At that time, Hitler had actually not yet planned a war. In that respect the testimony of General Field Marshall Milch is very informative.
When the witness, in the months following the speech of 23 May 1939, repeatedly pointed out to Hitler in personal reports that the air force was not ready for action with their bombing squadrons and that the air force had hardly any stocks of bombs, Hitler refused to give an order for the production of bombs and remarked that this manufacturing was unnecessary and superfluous. Hitler persisted in this refusal, although Milch pointed out that the production would take several months. Such an order was given by Hitler, only on 12 October 1939.
Hitler's exposition before the Commanders in Chief can be easily explain by the peculiarity of Hitler, to develop frequently political ideas without bothering how to carry them out. In each case, his practical policy resulted from the requirements of the living development. occupied by Germany and thus to have violated the Hague convention concerning land warfare. This accusation is not justified. with absolutely noteworthy reasons that the Hague conventions on land warfare from the years 1899 and 1907 respectively cannot be made to apply to a modern war since they had become obsolete and insufficient in some respects at the beginning of World War II. At the time when they were worked out, aerial warfare, economic warfare and psychological warfare were still unknown. Total war which put the entire people and the entire national economy without exception at the service of the war, was also not known, Especially, economic warfare was not considered at all. Because of this gap, there is no international law which has been generally recognized, for economic warfare. Therefore, the old statement of Hugo Grotius applies to economic warfare that everything is permitted in war "quod ad finem belli necessarium est". specifically by a differring settlement through treaties.
The following is to be said for the legal situation as it stands : international law -- in any case as far as land warfare is concerned -- that the war does not affect any private legal relations between the citizens of the belligerent states, that private property on principle was inviolable,that the war would only be pursued with arms and that the enemy civilian population would not be affected by it.
This method of warfare suffered a basic change at the outbreak of World War I, when England, in the field of naval warfare, applied her interpretation of war of people against people. At that time, the enemy powers went over to the course to paralyze the entire German national strength, disregarding all established rules of the law of naval warfare and of neutrality law, by cutting off the necessary raw materials and import of food. This new type of warfare corresponded to the Anglo-Saxon interpretation which was joined in by France at the beginning of World War I, that war is not only fought against the fighting troops, but against the entire population of the enemy. The citizen of the enemy state is the enemy of England, his property is enemy property which is subject to seizure by the British Government. but also against the peaceful subjects of the belligerent enemy.
This goal was achieved by the total blockade carried out by England. The Hague Convention did not contemplate a total blockade in the form in which it was carried out by England. This blockade made any supplying of Germany through neutral countries impossible. method used by England with means of her naval power, for the warfare on land accordingly This fact leads to the following consideration:
warfare. There the principle of protection of private property dominates. In naval warfare, however, prive property is unprotected. Is it therefore possible that the rules of land warfare with their restrictions apply also to a combined sea and land war? Would it be just that goods are taken away from one at sea while he would not be allowed to touch the same goods from the one taking the goods on land? as before that private property is actually inviolable during war. This principle only suffers exception insofar as the Hague Convention of land warfare permits certain encroachments on private property, and insofar as encroachments may also have been caused by a state of emergency in which the state may find itself, which then would be justified to the extent in which they appear necessary in the interests of self-preservation of the state. In this scope therefore, actions are also permitted during war which would otherwise not comply with the laws of war, and would thus be contrary to international law. of naval warfare, Germany was driven into a state of economic emergency. fare, then Germany could have supplier herself through neutral countries, and the state of economic emergency during the war would not have occurred. regulations, they cannot expect Germany to observe the regulations on requisitioning which formpart of the rules of land warfare. manner, there prevail a national state of emergency which has the legal effect that the state does not act illegally when committing a violation of international law which is necessary for the repelling of imminent danger. course of World War II by theaction of the enemy powers. Any connection with neutral countries was made impossible for Germany by the total blockade, since a sufficient supply of raw materials necessary for the conduct of the war, and of food for the feeding of the civilian population, was made im-possible.
