office, in February of 1942, all the perpetrations or violations
A Yes. I am of the opinion that the moment I began in my of international law of which I can be accused today were realized on that very day.
Q And you don't question that you share a certain responsibility for that program--whether it is a legal responsibility or not, in fact--for bringing in this labor against its will? You don't deny that, do you? will, and I had no objection against their being brought to German; against their will. On the contrary, during the first period, until autumn of 1942, I certainly used my energy that as many workers as possible should be brought to Germany in this manner. labor, did you not, as among different plants or different industries that were competing for labor?
A No. That would have to be explained in detail -- I don't quite understand. did you not, in reference to the distribution of labor after it reached the Reich? I had to tell Sauckel, of course, in which one of my programs they were needed most. But that sort of thing was dealt with by general instructions. ent industries in their claim for the labor when it came into the Reich.
A That was a matter of course; naturally, that had to be done.
Q. Now, as to the employment of prisoners of war, whatever disagreement there may be about the exact figures, there is no question, is there, that prisoners of war were used in the manufacture of armament?
internees were used for the production of arms. Regarding the use of French and other prisoners of war, I have had several conferences with Keitel about their being used in the armament industry, and I must tell you that Keitel always adopted the view that these prisoners of war could not be used in violation of the Geneva Convention. I can claim that on the strength of his statement I no longer used my influence to bring it about so that these prisoners of war should nevertheless be used, against the Geneva Convention, in armament industries.
The conception, of course, of the phrase "armament production" is very much open to argument. It is important which position you recognize, whether you limit the conception of armament very much or not at all.
Q You succeeded to Dr. Todt's organization, and you had all the powers that he had, did you not? letter from the OKW, which is in evidence here as Exhibit 214, Document EC 294, which provides that the deputies of the Reich minister for arms and ammunition are to be admitted to prisoner of war camps for the purpose of selecting skilled workers. That was among your powers, was it not?
A No. That was a special action which Dr. Frank had initiated on the strength of an agreement with the OKW, which was not carried out later, however. this Planning Board, you mode this complaint, did you not, Mr. Speer? "There is a statement showing in what sectors the Russian PW's have been distributed, and this statement is quite interesting It shows that the armament industry received only 30%. I always complained about that."
That is correct, is it not?
A I believe that has been wrongly translated. It should not say "ammunitions industry"; it should say, "The armament industry received 30%".
Q I said "armament".
A Oh, no. But then, this still is not a proof that these prisoners of war were employed in violation of the Geneva Convention because in the sector of the armament industry there was ample room to use these workers for producing articles which did not come under the Geneva Prisoner of war agreement, and accordingly were armament products. prisoners of war, there was not the same value attached to the Geneva Convention as there was in the case of prisoners of other countries.
I now speak of French prisoners of war -- that French prisoners of war were not used in the manufacture of materials which directly contributed to the war, or is it your contention that although they were used it was legal under the Geneva Convention? not used contrary to the rules of the Convention. I cannot check that, because control with reference to employment did not come within my jurisdiction. During numerous inspection of work, I never noticed that any prisoners of war from the Western Powers were working directly on armament products. by way of manufacture. What were they working on?
A That I cannot answer. I already explained yesterday that the allotment of prisoners of war or foreign workers, or German workers for that matter, to the individual firms was not a matter for me to decide. But the allotment was carried by the local labor office in collaboration with the prisoner of war camps as far as we were concerned, with prisoners of war. I received only a survey of the number of workers who had gone into the firm in toto, and I therefore could not obtain a survey of the individual types of workers which were being employed in the various fir Therefore, I cannot give you a sufficient answer to your question. yesterday you removed and put to work in a different location, that Sauckel complained about. What did you put then to work at?
Q Let us take up those workers. What were you doing with them?
A These workers were working on the Atlantic Wall. From there they were transferred to the Ruhr where they worked on the two dams which had been destroyed by air attacks, and which they repaired. That is not being said in this connection. Yet the transfer of these 50,000 workers took place first of all without my knowledge, and the results of the transfer of these 50,000 workers from the West of Germany were catastrophic for us who were wor king on the Atlantic Wall, because as a consequence of it, more than a third of all the workers loft their work on the Atlantic Wall, because they, too, were afraid that they might be taken to Germany.
