This lack of knowledge seems to be confirmed by the statement of Dr. Meyer of the International Red Cross for the permission to have the International Red Cross visit the Jewish Camp at Theresienstadt and to allow food and medicalsupplies to be sent in, coming from Kaltenbrunner, seems to be proof of the bad conditions in the camps during the last months of the war; nobody would allow neutral or foreign observers to have insight into the camps, if it had been known that crimes against humanity occurred regularly in the camps, as is asserted by the prosecution. In any case, I do not come to the result that Kaltenbrunner had full knowledge of the conditions in the concentration camps, but that it was his duty to investigate into the fate of those who were imprisoned. Kaltenbrunner might have found out then, that a considerable number of the inmates were sent to the camps because they were criminals, a much smaller portion was there because of their political or ideological viewpoints or because of their race; but then he would have found out about those primitive offenses against humanity, about those excesses and all the distress of these people, that I do contest in agreement with Kaltenbrunner. even the chief of the RSHA found nearly unconquerable obstacles in the hierarchy of jurisdiction and authority of other offices and persons. The improvement of the sad lot of the internees was from 1943 a problem which could have been solved only through the dissolution of such camps. A Germany of the last 12 years without any concentration camps would, indeed, have been an utopia. On the whole, Kaltenbrunner was but a small wheel of this machinery. In the preceding paragraph, I spoke about the subject of the orders for protective custody and of their effect.
Dr. Kaltenbrunner has affirmed the necessity for work education camps, owing to - as stated by him during his examination - the conditions then prevailing in the Reich, to the short comings of the labor market, and to other reasons, and if I am not mistaken, no convincing proof was submitted of mistreatment and cruelties in such camps . The reason may well lie in the fact that these camps were in some respects only related to, but not on equal footing with concentration camps.
With all available means of evidence, Kaltenbrunner has opposed the accusation of having covered orders of execution with his signature. The witnesses Hoess and Zutter state that they saw such orders in isolated cases. The prosecution, however, does not seem to have proved that any such orders were issued without judicial sentence or without reasons justifying the death, with the exception of a particularly serious case reported from hearsay by the witness Zutter, adjutant of the camp commandant of Mauthausen. Thereby, a teletype, signed by Kaltenbrunner, is said to have authorized, in the spring of 1945, the execution of parachutists. An original signature by Kaltenbrunner is entirely lacking. I think I may assert that he did not sign any such orders concerning life and death, because he was not authorized to do so. Dr. Hoettl as a witness stated : "No, Kaltenbrunner did not issue such orders and could not in my opinion give such orders (for killing Jews) on his own accord". And Waneck explicitly confirmed as follows :
It is known to me that Himmler personally decided over life and death and other punishment of inmates of concentration camps. be considered proven. of Kaltenbrunner completely on this point. If such orders were executed on members of foreign powers, for example based on the socalled "Commando-Order" of Hitler of 18 October 1942, then there arises the question of the responsibility of that person whose signature was affixed to these orders, because the misuse of his name by subalterns was possible. It is certain that Kaltenbrunner had exerted not the least influence an originating the "Commando-Order". It can, however, hardly be doubted that this decree in itself constituted a violation of International Law. The development of the second World War into a total was by necessity created an abundance of now stratagems. Even where bona fide soldiers were employed in their execution, a motive of bitterness, humanly quite understandable, over the perhaps gangsterlike conduct of command troops concerned and other things could not justify the order. Fortunately but very few people fell victim to this order of Hitler as defendant Jodl has testified. Perhaps one would ask me whether it is my duty or whether I am only permitted to reiterate such points of incrimination as I have just done, since this seems to be the task of the prosecution. To this I reply: If the defense is so liberal as to admit the negative side of a personality, it surely is apt to be heard more readily when it approaches the Tribunal with the request to appraise the positive side in its full significance.
However, is there a positive side at all in the present case? I believe, I may answer that question in the affirmative. I already pointed out several facts which are connected with the time of the assumption of office by Kaltenbrunner. During the short time of 2 years of activity, this man has made himself a bearer of happy and humane ideas. I wish to remind of his attitude toward the lynch order of Hitler with respect to shot-down enemy aviators.
