he himself waged a five-year struggle against all violent measures.
The Prosecution has put in evidence as USA Exhibit No, 610 (437 PS) a memorandum which Frank addressed to the Fuehrer on June 19, 1943. In this memorandum on page 11 he listed 9 points in which he sharply condemned all the evils which had arisen in consequence of the violence practised by the Security Police and the SD and of the excesses committed by various Reich authorities, violence and excesses against which all his efforts had proved unavailing. These 9 points are in the main identical with the points of accusation against Frank. The content of the memorandum of June 19, 1943 however, shows very plainly that the defendant denies responsibility for these abuses. It reveals, on the contrary quite clearly that neither the defendant nor the general administration of the Government-General can be he. responsible for the said evils, but that the whole responsibility must be borne by the institutions mentioned above, in particular the Security Police and the SD, and or the Higher SS and Police-Leader East. If the defendant Frank had had the instruments of power wherewith to abolish the evils he condemned, it would not have been necessary for him to address that memorandum to Hitler at all. He would then himself have been able to take all necessary steps. In addition to this the evidence has shown that that memorandum of June 19, 1943 was not the only one addressed to the Fuehrer on the matter. It is clear from the testimony of the witnesses Dr. Lammers and Dr. Buehler, and the defendant's own statements in the witnessbox, that from the year 1940 onwards he (the defendant) sent protests and memoranda at regular intervals of a few months both to Hitler personally and to the Chief of the Reich Chancellory. These written protests were invariably on the subject of the violent measures taken and the excesses committed by the Higher SS and Police-Leader and the Security Police including the SD. But none of the protests met with success continually made suggestions to Hitler on the subject of improving relations between the administration of the Government-General and the population. The memorandum of June 19, 1943 too is cast in the form of a comprehensive political programme. It includes moreover all the essential points of protest contained in a memorandum presente in February 1943 to the Governor-General at his own desire, by the leader of the Ukrainian Chief Committee.
This latter memorandum was put in evidence by the Prosecution as USA Exhibit No. 178 (1526-PS). Such suggestions were also consistently rejected by Hitler. Frank could have done. Certainly he should have resigned, But that too he did. He offered his resignation no less than 14 times, the first time as early as 1939. His resignation was rejected by Hitler as often as it was tendered. But the defendant Frank did more. He approached Field-Marshal Keitel with the request that he be allowed to rejoin the Armed Forces as lieutenant. That was in the year 1942. Hitler refused his consent to that one too. These facts allow of only one conclusion, namely that Hitler saw in the defendant Frank a man behind whose back he (with the help of Himmler and the organs of the Security Police and the SD) could carry out the measures he considered requisite for attaining the aims of his power policy.
My Lords: Himmler were about to abolish the last remnants of a state resting on law; when it became increasingly apparent that the power of the police know no bounds and that a police-state of the purest water was in process of development, the defendant Frank came forward and addressed four great speeches to the German public with a last appeal on behalf of the idea of a state resting on law. He did that when Hitler stood at the summit of his power, He addressed this appeal to the German public at a time when the German forces were marching on Stalingrad and into the Caucasus, when the German Panzer Armies in Africa stood at El Alamein barely 100 km from Alexandria. In the course of the evidence I read some extracts from these great speeches which the defendant Frank made in Berlin, Heidelberg, Vienna and Munich. Those Speeches contained a clear repudiation of every form of police-State and championed the idea of the State resting on law, of the independence of the judiciary and of law as such. These speeches found a tremendous echo among lawyers, but unfortunately not in wider circles. Nor in particular were they echoed by the men who alone would have possessed the power to ward off the threatening catastrophe.
The consequences of this attempt to avert the extinction of the idea of the state resting on law by a last great effort are well-known.
