especially good example of German submarine cruelty the sinking in the autumn of 1940 of the "City of Benares", then this example is not very happily selected, because the "City of Benares" was armed and went under convey. submarine warfare, and I can at once point again in this connection to the example which Mr. Roger Allen holds up especially for the sinking of a neutral against international law.
It is a question of the torpedoing of the Danish steamer "Vendia" which occurred at the end of September 1939. The Tribunal will recall that this ship was stopped in a regular way and was torpedoed and sunk only when it began preparations for ramming the German submarine. This occurrence led the German Government to protest to the Danish government on account of the hostile conduct shown by a neutral boat. look if not only the result, namely the sinking of a neutral ship, is known but also the causes which led to this result. Until the last day of the war the fundamental order to the German submarines was in effect not to attack merchantmen recognized as neutral. There were some accurately defined exceptions to this order, exceptions of w hich theneutral powers had been notified. They affected in the first place ships which conducted themselves in a suspicious or hostile manner, and secondly ships in announced operational areas. in the war area with dimmed lights. On 26 September 1939 the commander of the submarine fleet asked the high command of the navy for permission to attack without warning vessels proceeding in the channel with dimmed lights. The reason was clear. It is there where at night the enemy's troop and material shipments took place through which the second wave of the British expeditionary army was ferried across the Channel to France. At that time the order still was in effect that French ships not be attacked at all. But since at night French ships could not be distinguished from English vessels, submarine warfare in the Channel would have had to be halted completely in compliance with this order. The Tribunal heard from a witness that in this way a 20,000 ton troop transport passed by the torpedo tubes of a German submarine unmolested. Such a happening in a war is grotesque and it goes without saying that, therefore, the naval command approved the request of the commander of the submarine fleet. occasion by an assistant at the Naval Command, Lieutenant Commander Fresch. Already the Chief of Section, Admiral Wagner, did not approve of the opinions expressed in it, and, therefore, they did not lead to corresponding orders.
The order to attack blacked-cut ships was issued by radio without any further explanation on the part of the Naval command, and on 4 October it was extended to further regions surrounding the English coast, and again without any explanation in the sense of the above-mentioned note. Vanselow , the wellknown expert on the law of naval warfare, makes the following remark:
"In war, a blacked-out vessel must in case of doubt be considered as an enemy warship. A neutral, as well as an enemy merchant vessel navigating without lights, voluntarily renounces during the hours of darkness all its right to immunity from attack without being stopped."
I furthermore refer to Churchill's declaration made in the House of Commons on 8 May 1940, concerning the action of British submarines in the Skagerrak. Since the beginning of April, the latter had had the order to attack all German vessels without warning during the daytime, and all vessels and so allneutrals, as well at night. This implies recognition of the legal standpoint. It even goes beyond the German order, insofar as neutral merchant vessels navigating with all lights on were sunk without warning in these waters during the night. to give an express warning to neutral shipping against suspicious or hostile conduct. Nevertheless, the naval command (Seekriegsleitung) saw to it that this was done. governments with the request that they warn their merchant ships against any suspicious conduct such as changes in course and the use of wireless upon sighting German naval forces, dimming, or non-compliance with the request to step etc. These warnings were subsequently repeated several times and the neutral governments passed them on to their captains. All this has been proved by documents which have been submitted. Therefore, if, as aresult of suspicious or hostile conduct,neutral ships were treated like enemy ships, they have only themselves, to blame for it. The German submarines were not allowed to attack any one who as a neutral maintained a correct attitude during the war and there are hundred s of examples to prove that such attacks never did occur.
shipping: the zones of operations. The actual development was briefly summed up as follows: seafaring neutrals in which it points to the use of enemy merchantships for attacking purposes as well as to the fact that the Government of the United Stateshad barred to its own shipping a carefully defined naval zone around the Central European coast, the so-called USA-combat zone.
