The chief of the political operational staff approached Rosenberg again that the army group "Center" attached particular importance to the fact that the children should reach the Reich not by the authority of the General Plenipotentiary for the employment of Labor, but through the agency of the Reich Minister for the East, as only then could they be assured a correct treatment. loyal conditions and wanted special regulations to be issued with regard to the taking care of these people, as regards mail service between them and their parents, etc. In the event of a possible re-occupation of the territory the East Ministry could then let the boys go back. To ether with their parents they would certainly form a positive element during the subsequent re-consturction of the territory. Finally as reason for the second request addressed to the Minister it was stated in addition that the boys, to be sure, would not essentially contribute to strengthening the military power of the enemy, but that the important factor in this case was the long-range weakening of the biological strength of the enemy; not only the Reichsfuehrer SS but also the Fuehrer had expressed themselves to this effect. Rosenberg finally gave his consent to this action. within the jurisdiction of Rosenberg's administration; he did not want to destroy foreign nationals even if biological weakening was given him as a reason, -a reason which he himself did not recognize. Instead he wanted to have the children educated and trained in order to bring them with their parents back to their homes later on. That is more or less the contrary of what de defendant is criminally charged with. Later on, late in summer 1943, Rosenberg visited the Junkers's plant in Dessau where approximately White Ruthenian children's camp. The clothing young workmen was irreprochable, they were industrious, enjoyed the best treatment and get along very well with the Germans. As Rosenberg was able to see for himself the young people were taught languages and mathematics by Russian teachers. The children were cared for in forest camps by White Ruthenian mothers and women teachers. The figure of 40 000, moreover, was never attained, in fact, barely half of it.
and to the disadvantage of the defendant, to considerations of humanity cannot be successful in my estimation. For it is exactly this example which compelled me to point out the following in particular : we were in the midst of a war which was being conducted with terrible intensity on both parts. Is not war in itself "monstrous bestiality"? The "weakening of the biological strength of nations" is truly a fitting expression for the goal and purbelligerent parties were aimed at. It is impossible to think that one should want to forget this in judging the actions of the defendants, and that one should hold the defendants responsible not only for unleashing the war but in addition for the fact that war in its very essence constitutes a great crime on the part of mankind both against itself and against the laws of life. was he who issued the inhuman and barbarian decrees which aimed at carrying out the deportation of Soviet people into German slavery. This brings me to discuss the question as to whether the compulsory labor decree of 19 December 1941 and Rosenberg's other decrees concerning compulsory labor for the inhabitants of the Eastern territories were contrary to International Law. tary occupation during the war. Through this "occupatio bellica" Germany realized a complete domination and had the same sovereignty as over her own territory. While according to previous conceptions of international law the occupying power could act arbitrarily without consideration of rights and law the recent developments in international law eliminated the principle of force and brought victory to the principles of humanity and culture. Therefore, the formerly unlimited might of the occupying power was modified to limited rights.
The Hague Rules of Land. Warfare stipulated in particular the legal duties of the occupying power. On the other hand, it is not ture either that the rules of land warfare set up only certain rights for the occupying powers. They merely set a balance to the intrisically unlimited right of the occupying power to exercise all powers deriving from territorial sovereignty over an occupied territory.
THE PRESIDENTS: Would that be a convenient time to break off ?
( The Tribunal adjourned until 10 July 1946 at 1000Hours) Official Transcript of the International
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in closed session this afternoon and will not sit in open session after one o'clock.
