to abolish this fact which was the result of a development of centuries. This is to be deeply regretted but one cannot go past reality.
That this opinion is in accordance with the conception of international law of the main participating powers that had signed the statute when war broke out follows from the fact that men of international reputation in the field of international law were of the opinion that, should the Kellogg-Pact and the system of collective security fail, the traditional legal conception as to war was still valid. acts, measured by the tradition of diplomatic technique, would be valuated as crimes punishable by international law? Herr von Ribbentrop, the then existing frontier line in the East was considered not to be tenable in the long run and was, therefore, considered to be needing some adjustment. the Polish demands when this state was newly created, problems which could not be solved by international cooperation in the time during the two world wars. pacts. In the Locarno treaties a guarantee for the Eastern frontier created by Versailles could not be reached because of the opposing interests of the participating powers, whereas for the Western frontiers it was arrived at. All that was achieved after endless efforts were arbitration treaties, connected to the Locarno system, between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia. They did not contain any guarantees for frontiers but only methods for settling litigations. I shall deal with them when I come to the various violations of treaties which Herr von Ribbentrop is blamed for. security by leaving the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, he went over to the system of bilateral treaties. At the preparatory negotiations to the agreements between Poland and Germany of 1934 it was clearly stated, that between the two states a solution of the problems should be found in the sprit of the treaty. We will not suppress here that for this settlement but peaceful means were considered and a 10-year non-aggression pact was concluded. Whether to change the untenable situation in the East by means of evolution is of no Hitler believed honestly in the possibility of solving this problem or hoped importance for the forming of an opinion on Herr von Ribbentrop's behaviour.
He did not take any initiative in this step, but found this agreement as an existing political and juridical fact. agreements are durable only when they correspond to political realities. If that is not the case, the force of facts oversteps of itself the original intention of the contracting parties. saying: "The element of political interest is an indispensable lining of written treaties." but continued to burden international relations. As shown by the evidence, it became more and more clear in the course of political evolution that sooner or later solutions of some kind had to be attempted. Both the statute of the Fre City of Danzig, which was in contradiction with ethnological, cultural and economical facts, and the isolation of Eastern Prussia through the creation of a corridor, had brought about causes for conflict, which a number of statesmen feared as far back as Versailles.
declaration to Poland of March 21, 1939, enlarged on August 25, 1939 into the mutual aid agreement, was susceptible, in case of the appearance of a possibility of conflict with this country, of making the Poles averse, from the first, to a sensible revision, even within a moderate frame. conclusions, taking a sensible political view, out of the decline of the collective security system, and how small a confidence it had in the practical results of the moral condemnation of war through the Kellog-Pact.
Mr. von Ribbentrop, had, therefore, to draw the conclusion out of the behaviour of Great Britain, that the attitude of the Polish Government, from which Germany was entitled to expect some concession, was bound to become rigidly inflexible. The development during the following months proved this provision to be right. particular that the coming danger would take place within the compass of the usual principles of politics and the carrying through of the interests of one's own country. The Soviet Union, too, had on her side, left the ground of collective security system. She looked at the approaching conflict from the viewpoint of Russian interests exclusively. As things were, Mr. v Ribbentrop took pains to at least localize the threatening conflict, if it could not be avoided. He could rightly hope to succeed in this endeavour, as both powers primarily interested in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Germany, concluded the non-aggression and friendship agreement previous to the outbreak of armed hostilities. At the same time, they came to terms, by way of a secret agreement, concerning the future fate of the territory of Poland and the Baltic countries. thereby the local Eastern European conflict became a world conflagration.
do so without taking into consideration the Soviet Union from the point of view of participation.
Britain and France, into a European one, necessarily followed by the universal conflict. The entry in the war of the powers mentioned took place according to the forms provided by the 3rd Hague Concention concerning opening of hostilities, i.e. an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.
At the session of March 19th, 1946, Mr. Justice Jackson, interpreting the indictment, has stressed the point that the extension of the war brought about by the Western powers, did not constitude a punishable aggression on the side of Germany. This interpretation is in keeping with his general argumentation concerning the notion of aggression. Should he want to carry this through quite consistently, he would logically have to declare Great Britain and France aggressors of Germany for having brought about the state of war by means of the ultimatum.