As the note states, these two facts give the Reich Government cause "to warn anew and more strongly that in viewof the fact that the actions are carried on with all means of modern war techniques and in view of the fact that these actions are increasing in the waters around the British Isles and near the French coast, these waters can no longer be considered safe for neutral shipping." sea routes which are not endangered by German means of naval warfare and, fur thermore, it recommends legislative measures according to the example set by the USA. In concluding the Reich Government rejects the responsibility for consequences which would follow if warning and recommendation should not be complied with. This note constituted the announcement of an operational area of the US combat zone with the limitation that only in these sea zones which are actually endangered by actions against the enemy, consideration conot longer be given to neutral shipping.
The Naval High Command (Seekriegsleitung) indeed observed this limitation. In the beginning the neutral powers had more than six months in which to take the measures recommended by the German Government forthe safety of their own shipping and to direct their shipping along the routes announced. Starting in January, the German Command then opened up to the German naval forces within the operational area announced, accurately defined zones around the English coast in which an attack without warning against all ships sailing there was admissible. THe naval chart on which these zones had been marked was submitted to the Tribunal. The chart shows that gradually those zones and only these were taken in which, as a result of mutually increasing attacks and defensive actions at sea and in the air, engagements continually occurred so that every ship entering this area was operating with the naval forces of both powers nearby. The last one of these zones was designated late in May 1940. These zones were not and needed not be announced because they were all within the area of operations as proclaimed on 24 November 1939. The distance of these zones from the enemy coast was on the average 60 sea miles. Outside these boundaries the declaration concerning the area of operations of 24 November was not observed, i.e., neutral ships could be stopped and sunk only in accordance with the Prize Ordinance.
of 1940, the British Isles became the center of the war. On 17 August 1940 the Reich Government sent to the neutral governments a declaration in which the entire area of the US combat zone around England without any limitation was designated as operational area.
"Every ship", so the note reads, "which sails in this area exposes itself to destruction not only by mines, but also by other combat means. Therefore the German Government warns once more, and urgently against entering the endangered area." arms against the craft encountered in it was permitted to all naval and air forces insofar as special exceptions had not been ordered. The entire development described was openly dealt with in the German pressnand Grand Admiral Raeder granted interviews to the foreign press on this subject which clearly showed the German viewpoint. If, therefore, in the sea zones mentioned neutral ships and crews sustained losses, at least they cannot complain about not having been warned explicitly and urgently beforehand. areas of operation as such constitute and admissible measure. Here, too, the prosecution will take the position that in the London Protocol of 1936, no exceptions of any kind were made for areas of operation and, therefore, sue exceptions naturally do not exist. world war. The first declaration of this kind came from the British Government on 2 November 1914 and designated the entire area of the North Sea as a military area. This declaration was justified on the basis that it was a reprisal against alleged German violations of international law. Since this justification naturally was net recognized, the imperial government replied on 4 Feburary 1915 by designating the waters around England as a military area. On both sides certain extensions were made subsequently. I do not wish to go into the individual formulations of these declarations and into the sagacious legal deductions which were made from their wording for or against the admissibility of these declarations.
Whether these areas are designated as military area, barred zone, operational area or danger zone, the point always was that the naval forces in the announced area had permission to destroy any ship encountered there. After the world war the conviction of naval officers and experts in international law alike was in general that the operational area would be maintained as a means of naval warfare. The development typical for the rules of naval warfare. The development typical for the rules of navalwarfare was confirme here, namely, that the modern technique of war forcibly leads to the use of war methods which at first are introduced on the grounds of being reprisals, but which are gradually being used also without such a justification as are recognized as legitimate.