The defendant Frank was deprived of all his Party Offices, he was dismissed from his post as President of the Academy for German Law. The leadership of the National Socialist Lawyers Association was conferred on Reich Minister of Justice Thierack. Frank himself was forbidden by Hitler to speak in public. Although the defendant Frank again on this occasion sent in his resignation as Governor-General, Hitler refuse to accept it, as he had always dons before. The reason for this, as given in a letter from the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to the defendant Frank, was that considerations of foreign policy had caused the Fuehrer again to refuse this latest request of Frank to be allowed to resign. According to everything that has emerged from the evidence in this trial it may be looked upon as certain that it was not only (and probably not even mainly) for such reasons that Hitler refused to accept Frank's resignation. policy not to let the security police and Reichfuehrer SS Himmler's other organs fulfil their appointed task openly, but rather to let them continue their work under cover while maintaining a general civil administration under the Governor-General. and Hitler and the state police system represented by Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and the Higher SS and Police-Leader East on the other, could not fail to have repercussions on the position of the defendant in his capicity as GovernorGeneral, Still more than before the various Reich authorities now began to interfere in the administration of the Government-General. Above all however, it was quite clear from the summer of 1942 onwards that the Higher SS and PoliceLeader East, together with the organs of the Security Police and SD subordinated to him, took no more notice at all of any instructions issued by the GovernorGeneral and the general administration. receded more and more into the background. The State was transformed into an umaldulterated police-state, and developments took the inevitable course which the defendant Frank had foreseen and feared. The course which on November 19, 1941 he had outlined at a Congress of the principal sektion chiefs and Reich Group leaders of the National Socialist Lawyers Association in the following words:
"Law cannot be degraded to a position wh ere it becomes an object of bargaining. Law cannot be sold. It is either there or it is not there. Law cannot be marketed on the Stock Exchange. If the Law finds no support, then the State too loses its moral prop and sinks into the depths of night had horror." The President: We will begin again at 10 minutes past two.
(A recess was taken.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 11 July 1946.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: The American prosecution has charged defendant Frick with criminal actions according to Article 6, items a, b, and c of the Charter. charter, with the series of penal cases contained therein, is to be considered as the authoritative criterion of the actual penal law which shall state, in a manner irrevocably binding for the Tribunal, those actions that are to be regarded as criminal, or whether Article 6 of the Charter concerns a rule of procedure defining the competence of this Tribunal for specific situations.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it will be for the convenience of the interpreters if I say that we might, as it is now nearly half past two, sit without a break until four o'clock when we rest.
DR. PANNENBECKER: This latter concept has been implied in the prosecution's exposition of the case by Sir Hartley Shawcross' remark that Article 6 fills a gap in international penal procedure but that the actual penal law to be applied to the defendants has already been previously standardized by positive laws. Equally to the point is Part II of the Charter, beginning with Article 6 and entitled: "Competence and general principles", and it may be inferred therefrom that Article 6 purports to establish a ruling as to the competence of this Tribunal to engage a procedure for specific series of crimes.
Sir Hartley Shawcross' statements were directed against the objection that it is inadmissible and in contradiction with a basic legal principle, to punish someone for an act which had not yet been forbidden at the time of its perpetration; an objection which has as a basis the conception that the charter has created a new material penal law with retroactive effect. is so important a legal principle that it should not be infringed. I need not state to the Court the reasons for which this legal principle found general recognition in all civilized countries, as a presupposition and a basic precept of Justice. defendants with the fact that they themselves had continuously disregarded law and justice, and inferred from this that the defendants in this trial could not as far as they were concerned appeal to such a legal principle. I do not believe, however, that such an argument can be decisive in these legal proceedings. would not have been better to repay a person with the same coin and not give the defendants of this trial any possibility at all to defend themselves in an ordered legal procedure. However such an attitude, simply to apply the power of the victor on the defendants, haspurposely not been assumed by the signatory powers for reasons presented in detail by the prosecution. On the cont rary, Sir Hartly Shawcross has appended to the Tribunal to use in this procedure -- I quote -- "the undisputable basis of international custom." according to equal principles of law in reference to the question whether the deeds with which the defendant is incriminated are to be regarded as criminal action for which, according to the recognized basis of international custom, punishment is possible. On the basis of international principles of law, there should be no argument if the use of a fundamental law, as in the prohibition of a retroactive law, in its application is to be made dependent on whether or not the defendants concerned themselves with justice and injustice. The decision of the signatory powers, on the basis of considerations which have been seriously weighed to subject the conduct of the defendants to a judicial examination observing all principles of international custom, signifies not only the adherence to legal procedure equipped with all assurances for fair trial, but this decision by the signatory powers also signifies the observance of the fundamental principles of a materialistic guarantee of justice and to those principles belongs the prohibition of retroactive laws.
