"Coal mining is the most urgent work. Every worker who is essential to coal mining is "indispensable".
"Note: Coal mining has even now become the key point of the whole of the armament industry, of communications and of export. If the necessary labour is not made available for it now, the most important part of the export trade, the export of coal, will cease. The purchase of coal in Poland will stop. The correct distribution of labour is determinative. In order to be able to man these key points with the right people, severe demands will shortly be submitted to the fuehrer which, even in the current mobilisation year, will under certain circumstances lead to an exceptional direction of the war, e.g. to the immobilisation of lorries and to the closing down of unessential factories owing to lack of coal.
"In addition, there is the supplying of Italy and other countries such as Scandinavia with coal (to maintain the German supplies of iron.)" larly important to our argument and pass to Item 2, page 9 of the English translation:
"A second category of workers liable for military service will be called up during the war after their replacements have been trained. A decisive role is played by the extensive preliminary training and retraining of workers.
"Preparations must be made for replacing the mass of other workers liable for military service, even by drawing on an increased number of women. There ore also disabled servicemen.
"Compulsory work for women in wartime is of decisive importance It is important to proceed to a great extent with the training of women in war-essential work, as replacements and to augment the number of male workers.
"In order to avoid confusion when mobilisation takes place, persons working in war-essential branches e.g. administration, communications, police, food, will not at first be removed. It is essential to establish the degrees of urgency and the standard of value.
"In the interests of the auxiliary civilian service, provided by every European people to gain and maintain the lead in the decisive initial weeks of a war, efforts must, in this way, be made to ensure by a trustworthy organization, easily understood, that every German in wartime not only possesses his mobilisation orders but has also been thoroughly prepared for his wartime activity. The works must be adapted to receive the replacements and additional workers.
"The General Plenipotentiary for Economy is given the task of settling what work is to be given to prisoners of war, to those in prison, concentration camp and penitentiary.
"According to a statement by the Rcichsfuehrer-SS, greater use will be made of the concentration camps in wartime. The 20,000 inmates be employed mainly in workshops inside the concentration camps.
"Secretary of State Reich Minister of Labour Dr. Syrup, made a report on the employment of labour in the event of mobilization and the schedule of manpower for the war."
the totality of the mobilization planned months before the war started, and indicating, as we shall argue, preparations for a war more extensive than the more brush with Poland.
"The figures for the schedule of manpower drawn up experimentally, could be only of a preparatory character and merely give certain guiding principles. The basis of a population of 79 million was taken. Of these, 56.5 million are between the ages of 14 and 65. It is also possible to draw upon men over the age of 65 and upon minors of between 13 and 14. Defectives and the infirm must be deducted from the 56.5 million. Most prisoners are already employed in industry. The greates deduction is that of 11 million mothers with children under 14. After these deduction have been made, there remains an employable population of 43.5 million: 26.2 million men, after deducting 7 million members of the Armed Forces: 19.2 17.3 million men, after deducting 250,000 nurses etc: 17.1 for the whole of GermanY's economic and civil life. The President does not consider women over the age of 60 as employable. 8.) The number of workers at present employed and of employed (2/3 of those gainfully employed) distributed over 20 large branches of industry, amounts roughly to the following: 24 million men (excluding 2 million service men), 14 million women. 9.) No information was then available regarding the number which the Armed Forces will take from the individual branches of industry. Therefore an estimate was made of the numbers remaining in the individual branches of industry after 5 million servicemen had been called up.
The President's demand, that the exact number liable to be drawn upon be established, is being complied with. These enquiries are not secret apart from figures given and formations.
"Apart from the 13.8 million women at present employed a further 3.5 million unemployed women, who are included on the card-index of the population, can be employed.
2 million women would have to be redirected: e.g. a transfer can be made to agriculture and to the metal and chemical industry, from the textile, clothing and ceramic industries, from small, trading, insurance and banking businesses and from the number of women in domestic service.