Germany also had to takecare of the food supply of the enemy civilian population in the occupied territories. Germany was therefore forced for the sake of supporting her own economy, which would otherwise have collapsed, to use the stocks of raw materials and food available in the occupied territories, and all otheritems necessary for the continuation of the war for herself, whereby the interests of the population in the occupied territories were given die consideration. In this, the principles established in the preamble to the convention concerning the rules and customs of land warfare, dated 18 October 1907, as they result from the customs existing among civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and from the demands of publicconscience, were strictly observed. A resignation of the right to use these sources of assistance in the occupied territories would have meant the abandonment of the independence and existence of the state, it would have meant unconditional submission. Emergency which necessarily leads to submission during war is the highest and most genuine emergency in the life of a nation. are covered which are necessary for the alleviation of danger which would not be repelled otherwise. The limitations naturally fluctuate, and the establishment of whether a genuine emergency act is concerned cannot always be easily made in individual cases. Here the Tribunal will have to consider in favor of the defendants the special circumstances and the conditions which were had to view during the time of war. defendant intentionally or carelessly. ant personally can be responsible for a violation, possibly committed intentionally orcarelessly--a violation which has been committed exclusively by him in his capacity as plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer -- or whether in such a case there is only a liability of the state. This side is of the opinion that also in this case there is only a violation of international law which does not call for a personal liability. Conditions were peculiar in the Eastern theater of war because there was no private economy in the East, but only a national economy strictly regulated by a central office.
The juridical situation here was that property of the enemy state could generally be claimed as war loot.
For therest, a particularly careful regulation was made, which was defined in the so-called "Green folder". The regulations contained in the Green folder did not suggest any looting or annihilation of the population, as asserted by the prosecution. Its toner was rather the mobilization of economy and the rules for keeping it going, the seizure and the orderly utilization of stocks, and traffic-installations in the zones to be occupied in the course of fighting, whereby account had to be taken of the Russian behavior, and the far-reaching destruction to be expected in consequence. The folder does not contain any order or suggestion which might convict certain groups of the population of activities beyond the needs conditioned by war. This decree, for which the defendant Goering has taken full responsibility, does not furnish any reason for an indictment.
In all of this, one moist not disregard one thing: totality as the creators of the Hague Convention certainly never had or could have had the remotest idea. It was a war in which nations fought for their existence or destruction. It was a war in which all valued had changed. Thus the defendant had the right feeling when he declared:
"After all there is no legality in the fight for life or death." the deportation of workers from occupied territories to Germany. in his opinion made this measure necessary. Servatius, will review these matters in detail. Therefore, I do not need to concern myself with further considerations in this regard.
I now turn to the matter of plundering of art treasures: As to the reproach of art treasure looting the defendant has made an inclusive statement of facts, which will be referred to in orde to justify his conduct. was not directly engaged in the safeguarding of art treasures in Poland. lection. In this respect the defendant cannot be incriminated in any way. By order of the Fuehrer works of art in France which were owned by Jews were temporarily confiscated for the benefit of the Reich. They were considered as unclaimed property because their owners had left the country. the Fuehrer, Goering received but a small part, and not for himself personally, but for the gallery he had planned, and in which he also intended to incorporate the works of art already in his possession. French art experts, and the proceeds were to be distributed amongs the dependents of French war victims.
The juridical situation, therefore, was as follows: the benefit of the German Reich. By this confiscation the former owners lost their right to possession and it was transferred to the Reich. The objects which were left him Goering acquired from the Reich, which was their present owner. proved premature by the course of events, was to forestall the peace-treaty to be concluded at the end of the hostilities when the final accounts would be made. This is similar to the confiscations and seizures of property carried out at present in Germany in view of the ultimate peacetreaty.
Government was juridically entitled to confiscate the goods and to become their owner. Goering acted in good faith in the matter of this acquisition. In his testimony, he emphsized his belief that he was entitled to acquire these things as they had been previously confiscated by the Fuehrer. of looting. articles which occurred during normal business transaction, and which the defendant had been offered spontaneously and the sellers were only too eager to dispose of in view of the good price they received for them. acquired through a voluntary exchange in which the second party to the contract enjoyed the same rights as himself. of the British Air Force after their escape from the prisoner of war camp Sagan.
The act of prosecution (page 33 of the German translation) reads as follows: Stalag-Luft III in Sagan were murdered after their recapture. According to a later declaration of the prosecution the circumstances were as follows: cers of the RAF escaped from the prisoner of war camp Stalag Luft III in Sagan. 50 of these officers were shot by the Security Service after they had been recaptured.
An investigation must be made on the following points: who gave the order for the shooting? Did Reich Marshal Goering play any part in this occurrence?