DR. THOMA: High Tribunal, Mr. President: commitment of manpower, I should like to continue on page 33. national law: legal as long as they are not inopposition to an authenticated legal stipulated of the International Rules of Warfare. Supposition, therefore, would indicate that the occupying power is entitled to the full exercise of all powers deriving from territorial sovereignty over an occupied territory. According to the uniform opinion of experts on international law the occupying power acts by virtue of an original law of its own which is guaranteed and defined as to contents by international law only, in the interest of its own conduct of the was as well as for the protection of the civilian population in the occupied territory. (I refer to the Heyland Handbook on International Law). allegiance to the enemy sovereign but only to the occupying power; the will of the occupying power rules and decides in an occupied territory; the occupying power is the executor of its own will; its own interests alone are decisive for theexercise of its sovereign rights and it, therefore, is at liberty to act against theinterests of the enemy state (Heyland as above). right to conscript labor in the occupied territory is denied. It is stipulated, thereby, that labor services may be demanded from the inhabitants of the occupied territory; the employment must be limited to the re quirements of the occupation forces.
It must be adjusted to the available resources of the country and must be of such a nature as not to compel the population to participate in military operations against their own country.
In these stipulations I cannot discern any prohibition of labor, conscription in occupied territories; on the contrary, I consider that an approval of compulsory labor service can be deduced from them at once. The employment of such labor in war industry is undoubtedly in accordance with the requirements of the occupation forces and, in my estimation, it is equally beyond doubt that this constitutes no commitment to military operations. The rules of land warfare contain no stipulations as to whether labor service may be demanded only in the home country or whether the conscript may be transported into the native land of the occupying power for the purpose of rendering labor services there. Thus, the general principle holds good, that supposition speaks for the authority of theoccupying power to exercise to their full extent all powers deriving from territorial sovereignty. should tend to humanize war by limiting the rights of the belligerents and that more progress should be made in this sense one must consider, on the other hand, that the stern reality of war tends to lead in the opposite direction.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal would like to know whether it is your contention that the Hague Rules authorize the deportation of men, women or children to another country for the purpose of labor service.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I would like to speak about the interpretation of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare but I will merely deal with the question as to whether it is admissible that for the purpose of collaboration and for the requirements of tie occupying forces, whether it is admissible to transport inhabitants of the country for that purpose. I have stated the position here that laborers can also be transported into the native land of the occupying power. About children, of course, I have said nothing. As to Jews, I did not speak about that either. I only spoke about men able to work, who were required to work for the necessities of the occupying power and I said it was admissible -- I thought it was admissible that they be transported into thenative country of the occupying power.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to have any autho-
rities in international law which you have to cite for that proposition.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I shall mention some more quotations, more detailed quotations. I have already quoted in that regard. I quoted Heyland, "Handbook for International Law", which was published by Stier-Somlo, 1923, and I shall give more quotations.
THE PRESIDENT: will you tell no what language that book is in?
DR. THOMA: In German, Mr. president. That was the "Hand book on International Law", published by Stier-Somlo, 1923. war has developed into total war, a life and death struggle of annihilation, in which the very last physical and moral forces of the nation are mobilized and the loss of which, as is shown by the example of Germany, means unconditional surrender and total destruction of her existence as a state. this struggle of life and death should not have been granted the basic right of self-preservation recognized by international law? I refer to Strupp, "Handbook on International Law", published by Stier-Somlo, 1920, Part III, "Violations of International Law", pages 121 and following. was at stake; that is, it was an emergency which justified, the compulsory employment of labor, even if it had not been permissable according to international law. It is inherent in that anomaly called war that international law, as soon as the state of war has been proclaimed, is set aside in the interest of the objective of the war-- the overpowering of the enemy. See Strupp as above, page 172. Even through the development of civilization was accompanied by a progressive moderation of this conception, according to which everything goes in war until the enemy is destroyed, the rules of war-fare constitute even today a compromise between the demands of military necessity with their fundamental boundlessness and chastened humanitarian and civilized views.
One thing, at any rate, is certain: namely, that the existence of a genuine emergency may be pleaded, even under the stipulations of the Hague Rules of Land warfare. During the negotiations preceding the formulation of Article 46 of the Hague Rules, the following was stated literally and without opposition:
"The restrictions will affect the liberty of action of the beligerents in certain extreme emergencies". may be pleaded. It is a recognized international law that even an aggressor must not be denied the right of pleading a state of emergency in case his existence is directly threatened. Strupp, page 170. ministration, I should like to point put all that the defendant has said concerning accusations of the Soviet Prosecution, and in particular the reports of the Extraordinary State Commission and the Molotov Reports, during his testimony. Documents USSR 39, 41, 751, 89, and Transcript of 16 April 1946. I hope that the factual corrections made by the defendant will be recognized by the Tribunal.
