BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
German and English fleet agreement?
A No; the willingness for a positive cooperation in limitation of armament, which was repeatedly emphasized, was further expressed in negotiations for a German disarmament in the air. From the beginning, as early as 1933, Hitler had emphasized the importance ff this point for the maintenance of peace. Germany was ready to cooperate in any limitation, and even in the complete abolition of air armament, if it was done on a mutual. But only England reacted to this subject for the time being. The difficulty was in persuading France to participate in the negotiation. of England. But France set up conditions which in effect made the success of these negotiations impossible. special bi-lateral agreements were to be permitted. In addition, the continuation of negotiations on air armament was to be made dependent on negotiations concerning the Eastern Pact. Germany could not participate in these eastern pacts, since it would have had to undertake military obligations whose outcome could not be foreseen. which made the difference among the western powers appear openly, the negotiations were stopped. German troops. The indictment sees in this a breach of the Locarno Treaty and further proof of your co-responsibility in the conspiracy against peace, which is claimed. Will you please comment on this?
A This assertion is completely untrue. A decision for a plan to wage aggressive war did not exist then any mere than the year before. The restoration of full sovereignty in all carts of the Reich had no military significance, but only political significance. only, and through this fact alone it had only a symbolic character. It was clear that a great and industrious people would not be satisfied forever with such a decisive limitation of its sovereignty, as had been imposed by the Versailles Treaty.
foreign policy could not resist. a plan which had been set up some time beforehand, or was the decision spontaneous? within a few days. sion? announced that after his return from Geneva he would present the Russo-French pact to the French Chamber for ratification. It did no good, that Hitler in an interview with the reporter of the French paper, "Paris Midi", M. Jouvenelle, attempted to point out the dangers of this pact, in offering his hand to France for an honorable and permanent understanding between the two peoples. I had discussed this interview in detail beforehand with Hitler, and I received the definite impression that he was absolutely serious in his for a permanent understanding between the two peoples. But this attempt was in vain, and the strong opposition to the pact by large parts of the French population, under the leadership of the Union Nationale de Combattants in the parliament itself could not prevent the French government from ratifying the pact. The vote took place on the 27th of February, in the French chamber.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to ask the Court to take note of the following two documents from my Document Book 4: The first is 108, the interview of Hitler with the correspondent of "Paris Midi", M. de Jouvenelle, of the 21st of February, 1936. The second is 107, an excerpt from the speech of Deputy Montigni in the French chamber on the 13th of February, 1936. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: treaty, the German troops marched in to the de-militarized Rhineland zone.
What considerations did the German government have on this serious step?
What determined them to take this step? danger that the western powers would not be satisfied with paper protests to the League of Nations as a solution this time, but would proceed with force of arms against this one-sided--
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, is this a question or a statement?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: It is a question. I should like to know the attitude of the government at that time. If I may make a comment on these explanations to clarify the decisions taken at that time, I must hear from the mouth of the defendant-
THE PRESIDENT: You were stating a number of facts. It is not for you to state facts. It is your duty to ask the witness.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No, I did not want to give evidence. I wanted to know from the witness what considerations led to the decision.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
there were? the French-Russian ? act and other French policy, we saw, we had to see the most serious threat on the part of France. This accumulation of power in French hands through various treaties could be directed only against Germany. This was obvious. In the world there was no other country that could be considered for this-- in the case of hostilities the possibility of which had to be considered in view of the tota l situation by a responsible government; as the result of the demilitarization of the Rhineland, the Western Border of Germany was completely open. This was not only the documentary revision of the Versailles Treaty but also the ones which threatened Germany most, but it had become absolute through the decision of there 11th of December 1932 --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, the Tribunal thinks this is all argument. If there are any facts as to what there German government did at the time, after the French and Russian Pact and before the entry into the Rhineland, the witness can give those facts but this is mere argument and the Tribunal is well aware of the argument. It doesn't require them to be restated and certainly not to be restated in the course of the evidence.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I merely wanted to avoid that later in my speech when I discuss this point, the objection might be made that these are my opinions. I want to show --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, that is quite a wrong conception. We are now hearing evidence. When we hear you we shall be hearing arguments and we shall be prepared to hear any argument from you.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I want to avoid that it is said those are my arguments. These arguments come from the defendant.