Did he actually take part in the drafting of the order to shoot these 50 airmen? Did he agree to the measure although it was a grave offense against paragraph 50 of the Geneva Protocol dealing with the treatment of Prisoners of War? in the drafting of this order. It refers amongst other things, to the reports which Major General Westhoff and criminal-counsellor Wielen drew up while they were in British custody. But the interrogation of those witnesses in court, as requested by the defense counsel, as well as the bringing forward of further evidence which has been so carefully accomplished before the Tribunal, has shown in the meantime that the previous statements of Westhoff and Wielen were incorrect, and, in respect to Goering's presence at the camp conference and his knowledge of the shooting-order, were only based on suppositions which had their roots in the fact that it was a question of a prisoner of war camp for airmen. The result of the evidence was as follows: escape of the 76 officers to the Fuehrer. For this Hitler severely reprimanded General Field Marshal Keitel. He considered the event to be of great danger to public security, since the escaped officers might assist the six million foreigners in Germany in the organization of an armed revolt. Then Hitler gave the order: "The prisoners will remain with Himmler". 15 officers who had already been recaptured by the Armed forces and returned to the camp, and these officers remained unharmed. not order the shooting of the prisoners, who were to remain in Himmler's hands. Neither Keitel nor Jodl expected such measures. Jodl expected the escaped prisoners to be sent to a concentration camp for some time. Keitel and Jodl agree in their testimonies that Reich Marshal Goering did not attend this meeting. Therefore, it cannot possibly be correct that General Field Marshal Keitel declared in a conference with General Westhof that he had been reprimanded by Goering at the camp meeting on account of the prisoners' escape.
over the telephone around about the end of March or beginning of April 1944, that the Luftwaffe, namely the Reich Marshal and Korton himself, were not involved in the order and had only been informed of it later. Furthermore Keller testifies that the Reich Marshal was extremely angry about the shooting.
These statements are completely in accordance with the declarations of Reich Marshal Goering, who was on a vacation at the time fo the conference with Hitler. The fact of the escape reached him only through a telephone report of his adjutant. It was only after his return from vacation some time around Easter 1944 that he learned, through his chief of general Staff, Korten, about the fact that shootings of prisoners had taken place. Reich Marshal Goering was much upset about this last report because he had only condemned the deed in itself but moreover feared reprisals for his own airmen. Goering with the justification that an order to that effect had been issued to him by Hitler. and how its perpetration could remain concealed from the Wehrmacht. In the absence of Keitel and Jodl, Hitler issued the order to Himmler to carry out the execution and Himmler then, unknown to the Wehrmacht, immediately passed on the order to the Reich Security Headquarters - i,e, according to Kaltenbrunner's Statement- to Mueller or, as the case may be, to Nebe. the latter had executed the order without informing Goering- but he raised the most vigorous protest against this measure in a subsequent interview with Hitler. This resulted in a violent argument between Goering and Hitler. tly afterwards that the prisoner camps be taken in charge by the OKW. On being questioned, Field Marshal Keitel confirmed, as witness, that a few weeks after the occurrence, he received a letter from the general quartermaster of the Luftwaffe, in which the Luftwaffe requested the taking over of its camps by the OKW. zed- straightens out the initial statements of the witnesses Westhoff and Wielen, which are contradictory in many respects, as well as Keitel's earlier declaration of the 10 November 1945, also, vindicates the conclusion that Reich Marshal Goering was in no way involved in this affair, that he condemn it most severely when he was informed of it and that he therefore cannot be called upon to answer for this extremely regrettable and reprehensible order which it was not within his power to prevent.
The Prosecution has gone on to the question of "lynch justice" which was practised by the German population in individual cases in 1944 when enemy airmen had been shot down. For those occurrences, the defendants, especially Reich Marshal Goering, are held responsible. The charge that defendant Goering or the Whermacht are in any way involved in this action, that they issued orders or instructions to this effect or even merely approved the action is seen to be entirely unjustifiable. The examination of evidence here has thoroughly cleared up the matter in favour of the defendant.