I believe I am sharing the prosecution's viewpoint when I give voice to the supposition that such a result would not meet with the prosecution's approval. The prosecution has brought forward its evidence in such a way as to enter into the politically historical background of the war. It has accordingly not been satisfied with relying on the formal juridical definition or any single criteria thereof. the definition proposed by the prosecution is notsuitable base for the qualification of the indeterminable concept of aggression.
May I be allowed to summarize the events at the outbreak of the war:
Kellog Pact and aggression concept -- the prosecution's pillars do not support it. The Kellog Pact had no juridically expressible contents, neither for the countries not, and even much less, for an individual. The attempt to put life into it afterwards,by means of a formal concept of aggression, was frustrated by political reality.
Mr. von Ribbentrop's share in the extention of the conflict to Scandinavia was so small that it hardly can be put to his charge as a separate action. Marshal Keitel, have shown beyond doubt that, as a matter of fact, Mr. von Ribbentrop was informed of this operation for the first time only 36 hours in advance.
His contribution was solely the elaboration of notes prescribed to him in contents and form.
Concerning the actual side, viz. the imminent violation of Scandinavian neutrality by the Western powers, he had to be content with the informations communicated to him. The evidence has shown, and I shall expose later on in juridical arguments, that he was, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, not compete to check those informations, and that he did not possess any actual means to do so. Presuming that these informations were true, he could justly assume that the German Reich behaved, in the intended action, quite according to international law. I leave more detailed argumentation concerning this point of law to my colleague, Dr. Siemers, well conversant with this point, whose client, Great Admiral Raeder, had submitted to Hitler a large part of enemy information and the proposal for a German occupation of Scandinavia. that an unrestrained maintenance of the neutrality of the Belgian-Dutch territory by these countries could not be guaranteed. Previous to the war, there already existed between the general staffs of the Western powers and those of both neutral countries agreements and currentexchanges of experiences concerning behaviour and occupation in case of a conflict with Germany. Detailed deployment plans and fortification systems built under supervision of detached officers of the Western powers were meant to prepare the reception of allied forces. These projects comprehended not only a cooperation of the armies concerned, but also the assistance of certain civilian authorities, for the purpose of carrying out supplying and advance of the Allies.
Important about these preparations is the fact that they were made not only for the case of defense, but also for the offensive. For this reason Belgium and the Netherlands also could not or would not prevent it that British bomber formations continued to fly over them, whose near aim was the destruction of the Ruhr-district, the heel of Achilles of the German war industry. This area was also the main goal of the Allies in case of an offensive on land. sive measures by the Western Powers had been ascertained beyond a doubt by sources of information. The grouping of the offensive forces showed that the Belgian-Netherland territory was included in the theater of operations. As has already been described in connection with preceding cases of conflict such information was currently passed on to Herr von Ribbentrop by Hitler or his deputies. Here too Herr von Ribbentrop had to rely upon the accuracy of these informations without having the right and the duty of checking on them. In that way he, too, became convinced that in order to avert a deathly danger, namely an Allied thrust into the Ruhr-district, preventive counter-measures were necessary. On the basis of these considerations Luxembourg simply could not be spared because of the extensiveness of modern military operations. others the German Foreign Policy and thereby Herr von Ribbentrop, to have made plans to march in, in contradiction to the 5th Hague Convention concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers, and persons in case of war on land. vention does not have reference to drawing a neutral into a war between other powers, but deals only with the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents as long as the neutrality status exists. tation of the Kellog-Pact, as I have shown, to the pact which had been made 20 years earlier. There remains no doubt that, at the time of the 2nd Hague peace conference, the law did not evaluate the outbreak of war as a legal but only as a historical fact.
All conventions concerning laws of war, especially the Rules of Land Warfare and the Neutrality Pact for Land and Sea-Warfare, are built upon the basis of an existing state of war, hence do not regulate the jus ad bellum, but the jus in bello.
This fact disposes of the Prosecution's references to the 5th Convention of the Hague in all cases of the spreading of the war to the neutral which have ratified this convention. mentioned, as it was done by the Prosecution, in connection with drawing Belgium into the war. With Germany's renunciation in 1935 the Locarno system had collapsed, as will be shown by the defense-counsel of Mr. von Neurath. All attempts to effect a new union which was to take its place were guided by the fact, that the actual situation created by Germany must be taken as the starting point for a new agreement. This may be see especially from the British and French plans for the intended new agreement. The attempt to create a new agreement was not successful. However, the thorough and long drawn out negotiations show very distinctly, that none of the signatories considered the treaties of Locarno valid any longer. On the contrary, the Western Powers proceeded to consider among themselves the effects which their obligations of guaranteeing the Western borders still held after Germany's withdrawal.