That is why we rescinded the entire order as quickly as we possibly could, so that the confidence of the French workers who were working on the Atlantic Wall had in us could be maintained ing for the Todt Organization were not employed under coercion; otherwise, they could not have left in such numbers after realizing that under certain circumstances they, too, might be taken to Germany. The measure by which 50,000 workers of the organization started in France, therefore, was only temporary, which I corrected as soon as possible. It was a mistake, which can happen if a minister gives force to his instructions which are then carried out by law authorities with every means at their disposal. the labor organization of the Todt had to recruit its manpower by force?
Q I beg your pardon?
AAt this moment I cannot recollect. Could I see the document?
Q Yes, if you would like to. I just remind you that the evidence is to the contrary of your testimony on that subject.
It is Page 42, the paragraph which reads:
" Unfortunately the assignments for the Todt Organization on the basis of Article 52 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare have for some time decreased considerably, because the larger part of the manpower allocated does not turn up. Consequently further compulsory measures must be employed. The Prefect and the French labor exchanges cooperate quite loyally, it is true, but they have not sufficient authority to carry out these measures".
A I believe that perhaps I have not been understood correctly. I did not say that a large number of the workers working for the Organization Todt in the West had been called up and that they came to the building site because of their compulsory status. But on the spot, we had no possibility of retaining then by force, or of preventing them from leaving by force. Therefore, if leave/ they were unwilling to work, they could/their place of work and either join the resistance movement or go into hiding somewhere else.
Q This calling-up system was a system of compulsion, was it not ? France. But here again I want to add something, if I may. This report is dated June, 1943. In October, 1943, the Organization Todt, in its entirety, was declared a restricted or "blocked" firm, by which means it had the advantages which other blocked firms had, which I explained sufficiently yesterday. Because of this, the Organization Todt also had a large in-take of workers who were there voluntarily, unless, of course, you consider the same pressure which was applied to the people who went to Germany as not voluntary.
Q Were they kept in labor camps ?
A That is the custom in the case of such construction work. The sites were far away from any villages, and therefore workers' camps were established in which the German workers and the foreign workers were accomodated. But there were also some of them accomodated in villages as far as it was possible to accomodate them there. I believe that it was not at all the principle that they should be accomodated in camps, but I cannot tell you that for certain.
THE PRESIDENT : Has this been introduced before ?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : I was just going to give it to you. The document from which I have quoted is United States Exhibit 892. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON :
THE PRESIDENT : Is it new, Mr. Jackson ?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : No, it has been in.
THE PRESIDENT : It has been in before ?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : I am told that I am wrong about that, and that it is new.
892 is a new number. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON :
THE PRESIDENT : Could tell us what the document is and where it comes from ? I see it is EC 60 : so it must be captured.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : It is one of the economic documents. It is a very large document.
THE PRESIDENT : Could you tell us what it is or who signed it ? It is a very long document, apparently, is it not ?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : It is a long document, and it is a report of the Oberfeldkommandant -- L-I-L-L-E is the name of the signer. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON :
THE PRESIDENT : Let me look at the document, will you ?
You see, Mr. Justice Jackson, my attention has been drawn to the point that as far as the record is concerned, we have only this extract which you read. *---* do not have the date, and we do not have the signature, if any, on the document.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : I was merely refreshing his recollection to get out the facts, and I was not really offering the document for its own sake. I will go into more detail about it, if your honor wishes. There is a great deal of irrelevant material in it.
THE PRESIDENT : If you do not want to offer it, then we need not bother about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : A great part of it is not relevant.
THE PRESIDENT : Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : The quotation is adequately verified.
THE PRESIDENT : In that case, you may refer to it without the document's being used. Then we need not have the document identified as an exhibit. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON : and coming to the questions dealt with in the second part of your examination, I want to ask you about your testimony concerning the proposal to denounce the Geneva Convention. Convention. Will you tell us who made those proposals ?
Dr. Goebbels. It happened after the air attack on Dresden but Goebbels and Ley had earlier, that is, as early as April 1944, bad frequent conversations to the effect that the war effort should be increased with every means so that I had the impression that Goebbels was merely making the Dresden attack the cause for a suggestion to renounce the Geneva Convention. was the proposal made at that time?