24 J une M LJG 4-2
THE PRESIDENT: I am pointing out to you that it is there function of counsel to argue and it is the function of there Tribunal to listen to argument. It is not the function of the Tribunal to listen to argument in the course of evidence.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Very well.
THE WITNESS: Perhaps I may make one statement. In there course of the winter of 1938, through cur military intelligence service, we had learned that the French General Staff already had a military plan for invading Germany. This invasion was to be through the Rhineland, along the so-called Rhineland to Czechoslovakia to join the Russian ally. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: continue with evidence, I shall be satisfied with the evidence, and I will present the argument In my speech. I should like to ask just one more question. Regarding the decision to reoccupy the Rhineland, did it involve any aggressive intention for the moment or for later?
A No, under no circumstances. The reoccupation, as it can be seen from my statement, was of a purely defensive character and was not supposed to have any otter purpose. By there occupation with such weak forces as only one division, it was clear that it was a purely symbolic act. It has been testified to here by the military--the witness Milch, for example-- that the Luftwaffe had no part whatever and only two or three days before had learned of the action. That there were no aggressive plans for the future, is shown by the fact that the German government, at the suggestion of England, on the 12 th of March 1936, obligated itself until the understanding had been reached with the Western Powers, particularly with France, not to increase the garrisons in the Rhineland and not to move the troops any closer to the border than they were already, under the condition, however, that the same would be done by France.
France did not want to accept this offer. Then, in the memoran-
24 June M LJG 4-3 dum of the 7th of March 1936, to the signatory powers of Locarne, which the prosecution has already submitted here, Germany made suggestions for an agreement with Prance, Belgium and the other Locarne Powers and also explained her willingness to sign a general air pact to avoid the danger of sudden air raids and in addition, to join the Leave of Nations again. In a speech in the Reichstag on the 7th of March 1936, Hitler explained the reasons for the reoccupation of the Rhineland before the world. This speech and the memorandum, I had discussed beforehand with Hitler and I can only repeat that I did not have the slightest suspicion that Hitler was not honest and was trying to prevent his real intentions which tended towards war. Even today I have the firm conviction that at that time Hitler was not thinking of war. I need not emphasize that any such intention was far from my own thoughts. On the contrary, I considered the restoration of sovereignty throughout the Reich a step towards peace and understanding.
THE PRESIDENT:L et us got on. Dr. Luedinghausen, you are allowing the defendant to make long speeches. That is not the object of evidence.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit various documents in this connection and ask the Court to take note of the following document in my document book four. First, 100, memorandum of the Reich government to the signatory powers of the Locarne Treaty of the 7th of M arch 1936; the official statement of the German Reich Government of the 12th of M arch 1936, No. 112 ; No. 113, the announcement of the German ambassador in London to English foreign Minister Eden, of the 12 th of March 1936, and a memorandum of the German Government of the 3rd of J anuary 1936, sent to the extraordinary ambassador in London, Mr. von Ribbentrop, to the English Government. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: occupation of the Rhineland?
not comment on this question.
Q What did the western powers do? Did they take any diplomatic steps?
A Foreign Minister Eden said, in the House of Commons, that Germany's procedure did not involve any threat and promised careful examination of German peace suggestions.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit and ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following documents in my Document Book 4: No. 125 excerpts from a speech of the American Under Secretary of State Wells on "The Versailles Treaty and Europe", of the 7th of July, '37; Document 120, excerpt from the decree of the Peoples Commissars of Russia on the reduction of the age for military service; No. 117, a report of the Czechoslovakian Minister in th Hague of the 21st of April, '36. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, your further steps, or these of the Foreign Office, an attempt towards peaceful understanding with the other European powers, did they stop or were they continued?
A These efforts were constantly continued. The next opportunity was in our relationship with Russia. The development of this relationship up to 1933 -- since 1933, rather, has already been described in detail before the Court; but I should like to emphasize one point. My point of view on our relationship with Austria from the beginning to the end meant as follows: I wanted a close economic relationship, such as a customs union between the two countries and similar foreign policy on the basis of state treaties and close contact between the two governments, but I wanted to have the full independence of Austria guaranteed under all circumstances. For that reason, I was always an outspoken opponent of any interference in internal political affairs in Austria, and I resisted all support of the Austrian National Socialists by the German National Socialists in their fight against Dollfuss and Schuschnigg; an I was constantly urging Hitler to this effect. I sharply condemned the murder of Dollfuss from the moral as well as the political point of view. The Foreign Office, under my direction, had nothing whatever to do with this murder, as the prosecution asserted. I need not emphasize that. But that Hitler had nothing to do with the murder I can confirm iron various statements which he made to me.