Regardless of howone may jidge Germany's attitude of 1935, it remain to be stated that with it the pact system had lost its validity. Hence in 1940 German commitments to the Western Pact of 1925 did no longer exist with Belgium, Poland and Czecheslovakia in connection with the LocarnoTreaty, when discussing in general Germany's obligation for a peaceful settlement of disputes. to the neutralisation of this country. Evidently it went on the assumption that Germany had been forced by the Treaty of Versailles to give up its rights given to her by the London agreement of 1867. te Pact, Herr von Ribbentrop could not in the light of the available news assume that a few days after the joining, a military intervention by Germany on the Balkans would be necessary for political reasons.
This situation was caused by the forcible change of government in Belgrade. The reaction to the joining of the Tripartite Pact by the government Stojadinowitsch resulted in a new political change in Yugoslavia under the leadership of Simovitch, which aimed at a close cooperation with the Western Powers counter to the idea of the Tripartite Pact.
In view of this uncertain situation in the interior of Yugoslavia wh* because of the mobilisation of the Yugoslav army and their deployment on the German frontier became a danger for the Reich, Hitler suddenly decided on military operations on the Balkans. He made this decision without the knowledge of Herr von Ribbentrop, with the idea in mind to eliminate an imminent grave danger for the Italian ally.
The testimony of the witness Col. General Jodl has shown beyond a dou* that Herr von Ribbentrop after Hitler's decision and after the Simovitch Putsch, seriously endeavoured to be allowed to exhaust all diplomatic possibilities prior to the beginning of military operations. Colonel-General Jodl has confirmed there that Herr von Ribbentrop's endeavours were rejected in so rude a manner that, taking into consideration Hitler's nature and the prevailing methods, any influence on Hitler was practically out of the question. to the North from southern Greece, made a further localization of the ItalyGreek conflict impossible, This war begun in the autumn of 1940 against German wishes, but Hitler could, with a view to the general situation, certainly not tolerate the imminent defeat of his Italian ally. ties between Germany and the Soviet Union, inducing a secret agreement concerning the Division of Poland and the surrender to Russia of the Baltic states, the ideological discussion in part, of an extraordinarily vehement nature, between National Socialism and Bolshevism, were, for the time being eliminated from the international sphere, where they formed elements of possible danger. This system of treaties, to be supplemented in the course of next month, had a favourable influence on the opinion concerning Hitler's foreign policy of large circles of the German people, which were alarmed by the ideological contrasts.
a general conviction in Germany that the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia must always be the goal of our foreign policy. dered these pacts a strong pillar of the German Foreign policy. Because of this opinion he invited in Winter 1940 the Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Union, Molotov, to Berlin to clear up problems which had arisen in the meantime. Unfortunately this conference did not bring the desired results. formation, as about the future attitude of the Soviet Union towards Germany. Especially the attitude of Russia in the Baltic countries as well as the Soviet march into Bessarabia and into the Bukowina were considered by Hitler as actions which were apt to endanger the German interests in the Baltic provinces and in the Rumanian iol district. He furthermore saw in the attitude of the USSR the possibility of taking influence on Bulgaria. He could consider the Friendship Pact with Yugoslavia on 5 April 1941 as a confirmation of his suspicion, as it occurred at a time when Yugoslavia after a change of government, threatened to turn to the Western Powers. med Herr von Ribbentrop, the defendant tried to avoid the tensions. The Tribunal has permitted me to submit an affidavit which confirms that Herr von Ribbentrop still tried in December 1940, in an extensive discussion, to induce Hitler to give him once more authority for the inclusion of Rus* in the Tripartite Pact. This documentary evidence confirms that Herr von Ribbentrop after his conference, could have been of the opinion that he would succeed in this step through the consent of Hitler. Subsequently Hitler however, returned again and again to his misgivings which were str* thened by the news of hiw own secret service about military operations on the other side of the Eastern border. In spring 1941 Herr von Ribbentrop tried to bring to Hitler in Berchtesgaden, the then Ambassador in Moscow and one of his subordinates. Both diplomats were not admitted. This ended the regime. He afterwards also believed that he could no longer shut his eyes to the information which was brought to his knowledge.