A I couldn't ascertain by my own direct observation that gas warfare,was to be started but I knew from Ley, Goebbels, from various associates of Ley's and Goebbels that they were discussing the question of using our two gasses, Tabun and Sarin, and they desired to have it used. They believed that these two gasses would have a particular effect and they did in fact produce the most frightful results. We made these observations as early as the autumn of 1944 when the situation was deteriorating considerably and quite a number of people were very worried about it. and their effects; their qualities and the preparations that were made for gas warfare?
A That, I could not tell in detail. I am not enough of an expert. All I knew is that these two gasses had the most unusual outstanding effects and that no respirator, no protection would be of any use against them as far as they go, so that the soldiers would therefore have been unable to protect themselves against this gas in any way. We had for the manufacture of this gas, we had approximately three factories all of which were undestroyed and which until November 1944, were working at full speed. When rumors regarding the possibility of the employment of gas reached us, I stopped gas production in November 1944. I stopped it by the following means. I blocked the supplies for the component parts and components of the gasses; according to evidence before the Allied authorities, the gas production was in fact stopped--came to an end by January, 1945. First of all, I tried to write to Hitler a letter, which is available and which is dated October 1944, to use legal means to obtain his permission that these gas factories should stop to produce.
The reason I gave him was that the component products, mostly sozian, were needed urgently for other purposes because of air attacks. Hitler informed me right away that the gas production would have to continue under all circumstances but I gave the instruction that the component products should no longer be supplied. fare? them were in favor of gas warfare. All the reasonable militarists turned the gas warfare down as being utterly insane because, considering your superiority in the air, it would merely mean that the unprotected German cities would suffer the most tremendous catastrophy in no time at all. group around Hitler, didn't it? limited. They were mostly Ley, Goebbels and Bormann, always the same three, who with every means wanted to increase the fight and a man like Fegelein certainly belonged to that same group. As far as Himmler is concerned, I wouldn't even be so certain about that because at the time Himmler had distanced himself from Hitler a little because he allowed himself the luxury of running an army group of which he knew absolutely nothing. these who were proposing to use it on others and I suppose your motive was-concern that under certain circumstances there might be the employment of gas and the con ection of ideas of using that actual gas, that that is quite clear, is due to that in my guess.
Q And your reasons I take it, were the same as themilitary's, that is to say, it was certain Germany would get the worst of it if Germany started that kind of warfare. That is what was worrying the military, wasn't it?
A No, not only that. At that stage of the war, it was perfectly clear that under no circumstances should there be the committing of international crimes which would then be held against the German people after the war was lost. That was the decisive reason for me.
at England day after day; who favored that?
A You mean the rockets? most Expensive affair. Their effect compared to the output was negligible. We did not, therefore, find ourselves particularly interested in producing this affair to a very considerable degree. The person who was advancing this most was Himmler in this case. He gave Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler the task of supervising and carrying out the firing of the rockets against England. In army circles, they were of the same opinion thatI was, namely, that these rockets would be or were too expensive and in airforce circles, the impression was similar because at the expense of one rocket on e could build a fighter. It is quite clear that it would have been so much better for us if we hadn't permitted this nonsense. characteristics of this gas of an exceedingly high temperature? When it was exploded it created exceedingly high temperature so that there could be no defense against it?
A No, that is an error. Actually, ordinary passes evaporate during normal temperature. This gas would not evaporate until very high temperatures were reached; such very high temperatures would only arise if you added an explosion; in other words, if the explosives detonated --- that is, known as a high temperature and then the gas evaporated: the solid material becomes gas but the effects had nothing to do with the high temperature. knowledge?
A That, I can't tell you. Certainly experiments must have been carried out with it.
Q I am sorry but I didn't get your last answer.
A I can't tell you but I assume experiments must have been carried out with it.
Q Who was in charge of the experimentations with the gasses? armaments defense department of the ordnance section. I can't tell you for certain there. in atomic energy, were they not? had gone to America, we hadn't advanced as far as we wanted to. We suffered setbacks in atom research and actually we were about one to two years from achieving results, the results of splitting the atom.
