Peace hence existed only in the naturally rather unstable equilibrium of powers, obeying only their own laws. International Law, quoted by the prosecution failed because it was incompatible with the dynamic power of this time. It embodies as we know only an attempt to keep alive through secular arguments the aforementioned concept of Christian warfare. One cannot, however, derive justice from nature alone. It knows no other measure than brute force. It, actually, always decided in favour of the stronger. Considered froma metaphysical standpoint, justice can be defined as an independent force, set above natural impulses. Therefore the theory of Grotius necessarily petered out in the 18th century as thinking in a purely wordly sense it could not find a criterion for a just war.
From this time on the search for true justice stirs the world. All socialist theories are only attempts of solving this problem. After having been disappointed by the doctrines of too much liberty, mankind once again seeks security and order. Some wish to return to the Christian truth of God while others want to go forward in order to solve the problem through human intellect eventually. go further backwards and at the same time forward to a self-deification of life in a biological political sense, have been conquered and eliminated. Yet a solution of the problems of world order has hitherto not been found. The victorious powers intend to come close to it, however, by drawing a line between themselves and the vanquished through a common indictment and punishment of the same as criminals. justice and injustice in a legal sense? Insofar as such standards exist by International Law, valid up to now, further statements are not required. That a special court for the trial was created by the Charter of this Tribunal I also do not object to. I must, however, vigorously protest against its use, insofar as it is meant to create a new material law by threatening punishment for crimes which, at the time of their perpetration, at least as far as individuals are concerned, did not carry any punishment.
if the culprit was never aware of it, because at the time he was not threatened with such punishment, and he believed to be able to derive the authorization for his way of acting solely from the political aims pursued? What does a reference to the ethical laws help, if such must be first found again? According to Justice Jackson's opinion, however, the Nazi Government never from the start was the representative of a legitimate state which had pursued the legitimate aims of a member of the international community. Only from such an attitude can the indictment for conspiracy be understood which is to be discussed later. In fact this Indictment is far ahead of its time as is the whole way of argumentation by Justice Jackson. Because internationally recognized standards, outside the positive international law by which the legitimacy of states and of their aims could have been judged did not exist, just as little as an international community as such. Slogans about the legitimacy of one's own and of the illegitimacy of foreign aspirations served only the formation of political fronts just as the efforts to brand political adversaries as disturbers of the peace. In any case they did, indeed, not create law. the conquerors to deal with the conquered as they saw fit. But, said he, non-discriminatory executions or without a final establishment of guilt would be a breach of promise given repeatedly. For that reason he himself proposed judicial proceedings which would have to differ from the ordinary criminal proceeding by not admitting the usual tactics of obstruction and delay by the defendants. But an establishment of guilt should be made, but based on a just and fair trial. If the defendants were the first leaders of a conquered nation which had to answer before the law they were also the first ones to whom the opportunity was given to defend their lives "in the name of justice." for interpretation of the Charter. Because it would not be reasonable that the court were obliged to stand exclusively by the charter without taking into consideration international law recognized hitherto and convictions of others with regard to law.
In that case the judgment would rather become a pure dictate of force to appeal against which "in the name of justice" would make no sense. decrees are justifiable before the conscience, not only formally but also materially. The Charter itself says that nobody may be excused for a violation of its decrees by hiding behind an order of his government or of a superior. In that case it must apply this, its own logic also to itself by allowing the judge to examine the congruence of its prescripts with the general principles of just ways of thought. For a judge, after all, is far more free and independent from the lawmaker than a subaltern from his superior or a subject from his dictator. are so much in opposition to the previous and ordinary state of law, especially as to the fundamental ideas of all rules of law that the court cannot acknowledge them as right or apply them. Practically the most serious problem consists thereby in the decision what should have precedence in the case of conflict, the Charter or the legal maxim "Nulla poena sine lege praevia." rule in this given instant with the highly political charter of the trial. Such a justification, however, cannot possibly be recognized. The political significance of this trial shows itself otherwise by its consequences near and far, but not yet in the very procedure by influencing the legal norms to be applied. A judge should administer law but not deal in politics. He is called upon still less, to rectify mistakes made by the politicians. Punishment, the establishment of which in due time was neglected, may only be decreed by him on the strength of a subsequent law, if he would do this also in other cases, but not only as an exception. to be maintained. By this principle Montesquieu divided the originally united power of the absolute King into legislative, administrative and judiciary. The three different forms of expression of state domination were to have equal rank, to be in equilibrium and so to aid in controlling one another. This system of division of powers characterizes the modern consti tutional state.