No I come to a new subject. Contrary to the assumption of the Prosecution, Rosenburg was by no means the inspirer of Jewish persecution, anymore than he was one of the leaders and originators of the policy adopted by the Party and the German Reich as the Prosecution claims. Walsh, December 13 1945, Transcript page 1244. Rosenberg was certainly a convinced anti-semite, who expressed his conviction and the reasons for it both verbally and in writing. However, in his ease, anti-semitism was not the most outstanding of his acitivities. In his book "Blood and Honor", speeches and essays, 1919-1933, out of 64 speeches, for example, only one had a title referring to Jewry.
The s ame applies to the other two volumes of his speeches.
He felt his spiritual ancestors to be the mystic master Eckehart, Goethe, Lagarde, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain.
Anti-semitism was for him a negative momentum. His chief and most positive efforts were directed toward the publication of a now German intellectual attitude and a new German culture. Bec ause he found this endagered after 1918, he became an opponent of Jewry. Even such different personalities as von Papen, von Neurath, and Raeder now confess to their belief that the penetration of the Jewish element into the whole of public life was so great that a change had to be brought about. of Rosenberg's anti-Semitism was, above all, noble and intellectual. For example, at the Party Session of 1933 he spoke of a "chivalrous solution" of the Jewish question. We never heard Rosenberg use expressions like, "We must annihilate the Jews wherever we find them; we shall take measures that will lead to a sure success. We must cut out all feeling of sympathy". The Prosecution itself quotes the following as an expression of the program Rosenberg set up for himself:
"The Jewish question will find a decisive solution after all the Jews have been ousted as a matter of course from all official positions, and through the setting up of Ghettos". Walsh, Transcript 1236.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to interrupt. I believe that the Counsel is going beyond any permissable limits. the defendant is sitting in the lock and hearing his Counsel expressing his fascist sentiments. So far they have not been interrupted by the Court, but I think that it is absolutely inadmissable that the Defense Counsel should use this place to pro mote anti-human propaganda, otherwise lean not understand the contention of the lawyer that Rosenberg's belief in gathering dl Jews in ghettos was chivalrous. I feel that the lawyer is expressing his opinion, and I protest against the use of the International Military Tribunal for the spreading of antiSemitic propaganda. I ask the Tribunal to consider this objection of nine and to take appropriate action.
DR. THOMA: May it please the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We don't think it is necessary to trouble you. The Tribunal thinks that there may, of course, be differences of opinion as to the use of words in the course of your argument, but they see no reason for stopping you in the argument that you are presenting to the Tribunal.
DR. THOMA: Thank you. I should like to make one statement. In setting this up, I have tried to argue upon the statements of the prosecution and nothing else.
I would like to say one other thing. The words "chivalrous solution of the Jewish question" was not my expression; I just quoted that a s a statement made by Rosenberg a long time before he came into this court.
The prosecution quotes the following: "The Jewish question will find"--and so on; I have already read that. part in the boycotting of Jews in 1933, that he was not called upon to work out the laws against the Jews in 1933, 1934, 1935, and so on - expatriation, prohibition of marriages, withdrawal of the right to vote, expulsion from important positions and offices, and so on. Jews, not in the destruction of synagogues, nor in anti-Semitic demonstrations. Neither was he the instigator in the background, who sent out smaller people to commit certain actions or ordered them to do so. that took up Hitler's slogans and passed them on. For example, the motto, "The Jewish question will be solved only when the last Jew has left Germany and the European Continent." There was one slogan about the extermination of Jewry. weapons of propaganda. A Hitler speech without insults to his internal or external political opponents, or without threats of extermination was hardly imaginable. Everyone of Hitler's speeches was echoed a million times by Goebbels down to the last speaker of the party in a small country inn. The same sentences and words which Hitler had used were repeated,and not only in all the political speeches, but in the German press as well, in all the editorials and essays, until, weeks or months later, a new speech was given which brought about a new echo of a similar kind.