Witness Colonel Bernd v. Brauchitsch pointed out during his interrogation on the 12 March 1946 (page 5680 of the German minutes) that in Spring 1944 there was a sudden increase in the losses among the civilian population through machine-gun attacks by enemy airmen. invokes fusi of all a protocol of 19 May 1944 (L. 166) concerning the socalled "Hunting Conference" which was held on the 15 and 16 May under the presidency of the defendant. saying he would suggest to the Fuehrer that terrorist enemy airmen be immediately shot on the place of their offence. The defendant most definitely denies having made any pronouncement to this effect and justly points to the following circumstances which belie any such statement:
The session stretched over two days. Numerous technical and organisational questions were discussed. The question touched upon in item 20 had nothing whatever to do with the agenda for the rest of the session, least of all with the purpose of the session. The remark has its place amongst themes which deal with matters of an entirely different kind and has no point in this conjuncture. immediately issued such an order without further ado, as everyone knew the Fuehrer was well disposed to him.
tion with the fundamental attitude of the defendant. He always stood for the view that the enemy airman who is shot down is his comrade and must be treated as a comrade, a fact which I have already remarked upon in another connec tion. Moreover, in the question as to how terror airmen are to be treated, he has defended his position with all frankness against the conception upheld by Hitler and has made no secret to Hitler of his entirely different opinion. utterly out of the question that he should suddenly have urget Hitler to issue the above-mentioned order against the terror airmen- an order which he opposed with all his might and the execution of which he sought to prevent by every means as soon as it came to his knowledge. And he did succeed in fact in preventing the execution of this order. cussion could only have occurred with the implication that the Fuehrer suggested such a measure. be added: a two-day session during which there has been a great deal of talking and cross-talking. Experience made in many other cases has shown that such recordings are often very unreliable and have even at times reproduced the subject of the discussion in an utterly perverted form, precisely because the author of the script,- especially when several participants were present, and were talking at random, - could not fellow the course of the discussion and consequently did not reproduce the substance of it accurately especially when, in addition to this, he was relayed by other people; this explains many factual errors as well as the inadequacy and unreliability of such records.
The minutes were never submitted to the defendant. He has not therefore been able to verify their contents nor to correct their errors. which are not submitted to the perusal and approval of the parties concerned are worthless in the production of evidence.
They cannot in themselves alone serve as an adequate means of proof either to charge or convict the defendant. They can therefore only be made use of to the detriment of the parties implicated when the contended facts are confirmed by other material brought for evidence from sources external to these minutes. In the present case, there is no confirmation from other evidence that Goering actually made the statement contained in item 20 or made a request to Hitler to that effect.
The note dated 21 May (731-PS) fails to provide support for the claim. The note :"General Korten teilt nach Vertrag des Reichsmarschalls mit" can not, in viewof the defendant's undisproved statement, possibly mean that the Reich Marshal delivered an address on this matter in Hitler's quarters, but solely that Korten reported on this subject to the Reich Marshal and that Korten informed-the Reich Marshal of Hitler's order. that Goering was against a special treatment of enemy terror airmen who had been shot down, and that he opposed Hitler's order. civilians working in the fields, minor railway lines without any military importance and against pedestrians and cyclists. This constituted a gross violation of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, according to which any combat act against the non-combatant population of the country is prohibited, and any attack or shelling of open cities, villages, residences or buildings is forbidden.
According to the opinion of the witness v. Brauchitsch this behavior which quite evidently violated international law caused Hitler to order measures against these aviators themselves, besides defensive measures. Relative to this Hitler advocated -as far as it is known to the witness- the most severe measures; lynching justice was to be given the right of way. enemy aviators, however, did not meet with the approval of the Armed Forces, especially not with that of Reich Marshal Goering and that of his Chief of Staff (Generalstabschef) General Korten. Both of them did condemn to the utmost the attacks of enemy aviators which were exclusively directed against the defenseless civilian population.
However, they nevertheless opposed the handing-over of defenseless shot down aviators to the aroused mob for the carrying out of lynching justice, and they did not think these measures an appropriate means of combating this conduct which was in violation of international law.
The witness General Keller expressed himself to the same effect. Early in June 1944 General Korten informed this witness of the fact that the Fuehrer intended to decree an order to the effect, that terror-aviators were to be surrendered to public fury. Korten arrived at the opinion that the conception of the Fuehrer was to be rejected. They did consider the direct attacks of enemy low-flying planes on individual civilian persons, women and children, concentration of civilian persons, school-classes and Kindergardens out on walks, farmers at work in the fields, as well as attacks on public passenger trains and hospitals as ruthless; however, neither did the two see a passable road or a solution of the difficult problem in the Fuehrer's order. They were of the opinion that such an order was contrary to basic military conceptions the articles of war and to international law, and that it would give cause to numerous evils through which also other enemy as well as own crews would have to come to harm. And finally such an order could exercise also in its effects, a harmful influence on the morale of our own crews.