12.) The lack of workers in agriculture, from which about 25% of the physically fit male workers will be withdrawn, must be made up by women (2 in the place of 1 man) and prisoners of war. No foreign workers can be counted on. The Armed Forces are requested to release to a great extent works managers and specialist workers such as milkers, tractor drivers, (35% are still liable for call up).
"In the agricultural sphere, preparations must also be made to relieve individual employment through help from neighbouring farms, systematic use of all machines and making a store of spare parts available.
"15. The President announced that, in the war, hundreds of thousands of workers from non-war economy concerns in the Protectorate are to be employed under supervision in Germany, particularly in agriculture, and housed together in hutments. General Field Marshal Goering will obtain a decision from the Fuehrer on this matter."
I shall omit No. 16.
"17. If I may say as I offer this, it seems rather detailed as showing the extent of preparation already accomplished at the time in June of 1939.
"The result of the procedure of establishing indispensable and guaranteed workers is at present as follows: Of 1,172,000 applications for indispensability, 727,000 have been approved and 233,000 rejected."
I shall pass to "c" near the bottom of the page: "The orders to supplementary personnel to report for euty are ready and tied up in bundles at the Labour Offices." with wages and I pass to No. 21, a detail which I offer as indicating that a long war was in anticipation. "When labour is being regrouped, it is important and with specialist workers, essential that the workers are retrained for their work in the new factory, in order to avoid setbacks in the initial months of the war. After a few months have passed, it must be possible to replace most of the specialist workers."
I pass to point "V". "The General Plenipotentiary for Economy, Reich Minister of Economy Funk, stated his opinion of the consequences of the schedule of manpower, from the point of view of the carrying on of industry.
"a. In accordance with the verbal agreements made with the OKW, the regulations regarding indispensable personnel have been laid down, and the certificate of indispensability issued."
I shall pass to point No. 25 on page 15: "In reply to the request by the speaker that when withdrawing workers for the Naval Dockyards, more consideration should be shown for the important sections of industry, parti cularly export and newspaper concerns, the President pointed out the necessity of carrying out the Naval Building Programme as ordered by the Fuehrer, in its entirety."
I pass to the large heating Roman No. VI. "The General Plenipotentiary for Administration, Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick, dealt with the saving of labour in the public administration.
"The task is primarily a problem of organization. As can be seen from the surveys showing how the authorities, economic and social services are organized, which were submitted to those attending the conference, there are approximately 50 different kinds of officials in the District Administration, each quite independent of the other -- an impossible state of affairs. Formerly there were in the State two main divisions, the state Civil Service and the Wehrmacht. After the seizure of power, the Party and the permanent organizations were added to these, with all their machinery from top to bottom. In this way the number of public posts and officials was increased many times over. This makes public service more difficult.
"Since the war, tasks have increased enormously." The context makes it clear that that is the preceding war. "The organizing of total war naturally requires much more labour, even in the public administration, the in 1914. But it is an impossibility that this system should have increased its numbers twenty to forty fold, in the lowest grade alone. For this reason, the Reich Ministry of the Interior is striving for coordination of administration."
A small commission was created. I offer Item No. 29 in connection with Goering's testimony that they ceased to function. "Instead of further discussions before the whole assembly, the forming of a small commission was recommended, which will make definite proposals. Extensive preparatory work has been undertaken." And a note by the committee that the committee had been functioning.
Point 30. "The President requested that the commission's proposals be submitted. It was an important section of the preparation for war.
Now, I shall pass to the large sub-division "C" which relates to increasing the efficiency of the communications service, starting with the receipt of a report from the Army General Staff.
"The result of the examination of the work necessary for strategic concentration a year and half ago showed that the transport service could not meet all the demands made on it by the Armed Forces. The Minister of Transport agreed. The 1938 section of the Four Year Programme will presumably be completed in August 1939.