The witness, General of the Air Force, Keller portrayed the decent conduct of Kaltenbrunner which led to a total sabotage of this order. After first describing the contents of Hitler's order and Hitler's threat then pronounced during the discussion of the situation, namely that all and any saboteurs of this order shall be shot dead, Keller continues to repeat the assertions of Kaltenbruner "Kaltenbrunner said:
The tasks of the SD are continuously given a wrong interpretation. Such matters are not the concern of the SD. Moreover, no German's soldier will do what the Fuehrer demands. He does not kill prisoners and if a few fanatic partisans of Mr. Bermann try to do so, the German soldier will interfere.... Furthermore, I myself will do nothing in this matter...." on that matter. This positive action of Kaltenbrunner, important for the judgment of the actual nature of his personality, does not stand alone. Witness Dr. Hoettl confirmed the fact that in questions of the future fate of Germany, Kaltenbrunner went, if not beyond, at least up to the borderline of high treason. This witness for example confirms that Kaltenbrunner in March 1944 caused Hitler to moderate the plans concerning the Hungarian question, and that he succeeded in preventing the entry of Rumanian units into Hungary.
Dr. Hoettl then says literally:
"Since 1943. I advocated towards Kaltenbrunner that Germany must attempt at all cost to and the war. I informed him of my connections with an American authority in Lisbon. I also informed him that by way of the Austrian resistance movement I had taken up now contacts with an American authority abroad. He declared to be prepared to go to Switzerland with me and there to take up personally negotiations with the American representative, in order to prevent further useless bloodshed."
The depositions of witness Dr. Neubacher run along the same lines. This witness testified to an important positive human action of Kaltenbrunner.
Upon the question whether Kaltenbrunner had assisted the witness in moderating, as much as possible, terror policies in Serbia, Dr. Neubacher answered--and I quote--:
"Yes, in this field I owe much to the assistance of Kaltenbrunner. The German police agencies in Serbia knew of no and of Kaltenbrunner that he, in his capacity as Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service uncompromisingly assisted my policies in the southeastern territory. Thereby my ability to influence the police offices was accomplished. Kaltenbrunner's assistance was of value in my aspirations to overthrow the then prevailing system of collective responsibility and repression with the aid of judidious officers." Cross, which is duo to the initiative of Kaltenbrunner. The activity of the defendant with respect to this, was portrayed by the witness Professor Burckhardt, Dr. Bachmann and Dr. Meyer. As a consequence many thousands were able to exchange their captivity for liberty. I should like to draw your attention to a few words submitted by the defendant Seyss-In*uqrt on two points. He mentioned that Kaltenbrunner worked for a complete autonomy of the polish state as well as for the reintroduction of the independence of both Christian Churches. I might add that Dr. Hoettl testified that right from the beginning of his activity Kaltenbrunner took care of that position, during which he overcame the energies and resistance put up by Bermann. in this field. Therefore, it seems to me to be of significance to point and his efforts to make Austrian Gauleiters understand that any resistance against troops of the Western powers would be senseless, and that in view of this, irresponsible orders for resistance were not to be issued. This was confirmed by the witness Waneck. The prosecution held Kaltenbrunner responsible for the evacuation and planned destruction of certain concentration camps. I believe this proof may not only be considered as unsucessful, but rather as a proof for the contrary.
Upon the question addressed to Dr. Hoettl, whether Kaltenbrunner had instructed the Commandant of the concentration camp Mauthausen to surrender the camp to the advancing tropps, Dr. Hoettl answered:
"It is correct that Kaltenbrunner issued such an order. He dictated it in my presence for transmission to the Camp Commandant." declared very logically: with professional criminals, was not to be evacuated, an order to evacuate Dachau was devoid of any basis by reason of its -compared with Mauthausen--harmless inmates, according to the testimony of Freiherr von Eberstein, the destruction of the concentration camp Dachau with its two secondary camps was the wish dream of the then Gauleiter of Munich, Giessler. order of Kaltenbrunner had not become known to him; that, however, duo to his position with Kaltenbrunner he would have known it had such an order been issued by the latter or oven if the issuance of such an order had been taken into consideration. with certainty. The witness House in his examination, mentioned an order of evacuation by Himmler as well as directly by Hitler. In this connection it seems appropriate to me to point to Kaltenbrunner's participation in the sad case of Sagan as charged by the prosecution. With reference to Kaltenbrunner's statement, confirmed by the examination of the witness Wielen, it appears to me to be a proven fact that this matter camp for the first time before Kaltenbrunner only several weeks later, after the conclusion of this tragedy. the Einsatz group, deployed upon the basis of Hitler's "Commissar Order" of 1941, were still in existence and functioning after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner. Some facts speak for it; others against it.