As Col. Gen. Jodl had testified, he and all the Commanders in Chief who took part in the beginning of the Russian campaign, were convinced that they had pushed right into the midst of an offensive concentration of troops This is proven by, among other things, maps which were found and which covered the territory on this side of the German Russian line of interests. Can one really believe that this conduct of the Soviet Union is in agreement 8 July M LJG 4-1 with the Non Aggression P act?
war into a world war began to stand out more and more threateningly. The United States proclaimed a neutrality law at the beginning of the war, in which they submitted in advance to fixed rules in case of a future war. The mechanism of the neutrality law was set in notion by a proclamation of the President. It designated at the same time the danger zone within which American ships could not count upon the protection of their government. the United States, the author of the Kellogg-P act, were not of the opinion that the traditional law of neutrality had in any way been modified by it. the spreading and the aggravation of the European war more and more from the original line, without the German Reich furnishing any cause for conflict with U.S.A. general opinion and consequently that of Herr von Ribbentrop was for a prevention by all means of an intervention on the part of the U. S. A. Since the quarantine speech of President Roosevelt in 1937 strong contrasts could be noticed more and more in the ideological-political train of thoughts of the world's public opinion. The situation was aggravated by the incidents of November 1938 in Germany, which were the reason for the recall of the Berlin Ambassador to Washington for reporting, from where he did not return to his post. prepared by legislative actions and became effective at the beginning of the war, the German Foreign Office and Herr von Ribbentrop could conclude that the existing differences of opinion as to the internal political form of the state would not change the neutral attitude of the United States. Because of this expectation, not only everything that could produce un-8 July M LJG 4-2 favorable effect in the United was avoided since the outbreak of the war, but we also acquiesced to quite a number of actions by the United States which were weakening Germany and were not in accordance with strict neutrality.
political aims of the neutral America and the belligerent Great Britain, when the leading men of the two states proclaimed in August 1941 the Atlantic Charter as the program of the new order of the relationships between the nations. It had an obviously hostile character against the Axis P owers and left them no doubt that the United States had sided with the other side. the evidence has shown, can be credited to the account of the material support of Great Britain by the United States. the U.S.A. took ever the protection of the most important line of communication of the then severely struggling British Empire. This was a military intervention even before the outbreak of the officially declared war. The socalled shooting order of the President brought about a dangerous situation which could result any day in the outbreak of the armed conflict. Several months before the 11 December 1941, the United States took measures which formerly were taken only during a war. The outbreak of the war was only a link in a chain of successive incidents, perhaps not even the most important. It was caused by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which, as the evidence has shown, was neither instigated nor could have been foreseen by Germany. declaration of war is one of the criteria for the determination of the aggressor. As I have already pointed out in connection with the spreading of the war in Europe this criterion alone without the factual background is no positive proof for an act of aggression. As reaction to the numerous neutrality violations by the Unites States, which represented actions of war, the 8 July M LJG 4-3 German Reich would have been justified for a long time to reply on her pert with military actions.
Whether this right was exercised after a preceding announcement -- that is a declaration of war -- or not is immaterial. So far, I have thrown some light upon aggressive acts as enunciated by the Prosecution, from the beginning of the Polish Campaign to the entry into the war of the United States. It remains to take up a juridical position regarding the treaties concluded by Germany, which provided for a pacific settlement of political conflicts. a party to aggressive acts, but also with his omission to release the mechanism of aforesaid treaties previous to armed conflict. From the fact that the ways for pacific settlement as provided by the treaties had not been used, the Prosecution draws the conclusion that these omissions can be attributed, in a criminal sense, to Herr von Ribbentrop. This interpretation however would be erroneous in a legal sense.
If we begin my sharing the Prosecution's point of view, we shall see that even in this case the conclusions drawn by the Prosecution cannot be upheld. Even if a single minister could be made legally responsible for the non-operating of a set of treaties, the Prosecution cannot but ask whether the minister was actually in a position to ensure a result of any legal consequence.