"Shortly after this programme was drawn up, demands were made on the Wehrmacht, which changed completely the usual employment of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of a war. Troops had to be brought to the frontier, in the shortest possible time, in numbers which had until then been completely unforeseen. The Wehrmacht was able to fulfill these demands by means of organizational measures but transport could not.
"In the Transportation sphere Germany is at the moment not ready for war." peatedly made by a number of witnesses that the movements of the Wehrmacht in the Rhineland, the Anschluss and all the rest of it, even Czechoslovakia, were surprise movements. "In the case of the three operations in 1938/1939 there was no question of an actual strategic concentration. The troops were transported a long time beforehand near to the area of strategic concentration by means of camouflaged measures.
"This stop gap is of no use whatsoever when the time limit connot be laid down and known a long time beforehand, but an unexpected and almost immediate military decision is required instead. According to the present situation, transport is not in a position despite all preparations, to bring up the troops."
"a" is unimportant for my purposes, on page 18.
"b" and "c" represent steps to be taken to meet the deficiency.
On page 19, I shall not bother to read No. 38, showing the preparation of highways from East to West and from North to South.
I read No. 39, if I may: "The President remarked that even in peacetime certain vital supply stores of industry and the armed forces are to be transferred to the war industrial centres to economize in transport later on I shall pass to point No. 41 on page 29:
"To sum up, the President affirmed that all essential points had been cleared up at this meeting."
which Mr. Dodd will Submit, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you have got some other papers to put in ?
MR. DODD: I would like to offer, Mr. President, Document 406-PS, which is the bulletin of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition, and it is a matter that the Tribunal, in our judgment, may take judicial notice of. It is an official publication but it will be quite helpful in connection with the labor program as between Suackel and Speer and it is offered for that purpose, to clear up some of the coubts that may have arisen after the Speer and Sauckel testimony. I think there is no necessity to read it at all but simply to offer it. It would become USA 902.
Then I would like to offer Document 1452-PS. This is a report of a conference of the chiefs with the Chief of the Department of the Economic Armament office, and I would just like to read a short excerpt from it. It is Document 1452-PS, dated the 24th of March, 1942. It says :"Conference of the Chiefs with Chief of the Department. Report of the Chief of the Department on the conference on the 23rd of March with Milch, Witzell, Leeb, in Minister Speer's office. The Fuehrer looks upon Speer as his principal mouthpiece, his trusted advisor in all economic spheres. Speer is the only one who today can say anything. He can interfere in any department. He already disregards all other departments." And the remainder of the document we do not with to quote and I do not think it is necessary because the text is not changed any by what we have quoted from it. That becomes USA 903.
Now we also have here some photographs, Mr. President, and these are offered with respect to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. They were turned over to us by our colleagues of the French prosecution. The first one is F-894, which becomes USA-904. That is a picture showing Himmler congratulating someone, Kaltenbrunner immediately to his rear.
THE PRESIDENT: How are they identified ?
MR. DODD: I will submit it -- well, these are all captured documents
THE PRESIDENT: No, I mean by caption or any other way, where do they come from ?
MR. DODD: Well, I assume them to be all captured documents. Oh, I see how -- there are affidavits attached to each one which explain their source.
Here, this first one, there is a man by the name of Francois Boix, who says that he is a photographer and was interned at Mauthausen, and so on, and he attests that this photograph was taken, and so forth. I think that is sufficient -- I assume it is -- to identify the picture. I believe that each one of them has a similar statement.
Now the next one is F-896, which becomes USA-905. The back of the original bears an affidavit by Francois Boix.
The next one is F-897, which becomes US A-906. This, as well, bears the affidavit of Francois Boix and shows Kaltenbrunner and Himmler and other SS officials. we particularly call to the Tribunal's attention. It, as well, boars the certificate of Francois Boix, Kaltenbrunner is there in the second row, Himmler and Hitler in the immediate center between Kaltenbrunner and, apparently, Martin Bormann, taken at a concentration camp it appears from the picture of the unmates on the left side. offer as USA-908. It is the deposition of Oswald Pohl, P-o-h-l, dated the 28th of May, 1946. The substance of the affidavit reads as follows:"I can say with absolute certainty that on the occasion of a duty call at Mauthausen --"
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Was Pohl called as a witness ?