Q The policy of driving people out who didn't agree with Germany hadn't produced very good dividends, has it? particularly in this sector. experiment which wascarried out near Auschwitz and I would like to ask you if Was heard about it or if you knew about it. The purpose of the experiment was to find a quick and complete way of destroying people without the delay and trouble of shooting and gassing and burning, as it had been carried out, and in this experimentation, as I am advised, a,small village was provisionally erected, with temporary structures and in it approximately twenty thousand Jews were put. By means of this newly invented weapon of destruction, these twenty thousand people were eradicated almost instantaneously, and in such a way that there was no trace left of them; as it developed, the explosive reached temperatures of from four to five hundred degrees centigrade and destroyed them without leaving any trace at all.
Do you know about that experiment?
A No, and I consider that it is utterly improbable. If we had had such a weapon under preparation then that would not have remained unknown to me, but we didn't have such a weapon. It is clear that in chemical warfare experiments, attempts were made on both sides to make research of all weapons which can possibly thought of, because one didn't know which party would start chemical warfare. the purpose of keeping the German people in the war? Beginning with June or July 1944, I went to the Front very often. I visited about forty frontal divisions in their sectors and I had to find out on those occasions that the troops just as much as the Germans, the German nation, were given hooes regarding a new weapon which was due to come, that their should be a miraculous weapon which, without requiring the use of a man and soldier, would then guarantee victory. It was due to this belief that many people in Germany lost their lives, although due to reasons in their own thought they must have realized the war was finished. They believed that within the near future this new weapon would arrive. I wrote about this to Hitler and in various speeches even before Goebbels propaganda leaders, I tried to work against this conviction or belief. Both Hitler and Goebbels told me, however, that this wasn't propagands which they were making but that this was a belief which had arisen from the people. Only in the dock here in Nurnberg, was I told by Fritsche that this propaganda was made systematically through some channels, however, and brought amongst the people and that SS Standartenfuehrer Berg was responsible for it. Many things became clear to me thereupon because this man Berg, as a representative of the Ministry of Propaganda, had quite often participated during meetings, large scale meetings of my Ministry because he was wriing articles about these meetings and there he heard of our weapons of the future and he then used this knowledge and his imagination and fantasy to bring them in amongst the people.
Q. When did it become apparent that the war was lost?
I take it that your attitude was that you felt some responsibility for getting the German people out of it with as little destruction as possible. Is that a fair statement of your position?
A. Yes, but I had that feeling not only with reference to the German nation. I was aware of the fact that one should equally avoid that destruction should take place in the occupied territories. That was as important to me as the other for a very realistic reason. I considered that all this destruction would no longer be limited to us after the war, but to the following German government, and coming German generations.
Q. Where you differed with the people who want to continue the war to the bitter end, was that you wanted to see Germany have a chance to restore her life. Is that not a fact? Whereas, Hitler took the position that if he couldn't survive, he didn't care whether Germany survived or not?
A. That is true, and I would never have had the courage to make this statement before this Tribunal if I hadn't been able to prove it by the means of my documents, because such a statement is so incredible. The letter, however, which I wrote to Hitler on the 29th of March and in which I confirmed this, shows that he said so himself.
Q. Well, if I may comment, it was not a new idea to us that that was his viewpoint. I think it was expressed in most of the other countries that that was his view point. telegram from Goering, suggesting that Goering take over power?
A. On the 23rd of April I flew to Berlin in order to take leave of several of my associates, and, as I want to tell you quite openly, also in order to place myself at Hitler's disposal after everything that had happened. Perhaps this will sound peculiar to you, but the conflicting feelings which I had with reference to what I was trying to do against him and all the actions Which he had committed, still didn't give me a clear basis inside me for my relationship to him, so I flew to see him.
I didn't know whether he would order no to remain in Berlin. It was my impression, however, that it would be my duty not to run away like a coward, but once again to appear on the scene. It was on that day that Goering's telegram arrived, Goering's telegram to Hitler -- the telegram to Ribbentrop, I mean, arrived, and Bormann submitted the telegram to him.
Q. Submitted it to Hitler?
A. Yes, to Hitler.
Q. What did Hitler say upon that occasion?
A. Hitler was most excited about the contents of the telegram, and he expressed himself in a very clear manner about Goering. He said that he knew for some time that Goering had failed, that he was corrupt, that he was a drug addict. I was very shaken by this, because it occurred to me that if the head of the State had had such knowledge for some considerable time, then it was irresponsible on the part of the head of the State that he had loft this ran in office, this man on whom depended the lives of huge numbers of people. It was typical of Hitler's attitude towards the entire problem, however, that he followed his statement us by spying: "But he can, nevertheless, negotiate the capitulation".