The technical reasons for such a development are very obvious. The improvement of mines made it possible to endanger large sea areas by mines. But if it was admissible to destroy by mines every ship sailing, despite warning, in a designated sea area, one could see no reason why other means of naval warfare should not be used in this area in the same way. Besides, the traiditional institution of the blockade directly outside enemy ports and coasts by mines, submarines and aircraft was practically made impossible so that the sea powers had to look for new ways to bar the approach to enemy coasts effectively. Consequently, it was these necessities which were the compelling factors in bringing about the recognition of the operational area. ning the particular prerequisites under which the declaration of such areas would be considered admissible just as there was none with regard to the designation which the belligerent power must choose. Also the conferences of 1922 and 1930 did not change anything in that respect. This is shown by the efforts which were also after 1930, exerted especially by American politicians and experts in international law for a solution of this question tail and, therefore, it must suffice for the purposes of the defense to stat that during the conferences in Washington in 1922 and in London in 1930 the operational area was an institution known to all powers concerned, an institution operating in a way which had been determined by both sides in the first world war to the effect that all ships encountered in it would be subject to immediate destruction.
If this institution were to have been abolished in the mentioned conferences, especially in the treaty of 1930, an accord should have been reached on this question, if not in the text of the agreement at least in the negotiations. The transcripts show nothing of the kind. The relationship between operational area and London protocol remained unsttled. The French admiral Gaston has the same viewpoint. Admiral Bauer, Commander of Submarines in the first world war, in 1931 stated his disappreval of the application of the London rules in the operational area and this opinion was absolutly known to the British Navy. In a thorough study of Erns Schmitz of 1938 a merchant vessel which enters an operational area despited general prohibition is regarded as being guilty of "persistent refusal to stop". The powers"participating in the conferences in Washington and London consciously avoided, in these as in other cases, to start controversial questions on which no accord could be reached. Therefore, every power maintained a free hand to champion in practice that opinion which corresponded to its can interests. and I have as a witness for this no one less important than French Minister for Foreign Affairs of that time, Briand. In his instruction of 30 December 1921 to Sarraut, the French chief delegate in Washington, he announces the basic readiness of concluding an agreement about submarine warefare. However he then points out a series of questions as being essential parts of such an agreement, among them the arming of merchant ships and the defenition of com zones. The instruction goes on.
"It is indispensable to examine these questions and to solve them by a joint agreement, for surface vessels as well as for submarines and aircraf in order not to establish ineffective and deceptive stipulations." Particularly with respect to the question concerning the area of operations. Briand characterizes the submarine rules as being "ineffective and deceptive. after this testimony nobody will be able to designate the German conception as fraudulent' according to which ships in declared, areas of operation are n under the protection of the London protocol. Even Mr. Reger Allen's report concedes this.
Therefore the attacks of the Prosecution seem to be directed, as I understand from the cross examination, less against the existence of such zones than against their extent and wehave repeatedly heard the figure of 750.
000 square miles. Incidentally, it is to be noticed that this figure includes the land area of Great Britain, Ireland and Western France; the area of water alone amounts only to 600.000 square miles. I quite agree, however, that through operational areas of such a size the interests of the neutrals werebadly prejudiced. for an agreement of 1939 which concerns the rights and duties of Neutrals provides for a considerable expansion of the operational area. Such an area which is termed "Blockade Zone" in the draft isto include the waters up to a distance of 50 sea miles from the blockaded coast.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr.Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal would like to know what that American draft of 1939 is, to which you refer.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have already mentioned this draft sot up by American professors, dealing with the rights and duties of neutrals in sea warfare, the professors Jessup, Orchard and Charles Warren. It was published in the American Journal of International Law of July 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Jessup and Warren, you say?
DR.KRANZBUEHLER: Jessup, Orchard, and Charles Warren.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: This would correspond to a large extent to the area of waters in which surprise attacks were authorized until 17 August 1940 it covers 200.000 square sea miles approximately. However it seems to me almost impossible to approach from a scientific angle such an eminently practical question as that of the expansion of an operational area, As long as this question is not settled by an agreement, the actual determination will always be a compromise between what is desirable from a military point ofview and what is politically possible. It seeps to me that laws are only violated when a belligerent misuses his power against neutrals. The question as to whether such a misuse exists should be made dependent upon the attitude of the opponent towards the neutrals as well as upon the measures taken by the neutrals themselves.