All these reasons caused the Armed Forces to reject Hitler's demand , and the attempts of the Armed Forces were now directed toward preventing the disapproved conception of Hitler. The witness v. Brauchitsch therefore credibly states, that the Armed Forces now looked for a way out which way was seen in the fact, that the higher command levels were deceived by measures which were not actually carried out. om doscussion with the OKW the concept of terror-aviators. In the subsequent discussions and exchange of correspondence those cases were mentioned which represented violations of international law and which were to be considered criminal acts. By this definition of the concept a lynching lustice was to be prevented. The exchange of correspondence which lasted for a longer period of tiem showed the tendency of the agency to prolong the matter as much as possible.
correspondence shows all signs of a "delaying action to gain time", i.e., those concerned either did not want any decision, or they wanted to postpone it as Ion as only possible.
In particular the margin note on document 785 D (Exhibit GB 318), entitled: "No answer received from Commander in Chief of the Air Force", allows for the conclusion that the Reich Marshal purposely wanted to prolong the matter. Furthermore Reich Marshal Goering, as can be seen from the letter of 19 June 1944 (D 779) maintained the opinion, that in every instance he considered legal procedures also against terror-aviators as definitely necessary. If it is stated in a subsequent document of 26 June 1944 : "The Reich Marshal agrees with the announced formulation defining the concept of terror-aviators and with the suggested procedure", then the agreement with the procedure refers exclusively to the suggested procedure of publication suggested in the final paragraph of the letter of 15 June 1944, for which Reich Marshal Goering's approval had been requested. That the Reich Marshal Goering until the end of the war maintained the old aviatorstandpoint, according to which enemy aviators as soon as they have been shot down are to be considered and treated as comrades - was not only expressly deposed by the witness General Field Marshal Milch, but is also emphasized by General Koller with the following words :"Undamaged by occasional expressions of displeasure the attitude of the Reich Marshal always remained correct and valiant in accordance with his frequently emphasized flying tradition which he had retained from the First world War. In understandable anger about great difficulties in the air defense, pressed by the Fuehrer, he perhaps for once used harsher words, which were quickly forgotten", and the witness does not know of any case "in which such a spontaneous displeasure caused the Reich Marshal to take incorrect of harsh measures against members of the enemy air forces". at all times. To fight chivalrously was a matter of honor with the German aviators. The air Force as well as the defendant Goering retained this point of view, although as Koller express mentioned the flying personnel felt extremely bitter over the strafing attacks on German crews suspended on parachutes, and individual hotheads spoke of equal measures as reprisals.
be clearly seen from the description of the witness Koller about the establishment of a sea-emergency-service of the Air Force, which brought aid to Germans as well as the enemy in an equal measure and which carried on despite enemy attacks in violation of international law, with its attempt to provide aid for both friend and enemy in need. Accordingly it must be determined: justice as well as all procedure against the terror-aviators, no in accordance with legal regulations and have not issued any orders to troops under his command; in no case have enemy aviators been shot by the air Force or by the Army, or handed over to the Security Service (SD).
Gestapo -K.Z. a reign of terror in Prussia immediately after 30 January 1933 in his capacity as Prussian Minister of the Interior and soon afterwards as Prussian Minister President in order to suppress all opposition against the Naziprogramm. he had ordered as early as in February 1933 to protect the new government by proceeding ruthlessly.
against all political opponents without consideration of the consequences. feared Secret State Police and established concentration camps as early as spring of 1933. and it would rather have been a severe violation of the duties entrusted to the defendant, if he had not devoted himself with all his strength to the safeguarding of the now government and taken every imaginable precaution in order to make any attack on this new government impossible from the very beginning. In order to achieve this goal first of all the police institutions had to be considered. defendant considered necessary, were objectionable. considerations:
In every state the police is the inner-political instrument of power; in every state it has the task to support the government, to protect it in every direction and to render the disturber of the peace and the violator of the law harmless by force of arms, if necessary. The defendant transferred the same tasks to the police which was under his direction, whom he ordered in the speech mentioned by the Prosecution, to act energetically and to fulfil their duties conscientiously. To what extent such an appeal for the performance of duty should not be permissible remains incomprehensible. reasons and along which lines he considered a reorganization of the police as necessary and these directives cannot be objected to. reorganized rules of international law a sovereign state has the right to regulate its internal affairs as it deems fit to do.
