legislation and by adjusting the laws to the altered manner of life in good time, so it is with the community of states as well . Wilson also had this fundamental principle in mind as we saw. One of the great British experts on international law, one of the enthusiastic, unconditional and progressive adherents of the Paris Pact, McNAIR, took this into account too when, in 1936, he wanted to have placed beside collective force the collective and peaceful revision of conditions which had become, dangerous. This was taken into account by the American experts on International Law, BORCHARD and FENWICK, in their warring explanations of the aspects of the situation connected with international law, shortly before the second World War. The Government of the German Reich had, by the way, pointed out this problem which overshadowed all others, in Stresemann's Note to the American Ambassador dated the 27 April 1928, when unconditionally agreeing to Kellogg's proposal.
The problem of "collective revision" was not seriously tackled later on either. This is not surprising, if only because the very character of such an institution presupposes renunciation of their sovereignty by the states. And can such a reninciation be considered in the times we live in ? Philip BROWN melancholically thinks that this is less possible than ever. And for this reason a real forward stop in the question as to how war could literally be outlawed was not practicable. great, deal to satisfy the urgent demands of the nations in spite of these inextricable interdependences. They subsequently tried to give the pact a precise content and "teeth". The science of international law provided suggestions for this and checked it. We must also trace this process briefly even though it remained completely unsuccessful, because the seeds of the ideas contained in the Indictment are to be found here, insofar as its line of argument is not a political or ethical, but a legal one.
Firstly: In its ban on aggression, the Paris Pact unquestionably starts from the political concept of aggression. But in that it is quite indefinite.
SHOTWELL and BRIERLY, among others, tried to help immediately by deducing a legal concept of aggression from the second Article of the Treaty, which Article establishes the obligation to follow a procedure of peaceful settlement. We can leave open the question whether this interpretation may be applied to the treaty. In practice nothing is actually gained by doing so; one kind of difficulty is simply put in the place of another. There are no fewer obscurities: the measures of peaceful settlement presuppose good will on both sides; what, then, if is lacking on the ether side ? And what is still a measure of peaceful settlement and what is one no longer ? The Russian Government was quite right in the above-mentioned note of 31 August 1928 to the Briand-Kellogg Pact when it expounded this question.
Then : Other attempts to help tried to develop a completely new world constitution from the entirely indefinite pact by means of logic. They are connected with the name of the American Secretary of State Stimson and with the work of the Budapest Meeting of the International Law Association in 1934. really brought about, in a legally definable manner, an unambiguous and unconditional renunciation of war. Then of course, there no longer exists the right to wage wars as and when one likes. War waged against this prohibition is an offence against the constitution of the community of states. We are immediately faced by the question: the same as that of a State which is attacked contrary to law ?
If one answers: No, as does for instance the influential French commentator of the League of Nations Covenant, Jean Ray, does this then mean the elimination of the most important fundamental principles of classic International law ?
right to wage war freely and the duel-like character of war and, at any rate, the equality before the law of the belligerents - appl, for the appreciation of the actions of the belligerent powers again one another? still exist in such a war? recognized by law, especially if it is put into the form of a treat, or must not the community of States deprive the aggressor of the spoils of his victory by a policy of non-recognition? Should there be, or perhaps even must there be, common coercive action by the states against the agressor?
It must be noted: Not even the theory of law has drawn all the conclusions. The practice of the states, after a few tentative beginnings in isolated points, did not finally carry things to a conclusion in a single case.
With regard to the first point: whatever the latter's origin, has not as yet been seriously dispute by any state. Any doubts that arose were cleared up in a way which allowed of no misunderstandings. I draw attention to Resolution No 3 of the League of Nations Assembly of the 4 October 1921 and to the report of the Committee of Eleven of the League of Nations for the adaptation of the Covenant to the Pact of Paris. The aggressor state has the same rights and duties in a war as the attacked nation, i. e. those laid down by the traditional interaction. al laws of war. The French Chief Prosecutor appears to wish to deviate from this line, but not to wish to draw the full conclusion. But I do not see any tendency to deviate from the present path even in the most recent practice of states.
With regard to the second point: by neutrality, and in fact finally to give the states not involved the right of non-neutrality and oven the right to wage war against the aggressor.