According to a principle embodied by nature into any system of criminal law on earth, a defendant is punishable for an omission only if he had actually been in a position and legally liable to act. I shall demonstrate at length, within the compass of my arguments concerning the conspiracy, how small, in fact, Herr von Ribbentrop's possibilities of influence have been. The decisive point at issue is the fact that he was not legally in a position to make any declarations to foreign powers binding the German Reich, other than these he was empowered to do by the head of the state. As head of the state, Hitler was the representative of the German Reich from the point of view of international law. He only was in a position to make binding declarations to foreign powers. Any other persons could legally bind the German state only if authorized by the head of the state, unless the treaty in question explicitly provided otherwise. foreign minister cannot independently enter into binding commitments towards foreign powers. It is rather a general principle of international relations that only the organ empowered to represent the state is apt to act for it. The difference between German conditions and these of democratic constitutions merely lies in the fact that in the former the foreign minister usually has a larger internal influence on the intentions of the head of thestate. The defendant, therefore, could not have obtained any legal result if he had tried, against the Fuehrer's wish, to have recourse to thepossibilities of settlement of conflicts as provided by the numerous treaties of arbitration and conciliation. No one but Hitler could have put in motion such a procedure. The defendant could have been in a position to do so by Hitler's order only. He had not even a claim on giving advice, if Hitler chose to ignore him. enumerated by the prosecution: Treaty of Arbitration of 1929 between Germany and Luxembourg. provide an obligatory settlement of political disputes.
Slovakia and Belgium, concluded in connection with the Locarno treaty, the additional point applies - quite aside from the legal argument just mentiones - that they and the Western pact form a political unit. Even externally, this is expressed in the fact that these agreements and the Locarno pact are all of them annexes to the general final protocol of the powers participating in the Locarno conference.
The question could, therefore, be asked whether the arbitration treaties share the fate of the principal treaty i.e., the Western Pact. in these treaties had finally led, in case of non-settlement, before the League of Nations Council, wherein, at the time of the Western Pact, the 4 participating great powers had, or - as was the case for Germany - were to have permanent seats. The withdrawal of Italy and Germany from this political body deeply affected the principle of the political base which supported the settlement treaties. Moreover, the grouping of the powers had shifted so much that a part of the Locarno great powers,for example, Great Britain and France, had in theyear 1939, gone into binding agreements with Poland, so as to take sides beforehand in the event of a possible conflict. and the Netherlands of 1926, I may be allowed to point out that the proceedings provided therein could not be applied at all, as there were no conflicts between Germany and aforesaid countries; quite to the contrary. Germany took steps which were aimed at the enemy belligerents, which were meant to be preceded in the occupation of these countries. Hitler to countries with which Germany subsequently waged war. As Herr von Ribbentrop did not give such assurances in person, his participation could form a point of argument only if he had given advice to Hitler in this respect. No evidence has been produced to sustain such a suggestion. A large part of these assurance is contained in speeches made by Hitler before a German public, either in mass meetings or at the Reichstag. It is doubtful indeed whether such declarations, addressed in the first place to the German public, could have any binding results in the field of international law.
Whereas up to now K have spoken about the actions that led 8 July M LJG 5-1 to the outbreak of the war and its spreading, I shall now proceed to the second large complex of the indictment, which deals with crimes committed during the war.
laws or customs of war to be punishable. This conception is illustrated by a number of examples much as deportation, shooting of hostages, etc. But these examples do not limit this conception. We are therefore obliged--in the same way as with Article 6a -- to propose to the Court a qualification which it can use as a base for its decisions. by the French prosecution. They declared that they would be free to give a more explicit definition of punishable offences which had not been fully defined by the charter.
The use of the expression "Laws and Usages of war", as well as the enumeration of examples, forces one to believe that the Charter aims at violations of the classical "jus in bello". I therefore qualify war-crimes as offences against the law established between belligerants by agreement, or against prescriptive law, binding and recognized generally without special agreement. The several cases which come under the collective conception of war crimes must, therefore, each be examined as to whether they are to be regarded as such according to the traditional rules applying to armed conflicts between states. Whereas, in general, classical international law holds responsible the state as a unit only, there always existed in the usage of war the exception that also acting individuals were liable to be held responsible. Whether this responsibility of the individual person can be followed up in a punishing prosecution after the warhas been the subject of many discussions. One will be able to ascertain that in the ruling practice of states, the belligerant who was violated by a war-crime may also, after the war, call to account the offender.
If several states which 8 July M LJG 5-2 have fought shoulder to shoulder in the war form a common court against the war-criminals of the conquered adversary, this court has the collective competency of all the states that form the court or have joined its charter.
for crimes committed during the war against the adversary, who thereafter sits in judgment upon him, one would be thinking in the first place of former members of the combatting forces. Already at Versailles there were difficulties in answering the question to what degree military chiefs were to be made responsible. The idea to have a minister of a cabinet (Ressortminister) hold responsible under criminal law, so far, never has appeared. Also in Versailles the War-Criminals Committee was occupied with the question of making responsible non-military personalities from only political points of view. This committee discriminated clearly between war-criminals, which were to be judged by the allied court, and the guilt with regard to the outbreak of war for the examination and judging of which a special political international court was to be created.