Q. Did he s ay why he was willing to let Goering negotiate the capitulation?
A. No. He stated in an off-hand manner: "It doesn't matter anyway who does it". His disregard for the German nation was expressed in the way he said this.
Q. That is, his attitude was that there was nothing left worth having so let Goering work it out. Is that a fair statement of his position ?
A. That was my impression, yes.
Q. Now, this policy of driving German to destruction after the war was lost had come to weigh on you to such a point that you were a party to several plots, were you not, in an attempt to remove the people who were responsible for the destruction, as you saw it, of your country?
A. Yes. But I wait to add -
Q. There were more plots that you have told us about, weren't there?
A. During that time it was awfully easy to start a plot, because you could talk to practically anybody in the street and tell him what the situation was, and then he would say, that is insanity, and if he had any courage he placed himself at your disposal. Unfortunately, I didn't have an organization at my disposal wich I might have commanded and with the help of which I could have done anything. That is why I had to depend on my personal conversations by which I remained in contact with various people. But I do want to say that it wasn't as dangerous as it looks here because, actually, the few unreasonable ones whoremained were perhaps a few dozen. The other eighty million were perfectly reasonable when they knew what this was all about.
Q. Perhaps you had a sense of responsibility for having put the eighty million completely in the hands of the Fuehrer principle. Did that occur to you, or does it now as you look back on it?
A. May 1 have the question repeated, because I didn't understand its sense.
Q. You have eighty million sane and sensible people facing destruction; you have a dozen people driving them on to destruction and they are unable to stop it. I ask you if you have a feeling of responsibility for having established the Fuehrer principle, which Goering has so well described for us, in Germany?
A. I, personally, by becoming minister in February '42, have placed myself at the disposal of this Fuehrer principle, this leader principle.
But in my organization I recognized that this principle of leadership was full of tremendous mistakessand therefore I tried to weaken its effect. The tremendous danger, however, contained in this totalitarian system, only became abundantly clear at the moment when we were approaching the end It was then that one could see what the meaning of the principle was, namely, that every order should be carried out without any criticism. Everything that has happened during this trial, everything you have seen in the way of orders which were carried out without any consideration, did after all turn out to be mistakes; and there was the final result of the order to destroy bridges and carry out the destruction, all the outcome of that totalitarian system. This system -- let me put it like this -- to the end of the system it has become clear what tremendous dangers are contained in any such system, as such, quite apart from Hitlers ' principle. The combination of Hitler and this system, then, brought about this tremendous catastrophe to this world.
Q Well, now Hitler is dead,--I assume you accept that?-- and we ought to give the devil his due. Isn't it a fact that in the circle around Hitler there was almost no one who would stand up and tell him that the war was lost except yourself?
A That is correct with certain limitations. Amongst the military leaders there were many who, with reference to their own sphere, explained to Hitler very clearly what the situation was. Many Army group commanders, for instance, made it clear to him how castrophic developments were, and about that there were often serious arguments concerning the situation. Men like Guderian and Jodl, for instance, talked about their own sector very clearly quite often in my presence, and Hitler had to know from what they told him what the entire situation was. I have not been able to ascertain, however, that those who are actually responsible were around Hitler to tell him the war was lost; nor did I experience that these responsible people attempted to establish communications among themselves to come to some joint step against Hitler. With a few exceptions, I didn't attempt that on my part either because it would have been useless. Hitler, during that phase, had frightened all these close associates to such an extent that they were without any will of their own. of fighting to the very end. Were you present at a conversation between Goering and General Gallant in which Goering, in substance, forbade Gallant to report the disaster that was overtaking Germany?
A No; in that form, that isn't correct. That was another conference.
Q Well, tell us what there is about General Gallant's conversation with Goering as far as you know it.