Some statesmen and scholars have devoted themselves just as passionately to undermining and even to denying the right to neutrality as other statesmen and scholars have spoken in favour of its undiminished continuance. The clearer it became that the whole system of collective security did not function in the particular cases which were of decisive importance, namely in those cases where steps would have had to be taken against a great power, the more the idea of neutrality asserted itself with new strengths. The complete discrediting of the League of Nations and of the syste of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in the Abyssinian conflict put classic international law back in its old position again here too. In 1935 Switzerland declared her unrestricted neutrality; Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, Norway, Holland and Sweden followed with their Declaration at Copenhagen on 24 July 1938. The failure of the League of Nations was the reason, this fact also being mentioned openly.
With reference to the third point: The states not involved in a conflict should conduct themselves as members of the community of states, i. e. they should protect the constitution of the community of states by refusing to recognize the fruits of the victor's victory, should he have been the aggressor. The situation he has created by force should not even seem to become a legal situation. He will thus be deprived of what he has gained, and one of the main inducements to wage war will thereby be eliminated. Such a policy of non-recognition is undoubtedly not enough to guarantee a system of collective security by itself, but it is an indispensable part of such an order. There can be no dispute about this. The Brazilian representative BRAGA gained merit by proposing, at the 2nd League assembly in 1921, such a policy to be followed by the members of the League of Nations under the name of a "universal juridical blockade" (blocus juridique universal).
The Finnish representative PROCOPE interpreted Article 10 of the Covenant in this sense in 1930 before the League Assembly. The Notes of the American Secretary of State STIMSON of 7 January 1932 to CHINA and JAPAN made this idea echo throughout the world. Their contents are commonly called the Stimson Doctrine. The League of Nations accepted the Doctrine as a resolution of the Assembly dated the 11 March 1932. The idea was later the central point of the Pact of Rio de Janeiro of 10 October 1933 and of the Budapest Articles of 10 September 1934. The conflict between Italy and Abyssinia in 1935/36 became the great test-case, which decided the fate of the system of collective security: The League of Nations declared a member which was a great power to be the aggressor and decreed economic sanctions, but then shrank from coercive military measures and finally, after Italy's victory, struggled painfully in debates on procedure, especially at the 18th Assembly of the League, to find an answer to the question as to how the League, without openly betraying its constitution, could cross the attacked member, the minor-power Abyssinia, off the list of existing states and recognize it as part of the Italian Empire. The United States also did not enforce the Stimson Doctrine, but remained strictly neutral.
It is necessary to know all this; and also to know that the British Government on 20 February 1935 politely but firmly refused, through the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Sankey, to accept the logical deductions, and paid tribute to the old truth : it is not logic but history that creates law.
On a later occasion, when Secretary of State Cordell Hull had explained the principles of American policy to all the powers on the 16 July 1937, the Portuguese government isued a warning against "the abstract and generalizing tendency of jurists"; it warned against attempts to "find a single formula" and against not studying historic facts sufficiently.
We therefore come to the conclusion that : during several years prior to 1939 - no effective general ruling of international law regarding prohibited war. peoples were aware. international law was followed to an over increasing extent : two states would then conclude treaties, in full knowledge of their particular historical conditions and with a view to securing peace between themselves. help Great Britain. Great Britain was able to acquire destroyers and it later received the assistance of Lend-Lease. The American public recognised this act of assistance as being essentially no longer neutral; it was regretted by some, welcomed by others, now attacked and now defended. The supporters of the measures before the American public, above all Stimson and Cordell Hull, quite rightly did not attempt to justify them as consistent with neutrality. On the contrary, they took up their stand on the Pact of Paris as interpreted by the Budapest Articles. As we saw, this would, according to Viscount Sankey's indisputably correct conception of what are the sources of international law, have been wrong even in 1935.
After the developments which had taken place since Italy's victory over Abyssinia, such discussions were entirely outside the field of legal realities. Their purpose was to resolve internal dissensions in America and they could therefore be of no direct importance for international law. Even had these discussions taken place between states, they could at most have helped to create law. But is it actually necessary to assert or prove that such discussions could not have created, during the great struggle, a law to attain which so many efforts - efforts which proved to be Utopian - were made in vain in peace-time ? In this court many ways of legal thinking meet - ways which are in part very different.