MR. DODD: No, sir, he was not called. That was Puhl, P-u-h-l. The names are similar.
"-- I saw and spoke to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner there at the officers'mess on the righthand side of the camp entrance either in the autumn of 1943 or the spring of 1944. I took lunch with him there at the mess table."
And then another affidavit, 4032-PS, which becomes USA-909. I think it is unnecessary to read this; it has been translated. It is the deposition of one Karl Reif, R-e-i-f, in which he states that he saw Kaltenbrunner either in May or June about midday in 1942 in the camp at Mauthausen.
That is all we have to offer, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT : Do the other members of the Prosecution wish to offer any other evidence ? Bergold, will you call the witness you wish to call, Kempka.
DR. BERGOLD (Counsel for the defendant Bormann) : Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I shall call the witness Kempka.
ERICH KEMPKA, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows : BY THE PRESIDENT :
Q Will you repeat this oath after me : truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT : You may sit down. BY DR. BERGOLD :
Q Witness, in what way were you working near Hitler during the war ?
Q Did you meet Martin Bormann in that capacity ? he became my indirect superior.
Q Mr. Witness, on what day did you see the defendant Martin Bormann for the last time ? the former Reichsleiter Martin Bormann near the Friedrichstrasse Station at the Weidendamm Bridge. The former Reichsleiter Bormann asked me what the general position war near the Friedrichstrasse Station, and I told him -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing) : You are going too fast. He asked you what ?
THE WITNESS : He asked me what the position was and whether one could get through near the Friedrichstrasse Station. I told him that it was practically impossible, since there was too much of a defensive action being fought. Then he went on to ask whether it might be possible to do so with armored vehicles, and I told him that it was all a question of trying it.
to cling to them, and the armored vehicles penetrated the anti-tank trap after the vehicle at the head had got through. Bormann was walking approximately in the middle of the column on the lefthand side. Suddenly that was a direct hit, presumably by a Bazooka shell, and the tank next to which Bormann was walking was blown up. On the very side where Bormann was walking, there was a bright flame.
THE PRESIDENT : You are still going much too fast. The last thing I heard you say was that Bormann was walking in the middle of the column. Is that right ?
THE WITNESS : Yes, he was walking on the lefthand side, center of the tanks. the tank was hit, presumably by a Bazooka shell fired from a window. The tank disintegrated at the very spot where Martin Bormann was walking. think it was Standartenfuehrer Dr. Stumpfecker -- I was thrown aside and I became unconscious. When I came to, I couldn't see anything at all since this blinding flash had blinded me. I then crawled back as far as the tank trap, and since then I have not seen Martin Bormann again. BY DR. BERGOLD : flame ?
A Yes, there was a movement; there was a sort of collapse. You might call it a flying away. Martin Bormann must have died on that occasion ? that he lost his life.
Q How was Martin Bormann dressed on that occasion ?
A Martin Bormann was wearing a leather coat, and SS leader's cap, and the insignia of an SS Obergruppenfueher. occasion he would have been identified, because of his clothes, as being one of the leading men of the movement ?
Q You have said that either beside or ahead of Martin Bormann another man was walking, a man named Naumann of the Propaganda Ministry.
A Yes, it was the former Secretary of State, Dr. Naumann.
Q Was he near the explosion ?
Q Have you subsequently ever seen Secretary of State Naumann ?
A No, I haven't seen him again either. The same applies to Standartenfuehrer Dr. Stumpfecker whom I haven't seen either.
Q On that day you crawled back, didn't you ?
Q Didn't anyone follow you ?
A Yes. Always, when you passed behind that anti-tank trap, you would run into defensive fire, and a few would remain lying on the spot and a few went back, but those who were with that tank I have never seen again.