THE PRESIDENT: One minute. Dr. Kranzbuehler, doesn't the right to declare a certain zone as an operational zone depend upon the power to enforce it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I do not quite follow the sense of your question.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, your contention is, apparently, that any state at war has a right to declare such an operational zone as it thinks right and in accordance with its interests, and what I was asking you was whether the right to declare re an operational zone, if there is such a right, doesn't depend upon the ability or power of the state declaring the zone to enforce that zone, to prevent any ships coming into it without being either captured or shot.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: In my opinion, Mr. President, there are no unified estimates available in science regarding that question. Contrary to the blockade zone in a classical sense, where full effect is necessary, the operational zone only provides for effective endangering through continuous combat actions. This effective threat was present in the German operational zone, and I refer in that connection to theproclamation of President Roosevelt regarding the United States of America, combat zone where the entering of that zone was prohibited, pointing out that because of the combat actions there shipping must of necessity be continuously endangered.
THE PRESIDENT: The proclamation of the President of the United States was directed, was it not, solely to United States vessels?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, indeed. I am referring only to my establishing proof of the German statement that this area was endangered, and this effective endangering seems to be the only legal and necessary prerequisite for declaring an operational zone.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you say that it was a valid proclamation if Germany had declared the whole of the Atlantic to be an operational zone
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, in that case I would say that at the beginning of the war that would not have been possible, for the Ger armed forces at that time were, without doubt, not an effective danger to the entire sea traffic. I am of the opinion that with the increase in the number of U-boats on the one hand, and with the increase of defense by hostile aircraft on the other hand, the danger zone of course expanded, and therefore the development of this war quitelogically led to the point that operational zones gradually were extended and enlarged.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean, then, that you are basing the power of the state to declare a certain zone as an operational zone not upon the power of the state to enforce its orders in that zone, but upon the possibility of danger in that zone ?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You say it depends upon the possibility of danger in the zone?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I would not say the possibility;r of danger, Mr. President, but the probability of danger, and the impossibility of the belligerent's protecting neutral shipping against this clanger.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you what other legal basis there is for the theory you are putting forward, other than the adoption of the blockade?
DR. KRANZBUELER: Mr. President, I am referring, as a legal basis, to the practice of the first World War, the practice that was current then, and thestatements made by scientists after the First world War, and I am referring to the generally recognized rules about mined areas. The mined areas, for a fact, proved to be operational zones in this war, in which every means of sea warfare was used. I shall later refer to this topic once mere.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: During theproduction of documents, the Tribunal has eliminated all those which I intended to utilize in order to prove that British naval warfare also paid no attention to the interests of neutrals when they were in contradiction with their own interests. If it is the Tribunal's wish, I will not go into the details of the British measures and in summing up I will mention them only in so far as they are indispensable for the legal argumentation. The following points are the essential ones:
1) The British regulations of 3 September 1939 concerning contraband Germany through the introduction of the so-called"hunger blockade".
2) The decree concerning control ports for contraband goods
3) The introduction of an export-blockade against Germany on
4) The introduction of the Navicert-System in connection with the towards neutrals were admissible or not from the point of view of international law.
In any case the neutrals themselves considered many of them inadmissible and there was hardly any which did not arouse more or less vehement protests, as for instance on the part of Spain, the Netherlands, Sovi Russia and the United Sates. From the beginning, the British Government on its side had prevented any legal examination of its measures by freeing itself from the optional clauses of the Permanent International Tribunal at the Hague, through a note of 7 September 1939, This step was expressly based on the necessity of providing the British Navy with full freedom of action. already and has been emphasized eversince that British measures did indeed prejudice the interests and possibly the rights, too, of the neutrals. However, they did not imperil either the ships or the crows and are therefore considered morally superior to the inhuman German measures. First, as mentioned before, the obligation of entering control "ports was dangerous for neutral ships and crows and for this very reason neutral countries protested against it. But apart from this, it scorns to me that the actual difference between the British and German measures for blockading the adversary are not founded upon moral differences but rather upon differences in their sea power. In the waters where the British Navy did not exercise naval supremacy, namely around the coasts we were occupying as well as in the Baltic son, it used the same methods of naval warfare as we did. measures against neutrals were inadmissible, and the Reich Government formulated against the neutral powers the accusation that they protested indeed but actually submitted to the British measures. This is clearly stated in the proclamation issue on the occasion of the proclamation of the blockade on 17 August 1940. Consequently, the following facts confronted the German Naval Command. 1) A legal trade between the Neutrals and the British Isles no longer existed On the ground, of the German answers to the British stipulations concerning contraband goods and the British export blockade, any trade to and from England was contraband trade, therefore illegal from the point of view of international law.