This leads to certain insoluble differences of opinion. But no way of legal thinking anywhere on earth, from the most ancient times to the most recent, could or can make possible arguments which contradict the very nature of law as a social order of human life arising out of history. If several governments accept articles, about the contents of which they are of different opinions, and if these articles then find no real application in the practice of these governments - which is not to be wondered at considering the circumstances under which they arose - and it theorists then interpret these articles and the practice of Governments rejects these interpretations either expressly or tacitly, one must then resign oneself to this, in so far as one wants to keep to the task of legal appreciation, no matter how much the goal may be worth striving for politically or morally. following the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. Let us suppose for a moment that a general and unambiguous pact had existed, accepted and applied by the Contracting Parties in fundamental and factual agreement. Would the liability of individuals to punishment for the breach of such a treaty be laid down in international law ? individuals. at present valid from any other violation of international law. The state which violates a treaty would commit an offence against international law, but not a punishable act. Attempts were occasionally made to deduce from words "delit" (offence), "crime international" (international crime) and "condamnation de la guerre" (condemnation of war) the existence of an International Criminal Law dealing with our case. Such conclusions are based on wrong premises. Every lawyer knows that any unlawful behaviour can be called a "delit" (delictum), not only punishable behaviour. And the word "crime" is used even entirely outside the legal sphere. And this is precisely the case here. When, in 1927, on Poland's application, the League of Nations Assembly declared war to be an international crime, the Polish representative expressly stated that the declaration was not actually a legal instrument, but an act of moral and educational importance.
on a legal basis failed. But this does not mean that the numerous bilateral treaties, whose purpose it is to preclude wars of aggression between the two partners, became inapplicable. One will actually have to examine whether the parties to the treaty may have made the existence or continued existence of a general machinery of collective security the prerequisite for the validity of the treaty. bilateral treaties. assurances were given. In some cases the political and in some a legal concep of aggression, and even a number of such legal concepts side by side, determine right and wrong. The German Reich also concluded a series of such pacts. They have been drawn upon by the prosecution as an argument. One must examine whether all these treaties were still in force at the critical moment. This examination must be left to the individual defence counsel. But if the German Reich did attack in an individual case in breach of a non-aggression pact which was still valid, it committed an offence in international law and is responsible therefore according to the rules of international law regarding offences in international law.
But only the Reich. Not the individual, even if he were the head of the state. valid.
It is unnecessary even to speak about this. For up to the most recent times not even the possibility has been mentioned, either in the Manchurian, or in the Italo-Abyssinian or in the Russo-Finnish conflict, of instituting criminal proceedings against those people who were responsible, on the Japanese Italian or Russian side, for planning, preparing, launching and prosecuting the war, or who simply participated in these acts in any way. And it was certainly not because matters had, paradoxically enough, not been thought out to the end, that they were not prosecuted. But they were not prosecuted because this can not happen as long as the sovereignty of states is the organizational basic principle of the whole inter-state order.
THE PRESIDENT : I think this would be a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken) DR. JAHRREISS: S hould things reach the point where, according 4 July M LJG 6-1 to general world law, the men who participated in the planning, preparation, launching and prosecution of a war forbidden by international law could be brought before an international criminal court, the decisions regarding the state's ultimate problems of existence would be subject to super-state control.
Ono could of course still call such states sovereign, but they would no longer be sovereign. In his paper of late 1943 which I have already mentioned several times and which he wrote after the Moscow conference of the 1 November 1943, Kelsen again and again repeats the phrase that in questions of breach of the peace, the liability of individuals to punishment does not exist according to the general international law at present valid and can not exist on account of sovereignty. centuries, above all since the ever more rapid advances made by the idea of the national state, gained the dignity of a superperson.
Of course acts of state are acts of men. But they are in fact acts of state, i.e. acts of the state carried out by its organs and not the private acts of Mr. Smith or Mr. Robinson. community as alegal entity, it wants to have individuals legally sentenced for their decisions regarding war and peace, is, when one looks at it from the angle of European history, to look upon the state as one would look upon a private individual, indeed, more than that, what it is doing is to destroy the state mentally. Such a charge, the moral justification of which is not my concern-such a charge is, as we have already shown, incompatible with the very nature of sovereignty and with the feeling of the majority of Europeans. It seems, indeed, as though not only Europeans feel that way. In 1919, in Paris, it was the American delegates at the War Guilt investigation Committee who opposed most strongly any legal sentence on the Kaiser for the very reason of the incompatibility of such a procedure with the sovereignty of the State. And it is impossible to recognize the idea of sovereignty more strongly than Kellogg did eight years later during the negotiations 4 July M LJG 6-2 in connection with the Pact of Paris, when he declared, as I have already said, "Every state is the solo judge of its behaviour with regard to questions affecting its existence."