DR. BERGOLD : Gentlenen of the Tribunal, I have no further questions to this witness.
MR. DODD : I have no questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT : To the defense counsel want to ask any questions ? BY THE PRESIDENT :
Q How many tanks were there in this column ? have been fewer, but there were more SPW's, armored rifle protection cars.
Q Howmany were there of them? They tried to get through at that point. Possibly one or two tried. The others fell back when that tank was blown up.
Q where did the column start from?
A That I wouldn't know. They were there quite suddenly. I presume that there were armored cars which were in the middle of the town, and which were looking for a gap through which they could get out. were? Where did they pick you up?
A I wasn't picked up. I left the Reich -
Q Well, where did they join you? Where did you first see them? There they appeared during the night. possible to get through? near the Weidendamm Bridge.
Q Do you mean that you met him in the street?
A Yes. when moving out of the Reich Chancellery, Martin Bormann wasn't present, and then he appeared near the bridge at between 2 and 3 in the morning.
Q You met him there just by chance, do you mean?
Q Was anybody with him?
A Secretary of State Dr. Naumann from the Ministry of Propaganda was with him, and also Dr. Stumpfecker who had been the last doctor who was with the Fuehrer.
Q How far were they from the Reich Chancellery? imately a quarter of an hour's way under normal circumstances.
along, is that right?
Q German tanks and German armored vehicles?
Q Did you have any conversation with the drivers of them?
A No, I didn't talk to the drivers. I think the former Secretary of State Dr. Naumann did.
Q And then you didn't get into the tanks or the armored vehicles?
A No, we didn't, neither Secretary of State Dr. Naumann nor Reichsleiter Bormann.
Q You just walked along?
Q And where were you with reference to Bormann? the talks.
Q How far from Bormann?
Q And then some missile struck the tank, is that right?
July 3 A LJG 20-1 shot from a window and that is how the tank was hit.
Q And then you saw a flash and you became unconscious? second I also saw how Reichsleiter Bormann and Secretary of State Naumann both made a movement of collapse and of breaking away and I also was thrown aside at that same instant and then subsequently lost consciousness.
Q And then you crept away? I crawled away. I crawled until I hit the tank block, the tank trap with my head.
Q Where did you go to that night? to my drivers, some of whom were still there and then I remained amongst the debris and then the following day I left Berlin.
Q Where were you captured? BY THE BRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle):
Q Now near were you to the tank when it exploded?
Q And how near was Bormann to the tank when it exploded?
Q Well, you say you assume. Did you see him or did you now see him?
A I did not see him on the tank actually. He followed the tank also -- I had done the same thing. I had held on to the tank at the back. the explosion?
A No, I did not see that. I did not see an effort on Bormann's part which would hint that he wanted to climb on board the tank.
Q How long before the explosion were you looking at Bormann?
AAll this happened in a very brief period. When I was 3 July A LJG 20-2 still talking to Bormann the tanks arrived and subsequently it Went through the tank trap right away and then about 40 meters afterwards it was when the tank was hit.
Q What do you call a brief period? minutes possibly.
Q And how long between the conversation and the explosion? quarter of an hour, it was not half an hour which had passed.
Q Had you been in the Chancellery just before this?
A In the evening towards 9 o'clock I left the Reichschancellory.
Q Have you ever told this story to anyone else? and I have already made the same statement.
Q And who took your interrogation, some officers?
Q With what army, what nations? at Freising and the third time at Oberursel.
MR. DODD: As a result of the Court's inquiry there are one or two questions that occur to me that I think perhaps should be brought out Which I would like to ask the witness, if I may. BY MR. DODD:
Q You were with Bormann were you, at 9 o'clock in the bunker in the Reichschancellory on that night?
A Yes. Towards 9 O'clock I saw him for the last time when I said farewell to Dr. Goebbels. Then I met Martin Bormann downstairs in the cellar and then I saw him again during the night between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning. Where did you see him at 2 or 3 in the morning prior to the time that you started to walk with him along with the tank?