In a slightly strained way one may define the field of activities and competency of the three different forms of expression of sovereign authority in stating that the legislature has to deal with the future, administration with the present, and judiciary with the past.
The legislature sets the standards to which life is to conform. From time to time these must be changed and put in accord with the changed way of living. But till then they remain valid. it will be formed, case by case, by the administration. The administration itself is bound by certain norms, but on principle has free play within the lawful bounds of its good judgment so as to be able to respond to the daily changing needs. For it, just as for the law making politicians, the idea of serving a purpose is decisive. but shall decide according to the law. In general, it is not his task to create, but to judge. He has to judge the actions after they were committed and the conditions after they have arisen whether and in how much they corresponded to the standards respectively what juridical consequences they have brought about. Therefore, as a matter of principle his view is directed towards the past. In the life of the state, which is continuously inspired by politicians looking to the future, he is the steadfast counterpole serving as a brake. merely an executive organ. On the contrary he should control the lawmaker by re-examining the laws with regard to their conforming to the constitution. Therein, in any case, according to reason, would belong the examination whether the principle of the division of powers was maintained. Because just as the judge may judge but "de lege latea" and must leave the decisions "do lege forenda" to the lawmaker, the latter is obliged in reverse not to meddle with the former's competency by giving laws with retroactive power.
state is mainly based on its having abandoned the division of power. By putting at the top the political leadership idea (Fuehrerprinzip), it meddled despotically with the competency of the judges. By means of the police, i.e. the administration, it arrested and imprisoned people without judicial warrant of arrest only for reason of political prevention, and even arrested others that had been acquitted by the judge and set free. On the other hand for political reasons, convicted criminals were withdrawn from the hands of justice, Thereby quite naturally, safety and clarity of the law were seriously endangered principle on another occasion, and I then continue: splitting up of law, lay in the fact that the National Socialist State was based on a specific ideology by which the judge was bound. the SwissProfessor of law Hans Fehr Bern already in 1927 wrote in his book. "Law and Reality; insight into the growth and decay of the forms of law" (Einblick in Werden und Vergehen der Rechtsformen"). He says literally:
"Without ideology law floats in a vacuum...Anyone who has no ideology, can not have a sense of right or wrong either"...... Charter is not recognizable. As its signatories stand on very different ideological ground we will have to start out in it, as in the international law valid hitherto, from the liberal idea of freedom of ideology. Therefore the legal thesis "Nulla poena sine lege" should be especially sacred for it. This is also proven by the fact that the Control-Council for Germany, by abolishing the criminal analogy of article 2a of the criminal code, brought the above max back again to all Germans most emphatically. help out. Justice Jackson has called the Charter and the Trials a stop in the direction: "To create a juridical guarantee, that who starts a war, will pay for it in person". The American commentator Walter Lippmann stated elsewhere, that the system of collective security for the prevention of wars had broken down, because nobody was prepared to declare war on the breaker of peace in order to help prevent a war which did not directly affect him.
the disease itself. In consequence of the fiasco of the collective methods the thought to base security in the future upon holding responsible those individual persons accountable for breaking the peace crystallized with the enemies of Germany in the last war. And so it led to the Nurnberg trial. Taking one's starting point from this fact today one could say: During this second world war revolutionary developments have taken place. It has driven humanity beyond the sphere of what has been the modernage until a short time ago: The first but essential steps to create a world state have been made. although one still will doubt its absolute reliability. Justice Jackson himself has expressed doubts whether punishment will be a warning and help prevent breaking the peace in the future. Only one who is certain of Victory will decide to wage a war and so will not seriously consider punishment which will reach him only in the case of defeat. Therefore the educational issue of this trial, to strengthen the sense of justice, seems more important than the effect of deterring, which can also be achieved by warning for the future. The politician will have to learn that the principle of division of power will also have to be observed by him and that he will not find a judge willing to ment his mistake afterwards by punishing on the basis of future laws. The confidence in international jurisdiction, which today still suffers from the suspicion of being easily misused for political purposes, would be raised considerably through such a decree.