others anathematize it. Some idolize and anathematize it simultaneously. Our epoch does so. Perhaps we are living in a period of transition. Perhaps a transformation of values is taking place. Perhaps world community will become the supreme political treasure for the peoples, in place of their own particular States, which have at any rate hold this position hitherto. Perhaps we shall reach a point where the unleashing of a war deserving moral and also legal condemnation will, for the general legal conscience, constitute high treason against the world community. Perhaps we shall reach a point where it will be permissible, or even compulsory, to betray a government which starts such a war to foreign countries without a legal justification for calling this high treason towards one's country. At the moment in no nation is there a majority-let alone unanimity -- in support of this opinion. for breach of the peace between states can thus be ordered only if the fundamental principles of the international law currently valid and the scale of values which has for centuries been firmly rooted in the feeling of the European nations, are abandoned -that scale of values according to which the state, one's own sovereign state, forms the indispensa ble foundation for free personality. time when it stood upright in its full strength and acted through its organs. It must do so if it desires to prosecute individual persons for a breach of the peace between states. It must turn the defendants into private individuals. But it then combines them -so to speak on the private plane --with the help of the criminal law concept of a conspiracy which is taken from Anglo-Saxon law and is strange to us, gives them the many millions strong substructure 4 July M LJG 6-3 of organization and groups which are designated as criminal, and thereby again places a superperson before us.
it lays down fundamentally new law, if - with the British chief prosecutor - one measures them against existing international law. That which, originating in Europe, has finally spread to the whole world and is called international law, is, in essence, a law of the coordination of sovereign states. If one measures the regulations of the Charter against this law, one must say: The regulations of the Charter negate the basis of this law, they anticipate the law of a world state.
They are revolutionary. Perhaps in the hopes and longings of the nations the future is theirs. establish that they are now - revolutionarily new. The laws regarding war and peace between states had no place for them could not have any place for them. Thus they are criminal laws with retroactive force.
sovereignity of states in his humanly very moving speech and quite rightly saw that an unbridgeable gulf exists between the Charter and the international law at present valid, when it wants to see individuals punished as criminals for breach of international peace. He therefore shifts the trial from the plane of international law to that of constitutional law. It might possibly have happened that a German state power would have settled accounts after the war with those people who were responsible for launching the war. As the whole life of the German people is crippled today, those foreign powers who, in cooperation with each other on the basis of treaties, have territorial power in Germany, are undertaking this settlement of accounts. The Charter has laid down the rules which are to guide the Court in its investigation and verdict. One can here leave unexamined whether this opinion is legally right or not. Even if it is right, our question is not altered therby: When looking at the problem from this point of view, no less than from that of international law, we must know how far the Charter creates penal law with retroactive force. But we must now measure the regulations of the Charter not only against the international law which was valid for Germany and was transformed into national law - as people are wont to say - but also against the national criminal law which was binding on the defendants at the time of the deed. It is, after all, possible for a state, a member of the community of states, to be more cosmpolitan in its criminal law than the current international law. The rule of the Charter which is new with regard to existing international law may correspond to an already existing national law, and then it would not be a criminal law with retroactive force. So how was the breach of peace between states - particularly the breach of non-aggression pacts - treated in the national criminal law to which the defendants were subject at the time of the preparation and launching of the war? It is possible that, in a state, those people are threatened with punishment who have prepared or launched or waged a war in breach of the international obligations of that state. (78) That would actually be completely unpractical. For the result of a war also decides the internal settling of accounts. No criminal court threatens a victorious government.