Kaltenbrunner denied the existence of those groups for the period of his office as Chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. I do not want to lose myself in details but I should like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to those doubts. The same applies, for example, to the bullet decree, the Kugelerlass, Document PS 1650, which confirms that it was not Kaltenbrunner but Mueller, the infamous Chef of Amt IV who signed the instructions involved, while document PS 3844, deals with personal signatures of the defendant. It appears to me that the first document deserves preference. May I finally draw your attention to such documents, which are rather inconclusive, insofar as they are based upon indirect observation.
I trust that the Tribunal possesses sufficient experience in evaluating evidence so that I do not have to argue about this any further.
I may be the more justified,in emphasizing the positive in Kaltenbrunner's personality. In how far, however, will I be justified in stating that Kaltenbrunner had actually insufficient knowledge of many war crimes and crimes against humanity which in the course of the last 2 years of war were committed with some kind of participation of the Section IV (Gestapo)? exculpating the Chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt? Kaltenbrunner admitted during his examination that he received knowledge of orders, instructions and directives, unmindful of their originating long before, in some instances even several years before his assumption of office, only very late, sometimes as late as 1944 or 1945. particularly, that those orders, contrary to international morals and decency, do eventually go back to a time during which Dr. Kaltenbrunner was still living in Austria. I will not at this moment try to prove in detail those statements of Kaltenbrunner. orders, decrees, directives, etc., were also executed during the period of time in which the defendant was in office as head of the Reich Security Main Office. It is also often very difficult for the defense counsel to follow up the secret channels of knowing or not knowing the defendant. Perhaps the defense counsel sometimes lacks the necessary distance for a free judging in view of the hecatombes of victims spread out across a whole continent and he is unjust. I add that we may leave the character formation of the defendant to history as, even if it is too late, the defense counsel may fail if he wishes to draw the picture of his client.
At his interrogation at Court Kaltenbrunner once ex-
plained the difficult position he was in when he took over his office on February 1st 1943, and I hope that nobody will misjudge this situation. The Reich was still fighting and even in 1943 still dangerous for any adversary colliding with it. But it was already clear that it was a fight for a goal in the infinitely far away and out of reach. Who tries to hold back the spokes of the wheels of a carriage railing into an abyss at top speed will perish. Couples with these conditions, from which there was no way of escaping, there was an officiousness, uncreative are caused by nervous insecurity in all areas of private and public life. Kaltenbrunner said with regard to this situation:
"I beg you to put yourself into my situation. I came to Berlin in the beginning of February 1943. I began my work in May 1943, except for a few visits of introduction. In the fourth year of the war the orders and decrees of the Reich had piled up also in the executive sector already to many thousands on the tables, and in the filing cabinets of the civil service. It was quite impossible for a human being to read through all that, even in the course of a year. Even if I had felt it to be my duty, I could never possibly had made myself acquainted with all these orders". according to the evidence given by the witness, Dr. Hoett and others, the REHA in Berlin had 3,000 employees of all categories when Kaltenbrunner was in office, and that according to the statement of the name witness, Kaltenbrunner never dominated this office completely. whether it was Kaltenbrunner's duty to have himself informed in the shortest possible time about the most essential proceedings, at least in all the offices of the main Office for Reich Security and whether he would not then very soon, after all, have obtained knowledge of, for example, Himmler's and Eichmann's Jewish operation and many other serious terrorist measures.
I may remind you that Kaltenbrunner, in answering my question, declared repeatedly and emphatically before this Tribunal, that he protested regularly every time he heard of such occurrences, addressing himself to Himmler and even Hitler, but that he had had but little success and that only after a long while. The defendant, for example, traces back the stopping of the extermination of Jews by a n order of Hitler in October 1944, to his personal initiative. However difficult it may be to judge whether the power and influence of a single would have been sufficient to bring about the suspension of a program of extermination, already in its final phase, I believe I may say, without being incorrect, that many tens of thousands of Jews owe it to this man that they escaped the hell of Auschwitz and still see the light of the sun. From the statements of Messrs. Dr. Brachmann and Dr. Meyer of the International Red Cross, it appears that Kaltenbrunner asked the International Red Cross to organize relief-shipments to a large Jewish camp at Unskirchen near Wels.