Therefore even under the view-point of political usefulness the violation of the sentence "Nulla poena sine lege praevia" could not be justified. On the other hand, however, one must realize that the strenghtening in the belief of the inflexibility of justice as the basic pillar of the tremendous dynamic of political forces, serves peace best. individual considerations presented by the representatives for the defendants. national law could not be imagined without international morals and that a moral code has to precede all claims for freedom by the individual as well as by the nations. These certainly are facts well worth considering. Correctly considered, however, they speak only for my viewpoint that the strenghtening of the sense of justice must not begin by violating it. there could be no belief in justice by not punishing the Chief culprits of Nazi Germany, then obviously he went too far in the enthusiasm of the speech. Justice does not grow out of obtaining at any price satisfaction for the violated sense of justice. Otherwise we should quickly arrive again at the endless chain of horrors, at vendetta. No-- justice demands moderation and consideration of motives and counter-motives. And there the onesided action itself against members of the Axis powers violates the idea of justice. It is impossible to justify it by a direct violation against it, that is, against the, otherwise, commonly prevailing rule: "Nulla poena sine lege praevia". The British Chief prosecutor himself declared the possibility of subsequent legislature one of the most offensive doctrines of the national socialistic legal terminology. With this he meant that the possibility of punishing an act already marked as a crime does not mean a change of the legal situation but only its logical development, and therefore is permissible. I do not at all want to contest the institution of the Tribunal thereby justified by him.
Rather the question arises whether this Tribunal is obliged to punish even though no penal law can be found which threatened the offences with punishment at the time of their committment. The affirmation of this question would go much further than the national socialistic judicial procedure which is rejected so vehemently by the British Chief prosecutor.
Moreover he should be prepared to admit that the Charter woul* have stated clearly and unambiguously, if it did not only presume, but possibly also establish, the basis for the punishableness of acts referred to by it . The passage involved in Paragraph 6 of the charter completely lacks such distinctness. It reads:
"The following acts or any of them are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal." This may be interpreted in the sense of a mere regulation of competence as well as, even though with difficulty, a regulation first establishing punishableness. Therefore, this passage must in any case be interpreted in favour of the defendant according to the established legal principle "in dubio pro reo", The following phrase, "for which there shall be individual responsibility" and the material regulations for punishment quoted in the follow ing paragraphs, present, according to their wording, no reason for doubt as to their interpretations.
However, they contain only modifications for an established punishableness. The tribunal may decide whether or not and to what extent they are compatible with the principle "Nulla poena sine lege praevia". American prosecutor. On one hand he passionately disavows all legal arbitrariness of the Nazis. On the other hand he is not prepared to acquiesce in the punishment of the defendants only for those crimes which were not only considered punishable at the time of being committed but were also actually threatened with punishment. On one hand he does not want executions or punishment without first having accomplished the determination of guilt in a fair manner.
On the other hand he demands a strict application of the Charter even though it contains new law surprising the defendants. On one hand he wants the trial to appear to future generations as the fulfilment of the human yearning for justice. On the other hand, in the face of objections to the Charter, he bluntly presumes upon the power of the victorious, who really could have made short work with the defendants. paragraph.
As far as the political side of this process is concerned I have already stated why it must not exert an influence on the outcome of this trial.
I wish to point out here that a policy which is carried out by the victors on the vainquished and therefore may be charactericed as one of "the weakest resistance", has once before proven to be a failure. extensive as regards time and object. Professor Exner, in his capacity as a University teacher of criminal law, occupied himself in particular with the importance of the legal conception for our process. In order to save time by avoiding a duplicate report, Professor Exner has placed the result of his research at my disposal. In conformity with him I have to present the following regarding this question :
The conception "conspiracy" belongs to the Anglo-American law sphere. There, however, it is not at all uncontested, rather, the opinion is noteworthy as being represented in England that this conception is long since obsolete : "It has been said that in England this law has become entirely disused."
In these proceedings, it is a different point that matters. The concept of "Conspiracy", as used by the Prosecution, is entirely unknown to German law. I would like, therefore, to begin my short legal argument with two questions which give rise to doubts.
1) May a criminal procedure, which is bent on realizing justice, use legal concepts which are and always have been utterly alien to the defendants and to the legal trend of thought of their people ?