But, in case of defeat, the defeat itself gives the measures of the settlement of account. In any case the regulations of the Charter regarding punishment for breach of the peace between states are new for the national criminal law which the defendants were subject to at the time of the deed. But if one does not understand the phrase "null um crimen, nulla poena sine lege" as it is understood on the European continent, i.e. as meaning that law in the sens of "lex" is a rule laid down by the state, a state law, but is of the opinion which - as far as I can see - is peculiar to English legal thinkers, that law in the sense of "lex" can also be a deeply rooted rule of ethics, or morality, we have one question left: As things happened to be, did the defendants, - formerly ministers, military leaders, directors of economy, heads of higher authorities, feel at the time of the deed,or could they have felt - that a behaviour which is now made punishable by a Retroactive law was against their duty? The answer to this question cannot be given unless one has an insight into the nature of the constitution of the German Reich at the moment of the deed. form, with that constitution, which it happened to have at any given moment. Such is the case with every member of the community of states. The United States and the British Empire, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic, Brazil and Switzerland stand inthe framework of the family of nations with that constitution which they happen to have at the time. this concrete legal structure of the Reich. For, without trying to do this, no one in this trial will be able to arrive at a decision regarding right and wrong. In addition it seems to me that many ethical question s which have been raised here require such an attempt to be made. But I am afraid that, with the picture presented by the prosecution, it is not possible to arrive as close to the truth as is possible in spite of the complex nature of the subject. the world on the part of a few dozen criminals. The German State, if one looks upon things in this way, becomes a mere shadow or tool. But this State had long been in existence; no one could set aside the enormous weight of its history.
It was only various things in this history, at home and especially abroad, that made Hitler's rise to power at all possible or which made it easier for him, and it was many things in this history that guided, urged on, limited or put a brake on Hitler in his choice of aims and means, and helped to decide the success or failure of his measures and undertakings. The prosecution was certainly right in lawying great stress on the so-called Fuehrer principle. This so-called Fuehrer principle was, in fact, for the eyes and even more for the cars of the German people and of the world in general, the organizational guiding principle in the development of the Reich constitution after 1933. character during the course of the years. In the life of men, leading and commanding present inherent contradictions. mankind, which is to rule by issuing commands, and there is another one, which is to lead the way by setting an example and to be followed voluntarily, which is to lead or whatever one wishes to call it. This differentiation between two fundamentally different methods of governing men is often already made difficult by the words used; in the German languages for instance, this is so because leading is sometimes called unconscious ruling, and ruling is sometimes called leading. Furthermore, the differentiation is rendered more difficult by the fact that it is at one time leading and at another commanding that governs the relations between the same persons or by the fact that methods which are actually applicable to leading are used for ruling, and vice versa. Every State has been is, and will be faced by the question of how it is to link up both these methods, so that they complement, advance and keep a check on each other.
Both methods appear continually and everywhere. There has never yet been a really great ruler who was not also a leader. But minor rulers are also subject to this law. And the Hitler regime brought about - at least to begin with - a synthesis of both method's which had at least the appearance of being tremendously efficient. To this synthesis has been attributed - perhaps not unjustly - much of what the world saw with wonder, sometimes approvingly but more often disapprovingly, as the result of an unheard of mobilization, concentration and increase in the energies of a nation. This particular synthesis of leading and commanding found its strongest expression in the person of Hitler himself, in his actions of leading, for instance in his speeches and in his commands. Hitler's acts of leading and commanding became the motive power of the German political life of that time. Justice must be done above all to this phenomenon. It is of absolutely decisive importance for judging the enormous mass of facts which has been produced here. With all the caution which is natural to men who think along scientific lines and which imposes on them an almost unconquerable mistrust of any attempt to comprehend and evaluate events which havehappened so recently, one can perhaps risk this assertion: In the course of the years, Hitler gave commanding an increasingly favoured place to the detriment of acts of loading, and finally brought it so much to the fore that commands and not the act of leading became the all decisive factor. Hitler the man of the people became more and more the dictator. The speeches in which he repeated himself ad nauseam even for his most willing followers and overshouted to the irritation even of members of his entourage who had faith in him, became rarer, but the legislative machine worked faster and faster. A later age will perhaps realize how far the great change in the attitude of the German people to Hitler, which was beginning even before the war, was the cause or effect of this change. While, on the question of something superficial, i.e., the question as to how he wished to be designated, Hitler pressed not to be called "Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor" any longer but only "Fuehrer", the way in which the state was being governed was following the exactly opposite path; leading disappeared more and more and there remained naked domination.