3 July A LJG 20-3 at between two and three in the morning and before that for the last time I had seen him at 21 hours at the Reichschancellory.
Q Well I know you did. But did not you and Bormann have any conversation as to how you were to get out of Berlin when you left the Reichschancellory bunker about 9 o'clock that night? Milunke. I was not getting direct orders from Reichsleiter Bormann anymore.
Q I did not ask you if you got an order from him. I asked if you and Bormann and whoever else was there had not discussed how you would get out of Berlin. It was 9 o'clock at night and the situation was getting pretty desperate. Did you not talk about how you would get out that night? There were not many there. in the Reichschancellory and those four or five hundred people had been subdivided into groups. These groups were leaving the Chancellory one by one, one group after another. I am talking about that bunker you were in. You testified about this before have you not? You told people that you knew Hitler was dead as well as Bormann. You must have been in the bunker if you know that. Bormann and whoever was left in that bunker talked about leaving Berlin that night before you left the bunker? it at the time. We only had marching orders saying if we should succeed we should report to Fehrbellin where there was a fighting group which we were to join. Hitler is dead and the only one who has been able to testify that 3 July A LJG 20-4 Bormann is dead, is that so, so far as you know?
A That Hitler is dead is something I can say. I can say that he died on the 30th of A pril in the afternoon between two and three o'clock.
Q I know but you did not see him die either, did you? carried his body out of the bunker and set it on fire. Aren't you the man who has said that?
A I carried Adolf Hitler's wife out and I saw Adolf Hitler himself rolled in a blanket.
Q Did you actually see Hitler?
A Not himself any more. The blanket in which he was rolled was a little short and only his legs were hanging out.
MR. DODD: I do not think I will inquire further, Mr. President.
DR. BERGOLD: I have no further questions either.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. BERGOLD: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, then there is witness Walkenhorst who is also present. It appears to me that there is a misunderstanding between the High Tribunal and myself. I had stated in the afternoon that apart from witness Kempka I did not wish to call another witness and I therefore forego the calling of witness Walkenhorst expressly.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you ask for him to prove in the first instance?
DR. BERGOLD: Well, originally -
THE PRESIDENT: We have get your application.
DR. BERGOLD: But after talking to witness Klopfer, who I did not wish to call either, I shall also forego the witness Walkenhorst because he does not appear to me to be competent enough to testify as to what I wanted him to testify about. except for two documents which the Tribunal have already granted 3 July A LJG 20-5 me, namely the decree for the stepping of measures against the churches and Bormann's decree from 1944, with which he forbade members of his chancellory from being members of the SD.
Those two documents I have not yet received and when I shall have received them I shall submit them.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Dr. Servatius, you have some question or affidavit you wanted to get from this witness Walkenhorst, did you not?
DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for defendant Sauckel): I have an affidavit from witness Walkenhorst which deals briefly with the question of the telephone conversation which Sauckel had with reference to the clearing on that occasion of the camp at Buchenwald. He has been accused of having ordered the evacuation of the camp when the American Army approached. Now this witness Walkenhorst has accidently been found and it transpires that peculiarly enough he was the man with when Sauckel had his conversation. In an affidavit he has confirmed that Sauckel has demanded that the camp should be handed over in an orderly way and that is really all I wanted to ask of this Witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution want the man called or will the affidavit do?
DR. SERVATIUS: I am satisfied with handing over the affidavit.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: A s far as the Prosecution are concerned, an affidavit would suffice.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SERVATIUS: In that case I submit the affidavit and I shall state its exhibit number together with my list.
THE PRESIDENT: There is one other matter which I wish to draw the attention of the defendants' counsel to. es of the defendants' counsel which have been placed before the translation division for translation and in the case of the defendant Keitel and in the case of the defendant Jodl the speeches which seem to have been put into the translation division seem to 3 July A LJG 20-6 be very much longer than the Tribunal had anticipated and quite impossible to be spoken in one day.