DR. SERVATIUS: Dr. Servatius, counsel for Sauckel. BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q Mr. Witness, during the negotiations which Sauckel had in 1943 and 1944 with Laval in Paris, were there representatives present who came from year department and did they support Sauckel? partly present. They were present for the purpose of protecting the blocked restricted firms and also to see to it that there were no interferences with the production interests which I had proposed to protect. Sauckel's demands but they were against it?
A It wasn't the task for these representatives to act for or against Sauckel's demands because Sauckel stated his demands in such definite language that a smaller official was not in a position to speak either for or against these demands in any way. This would have been a task which I would have had to carry out myself.
Q So that these representatives didn't fulfil any task, did they? later armament and war production in the Occupied Territories and as such, they had their special orders and their special tasks.
Q Mr. Witness, did you in 1943 act independently and without consultation with Sauckel, transfer fifty thousand French workers to the Ruhr?
A Yes, that is true. After the attack on the Moene Dan and the Eder Dam in April or May 1945, I went there and in that period I ordered that and action group from the Tdt organization should take over the restoration of there plants. The reason why I did it was because the machinery and the technical staff should been the spot at once and this action group of the Todt organization first of all, without asking me, brought the French workers along which for us had tremendous repercussions in the West because the workers on the side of the Atlantic Wall who had up to that time felt safe from Sauckel's reach -
Q. Mr. Witness, we are not interested in hearing what was done. I am only interested in the fact that these 50,000 workers were obtained without Sauckel's agreement and by yourself independently, and that you have confirmed, haven't you?
A. Yes, that is true.
Q. Sauckel was responsible for the ruling on working hourse in those works, wasn't he? Is it known to you that the ten-hour day was later on ordered by Goebbels in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for Total Warfare, applicable to both Germans and foreign workers?
A. That is probably true. I am not directly recollecting it but I think it is right.
Q. Then you have stated that the Geneva Convention was not applied to Soviet prisoners of war and Italian civilian internees?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Do you know that the Geneva Convention, although it was not recognized for Soveit prisoners of war, was nevertheless applied as far as meanings were concerned and that there were corresponding orders?
A. I can not give you an answer to that because that was too much detail and dealt with my department directly. I should like to confirm it for you.
DR. SERVATIUS: I shall later on submit a document to the Tribunal which will show this point. BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q. Do you know that Italian civilian internees -- let's say those who came from the Italian armed forces, were given free working conditions and that that was the reason why they didn't come under the Convention?
A. Yes, that is true and it was done by Sauckel's request.
Q. The responsibility for carrying out Sauckel's orders in the firms was up to the work leaders, isn't that right?
A. As far as they could be carried out, yes.
Q. And you have said that if, because of special events, the air attacks it wasn't possible to carry them out, that then the supreme authorities in the Reich should have taken care of the matter?
A. Yes.
Q. Which authorities in the Reich do you mean?
A. The General Plenipotentiary for Labor.
Q. That would be Sauckel?
A. Yes. And the German Labor Front, who was responsible for accomodations and working conditions.
Q. Which organization did Sauckel have at his disposal to stop these shortcomings? After all, this was practical assistance that was wanted.
A. No, I think you have misunderstood me. The catasthropic conditions were conditions which were brought about by bombing. Nobody could remedy them, not with the best of desires., because every day there were new air attacks. But it isn't possible, as Sauckel has testified, that the work leader should be made responsible even for the fact that those conditions could not be stooped. I wanted to indicate that in such emergencies the leaders in their entirety must get together and they must decide whether ands this is any longer a bearable state of affairs or not. In that connection, it was the special duty of Sauckel, as the reporting and causing official, that he should represent these needs.
Q. But then, who should he take it to?
A. To the Fuehrer.
Q. Mr. Witness, you have explained your own administration and you have said that you were an opponent of a bureauocratic administration. You had introduced self-administration for the firms, hadn't you, and on the professional side, you had formed expert agencies and above that committees and you were directing them, weren't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And then there was a closed, administration which could not be penetrated from the outside by other authorities?
A. Yes, I would have represented that.
Q. Then you were the representative of these firms to the above -
A. Only as far as the technical tasks were concerned which I carried out.
Q. Please, will you describe the technical tasks?
A. Well, otherwise I would also have been responsible for food conditions or health conditions or matters which effected the police, but that was expecting too much. In that case I should have been given another part.
Q. Mr. Witness,weren't you referring to it earlier, that particularly as far as food was concerned, you had given instructions which the workers had the benefit of, and aren't you in that way confirming my view, that you should bear entire responsibility for that sector?
A. Not in the least. I believe that I took the action of the last phase within my entire responsibility, but not the individual responsibility for that sector?
A. Not in the least. I believe that I took the action of the last phase within my entire responsibility, but not the individual responsibilities which I had.
Q. Then, Witness, you have spoken about the responsibility of the Gauleiters as Reich Defense Commissioners with reference to the armament industries. Could you describe in detail what the scope of that responsibility was, because I just didn't understand it?
A. Since 1942, to an ever increasing degree, the responsibility transferred to the Gauleiters as Reich Defense Commissioners. This was the intention which mostly Bormann represented.