The reform of the police is an exclusively internal affair. The violation of rules, generally recognized by international law, is, therefore, out of question in this respect.
as well. Before the 30th of January 1933, it was called Police Department Ia, which among other things had to watch and to fight political adversaries. National Socialists and Communists in particular. Such a police dealing with the same tasks was also needed after the assumption of power in order to protect the new state against attacks, which threatened it in particular from the very strong Communist Party. exclusively with safeguarding the state against enemies of the state it was named "Secret State Police." fact, only the case until 1954 as then Himmler was put in charge - he strictly confined himself to the tasks prescribed to him, did not transgress his authority and no misuse of power occurred. The evidence produced has shown nothing against the defendant Goering for this period of time. Should, at a later date, the Secret State Police have transgressed their authority and should have committed illegal acts the defendant had no Knowledge of then and did not approve of it. For mistakes and crimes committed by his successors which remained unknown to him, he cannot be held responsible. for the defendant. This was the witness Dr. Gisevius. witness. He wants only to point out that this statement is untrue in all points incriminating the defendant. witness is considered to be trustworthy or not.
My fellow defense counsel, Dr. Nelte, has agreed to deal with this question extensively, so that - in order to avoid repetitious statements I shall refrain from further declarations. with resistance, and particularly the leftist parties were anything but satisfied with the situation thus created. The opponents were by no means weak, neither numerically nor in the means at their disposal.
The new rulers were, therefore, afraid of serious dangers to their power, if they let the opposition parties continue their activity without hindrance; they had accordingly to take preventive measures against such dangers in good time. In order to stabilize and consolidate their own power and to nip in the bud any possible source of unrest, thee defendant Goering considered it necessary for reasons of state to settle at one blow both leaders and officials of the communist party and its organizations. The defendant has spoken at length about his reasons for such acts. For the removal of danger and to ensure the safety of the state, the measures taken by the defendant were, for the government, a necessity caused by the unsettled nature of the times. As it was a preventive measure, it was not necessary for a provisional arrest that a criminal act against the government had already been committed or was, obviously, on the verge of being committed. The fact of membership in itself and previous activity in the said party was enough for arrest, as it was a political act of self-protection on the part of the government. the establishment of concentration camps, of which there were 2 at the time when defendant Goering was at the head of the police.
The aim of such camps was to hold provisionally politically unreliable persons, who might be of danger to the new state, until they either had adapted themselves to the new political conditions or until the power of the state had become so great that such persons could no longer endanger it. I can omit the next few pages and I shall continue to page 61, paragraph 4. Goering, when he created concentration camps in 1933 and issued laws concerning the Secret State Police. These were intended to be as he conceived then, a means of cleansing and strengthening the young community of the people. He did not aim at a definite annihilation of political enemies but after a certain period of education interceded generously for liberations,and discharged at Christmas 1933 about 5,000, and in September 1934 about 2,000 prisoners. admitted in the book he published in 1934, intended for the British public "The Building of a Nation". He let, for example, the Communist leader Thaelmann personally report to him about his conplaints in the concentration camp and took care to remove their cause. He dissolved the so-called "wild" camps of Stettin and Breslau, punished the Gauleiter of Pomerania, who had organized this camp without his knowledge and against his will, and had those responsible for these wild concentration camps brought up on trial for their infringements of the regulations. the actual physical annihilation of the prisoners. If the prosecution establishes that this was all in execution of a conspiracy which aimed at committing crimes against humanity, such an interpretation has no bearing on the reality of political life in the years in question. Such a conspiracy did not exist, nor was it the intention of the defendant to commit crimes against the principles of humanity nor has he committed any such crimes. As one of the political trustees of the German government, he felt himself bound to safeguard it against dangerous disturbers of the peace and to contribute accordingly to the permanence of the National-Socialist way of life. Far from looking upon such measures as criminal, consider them on the contrary to be the inevitable means of consolidating the political order as a basis of all law.