2) The Neutrals submitted, in practice, to all British measures even when those measures were in contradiction with their own interests and their own conception of locality. 3) Thus, the Neutrals directly supported British warfare. For, by submitt ing to the British control system in their own country, they saved the British Navy the use of large fighting forces which, according to the hitherto existing international law should have exercised the trade control at sea and which were now available for other war tasks. Therefore, the German Command, in determining its operational area in order to prevent the illegal traffic from reaching England, saw no reason for giving preference to the considerations towards the neutrals, to the detriment of its own military requirements. This all the less as the neutral shipping, which despite all warnings continued to travel to England, took big money far this increased risk and still considered therefore the trade with England as a lucrative business. which can be regarded as a completely now interpretation of the existing laws of naval welfare. All American countries jointly proclaimed the PanAmerican safety zone, an area along the American coast up to a distance of approximately 300 sea miles. In those waters, comprising altogether several million square miles, they ask the belligerents to give up the exercise of those rights which according to the hitherto existing International Law naval forces of the belligerents were authorized to apply to neutrals. On the other hand, as I have already mentioned, the President of the United States prohibited, on 4 November 1939, U.S. citizens and ships to travel within an area of waters expanding over approximately 1 million square miles along the European coast. Thus the development of the laws of naval warfare, under leading participation of the neutrals, forcibly led to a recognition of large areas reserved either for the purpose of safety or for that of combat proclamation that the maritime zone he had had closed was endangered by combat action as a result of technical developments.
The proclamation, thereby, only took into consideration the development of modern weapons, the long-range coastal artillery, which for example could easily fire across the English Channel, the invention of locating devices, which permitted landsupervision of maritime traffic over dozens of sea-miles, and particularly the increased speed and range of aircraft. as the above mentioned neutrals, namely that defense and offense would necessarily have to cover large maritime areas in this war. It was, therefore, not from choice that the German operational area, which the Prosecution objects to, grew to such a size, it was only because it was adopting itself to a system which was also recognized by the other powers as legitimate. enemy methods, may I ask the Tribunal to recall the naval chart on which the British zones of warning and danger are marked. These zones cover about 120,000 square sea miles. Even if these dimensions are smaller than those of the German operational area, it seems to me that the difference between 100,000 and 600,000 square miles is not so much a question of legal judgment as one of coastal length end of strategic position on the sea. The observation is confirmed by the American practice against Japan, such as Admiral Nimitz has professed. He says:
"In the interest of the conduct of operations against Japan the area of the Pacific Ocean is declared a zone of operations."
This zone of operations covers more than 30 million square miles. All ships in it with the exception of their own and Allied, as well as hospital ships, were sunk without warning. The order was issued on the first day of the war, on 7 December 1941, when the Chief of the Naval High Command ordered unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan.
first day of the war, is to be looked upon and justified as a measure of reprisal. For me the important thing is to show how it worked out in practice and this is unequivocal. surprise attacks in the operational areas, if possible unnoticed, so that mine hits may be pretended. Orders to this effect existed for the period from January until August 1940, i.e. during the period when submarines were permitted to act without warning not in the whole operational area of 24 November 1939 but only in the especially defined areas below the English coast. In this camouflage the Prosecution sees proof of a bad conscience and thereby the consciousness of wrong doing. The real reasons for the measures ordered were of a twofold nature: military and political. For the admirals concerned the military reasons stood, of course, in the foreground.