Witness Wanek has charaterzied Kaltenbrunner's attitude towards the question of Himmler's Jewish policy as follows: He says: and discussions, we did not touch the problem of the Jewish policy any more. At the time Kaltenbrunner came into office this question was already so far advanced that Kaltenbrunner could not have had any more influence on it. If Kaltenbrunner expressed himself at all on the subject, it was to the effect that mistakes had been made here that could never be made good." conducted independently of this enterprize, owing to, and through the direct channel of the command of Himmler-Eichmann and says that the position of Eichmann, which already had been a dominating one when Heydrich was still alive, had increased steadily, so that eventually he would have acted completely independently in the entire Jewish sphere.
And here I add that, according to Hoess' statement, the only man left alive who is familiar with this question, it is a proven fact that only about two to three hundred people know of that dreadful order of Himmler's which was given during a conference which lasted for ten or fifteen minutes, the order on the basis of which more than four million people were exterminated.
And I add that about those things, a nation of eighty million could have known little or probably nothing, natters which happened in the southeast of the Reich during the war. cussing the Jewish question declared:
"It is the greatest nonsense; all the Jews should be released, that is my personal opinion. But in spite of all this, the fundamental question is raised for the problem of guilt: may a high official and the director of an influential office, whose subordinates in a far-reaching hierarchy continuously commit crimes against humanity and against the rules of international law, assume such an office at all or remain in such an office, although he condemns these crimes. But is it perhaps a different case, if this man has the intention of doing all that is humanly possible to break the chain of crimes and thereby finally to become a benefac* of humanity? The last question is in my opinion to be answered in the affirmative. It is to be appraise d solely from the standpoint of the highest ethic principles.
My further thought in this connection is the following: he who invoke his philanthropic intention is free of guilt if, from the first day of his taking over such an office, he refuses all active participation in the direct commission of injustice and even going beyond this, however, uses every conceivable possibility nay, seeks it out, in order to achieve the elimination of unjust orders and their execution through his never ending resistance and every kind of human cunning. these things. On account of the importance of thequestion I should like to refer to his interrogation:
"Question: I ask you whether there was a possibility that you might have brought about a change after having gradually learned the conditions in the Secret State Police and in the concentration camps, etc. If this possibility existed, will you then say that an alleviation, i.e. an improvement, was brought about in the conditions in these fields due to your remaining in office?
Kaltenbrunner says: "I repeatedly applied for service at the front. But the most burning question which I had to decide for myself was whether the conditions would be thereby improved, alleviated or changed. Or is it your duty to do all that is possible in this position to change all the conditions that have here been so severely criticized? As my repeated demands to be sent to the front were refused, all I could do, therefore, was to make a personal attempt to change a system, the ideological and legal foundations of which I could no longer change, which has been illustrated by all the orders presented here from the period before I was in office; I could only try to moderate these methods in order to help to eliminate them definitely.
"Question: And so, did you consider it consistent with your conscience to remain in spite of this?
"Answer: In view of the possibility of constantly using my influence on Hitler, Himmler and other people, I could not in my opinion reconcile it with my conscience to give up this position. I considered it my duty to take a personal stand against injustice." decide, whether this conscience, taking into consideration duty towards one's own country but also towards the community of manking has failed or not. exists in itself for every human being, regardless of his position. This duty is expressly affirmed by Kaltenbrunner also. He who holds a state-office, must in the first place be able to prove that he contributed toward abolishing the gigantic injustice which occurred in Europe as soon as he learned of it, if he does not want to become guilty. Has Dr. Kaltenbrunner presented sufficient proofs? The answer to this question I leave to your judgment. But one thing I should like to express as my opinion: This man was no conspirator, but rather he was exclusively a man acting under orders and under compulsion.
Himmler's order was to take over the Main Reich Security Office. Is it tight that a given order should change the fundamental aspect of the problem? This question is of the highest importance. The Charter of this Tribunal has forbidden appealing to orders for the purpose of avoiding punishment. The reasons given for this by the American chief prosecutor proceeded from the presumed knowledge of the crimes or their background in the minds of the higher leaders which, therefore, prevented him from appealing to orders given. Like a red thread the fact runs through this trial that hardly one high official in whatever position of public life he may have been, was put into office without the order of the highest representative of the legal authority of the state; for in the last three years of the war the already clearlydistinguishable inevitable destiny of the Reich meant for the holder of a high office the renunciation of that part of life which many people say makes life worthwhile.