By means of the traditional conception a Minister (Ressortminister) cannot therefore be hold responsible for violations of the "jus in bello". The prosecution can reach this success only by going the roundabout way via a conspiracy. If we follow the interpretation given to this conception, the Foreign Minister of the Reich would, for example, have to be responsible for the destruction of the village of Ouradur. He would have to stand up for actions which have nothing in the least to do with the Reich's foreign policy and are only single actions of some odd offices. Minister was not only not competent for the conduct of war, but had in fact not the slightest possibility of influencing military measures either in a curbing or furthering way. (Fachminister) as a community of conspirators also with regard to war crimes, it would have to be proved that the mili tary, competent to conduct the war, acted in agreement with 8 July M LJG 5-3 subsequent construction of the prosecution.
The unity, which worked, has but now been drawn up as a conception.
It is self the German side.
Such a responsibility for the results would be outright grotesque.
He could, on the contrary, only be according to testimony of General Lahousen, he issued "direc tives" to Admiral Canaris to have Ukranian villages set afire, and to beat the Jews living there to death.
First I wish to directives of any sort to a military agency.
Furthermore, it for the setting afire of Ukranian villages.
Ukranians supported the German fight against the Poles.
Thus, hardly anyone will destruction of his own ally.
My client further insists that to questions of humanity.
As was proven beyond doubt by the prisoners of war through vigorous, personal intervention.
As 8 July M LJG 5-4 I will further show, within the framework of the conspiracy, he was instrumental in the unshackling of British prisoners of war and he used his influence for the preservation of the rules of the Geneva Convention.
He was opposed to the branding of Russian prisoners of war. decision with respect to questions of humanity. appropriately gauge the remaining attitude of the accused, as concerns questions of humanity. Further, his attitude in the question of treatment of terror-aviators is charged as a war crime to Herr von Ribbentrop. the conference at Schloss Klossheim, mentioned in document 735-PS, ever took place. I should like to emphasize that General Warliment, who made these notes, did not personally participate in the conference. Furthermore, the expression of opinion attributed, according to the document, to Herr von Ribbentrop, stands in contradiction to his usual demeanor in this question. Under Secretary Steengracht deposed here that Herr von Ribbentrop, after the publication of the notorious article about lynch, justice in the Reich, at once vigorously protested against it. through examination of the witnesses Colonel-General Jodl and Fieldmarshal Keitel, proves that not only the Foreign Office but Herr von Ribbentrop personally had pledged themselves in principle for the preservation of the Geneva Convention.
and that Herr von Ribbentrop and other leading personalities took pains to assure the retention of at least the basic human principles even in Hitler's most radical period. In spite of all that happened, it must be pronounced as a success that, in consequence of these steps the Geneva Convention was not abrogated. Hereby it must never be overlooked that especially in cases of terror fliers, where so-called terror-attacks in the form of air bombardments were involved -- which were characterised by an indiscriminate attack upon cities without attacking military and armament objectives, such attacks then undeniably constituted a war crime in themselves. It must be taken in account in the reaction throughout Germany towards the conduct of air warfare of the western powers, that, according to established and traditional conceptions of an armed conflict between nations, the attack on the civilian population is prohibited. This thought is not only expressed in the Hague Convention on land warfare but constitutes a stipulation by contract of general International Law, binding for all, which is valid not only in the theater of operations on land. Acknowledging this, the Hague rules of air warfare, although permitting air attacks of military objectives in undefended cities, do not permit the bombing of dwellings of the civilian population. Although the Hague rules were not ratified, they were in practic followed by all belligerents, and acknowledged as common law. These measures became especially acute after complete air superiority had been achieved by the Allies and the resulting constant low level attacks with weapons on board on the civilian population took place. These particular events led for the first time to the discussion whether, in the face of a warfare which was undeniably violating International Law, it was still of any use to uphold the Geneva Convention in its substance. These considerations and corresponding reflections led to the drafting of documents which have become the object of evidence in the proceedings and which constituted -as shown by the evidence- drafts but not decisions in this question. They can therefore not form the basis of a judgment, as certainly a state is entitled to have appropriate agencies express their opinion on this question. Ribbentrop before the war, at its outbreak, and for its duration.