A This was at the Fuehrer headquarters in East Prussia outside Goering's train. Gallant had reported to Hitler that the enemy fighter planes had accompanied bombing squadrons as far as Luettich and that it was to be expected, there fore, that the bombing units would, in future, appear much farther from their bases, still accompanied bu fighters. After the discussion on the military situation Goering got held of Gallant before Hitler and, first of all, in an excited manner, told him that this couldn't possibly be true, that this couldn't be the facts, that they couldn't go as far as Luettich, these fighters. He said, in this connection, based on his experience as an old fighter pilot, that he knew that that was certainly so. Thereupon, Gallant replied that, after all, the aircraft, the fighters had been shot down and they were lying on the ground, burning, and Goering wouldn't believe that was true. Gallant was a very outspoken man who told Goering his opinion most clearly and he wouldn't allow Goering's excitement to influence him. Finally, Goering, as Supreme Commander of the Air Force, prohibited Gallant expressly from making any further reports about this matter. It was impossible, he said, that enemy fighters could tenetrate so deeply into Germany, and he was giving the order, therefore, that that was the opinion which he would have to accept as being correct. I continued to discuss the matter after wards with Gallant and, as a matter of fact, Gallant, as the General of the Fighter Command, was relieved of his duty by Goering. At this point, Gallant had been in charge of all fighter units in Germany. He was in Supreme command of the Air Force.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?
JUSTICE JACKSON: I was going to ask.
THE FITNESS: It must have been towards the end of 1943.
THE PRESIDENT : Justice Jackson, perhaps we had better adjourn now.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.
Q. If it please the Tribunal, I wanted to ask the witness whether it was known in the days when you were struggling for manpower enough to make armaments for Germany, that Goering was using manpower to collect art and transport art for his own purposes. Was that know to you at the time?
A. He needed very few workers for that purpose.
Q. Well, very few were very valuable, were they not?
A. The art objects were valuable, not the workers.
Q. To him?
A. Yes.
Q. Let me ask you about your efforts in producing, and see how much difficulty you were having. Krupp was a big factor in the German armament production, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. The biggest single unit, wouldn't you say?
A. Yes, but as I said yesterday, he produced few guns and armaments that were big with respect to concerns within armament industries.
Q. But you had pushed, as far as possible, the use of resources and manpower for the production of things that were not useful for the war, is that true?
A. That is true.
Q. And the things which were being built in Krupps were guns not other objects? They were things which were essential to carrying on the economy or conduct of the war? That's true, isn't it?
A. One cannot generalize the last analysis. Every object which is produced at home here, whether it si shoes for the worker, or clothing or coal, is of course products needed to wage war. That has nothing to do with the obsolete term from the Geneva Convention.
Q. Well, at the moment I am not concerned with the question of the application of the Geneva Convention. I want to ask you some questions about your efforts to produce, whether they were armament or not armament, and conditions which your regime was imposing upon labor and adding, as I think, to your problems of production.
I think you can give us some information about this. You were frequently at the Krupp plants, were you not?
A. I was at the Krupp plant 5 or 6 times.
Q. You had rather close information as to the progress of production in the Krupp plant as well as others?
A. Yes, this was mostly after air raids, when I went to survey the damages, and then I got an idea of the production.
Q. Krupp also had several labor camps, did they not?
of war. workers and prisoners of war. camps, and from Krupp's own charts it appears that in 1943 they had 39,245 foreign workers and 11,234 prisoners of war, and that this steadily increased until in September 1944 Krupp had 54,990 foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war. knowledge of the industry?
A I don't know the details. I don't know the figures of how many workers Krupp employed, the total, but I believe that the percentage of foreign workers at Krupp was about the same as in other armament concerns.
Q And what would you say that percentage was?
A That varied a great deal. The older industries had a lower percentage of foreign workers than he new industries which had grown up and which did not have any old group of employees. The reason for this was that the young age groups were drafted into the Wehrmacht and therefore the concerns who had older workers kept a greater percentage of the older workers. Therefore, the percentage of foreign workers in the armament industry as an old industry was lower than the percentage of foreign workers in the air armament industry because that was a completely new industry which did not have old workers. Krupp as an example -- were housed in labor camps and under guard, were they not?
A I do not believe that they were under guard, but I cannot say. I don't want to avoid giving information here, but I couldn't worry about those things on my visits. What I was concerned about when I went to a factory was in an entirely different field. In all my activities as Armament Minister I never once visited a labor camp, and can't, therefore, give any information about them.