decreeing of the retroactive validity of penal laws, when so ordered by the National Socialist government for certain individual cases, aroused horror in the entire civilized world. Dr. Stahmer has already referred to these cases. At that time, the violation of such a principle of law was generally condemned as a deplorable retrogression in culture. taken by the occupation powers for delivery from National Socialist abuses of law, was to declare void any laws instituting retroactive application of the substantive penal code. argue that according to its caption, Article 6 of the Charter be regarded on agreement on the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, all the more so as the signatory powers have already and with so much emphasis gone on record for a strict and uniform reobservance of the prohibition against retroactive penal laws. the jurisdiction of this tribunal, it is up to the Tribunal, through its own decision ret only to determine whether the charges on which the indictment is based are substantiated, but also to rule on the legal question as to whether, for the facts established in each case by the prosecution, substantive criminal law provides a law which makes punishment possible. To revert in this way to provisions of substantive criminal law in existence at the time the act was committed does not mean it would be impossible for thie tribunal to call the accused to account for offenses which are punishable under all circumstances. There are, however, a number of restrictions resulting from this which in the opinion of the defense, however, it would be better to accept rather than to violate a principle so essential to a just procedure as is the prohibition against retroactivity in criminal laws.
inconsistent with the need for a just expiation for actual war crimes to interpret Article 6 according to its caption as an agreement on the jurisdiction of this court to try criminal cases bu not as a now kind of substantive criminal law. which has been pleaded ingreat detail by Dr. Stahmer, to such an extent that I can omit those pages and I shall turn now to page 7, beginning with my summary. responsible also for such acts of commission as exceed the measure of his participation in the common plans. The wording of the charter "in the execution of a common plan "does not contradict the interpretation that the charter establishes responsibility for acts of commission which remained within the scope of the plan discussed.
to an equal extent to a judicial precept, but beyond it would violate essential legal principles. actions of others are concerned and for which a defendant is supposed to be liable, the proof cannot be foregone that these actions, in the manner of their execution, have corresponded to the intention of the defendant.
To give an example:
"The participation of a defendant in rearmament against the regulations of the Versailles Treaty does not in itself justify the assumption that this defendant has also desired a war of aggression, which was later on planned by others, in the further shaping of the plan to mobilize the German people. Frick is accused and the first assertion of the Prosecution that the defendant participated in the planning and preparation of wars of aggression. With regard to the problem, as to whether a war of aggression is a criminal offense according to the concepts of law for the period in question, I refer, in order to avoid repetitions, to the statements of Professor Jahreis, with which, in the name of the defendant Frick, I completely agree. possibility of punishing cooperation in a war of aggression as a criminal offense that can be perpetrated by single persons, if, namely, in opposition to the statements of Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Charter is applied as a rule of substantive penal law, which has for the first time, formulated with retroactive effect that a war of aggression is a criminal offense by individual persons. Considering the other interpretation, which regards Article 6 of the Charter as a proecedural regulation on jurisdiction of this Court, the Defense holds that the deduction is cogent that the court is indeed declared competent to judge offenses against peace, but that so far a criminal guilt of the individual defendants is not proven, because one condition for this is lacking, namely, the possibility of establishing that the defendants have offended against a principle of generally valid international custom or national law which characterised the war of aggression at the time of their act and declared it punishable as a crime of which a single individual could be guilty.
For the statesmen during the period between the two world wars neglected to establish adequate measures of general validity, by which it would have been made clear that anyone who after the first awful slaughter of nations organized second world war would run about with a rope around his neck. international, law are necessary, are absolutely compelling, but the fact cannot be overlooked that such rules, however, were not created by statesmen at the right time. case, and replaced by an order of procedure or by the sentence of a court, whose task is to apply the general law, but not to create for a single special case. a participation by the defendant Frick in the planning and preparation of wars of aggression.
The Prosecution sees such an activity in Frick's earliest cooperation with the Party which he continued until the year 1933, in order to bring Hitler to power. of Frick after the taking over of the government by Hitler, when he worked to consolidate the power of the Party and its leaders through measures of domestic policy especially by his participation to the legal measures, by which an armed force (Wehrmacht) was created, against the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, and finally his collaboration in measures by which direct preparations were made in case of war. of the defendant in the preparation of a war of aggression is of penal importance, I shall now enter upon the question as to whether the Prosecution has proved that the defendant recognized this by collaboration in the advancement of the Party and its aims as a preparation for war, and wanted it to be so, and therefore deliberately helped to bring about war himself.