Even during the duration of the war, orders held the office holder fast in his position as with an iron ring. There is also no doubt that he who refused to obey an order, especially in the last years of the war, had to fear his own death, and possibly also the extinction of his family. 1933, the appeal to the above-mentioned state of necessity ought not to be denied to the defendant, because that principle of necessity, which exists also in the German criminal code and which probably exists in the criminal codes of all civilized nations, is based on the freedom of the individual being necessary for the affirmation of any guilt.
deprives him of this liberty by endangering his life, then, on principle, he is not guilty. I do not want at this instant, to examine whether in the German world of reality of the last years such a direct immediate danger for one's own life always existed, an encroachment upon the freedom of the man receiving orders existed in smaller or larger dimension without doubt. It seems certain to me that Himmler would have interpreted a refusal of Kaltenbrunner to take over the direction of the Reich Security-Main Office as sabotage and would, as a necessary conclusion, have eliminated him. has over known. Many even affirm the duty to kill such a monster, so as to guarantee for millions of human beings the right of freedom and life. At these trials the most different points of view with regard to the "Putsch especially the killing of the tyrant, have been preferred by witnesses and defendants. I cannot recognize the duty, but the right is certainly not contestable. If the oppression of human freedom occurs by means of a clearly unjust, because misanthropic, order, the scales in the now ensuing conflict between obedience and freedom of conscience will be turned to the side of the latter. Also the so-called oath of allegiance could not justify a different point of view because, as everybody feels, the obligation to allegiance presupposes duties of both partners so that he who treads under foot the obligation to respect human conscience in the person of his subalterns loses, at the same moment, the right to expect obedience. The tortured conscience is freed and breaks the tics which the oath had created. Perhaps some persons will not agree with my point of view on this problem and will point at the necessity of an orderly state of community and the wholesomeness of obedience especially in the interest of this orderly state, or they will point at the prudence of those in command and at the impossibility of knowing and evaluating all such orders as the person in command can, they will point to patriotism and many more other points of view. And although all that may be correct, it remains the absolute duty, to resist an order, the purpose of which, clearly recognizable for a subaltern, contains the realization of evil and violates unequivocally the sound sentiments for humanity and peace among peoples and individuals.
The phrase "In the fight of a people for life or death there is no question of legality", is not thought out to the end. could not induce me to change my conviction. Dr. Kaltenbrunner would not deny that he who stands at the heed of on office of great importance to the community is obliged to sacrifice also his life under the above-mentioned provisions. If, however the direct present danger for his own life and that of his family cannot excuse him, it does moderate his culpability. Kaltenbrunner only means to point to this moral and legal evaluation of his position. Thus he emphasizes a fact, historically proven, which was one of the deeper reasons for the collapse of the Reich; for no living man can bring liberty, peace, and welfare to a country who himself carries chains reluctantly and has lost that freedom which is the decisive characteristic of all human beings. I believe Kaltenbrunner would like to be reborn and I know that he would fight for that freedom with his life's blood. Kaltenbrunner is guilty; but he is less guilty than he appears to be for the Prosecution. He will await your judgement as the last representative of an ominous symbol of a period of the Reich, darker and more laden with anguish than any other period and yet he was a man, one could not meet without a feeling of pathos.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA (Counsel for defendant Rosenberg): May it please the Tribunal: The documentary file which was shown in this room and which was supposed to illustrate the Rise and Fall of National Socialism begins with a speech delivered by Rosenberg concerning the development of the Party up to the taking over of power. He also describes the Munich insurrection and says that in the morning of 9 November 1923 he saw police cars with meaning-guns assembling in the Ludwigstrasse in Munich and he knew that the march to the Feldherrnhalle was imminent. Nevertheless he marched in the first lines. Today, also, my client takes the same position in face of the Indictment formulated by the Prosecutors of the United Nations. He does not want to be pictures as though nobody paid any attention to his books, his speeches and his publications. Even today he does not want to appear as another person than he was once before, a fighter for Germany's strong position in the world, namely a German Reich in which national freedom should be linked to social justice.
speak Russian as a young boy, passed his examination in Moscow after the Technical College in Riga moved to Moscow during the first world war, took an interest in Russian literature end art, had Russian friends, and was puzzled by the fact that the Russian nation, defined by Dostoyevsky as "the nation with God in its heart" was overcome by the spirit of materialistic Marxism and he considered it inconceivable and unjust that the right of self determination had often been promised indeed but never voluntarily granted to many nations of Eastern Europe which had been conquered by Tsarism as late as the 19th century.