The deed was carried out by Austrian National Socialists who were, in part, much more radical than the Germans. This attitude of mine is best proved by the fact that when, shortly after the murder of Dollfuss, the German minister in Vienna, Mr. Ried, without my knowledge, asked the Austrian government for free passage of several persons involved in the murder to Germany, I recalled him from Vienna and dismissed him from the Foreign Service. I, as well as a number of other ministers, was an opponent of the prohibition against Austrian travel which was imposed by Germany, but I welcomed the efforts which started in '35 and were carried out with success by von Papen and I always worked on Hitler to this effect. As for von Papen's actions in Vienna during this time, I was only imperfectly informed, since Mr. von Papen was not under me and received his orders directly from Hitler. I learned only here of a number of letters which von Papen wrote to Hitler.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two passages, one from a letter of von Neurath to the head of the political section of the Foreign Ministry of the 28th of June, '34, No. 84 in my Document Book 3, Page 227, which said in regard to conditions at that time: "The Austrian events cannot be foreseen in their development. The acute dancer for us seems to me --"
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. You are going a little bit too fast. You didn't observe the light. The light came on. You are going a little bit too fast. Go on.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: "The Austrian events cannot be foreseen in their development. The acute danger for us seems to me, however, that is to the fast acting, to have been averted. We should act with great reserve now and to this end I spoke to the Reich Chancellor yesterday. I found complete understanding." Bishop, Dr. Wurm, No. 1 in my Document Book 1, on Page 3. It says: "I remember especially his sharp condemnation of occurrences in Vienna at which Prime Minister Dollfuss was murdered and of the persons which were used by Hitler during the agitation in Austria."
Seyss-Inquart, or his defense counsel, have already submitted under No. E.S. 32, which is an interview of the Staff Chancellor, Dr. Renner, of the 3rd of April, '38. As a precaution, I have included it once more in my document book under No. 130, Document book under No. 130, Document Book 4. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Mr. von Neurath, you know that the charge is made against you that on the 11th of July, '36, a treaty was reached between Germany and Austria in the course of these negotiations by von Papen. This has been discussed her in detail. The charge is made that this treaty was concluded with traitorous intentions, that is with the purpose of lulling Austria in security and preparing its future incorporation into the Reich. Will you please comment on this point?
A. This assertion is untrue. I welcomed this treaty honestly. It corresponded to my point of view in every respect. I saw in this the best means of clearing up the unnatural differences. For that reason I cooperated as much as I could in bringing it about. The assertion of the prosecution has been disproved by the statements of the former Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Guido Schmidt; but to my satisfaction, the treaty had a special significance as far as foreign policy was concerned, in that this treaty, in which the Germans clearly recognized Austrian independence, the German-Austrian differences which had formed a danger to Europe were removed.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, from my Document Book 4, under No. 118, I have the agreement between Germany and Austria of the 11th of July, '36, and I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Mr. von Neurath, aside from clearing up the Austrian question, in the years before '37, you carried on negotiations with Eastern European states. In the affidavit of the American Consul General Messersmith, which the prosecution has submitted as USA 68, PS 2385, it is asserted that the purpose of these negotiations was to have these southern states approce the destruction and splitting of Czechoslovakia which Germany intended and even active participation in it, and that for this purpose, in the course of these negotiations, you even promised these states, or had these states promised, that they would receive parts of Czechoslovakia and even Austrian territory as reqard.
Will you please comment on this?