Party, from the Very beginning, openly pursued the aim of bringing about a change in the foreign political situation of Germany by means of war. special proof is necessary that each of the defendants, in working for Hitler and his Party, also knowingly collaborated in the preparation of a war of aggression. planned a war of aggression, the Prosecution refers to the Party program, which names as one of its crimes the abolition of the Treaty of Versailles. With not one word, however, is it said in the Party program that this aim should be achieved by force of arms. others, from the testimony of the defendant von Neurath, there is nothing to prove an intention existing from the very beginning to wage a war of aggression. Nothing different is found in the official publications of the Party from the time of Hitler's assumption of the government. the intention to compel the revision of the Treaty of Versailles by force of arms, it was therefore, even-before 1933, permitted outside the territory of the Reich, as in the year 1930 in Danzig with the assent of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations and of the Polish President. as responsible head of the Government, took a quite unequivocal attitude in regard to the ways and aims of his foreign policy, whether in official speeches and discourses or in private conversations. power, stressed his unconditional will for peace and his abhorrence of war, and he always defended this attitude with convincing reasons. He repeated again and again that he intended to obtain certain revisions of the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means only.
I need not repeat the appropriate quotations from Hitler's speeches, which already have been submitted by the Prosecution, to prove to what extent Hitler deceived the world and the people he ruled by his peace speeches, which were repeatedly supported by a peal of church bells to increase their effectiveness.
speeches which he, as responsible Government chief, made again and again. wanted war remained, however, a hopeless minority throughout the world. Hitler's assertions of peaceful intentions seriously, and the best proof of this peace delusion of even the foreign statesmen who also knew the Party's program, lies certainly in the fact that these statesmen neglected to such a great extent to create defensive armaments against Hitler's war of aggression. Nobody in Germany and in the world who was not directly initiated into Hitler's most secret plans seriously believed in it. 1933 in the period of parliamentary opposition, it is not possible to prove a continuous preparation for a war of aggression since the twenties, supposedly discernible by anybody who looked the Party program through. The Prosecution now contends further that, even if the warlike intentions were not discernible in a general way, the intention of Hitler to prepare a war of aggression must have been clearly visible to defendant Frick by reason of the duties which Frick fulfilled since January 30th 1933 in his capacity as Reich Minister for the Interior. political power of Hitler and his Party at home. In this connection the Prosecution referred to the collaboration of Frick in the legal decrees by means of which the opposition against Hitler's system of government was destroyed in parliament and in the country; further the legislative measures which eliminated a true self-administration in the cities and rural communities; furthermore, legislative and administrative decrees by which opponents of the National Socialist system were excluded from taking any part in the business of the State and in economic life. could not have conducted another war, the beginning of which, promising such success, presupposed of necessity a complete destruction of opposition in the country and the establishment of the absolute dictatorship of Hitler.
the preparation for war is lacking. connection with a forthcoming war, if considered purely as projects on a National Socialist domestic policy. It has not been proved whether the defendant Frick had furthermore been informed of Hitler's further plans after a strengthening of power at home and for pursuing the aims of their foreign policy of the Party by other than peaceful means,but to enforce them by war. authority was Hitler's pre-suppoisition for his later known war intentions, nothing has been achieved unless the proof is forthcoming, that Hitler had, from the beginning, aimed at authoritative power in the domestic sphere as a first step towards the carrying on of war, and that Frick was aware of this when he took part in the activities of the internal policy of which he was in charge. provisions of the Charter, they do not come under the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. typical Home Office civil servant, considered his measures as absolutely independent drives within the scheme of domestic policy, which, however, had nothing whatsoever to do with the solutions by force of questions of foreign policy. dealing directly with Germany's rearmament, i.e. the reintroduction of general conscription and the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Frick, issued the orders of the civil administration for the recruitment of men liable for military service, and he therefore himself signed the Armed Forces Law for war of aggression.
of military sovereignty over the demilitarized Western Zone was explained by Hitler himself to his collaborators and the world by arguments, the reasoning of which was then widely accepted, and after the first shock many foreign statesman still believed in Hitler's well-founded assurances of peace, and advocated the presumption that there was no reason to fear any belligerent intentions of Hitler. I refer to the document 789-PS U.S.A. Exhibit No. 23 - according to which on 23 November 1939 Hitler personally declared to his Commanders-inChief that he had created the Wehrmacht in order to make war. even at that time still found credence in Germany and abroad and - as proved by the evidence - ever his collaborators in his own Cabinet who had not been initiated into his secret plans and believed in it. agreed in the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht, though contrary to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, but that they never wanted another war and did not consider that by collaborating they would contribute to the planning of a war of aggression.