Rosenberg was no exception. He repeated all of Hitler's slogans just like the rest, that of the "solution of the Jewish question", and once also that of the "extermination of Jewry", and so forth. Apparently, like Hitler's other supporters, he gave little thought to the fact that in reality none of those words were clear, but that they had a sinister, double meaning and, though they may have meant real expulsion, they may also have meant the physical annihilation and murder of the Jews. made a reference to a speech of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons, in 1933, in which speech it was stated that Prussian militarism had to be exterminated. He said that no German interpreted that literally; he believed no one interpreted it in such a way that it meant the German soldiers and the National Socialist had to be exterminated, every one of them. quite apart from the knowledge and will o f the majority of the leadership of the Party--that is, Bormann, Himmler, Eichmann, and so on--there was hatched and carried out, from 1941 onwards, a mass of crime which surpassed all human conceptions of reason and morality. The Jewish question was even further developed and brought to its so-called final solution. as the specially characteristic exponent of the Party and Reich Minister for the Occupied Territories, is also responsible for the murdering of Jews, and particularly for the murdering of Jews in the East. Or, must it be recognized and admitted that though he stands a hair's breadth from the abyss, it was, after all, nothing but external circumstances which led up to it all, and that these circumstances were outside his sphere of responsibility and guilt? aimed, either openly or in secret, at the physical extermination of the Jews. His reserve and moderation were certainly no mere tactics. The gradual slipping of anti-Semitism into crime took place without his knowledge or his will.
The fact in itself that he preached anti-Semitism justifies his or his territory.
Criminal responsibility, according to the Penal Code, without exception.
The Regional Commissioner immediately made vigorous pro tests and demanded that the action be stopped at once.
With pointed revolver implicated be punished for the unheard of butcher.
The latter reported to the in higher places.
The Reich Minister for the Occupied Territories sent the requesting further instructions.
Due to an ingenious system, according to which not even obliged to report, Rosenberg could not take any further steps either in this or in similar cases.
He wasnot above the police and could only hope offices over the reported incidents that none of then knew anything about them, that it was no question of excesses, but of an action ordered by Heydrich and Himmler.
When Heydrich and Himmler declined the responsibility, Rosenberg could not suspect anything. the Reich Minister for the occupied territories-
THE PRESIDENT: Would you give us the number again?
DR. THOMA: That is 3663-PS, in which the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories--signed, "for Dr. Leibrandt"--calls for a report by the Reich Commissioner Ostland because a complaint has been made by the Chief Office of Reich Security, the RSHA, that the Reich Commissioner Ostland has prohibited Jewish executions in Libau. To this the addressee replied:
"I prohibited the execution of Jews inLibau because there was no justification for the way in which it was carried out."
This is followed by a request for further instructions. Of this document--which is signed by the departmental chief Liebrandt, and which in no way points to any knowledge on the part of the defendant Rosenberg--the following careful statement may be made in brief: because the executions of Jews were not continued, but it simply points to the transfer of a complaint to the Reich Security Office, the RSHA, with a request to report. It is to be pesumed that the reason for the complaint was that the Reich Commissioner Ostland encroached on the competency of the Reich Security Chief, RSHA, and the demand for a report was supposedly issued in that sense. signed "for Braeutigam", asking the Reich Commissioner Ostland to settle directly any questions which occurred with the Higher SS and Police Leaders.
To identify the sign "R" as Rosenberg's initial, because the Prosecution obviously was more than doubtful about Rosenberg's knowledge of matters, turned out to be a failure, too.