A. This assertion of Mr. Messersmith is from beginning to end a pure invention, and figment of the imagination. There is not one true word in it. I can only call this affidavit phantasy. It is not even true that, as he says, Mr. Messersmith was a close friend of mine. I met Mr. Messersmith a few times at large meetings but I avoided discussing politics with him because I knew that in his reports and other statements he repeated talks which he had had with diplomats and interpreted them in a way which did not always correspond to the truth. This affidavit, significantly, does not contain accurate indications of the sourses from which he obtained his information.
trips to their capitals, in reality had only the one purpose of strengthening the existing economic relationships, and thus promoting mutual trade and exchange of goods, and in addition, to gain information about the political conditions, which are always difficult to understand,
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In my Document Book No.2, under No. 30, page 87, I have a short excerpt from another affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, on the 29th of August 1945. The Prosecution has already submitted it as USA-750, PS-2386, in another connection. I should like to quote one passage from this excerpt. It is on page 87 of my Document Book 2, and reads:
"During the years 1933-1934, the German Foreign Office was maintained by the Nazi Government for the most part with the old line conservative officials in charge. This situation continued generally throughout the period during which Baron von Neurath was Foreign Minister. However, after vonRibbentrop became Chief of the Foreign Office, the situation with regard to the policy officials was gradually changed. During vonNeurath's incumbency, the German Foreign Office had not been coordinated, and little blame for acts of German foreign policy could be attributed to von Neurath and his assistants during this period, though his continuation in office indicated his agreement with National Socialist aims, for which activities von Neurath might easily adduce in his defense reasons of patriotic motive." Southeast, I have the three communiques on von Neurath's visit to Belgrade, Sofia, and Budapest in June 1937, under Nos. 122, 123, and 124 in my Document Book 4. I ask the Court to take judicial noticeof them. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, from your speech of the 29th of August 1937, which you made at the demonstration of foreign Germans in Stuttgart, the charge is made that in this speech you made statements of aggressive intentions. The following statement was ostensibly made by you in this speech:
"The unity of national will created by National Socialism has made possible a foreign policy by which the terms of the Versailles Dictate are exploded, military freedom is regained, and sovereignty is restored throughout the state.
We are again masters in our own house, and we have created the means to remain so in the future. By our foreign political actions we have taken nothing from anyone. From the words and deeds of Hitler we can see that he has no aggressive desires."
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to point out that these sentences can be understood only in context. I should like to ask the permission of the Court to read the text briefly. This excerpt from the speech is submitted by me in Document Book 4, No. 126. I quote:
"We have become masters in our own house. We have created the means to remain so."
THE PRESIDENT: You have just read that. You have read it once.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I should like to read the sentence which was omitted.
THE PRESIDENT: You may read anything which is relevant and which was omitted, of course.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: The quotation that I am submitting reads:
"But this attitude of the new German Reich is in reality the strongest bulwark for safeguarding peace and will always prove itself as such in a world in turmoil, just because we have recognized the danger of certain destructive tendencies as they continually assert themselves in Europe, We are act looking for differences between other people, but are trying to find connecting links. We are not thinking of political isolation. We want political cooperation between governments, a cooperation which, if it is to be successful, cannot be based on theoretical ideas of collectivity, but on living reality, and which must devote itself to the concrete tasks of the present. With satisfaction we can state that in pursuing such a realistic peace policy, we are working hand in hand with our friend Italy. This justifies the hope that we may also reach a friendly understanding with other nations regarding important questions of foreign policy."
THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, just before the recess I had confronted you with a quotation from a speech dated 29 August, 1937 and I had asked you at that time whether you wished to make a statement concerning this at the time. which the Prosecution is trying to show. It is almost impossible to show my peaceful character and intentions in a more convincing way than I did in this speech. policy that you conducted, and that it could be summarized and they accuse you of the following sentences in a speech before the academy for German Law when you said, and I quote:
"From the realization of the fundamental facts the Reich Cabinet always tried to be in favor of those things so that each concrete international problem be handled with those methods which are appropriate and not to assimilate it unnecessarily with other problems and thus complicate matters in that way and as long as the problem exists only between two powers the way for an immediate understanding between these two powers is to be chosen. We are in a position to determine and to see that this method has proved itself to be a good one, not only in the German interests but also in the General interests."
Will you please comment on that accusation which is leveled against you?