As to the defendant Frick: according to the conception of his defense no proof was given that Hitler had informed him of his belligerent plans, and he therefore cannot be charged with collaborating in the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht as an intentional contribution to the planning of a war of aggression.
A similar situation arises from the defendant's activity in establishing the civil administration in general in the event of a possible war, a task with which the defendant was charged as a General Plenipotentiary for the administration of the Reich by the second Reich Defense Law dated 4 September 1938. Administration of the Reich was created only by the second Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938, and thus had not been included in the first one of 31 May 1935.
dealing with the subject of Reich Defense which since 1933 met at irregular intervals as Commission for the Defense of the Reich, as stated in the documents submitted by the Prosecution. These meetings had nothing to do with an agreement to wage war of aggression. They dealt with general questions of Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935. The organization for Reich Defense was more closely coordinated, particularly by the appointment of the General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy, and at his interrogation the defendant Schacht explained in detail that the purpose of his assignment was not preparation for a war of aggression according to the tasks and regulations to be found in the first Reich Defense Law but the organization of economy for defense in the event of a war of aggression by other States. for Reich Administration as it was created by the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept 1938 which was delegated to the defendant Frick on the basis of his position as Reich Minister of the Interior. administration for the purposes of Reich defense. According to documents which have been submitted to the Tribunal, it may have been that Hitler wanted the war at the time when he instigated, but it is nevertheless relevant for the defense of the defendant, whether Frick at that time was able to recognize the aggressive intentions of Hitler from the law itself and from its preliminary work or from other evidence or information which was communicated to him at that time.
The law itself does not allow the recognition of Hitler's intention to use it as an instrument of preparation for war of aggression in the scope of civil life. capacity as Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration had to do merely with the concentration on the domestic administration of Germany in case of a possible war or of a threat of war.
Document 3787, USA 782, which was subsequently submitted. the defense of the Reich in case of a war. It speaks about the "state of defense" and mentions the case of a "surprise threat to the Reich territory", at which occurrence certain measures must be taken. himself planned to bring about a war and according to the repeatedly discussed principle of Hitler not to divulge anymore of his plans to anyone than the respective person had to know for his own work -- which principle was strictly adhered to even with his closest collaborators -- it should not be assumed, nor has it been proved, that when the order for this law was given to the Ministry of Interior anything else was communicated than the requirement to take precautionary measures - by means of concentration of powers of the domestic/administration of the country - against the possible attack on Reich territory by other states. be considered as premeditated preparation for a war of aggression when it is declared essential to the competent agencies of the domestic administration for the defense of the Reich against the threatened attack by another state, which Hitler understood how to feign very cleverly for all those who did not need to recognize his secret plans and who nevertheless should understand his armament and the organization of the state ordered by him for case of war. as their object the activity of the defendant Frick as Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration. Document 2608 PS, USA Exhibit No, 714 -- and stated that the planned preparation of the administration for the possible event of a war had been made during the peace by the appointment of a Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration. by the text of the law.
The same applies to Document 2986 -PS USA Exhibit No. 409 -, an affidavit by the defendant to the same effect. Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration as combined with the appointment of a General Plenipotentiary for Economy and the function of the Chief of the OKW, susceptible of reference as a "Triumvirate" holding governmental authority in Germany. government by such a Triumvirate, and witness Lammers too has referred to the strictly subordinate tasks performed by these persons by virtue of orders received, tasks which had nothing to do with the preparation of a war or aggression. Prosecution as participation in preparation for a war of aggression; namely, Frick's work for the Association for Maintaining Germanism Abroad. I am referring to Documents Frick, Exhibit No. 4 and 3258 PS, the latter submitted as - GB 262 aided its cultural efforts as a union for the promotion of German cultural relations abroad. It cannot, however, be gathered from the documents that Frick extended any activity whatsoever for the furtherance of the aims of a so-called Fifth Column abroad. of the policy of the aggressive war by Frick, is the affidavit of Messersmith 2385-PS USA Exhibit No. 68. incorrect and the defendant Schacht in particular demonstrated at his examination that in essential points it cannot be correct at all. The witness has not been subjected to cross examination. more so as an additional clarifying questioningof the witness through written questionnaires onlyled to the result that the witness,by using general phrases, avoided giving concrete answers to the questions put to him.