2) How would this be consistent with the rule : Nullum crimen sine lege praevia, a principle which the British Chief Prosecutor has acknowledged as a fundamental principle of civilized criminal law jurisdiction ? Can it be honestly stated that already before 1939 not only the initiating of an illegal war was held to be an act punishable individually, but moreover a "Conspiracy" for initiating such wars ? The affirmative answer to this question given by the Prosecution has surprised not Germany only. May I clear up, in this connection, a misunderstanding. It has been said that the national socialist state itself had issued criminal laws ignoring the rule :"Nullum crimen sine lege", so that the defendants had no right to invoke this rule. It is by no means my purpose to defend national socialist criminal law, but honesty compels me to say : this is an error.
The 3rd Reich has - as mentioned before -
issued three laws increasing the penalty for an action with retroactive effect by applying the death penalty to acts which carried when committed, prison sentences only.
However, in no case until now, has a lawful act been declared punishable, nor an act, which was not a crime when committed, retroactively converted into a crime.
And this is the case here. of the concept of "Conspiracy". I do not, therefore, go any further into these questions. At any rate, it would appear that if such a concept is to be applied to Germans, this could only be done with all restrictions imposed by equity. ween a number of persons for accomplishing crimes, "a combination or agreement between two or more persons for accomplishing an unlawful end or a lawful end by unlawful means."
Similar definitions always keep occurring. Two points are charactertistic: "Agreement" and "Common Plan".
Agreement means an explicit or tacit understanding. If some persons pursue the same and independently of one another, then there is no conspiracy. It is accordingly not enough that the plan is common to all of them, they must have knowledge of this community and every one must voluntarily accept the plan as his own. They very expression "to conspire" implies that everyone contributes knowingly and willingly. A person under duress is no conspirator, for duress does not produce agreement, at the utmost, purely external assistance. For instance, if somebody imposes his will on another, then there is no conspiracy. Therefore, a conspiracy with a dictator at its head is a contradiction in itself. A dictator does not enter into a conspiracy with his followers, he does not make any agreement with them, he dictates. plan. The contents of such a plan can be very different. In English law, for instance, conspiracies are known for committing murder, fraud, blackmail, false accusation, certain economic delicts, and so forth. In all these eases, conspiracy is treated as a crime sui generis (by itself), and therefore the conspira tors are punishable for conspiracy regardless of the fact whether a murder, a fraud, or even a mere attempt at such crimes has been committed in the individual case.
spiracy is one of the cases where even preparation of a crime is punishable. Such cases are known to German criminal law. The partner in an agreement for committing a crime against life is punishable. According to Article 49-b he is punishable for a "crime of preparing any killing" even if the intended action has not taken place. here. Participation in an association pursuing certain aims hostile to the state is punishable, again independently of the fact whether a crime has actually been committed. But if it comes to an action, everybody is charged with his own culpability in this action. If it happens that the cindividual conspirator is guilty neither as the perpetrator nor as an abettor nor as an accessory to the actual crime, then he can be charged only with participation in an association hostile to the state, but not with such a crime.
The prosecutors in this trial are going further. They want to punish, under certain circumstances, the conspirators for individual actions they do not participate in.
To take the most significant example: they want to charge a conspirator even with those crimes which were committed prior to his entering the conspiracy. find any evidence that this has any foundation in English or American law. One this is certain, however, that such a conclusion is utterly contrary to the German criminal law. For the latter is based on the self-evident and unanimously accepted principle that one is only resposible for an action when one has been the author, or at least the part author of it.
Let us now look at the Charter. The Charter quotes two cases which are declared as punishable and which fall within the competence of the Court:
1. Paragraph 6-a states: participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the perpetration of a crime against peace is As such are listed the planning, preparation, launching and conducting of a war of aggression or of a war involving the violation of international treaties or assurances. It is remarkable that a concept which belongs to the internal criminal and civil law of England and America is applied here, without more ado, to international facts. The Charter does this by treating individuals who plan or conduct illegal wars as gangsters participating in a highway robbery. This is legal audacity, because in this case the sovereign state stands between the individuals, and the result of their actions and this removed any foundation from the comparison with facts in international daily life. Up to now the concept of conspiracy has been unknown to international law.