The Fuehrer's orders became the central element of the German state edifice. In the public hierarchy, this development brought with it rather an increase than a decrease in Hitler's power. The great majority of German officials and officers had seen nothing behind the organized leadership but a machinery of domination with a new label and, if possible, of an even more bureaucratic nature, side by side with the inherited state machinery. When Hitler's orders became the Alpha and Omega, they felt themselves, so to speak, back in the old familiar path. The queer and puzzling part was gone. They were back in their world of subordination. But anyway this development had given the Fuehrer's orders a special aura of sanctity for them too; there was no contradicting the Fuehrer's orders. One could perhaps raise objections but if the Fuehrer stuck to his order, the matter was decided. His orders were something quite different from the orders of any official of the hierarchy under him.
Here we have come to the fundamental question in this trial: What position did Hitler's orders occupy in the German constitution? Did they belong to the type of orders which were set aside by theCharter of this Court as grounds for the exclusion of punishment? so-called constitutional state ("Rechtsstaat") than for other people to witness the slow and then ever more rapid disintegration of the guarantees of the constitutional state; for he never came to feel at home in the new order and always stood half outside it. But, for this very reason, he probably knows more than anyone else about the peculiarities of this new order. An attempt must be made to make it comprehensible. State orders, whether they lay downrules or decide individual cases, can always be measured against the existing written and unwritten law, but also against the rules of international law, morals and religion.
Someone, even if only 4 July A LJG 8-1a the conscience of the person giving the orders ordered something which he had no right to order?
Or has he formed and published his order by an inadmissible procedure? But an unavoidable problem for all domination lies in this: Should or can it grant the members of its hierarchy, its officials and officers, the right or even impose on them the duty - to examine at any time any order which demands obedience from them, to determine whether it is lawful, and to decide accordingly whether to obey or refuse? an affirmative answer to this question. Only certain members of the hierarchy were ever granted this right; and they were not granted it without limits. This was also the case, for instance, under the extremely democratic constitution of the German Reich during the Weimar Republic and is so today under the occupation rule of the four great powers over Germany. members of the hierarchy, the order has legal force for them. acts of state which must be respected by the authorities even when they are defective. Certain acts of laying down rules, certain decisions on individual cases which have received legal force, are valid even when the person giving the order has exceeded his competence or has made a mistake in form. order must finally come to an end, orders must exist under every government that are binding on the members of the hierarchy under all circumstances and are therefore law where the officials are concerned, even if outsiders may see that they are defective as regards content or form, if measured against the previous laws of the state concerned or against rules imposed from outside the state. result of a plebiscite of the nation is a fully valid rule or an absolutely binding decree. Rousseau knew how much the " volonte de tous" can be in contradiction to what is right, but he did not fail to appreciate that the orders of this "volonte de tous" are 4 July A LJG 8-2a binding.
a national assembly or of a parliament may have the same force. Constitution of the German Reich, the laws resolved by a majority of the Reichstag large enough to alter the constitution and proclaimed by the president were under all circumstances law for all functionaries, including the independent courts of law, even if the legislator - knowingly or unknowingly - might have violated rules not imposed by the state but by churches or by the community of states. In the latter case the Reich would have been guilty of an international offence. For it would not have seen to it that its legislation was in accordance with international law. It would, therefore, have been responsible in accordance with the international regulations regarding reparation for international offences. But until the law concerned had been eliminated in accordance with the rules of German constitutional law, all officials of the hierarchy would have had to obey it. to examine its legal binding force with the aim of obeying or refusing to obey it, depending on the result of this examination. This is not different in any other state in the world. It never was and never can be different. Every state has had the experience of its ultimate orders, its highest orders, which must be binding on the hierarchy if the authority of the state is to exist at all, being on occasion in conflict with rules not imposed by the state-to divine law, to natural law and to the laws of reason. Good governments take trouble to avoid such conflicts. To the great sorrow - indeed to the despair - of many Germans, Hitler frequently brought about such conflicts - and serious conflicts. And, if only for this reason, his way of governing was not a good one, even though it was for some years successful in some spheres. Only it must here be asserted straight away: These conflicts never affected the entire nation or the entire hierarchy - at least 4 July A LJG 8-3a not immediately - but always merely groups of the nation or individual offices of the hierarchy; and it was only some of the people concerned who were fundamentally affected, many being only superficially involved; not to mention those conflicts that remained unknown to the overwhelming majority of the people and of the hierarchy, nor, therefore, those orders by which Hitler not only showed himself to be inhuman in individual cases, but simply outside the pale of what is human.