A This quotation is, first of all, tern completely from its context. The entire speech contained the number of reasons out of which I considered the conclusion of bilateral agreements were possible in preference to so-called collective agreements and from this tendency and in this way this part which was quoted is to be understood. Therefore, I should ask that you please quote the passage in its entire context.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this speech Mr. von Neurath, referring to the League of Nations and international law, which he delivered on 30 October, 1937 before the Academy for German Law -- that will be found under number 128 of my document book volume 4--I would, with the permission of the Tribunal, like too quote this passage in its entirety, a passage from which we shall see that the accusation made by the Prosecution and the passage selected by the Prosecution does not have the sense which is credited to it by the Prosecution. It says here:
"I am convinced that the same or similar concerns will also arise in other case, where a schematic structure, as is an absolute mutual system of assitance will be intended for a more or loss larger group of states. Such projects, even in the most favorable cases, namely, when intended to be an equal guarantee by all participants, will only remain as a piece of paper --".
THE PRESIDENT. Is it not sufficient to refer to the document? The defendant has just said that the speech contained the reasons why he considered bilateral possible rather than general agreements. He said that, The document appears to confirm that. Could you not refer be the document without reading the words?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I did so because it was torn from its context and I believed that I would be permitted to quote the context as well. However, if the High Tribunal wish to read the matter itself I shall dispense with quoting it
THE PRESI DENT: It does not seem to me to add to it. It is just the words which the defendant has quoted the substance of.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I omitted one sentence as I thought it was superfluouse. But from the context it may be seen, and may be seen from the entire speech, what the defendant intended to convey. If the High Tribunal prefers to read the entire speech as I have submitted it, then, of course, I shall be satisfied. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, under number L-150, U.S. 65, the Prosecution have submitted a note of the then American ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, regarding a discussion he had with you in May of 1936 and the Prosecution concludes on page 8 of the English trial brief that as foreign minister you participated in the planning of aggressive war against Austria and Czechoslovakia. your position regarding this accusation which is leveled against you. and the signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles. This applied especially to France and Czechoslovakia. Therefore it was to be taken for granted in conducting a reasonable German foreign policy that this unrest had to be given a chance to die down so as to convince the world that Germany was not pursuing aggressive plans in that direction but was only a restoration of her full sovereignty in our own region.
The erection of fortifications was to serve only the purpose of decreasing the temptation of our neighbors who were armed to the teeth from marching into German territory, which was lying there unprotected. Despite negotiations and all efforts, it had not been possible to make them observe the disarmament clause in the Treaty of Versaille. instead of disarming continued to arm and through the conclusion of agreements with Soviet Russia increased the military superiority.
In my discussion with Mr. Bullitt I wanted to mention all these facts and I hoped through making military attacks more difficult France and Czechoslovakia would change their policy, which was hostile to Germany. I tried to create a better understanding with both these countries with special reference to the maintenance of peace. These, my hopes and my views, can be seen especially in the last part of the report -- a report which Mr. Bullitt agreed to and endorsed. report, at that time England was trying to bring about a rapprochement between Germany and Italy in order to prevent further conversations because of the tension which had arisen because of Abyssinia. That resistance against the Anschluss between Germany and Austria was to be recognized. This resistance was shared completely by Mussolini at that time. The realization of this intention on the part of England, which was rather transparent, was one of the motives for the conclusion of the German-Austrian treaty of 11/7/36. The statement which I had hoped for on the part of the British, in November 1937 on the occasion of the visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin, came about. Lord Halifax at that time told me and I took care to remember this statement verbatim and I quote in English:
"People in England would never understand why they should go to war only because two German countries wish to unite." English ambassador at Vienna, and the wording of which I knew, promised complete support and asked for resistance toward the Anschluss.
From the Bullitt notes, we can also see that I said that Hitler's greatest wish was an actual and true understanding with France.
Apart from that, and as he stated, right from the beginning, I also told Mr. Bullitt that the German government would do everything in order to prevent an uprising on the part of the National S ocialists in Austria.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: These notes set down by Mr. Bullitt are included as Number 15 in my document book, page 60. That has been submitted by no, and I should like the High Tribunal to refer to page 60, especially tha last paragraph, and to take special notice of it, so tha t I can save time by not quoting it. This is document book Number 1, Neurath document 15, page 60, last paragraph. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: the policy that was to be pursued by Germany with reference to Czechoslovakia? characterized by a strong suspicion toward us. This distrust resulted partly from the geographic location of the country, between Germany and Austria, and in part from the diversities of nationality which were found within the country. These national oppositions were very resentful, and the country's being drawn into a military and friendship agreement with the Russians and the French did not contribute to the creation of a closer relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia. stiuation and worked to that end. I also tried to extend our economic connections. In this connection, I did not consider as possibilities military occupation or violent means in this case, any more than I did in other cases. question? The Germans were present in the Sudetenland and In the peace negotiations in the year 1919 when these German were given 24 June A LJG 8-2 over to the Chech state, autonomy was promised to them, on the model of the Swiss Confederation.
Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons corroborated this statement in 1940. The Sudeten German delegation at that time, as well as Austria, had demanded anschluss with the Reich. ment. Instead of autonomy, there was a deliberate policy of Czech-ification. The Germans were refused the use of their own German language in the courts, as well as before administrative authorities, and so forth, and they were prohibited from using their own language under threat of punishment.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, can not the defendant go on to the time with which we have to dela, namely, 1958, and tell us what his policy was then, without telling us all these facts beforehand about 1919?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Very well. I just wanted to bring out certain foundations to show that his later policy was correct. However, if the High Tribunal believes that this is well known, I shall shall satisfy myself with the testimony which has already been given. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, what was your official and personal relationship to Hitler during your time as Foreign Minister? tion with Hitler of any kind. I did not belong to his close circle either. concerning foreign political matters, and on the whole, he was quite approachable as far as the arguments by no were concerned. However, In the course of time, these relationships changed to such an extent that other organizations, especially the Party, concerned themselves with foreign policy, and these organizations approached and had access to Hitler with their plans and their ideas. This applied especially to the so-called Bureau Ribben trop.
Ribbentrop turned more and more into a personal adviser 24 June A LJG 8-3 of Hitler when it came to foreign political matters, and he gained more and more influence.
Frequently it was difficult to dissuade Hitler from proposals which had been submitted to him through these channels. in certain aspects. The Foreign Office, not only in Berlin, but also through its representatives abroad, later not difficulty after difficulty. These difficulties were caused by the methods of work and the sources of information of this bureau of Ribbentrop. I personally was always opposed to any influence which the P arty and the Party organs tried to exert on foreign policy. Specifically, I was opposed to his officials being drawn into foreign political matters. I tried to oppose these things, especially if they were not out of my control, and for that reason I tried to resign several times. In each case, I succeeded in having Hitler for a certain period of time dispense with the influence which Ribbentrop had exerted on him in this direction.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to submit and have the High Tribunal take official notice of an extract from an article in the American newspaper " Time", dated 10 April 1933, number 9 of my document book Number 1, page 44. I should also like to refer-
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that more newspaper reports or comments are in the nature of evidence.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In addition, I should like to submit, or rather, I have submitted in my document book Number 1, under Number 17, an extract from the well known look of the former British Ambassador at Berlin, Henderson, " Failure of a Mission ", and to take official notice of it so I shall not have to read it, paying especial attention to paragraph 2, page
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that this document -- the article from Time -- may be admitted, but it is not necessary to refer to it.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Thank you. This is document number 9, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is document number 9. I say it may be admitted.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Thank you very much. Tribunal to document number 16, which is an attempt to resign by the defendant von Neurath, to Hitler, dated 27 July 1936, because of the intended appointment of Mr. von Ribbentrop as State Secretary. That was the occasion for his resignation request. It is probably just as well if I do not read this document, but I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal not only to the contents, but also to the manner of speech, to the greeting, and to the conclusion. The beginning states only "Esteemed Reich Chancellor", and the conclusion states, "Ihr Ergebener", "Yours respectfully". figures of speech were used in addressing letters to Hitler which exceeded ordinary courtesy. Any such figures of speech were never used by Mr. von Neurath. document book number 1. That is also an a ttempt at resignation, dated the 25th of October, 1935. I am asking the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, aside from your official policy, weren't their other agencies which independently undertook action; signed treaties, for instance? In other words, they carried through things in which you did not participate; is that right?
A Yes. That was the case, for instance, when the so-called BerlinRome-Tokyo policy was under consideration. Hitler pursued this plan stubbornly. and, of course, Ribbentrop supported him in this. I had rejected this policy, since I considered it detrimental and partially fantastic as well, and I refused my collaboration in the handling of this matter. Ribbentrop, therefore, in his capacity as Ambassador for a special purpose, carried on these negotiations independently, and, on Hitler's instructions, concluded the so-called AntiComintern pact.