2. According to article 6, the last paragraph of the Charter, the partners in a conspiracy or in a common plan to commit crimes against peace, the law of war or humanity, are responsible for all actions committed by any partner while executing such a plan. This is, as a matter of principle, quite another thing from the case mentioned in 1. It does not mean punishment of the crime of conspiracy, but responsibility for the individual action of another conspirator. In other words, Conspiracy, as taken here, is not a crime sui generis, but a form of complicity in the actions of the conspirators. Mr. Justice Jackson has given us an example: if three robbers conspire and one of them kills the victim, then all of them, through their complicity, are responsible for the killing. this trial. The individual conspirator is to be punished for crimes committed not by himself, but by another conspirator. One defendant, who had nothing to do with the annihilation of the Jews, is to be punished for this crime against humanity only because he was a partner in a conspiracy.
The question at issue is: In this trial are principles of responsibility to be applied which go beyond our German criminal law 5 ? co-responsible for any action committed by any one of the coconspirators "in execution of such plans", These are the decisive words for the interpretation.
In my opinion the meaning of those words is as follows: the other conspirators are co-reponsible for any actions of their comrades which form part of the common plan, or which they therefore have helped think out, or have willed or have at least accepted. A few examples:
Case A: A, B, C, and D commit a concerted house-breaking in a villa. They happen to find a girl in the house, and A rapes here. B, C and D cannot be charged for this rape. The reason is that A did not do so, when committing the crime "in execution of the plan" but if anything, at the "occasion of t execution of the plan". The point at issue is not the execution, but merely the occasion arising while executing the plan. This opinion, which sould not be disputed, is of importance as it makes clear that there cannot be any question of responsibility for all the actions of the partners to the conspiracy.
Case B: Whil exploring the villa, B and C come to fight about some piece of plunder, and B knocks down C. This action too was not committed "in execution of the plan", but was foreign to the plan. A and D are not responsible for this "excess".
The third case: While exploring the villa, the burglars are detected by the owner. D. shoots him. How the issue depends on the special circumstances of the case. Let us, for instance, go back to the example, quoted by Mr. Justice Jackson, of the three robbers, one of whom kills the victim. Considering the nature of American gangsterism, it would appear quite normal that the individual gangsters concerned bore in mind the possibility of such an occurence, and were quite prepared to approve of it. If this is the case, they are responsible for the killing, as accessories or assitants, also according to our opinion.
In such a ease, there would be no objection to Hr. Justice Jackson's solution. But if the case is different, if the fatal issue had not been forseen by the others, perhaps could not be foreseen--e.g., if they took it for granted that the inhabitants of the house were away from hone--then there is no responsibility of the co-conspirators. They are responsible only for dots belonging to the "execution of the plan". There common plan, however, includes only what has been foreseen, from the beginning, and improved. Other ways of execution are alien to the plan.
Mr. Justice Jackson's argumentation is fallacious in so far as he derives a common principle from a decision which clearly and obviously happens to apply to the "normal case" of his paradigm of the robbers, and can hardly be applied to any other ease. As the case stands, co-responsibility of any single act could be made to apply to those conspirators only who have foreseen and approved of their comrades' act.
A legal principle extending the follow-conspirator's responsibility to such cases as are not included in their common responsibility, is alien to German law. Whether or not it belongs to Anglo-American law, the application of such a principle in the present trial would make punishable acts, which heretofore, could not be punished. This would clearly contradict the rule: nullum crimen sine lege praevia, a principle, as previously emphasized, acknowledged explicitly by the British prosecutor too. In view of the fact that article 6 can be interpreted in various ways, we should select out of two possible interpretations, as corresponding to the author's will, the one which does not contradict the said principle. subsequent entrance into it. The question is: What about responsibility for acts committed during the period of non membership? The prosecution appears to be of the opinion that a per son entering into the conspiracy hereby approves anything pre-viously done by any conspirator, in pursuance of the common plan.