The Document No. 3426-PS concerns a letter of the General Commissioner for white Ruthenia to the Reich Commissioner for the East. It is a shocking document about the mass extermination of Jews in White Ruthenia; however, there is nothing of interest in it for the case against Rosenberg, because these horrible events may be attributed to him only if he knew of them, and, neglecting his duty, failed to interview. There is no actual proof to go by for a supposition of such knowledge. The claim that these documents were found in Rosenberg's possession is not in accordance with the actual facts, for they show the Reich Commissioner in Riga as the addressee.
In the Aktennotiz (the signed note) for the Fuehrer of the 18th of December, 1941 (Document No. 001-PS, USA 282) the defendant suggested the following, which I must quote literally: "The outrages against members of the German Wehrmacht have not stopped, but have gone on. It looks as though there were an obvious plan to disturb German-French cooperation to force Germany to take measures of retaliation, thereby bringing about a new defensive attitude on the part of the French against Germany. My suggestion to the Fuehrer is that instead of killing 100 Frenchmen now, he should have 100 or more Jewish bankers, lawyers, etc., shot". but one thing is certain, that Rosenberg has convinced such a measure was admissible. In that case, however, his suggestion must be considered in that light, and can by no means be judged as an independent incitement to murder.
The suggestion, however, had no results. In his reply of December 31, 1941, Lammers, acting on the Fuehrer's order, merely referred to the suggestion of utilizing the furniture and fittings from Jewish houses, and not to the shooting of hostages. Rosenberg made no more reference to it, either. Rosenberg, when the latter was in the witness box, that that was murder. Gentlemen of the Tribunal, it was not murder, because no execution took place. It was no incitement to murder. One can only incite someone who still has to be convinced or persuaded.
facturo, he can be incited no more, and there is only the derelict of a suggestion of a criminal act, which, according to German law, is just a violation to receive only slight punishment because it has had no consequence. witness that on one occasion a regional commissioner in the East was sentenced to death for having extorted valuables from a Jewish family, and that that sentence was carried out. Please do not consider it a bad argument of defense when I say: Does that not prove that Rosenberg loathed criminal acts against the Jews?
5. The Document S-135, USSR-289, refers to the report of the General Commissioner of white Ruthenia, in Minsk, dated June 1, 1943, on the subject of what happened in the prison of Minsk as regards gold fillings. This was addressed to the Reich Commissioner of Ostland, who forwarded the report on the 18th of June 1943, with his marked anger. already made a statement on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we are going a little too fast.
DR. THOMA: Thank you.
I should like to repeat this briefly now: He had returned on the 22nd of July, 1943, from an official visit to the Ukraine and found a pile of notices about conferences, a number of letters, and above all the Fuehrer decree from the middle of June, 1943, in which Rosenberg was instructed to limited himself to the principles of legislation and not to bother about the details of law. remember it -- that the letter was explained to him by his office, and presumably in the course of the reading hewas informed of many documents and learned that there was again serious trouble between the Police and Civilian Administration. And it is probable that Rosenberg said: Turn that over for investigation to Gauleiter Meyer or to the Police Liaison Officer. Rosenberg's memory.
and all the other frightful things not covered in the documents, but which actually happened, call for atonement. Nobody is in doubt that not only the lesser tormentors acting on higher orders might be punished, but also and above all those who issued the orders and those responsible for the crimes. Rosenberg did not issue an order to murder the Jews; so much is clear. But is he, in spite of this, responsible for the frightful murders? documents. In any case, it could not be determined that he know anything about what went on. But can we condemn Rosenberg on the basis of his supposed and probable knowledge? Rosenberg has by no means the intention of playing a false and cowardly game of hide-and-seek behind his advisors and subordinates. But let us remember with what cunning the so-called executions of the Jews were kept secret, not only from the public, but even from Hitler's most important colleagues. hide-and-seek with Rosenberg? The thoughts and intentions of none of the other NSDAP leaders were revealed so openly and clearly to all the world as those of the editor Rosenberg, in particular. Of none other could one be so sure that would turn with indignation from the cruel, inhuman acts. of this, the greatest crime of all. It is not proved, but one could imagine it and surmise it. Is he then responsible, too? Peculiar, even subtle, too, as we well know, was the departmental authority and the responsibility which went with it in the Eastern countries. The entire complex of the police force had been taken from Rosenberg's sphere of influence, the highest instance of which was Himmler, and under him Heydrich. Of their orders and measures Rosenberg had no knowledge and no suspicion, as a rule. subordinate and responsible to their police superiors and no one else. It was quite immaterial whether or not Rosenberg knew anything of the measures taken by the police. He could do as little about it as any other of his fellow citizens in the Third Reich. One might say, yes, he could have remonstrated with Himmler or Hitler; he could have given up his position.