not directed against certain temporary political phenomena only, but against the whole national tradition, against the religious faith and against the old rural foundations of the Eastern European nations, and generally against the idea of personal property. At the end of 1918, he came to Germany and saw the danger of a Bolshevistic revolution in Germany too; he saw the whole spiritual and material civilization of the Occident endangered, and believed to have found his life-work in the struggle against this danger as a follower of Adolf Hitler. It was a p o l i t i c a l struggle against fanatic and well-organized opponents who disposed of inter national resources and international backing and who acted according to the principle: "Hit the Fascists wherever you can." But as little as one can deduce from the latter slogan that the Soviet entertained intentions of military aggression against Fascist Italy just as little one can say that the struggle of the NationalSocialists against Bolshevism meant a preparation for a war of aggression against the USSR. Soviet Union, especially a war of aggression against the latter, seemed as likely or as unlikely as to any German or foreign politician who had read the book Mein Kampf. It is not right to maintain that he was initiated in some way in plans of aggression against the Soviet Union; he rather publicly advocated proper relations with Moscow (Document Rosenberg 7b, Page 147). Rosenberg never wanted a military intervention against the Soviet Union. However, he feared, in turn the entry of the Red Army into the border state and then into Germany. the Man-Aggression Pact between the German Reich and the Soviet Union--he was as little informed about the preliminary discussions as he was about the other foreign political measures taken by the Fuehrer--he might have gone to see the Fuehrer and protested against it. He did not do it and he did not object to it with a single word, which, the witnesss Goering confirmed as being a statement of Hitler's.As a witness Rosenberg himself described (Transcript of 16 April 1946, Page 789) that he was then suddenly called to Hitler at the beginning of April 1941, who told him that he considered a military clash with the Soviet Union as inevitable.
Hitler offered two reasons for it:
1) The military occupation of Rumanian territory, namely Bessarabia and North Bukowina.
2) The tremendous increase of the Red Armies along the line of demarcation and on Soviet-Russian territory in general, which had been going on for a long time. sued the appropriate military and other orders and he said that he would appoint Rosenberg in some way as a political advisor. As he further states as a witness, Rosenberg found himself confronted with an accomplished fact, and even the sole attempt to talk about it was cut short by the Fuehrer with the remark that the orders had been issued and that hardly anything could be changed in this matter. There upon Rosenberg called some of his closest collaborators together because he did not know whether the military event would take place very soon or later on, and he also had some plan made concerning the treatment of the political problems. On 20 April 1941, Rosenberg received from Hitler the preliminary order to establish a central office to deal with questions concerning the East and to contact the competent highest Reich authorities with respect to these matters (Document Number PS 865, USA - 143). to refute the assertion made by the prosecution according to which Rosenberg is "personally responsible for the planning and execution of the war of aggression against Russia"--(Brudno, on 9 January 1946, page 2278 of the Transcript)--and was aware of the "aggression predatory, character of the imminent war"--(Rudenke, on 17 April 1946, Page 8016 of the Transcript)--if, above all, one does not want to admit that Rosenberg was convinced of an imminent aggressive war waged by the Soviet Union against Germany, I would like to bring up four more points in order to prove the correctness of the statements made by the defendant.
at the Reich Chancellery on 10 November 1937 ("Hossback Document" Document Number PS 386, USA-25)--when Hitler disclosed for the first time his intentions of waging war. This was at the time when Rosenberg still had political influence, or at least seemed to have it. If ever, he should have played the part of the intimate political instigator then. this Tribunal that Hitler took all important decisions all by himself; thus, also the decision concerning the war against Russia-(Transcript Page 7363).
Third, upon my question about Rosenberg's influence with respect to Hitler's decisions concerning foreign policy, Goering replied before this Tribunal, on 16 March 1946: "I think that after the accession to power the Fuehrer did not consult the Office of Foreign Affairs of the Party a single time about questions concerning the foreign policy, and that it was created only for centrally taking care of certain questions concerning the foreign policy which came up within the party. As far as I know, Rosenberg was certainly not consulted about political decisions after the accession to power." This was also confirmed by the witness Neurath on 26 June 1946, in this court room. "Brief report concerning the activity of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the NSDAP." (Document Number 003-PS, USA-603). Brief mention is made in it of the "Near East" in such a harmless manner that no word has to be said about it. Also, in the confidential reports 004-PS and 007-PS, nothing is said about any preparations against the Soviet Union.