Such an assertion seems to arise out of the civil law theory of a subsequent ratification of a business transaction. This theory is not tenable in criminal law. The charter does not mention anything of the sort as the common plan, the execution of which involved the act which was common to those who were members at that tine. Even if one takes the act of joining the conspiracy to be an approval of its acts so far committed, the approval of a commited crime does not involve partnership in this crime . The same applies to the withdrawal from the conspiracy. The person withdrawing can be made responsible only for what happened during his membership, even if the result has occurred after his withdrawal. Again any other opinion would lead to the result that an ex post facto law is being applied in a conspiracy within the meaning of the indictment, viz. a conspiracy to commit crimes against Peace, Usages of war and Humanity? been nobody doubts it - the loader of those conspirators. But it has already been emphasized that a conspiracy headed by a Dictator is a contradiction in itself. Hitler would have laughed if it had been said of him that he had made an agreement with his ministers, partly loaders and generals, to wage this or that war, or to conduct the war by these or other means. He was an autocrat. He did not care for the approval of these men, but was merely concerned about having his decisions executed, whether they agreed to those decisions or not. Quite aside from legal considerations, Hitler's environment, in fact, was quite different from a community of conspirators, as considered by the prosecution, and that before the hearing of evidence. Apaprt from a small party clan, he was surrounded by an atmosphere of distrust. He trusted neither the "defeatist club" of his ministers, nor his "generals". Such was already the case before the war, and what his surroundings looked like during the war has been shown by witnesses with great impressiveness.
A cunning system of secrecy ensured that plans and aims of the Fuehrer's remained unknown to his collaborators as long as at all possible, so that his most Intimate assistants time and again were taken by surprise by the events, and, in fact, were shocked to learn sane of then at the present trial only. This system of secrecy also ensured an isolation of his individual collaborators, as one hand was not allowed to know what the other did. Does this look like a conspiracy? In fact, Hitler complained at tines that the generals were "conspiring" against him, and used, strangely, this very word while speaking of those who today are charged with having conspired with him. The evidence repeatedly mentions conspirations, but conspirations against Hitler, the least, highly imporobable that the score of survivors of the Third Reich picked out and put into the dock by the pros ecution, have ever formed a gang of conspirators in the sense of the indictment. Any homogeneity is lacking in this group of people as to outlook, background, education, social position and function, and some of the defendants only met in the dock. as the nucleus around which the conspiracy formed.
We should however, in this connection, too, consider the different individual attitude. Some of the defendants have not been party members at all, or, at any rate, not for a long time, and but few of them have played an important part in the party. Some held top positions in the party and its organization and devoted their entire activity to the aims of these organizations,awhile others did everything in their power to eliminate from their spheresof activity any influence of party and SS. ness of the state and of general war-weariness of the people at a time when, truly, no intelligent person thought of a second war or, even less, about a war of aggression.
But were any of the defendants' aims unattainable without war? adjoining German territory with the Reich. This applied to the Saar territory, Austria, Memel, Danzig, and, as a hope lingering in the far future, also to the Sudeten territory. They all had been in the past parts of the German Reich, they all would have already returned to the German Reich in 1919 if the right of self-determination solemnly promised to all peoples had been realized. But these objectives of German longing could be reached by peaceful means. And in fact, they have been reached without a shot or a stroke with the one exception of Danzig, which would have been done in the same peaceful way if the Fuehrer had had a spark of patience and the Poles a spark of goodwill. But they neither wanted nor believed in a war. Hitler was believed capable of a large-scale bluff, but not a launching the catastrophe of a war.
I cannot therefore, believe in a conspiracy to commit crimes against Peace and usages of war. May I add two points of general importance :
1) The first point refers to Goering's attitude previous immediately to th outbreak of war.
He was at that time Hitler's confident friend, the country's second man, and is now the chief figure among the defendants. If there had been, in truth, a conspiracy to launch wars of aggression at that time, then he would have been the second in importance in such a conspiracy but it was actually he who tried everything within his power, in the last day of August, 1939, to prevent the attack on Poland, and who tried behind Hitler s back to uphold peace. How would this be consistent with a conspiracy for initiating wars of aggression ? Nor did he agree with a war against Russia and he strongly dissuaded the Fuehrer of such a war.
2) If there had been a conspiracy to commit war crimes, then the war woul regard of rules of war. Just the contrary actually happened. In fact, in the first years of the war, international law was, on the whole, respected. Especially in the beginning one endeavoured to wage war with decorum and chivalry. If any evidence is needed, a look into the orders of the German High Command regulating the behaviour of the soldiers in Norway, Belgium, Holland is sufficient proof.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal adjourned until tomorrow.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 5 July 1946, at 1000 hours.)