Of course, he could have done so. The point, however, is not whether he could have done it. The question is, Would he have achieved anything by doing so. That is to say, whether he could have prevented the executions. For only in such a case could his responsibility be affirmed oh the ground of his failure to do so, and only in such a case could one speak of causality without which criminal responsibility is unthinkable.
One can make further claims, still under the assumption of Rosenberg's knowledge of matters, that Rosenberg could at least have stepped in against the Reich Commissioners, who were obviously involved in these matters. We know that the administrative organization and the dividing up of supreme authority in the last were vague, to say the least. The Reich Commissioners were sovereign masters in their own territory. They had the final say in the shooting of hostages and in other retaliatory measures of far-reaching consequence. And what was the extent of their authority? In case the Reich Commissioner was dissatisifed with Rosenberg -- and he mostly was dissatisifed -- he went to Hitler. those Kech as regards the execution of Jews he would have been upheld by Hitler if he had gone to him? In this again, there is a lack of that causality which is indispensible for a legal indictment.
trial against Rosenberg and have accused him of having systematically stolen objects of art and science on a large scale in the East and West (Storey 18 December 1945, Protocol Page 1408; Gerthofer, February 6, 1946, Protocol Page 3945; Smirnow February 15, 1946, and February 21, 1946). First I must take exception to some obvious exaggerations and injustices, that is, the assertion that the activities of the special staff in the West extended to public and private property without distinction, (Page 3951) and that the objects of art Germany appropriated amount to more than the treasures of the Metropolitan Museum in New York, of the British Museum in London, of the Louvre in Paris, and of the Tretjakew gallery all together.. Further, I must declare the statement incorrect that the looting program of Rosenberg was intended to rob the occupied countries of their entire centuries-old possessions of art and science. Finally, the Prosecution contrasts Rosenberg's actions to the looting of art -- treasures in former wars. It says that while egotism, conceit, taste and personal inclination were the underlying motives of such looting, the national-socialists in the first place had the criminal intention of storing up reserves of things of value. (Page 3965). I think it unnecessary to go back over the looting of art treasures in former times as far as Napoleon, because the concepts of International Law and regulations have changed in the meantime, but I should like to mention two things:
1) How many of the most famous objects of art in the most famous galleries of the world got there through the channels of war and how many get there in a peaceful way?
2) I can accept the fact that the Prosecution denies Rosenberg any delight in art, or joy in the possession of treasures of art as a possible motive for his actions because Rosenberg was no pirate of art -- no thief. He had no intention of appropriating the objects of art for himself or for someone else.
What were the actual facts? Rosenberg's operative staff was active in the east and in the west.
It had two tasks, 1) to search libraries, archives, etc., for material suitable for the "high school" of the Party which had been planned to confiscate this material and take it away for the purpose of research, and 2) to seize objects of cultural value that were in possession of or which belonged to Jews, or which had no owner or were of a doubtful origin. The Prosecution says "the true and only motive, the true and only purpose of this 'seizure' was robbery and looting. There could be no question of intentions of 'more safeguarding'." Ostland that he wished distinctly to prohibit the transfer for any kind of art treasure from any place whatsoever without the approval of the Reich Commissioner. (Document Number 1015c-PS). On 30 September 1942 the High Command issued an order in agreement with Rosenberg to the following effect.