cannot make concrete declaration at all and that he obviously was considerably deceived by his memory in his Affidavit. This may be due to his old age. essential points, can be used for passing legal judgment. defendant Frick participated in conscious preparation for war of aggression, the Prosecution submitted a further document - D 44 - USA Exhibit No. 428. From this document it is seen that the Reich Ministry of the Interior is supposed to have given a directive in the year 1933 that official publications were not to be drawn up in a form which might enable people abroad to infer an infraction of the Versailles Treaty from the publication. to be masked with the directives or whether it was only a matter of avoiding the appearance of treaty violations. The same problem exists for Document 1350-PS - USA Exhibit No. 742. This is the minutes of a conference between the Staff of the SA and the Reich Defense Minister, who proposed to the 3A in the year 1933 to have the budgetiary funds of the Reich designated by the Reich ministry of the Interior for the military training of the SA. ministry of the Interior towards this proposal and if they had accepted it, this again would have proved only that the Reich ministry of the Interior furthered the restoration of the Wehrmacht, a fact which, moreover, is already proved. recognized as a preparation for war of aggression the measures ordered by Hitler as necessary for the defense of the Reich.
with the Soviet Union, a conference certainly took place between the defendant Rosenberg and representatives of the ministries concerning measures in case of a possible occupation of territories of the Soviet Union.
This is shown in document 1039 -PS - USA Exhibit No. 146, Rosenberg's report concerning these discussions in which it is stated that negotiations took place with "Reich Minister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart)". These parentheses mean that the Reich Ministry of the Interior was represented in these negotiations by State Secretary Stuckart; therefore that Frick did not personally participate in the negotiations. Since the negotiations took placeonly a few days before the beginning fo the war in the East, it is not proven by the document that Frick himself was informed about the negotiations before the beginning of the war, which was then, as it is generally known, proclaimed by Hitler, as a necessary measure of defense against an imminent attack by the Soviet Union. It has been clarified by numerous proofs in this trial how much Hitler kept his true aggressive intentions secret, and understood generally how to cover up the true aim of all his political measures throughout the years with thousands of convincing reasons with which he justified the individual measures of his policy of aggression. his war plans, but this circle was not selected according to the position of the person concerned in the Cabinet or according to his position in the Party hierarchy, but exclusively from the viewpoint whether the person concerned had to know the aggressive character of Hitler's general policy or even his detailed plans of aggression in respect to his own tasks in the framework of the preparation of the war.
Document 326-PS USA Exhibit No. 25, shows with what consequence the principle of secrecy had been kept, even toward the older members of the Party and the administrators of important departments of the Reich Cabinet. Whoever, as the Reich Minister of the Interior, had to carry out only measures in the framework of the preparation for war, which could have been the same as tasks of a purely defensive character, was not informed concerning aggressive intention in observance of the letter's principle. even a single one of these secret conferences in which Hitler informed a circle of selected men about his foreign political plans and his war aims. Hitler had especially accentuated and given reasons for the exclusion of the Reich Cabinet as a governmental body in the document 326-PS just mentioned. USA Exhibit No. 27 -- the additional principle is established that no one may be informed about any part of the war plans who does not have to know these plans for his tasks directly. Frick's name is not only missing from the list of those present in the conferences of Hitler concerning his policy of aggression which took place before the war, but the same applies also to the nume rous conferences concerning further war aims and Hitler's aggressive intentions which had been held during the war.
them concerning the later attacks, as is shown by Hitler's lectures concerning his plans and the appropriate lists of those present. Frick, a true specialist of domestic administration who was not considered competent for military and foreign political questions, was good enough for the establishment of the civilian administration in case of any possible war. According to Hitler's opinion, the latter's foreign political and military plans were none of the former's business. determined, after the conquest of the foreign territories and after their occupation, the administrative policy in these territories and that he is responsible for it. The Prosecution considers this asserted activity of the defendant, according to Article 6, letter "a" of the statute, as "participation in the execution of wars of aggression".