"Apart from exceptional cases when it is urgent to safeguard objects of cultural value which are in danger, it is desired that for the time being such objects be left where they are." Further, it says, "The troops and all military service posts within the operational area are invariably directed to spare valuable cultural monuments as far as possible and to prevent their destruction or damage." in the occupied eastern territories the activities of the Special Staff for Fine Arts were restricted to the scientific and photographic seizure of official collections, and that the safeguarding and protection of these was carried out in cooperation with the military and civilian service posts. It further says that in the course of vacating the territories, a few hundred valuable Ikons and paintings were saved and with the cooperation of individual army groups were brought to a place of hiding in the Reich. Finally, on 12 June 1942 Rosenberg sent out the following decree in a circular letter to the highest Reich authorities. In the occupied eastern territories a number of service posts and individual people are oc cupied with the salvaging of objects of cultural value.
They worked from various angles and independent of each other. It is absolutely essential for the administration of the territories that a survey be made of the existing objects of cultural value. Furthermore it must be seen to that as a general rule they be left where they are for the time being. To this end, I have set up a central post for special discernment in my Ministry to lay hold of and salvage cultural value in the East." view that objects of cultural value and remain in the country and only through the retreat of the German troops were few hundred valuable Ikons and valuable paintings brought into Germany. mobile are as exposed to the danger of destruction as are any other values. Rosenberg could have stopped all unnecessary destruction, theft and removal inasmuch as he centralized the safeguarding of objects of cultural value and had all necessary action taken through his operational staff in the east and the West. (See Abels' report on the library at Minsk 076-PS, USSR 375.) It is quite in accordance with the conception of International Law (See Scholz, private Property in Occupied and Unoccupied Enemy Country, Berlin 1919, page 36) that care should be taken on the part of the occupiers not only to protect but to safeguard and salvage protected objects of art as far as the war situation permits. Yes, it is even considered a cultural duty for the occupier to remove particularly valuable objects of art from the zone of fire and place then in safety as far as possible. Under the circumstances the concept of International Law may make it the right and duty of the occupier to bring into his own country for reasons of salvage objects of special scientific and artistic value. This is not an inadmissable seizure (Article 56 Per. 2, LKO), because the latter term could only apply to acts which are hostile to culture and not acts which are friendly to culture. (See Scholz, Page 37.)
Finally, I want to refer to document Number 1109-PS. A report according to which scientific institute that had been saved were ready to be taken back to the Ukraine immediately after the hoped for re-entry of the troops.
I consider it completely impossible to read anything about looting into this clear text. of considerable value were destroyed by direct military actions or by wanton destruction or looting. It would be a fundamental misjudgment of the true facts of the case and a great injustice if these losses should be charged to the account of the Rosenberg Einsatzstab, and its chief, for his efforts were in the opposite direction.
In the West (I refer to the testimony of Robert Scholz of the 19th of May, 1946, Document Rosenberg 041), the case was different but, in my opinion, here also the defendant cannot be charged with looting and robbing objects of art. When in the summer of 1940 the Parissiennes with the exception of the Jews had once more returned, somebody conceived the idea of searching the now ownerless apartments, houses, and castles for books and libraries and of taking what was interesting of this scientific material to Germany. From various branches of the Wehrmacht, the Armed Forces, the report came that especially in Jewish castles there were collections of objects of art which one could not guarantee would remain intact in case of a long occupation. Thereupon, Rosenberg made the proposal that his Einsatzstab be allowed to direct its attention at objects of art and to take care of them, which was then ordered by Hitler.
What did the Einsatzstab do with these objects of art? It set up an accurate card index containing the names of the particular owner of each picture, photographed the objects of art, scientifically appraised then, repaired them expertly insofar as was necessary packed them carefully and shipped them to the Bavarian castles of Neuschwanstein and Chiemsee. Because of the danger of air raids, they were then stored in an old Austrian nine. Rosenberg attached great importance to keeping the objects cared for by the Einsatzstab separately and not mixed in with the great purchases which Hitler made for those proposed galleries in Linz.