Q. What tasks did they have.
A. Just a minute. He desired the centralization of all the forces of the State and the party in the Gaulieter. This state of affairs, the centralizing I mean, beginning in 1943, had almost been achieved in full, the only exception which still existed being my armament department, the so-called Armament Inspectorates, which, as they had previously come under the OKW, had remained military service departments which I had staffed, which, in turn, made it possible for me to remain outside the jurisdiction and influence on the part of the Gauleiters. But the Gauleiter was the central department in his Gau and he assumed the right to give orders if he didn't have them. The situation in our case was, as you very well know, that it wasn't a question of deciding who had the powers; it was a question of who would help themselves to the right to give orders.
Just a minute. And in this case most Gauleiters did assume the rights and powers, all of them, by which means they were the responsible and centralized departments.
Q What do you mean by "centralized departments"? Perhaps I may put something to you for a change. The Gauleiter, as Reich Defense Commissioner, only had the task of summarizing and centralizing certain authorities if a decision was necessary in the Gau. Take, for instance the case of an air attack, the removal of the damage, construction of a new plant, so that the various departments would be brought to one conference table, but he did not have orders or rights to decide, is that right?
A. No; I should like to recommend to you that you should talk to a few Gaul eiters who will tell you how it was.
Q. In that case, I will drop the question. I will read the law. Mr. Witness, then you went on to say that during a certain period there had been a surplus of labor in Germany.
Was this due to the fact that Sauckel had brought too many foreign workers into Germany?
A In this case there may be the possibility of an error. My defense counsel has pointed to two documents, according to which, during the time from April, '42 until April, '43, Sauckel had supplied more labor to the armament sector than armament had requested. Is that the passage you mean? workers than were required.
Q You don't want to say, therefore, that this had been brought about through the fact that Sauckel had brought too many workers in from foreign countries?
A No. I wanted to say by that answer that even according to Sauckel's opinion of the time and because of the demands to reach the top level that he was not caused, by these factors, to bring workers to Germany from France, because if, in a report to Hitler, he asserts that he had brought more workers to the Armament sector than I had demanded, which is what you can see from the letter, then it becomes clear that he has done more than I wanted him to do. The facts, however, were different. In fact, he didn't supply these workers at all, and we had quite a row because it was my opinion that he had supplied less and he had made a terrific report to Hitler; but of course during this trial the document is valid. of an argument between you and Sauckel regarding the question of whether there were sufficient labor reserves in Germany, and if I have understood you rightly, then you said that if workers were brought to work in the manner used by England and the Soviet Union, then one wouldn't have needed any foreign workers at all; is that true?
A No, I didn't say that.
Q Well then, hiw am I to understand it?
A I have expressed quite clearly enough that I consider Sauckel's policy, labor policy of bringing foreigners into Germany -- it was considered right by me.
I did not try to dodge that responsibility, but there were considerable reserves of German labor and there again is only proof for the fact that I wasn't responsible for the high level of the demands which were made, and that was all I wanted to prove. youth were used to a very considerable degree?
Q Do you also know that officers' wives or the wives of high officials also had to work in factories? speaking?
A I was talking about the period 1943. In 1943 I demanded, in the Central Planning Board, that the German labor reserve should be drawn upon, and in '44, during the 4th of January conversation, I said the same thing. Sauckel at that time stated in his speech, and his ppeech of the 1st of March, 1944, shows it, which I have submitted as a document, that there were no longer any reserves of German workers, but at the same time he also testified here that he had succeeded, in 1944, to still mobilize 2,000,000 workers from German sources, and that, according to the conference we had with Hitler on the 1st of January, 1944, appeared impossible to us. He himself has proved here that at a time when I desired the use of internal labor, he didn't think that this fact existed but that he was later forced, through circumstances in the blocked firms, to use and mobilize these workers from Germany after all; so that therefore my statement at the time was right.
Q. Mr. Witness, these two million workers you have mentioned, were they people who could he used in industry ?
Q Were they used directly as experts in industry ?
Q Didn't they first of all have to go through complicated transfers from one firm to the other which would make them free ? fine mechanical industry and other firms, and this is something which everyone knows who knows American and British industry, that the modern machines are perfectly suitable to be worked by women, even for serious and difficult work.
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal isn't interested in all these details, Dr. Servatius.
DR. SERVATIUS : Mr. President, a principal question in which I am very interested is whether there was a surplus of workers from foreign countries, and if, therefore, there wasn't any necessity for the state to got them. That question is of the greatest importance from the point of view of international law. That is the thing I wish to clarify.
THE PRESIDENT : Yes, you can put two more questions, but not on those details.
DR. SERVATIUS : No, it is something different. BY DR. SERVATIUS : Sauckel failed. Didn't you achieve that subordination in practice by the fact that on the medium of the center level Sauckel's department would have to do what your armament commission ordered ?
A No. I am afraid I shall have to go into broad detail before you can understand my answer.
Q But then you have said no, haven't you ? if my answer "no" is sufficient for you, splendid. clearly say no, that is enough.
Mr. Witness, one last question. You said that Sauckel had discussed and deciced the question of distributing labor within his labor staff. He, on the other hand, says that the Fuehrer had made certain decisions.
Mustn't one draw the dividing line between the considerable demands of a program where one is dealing with the distribution of labor for a lengthy period, and the distribution which was carried out currently, taking into consideration the demands of the program of the time ? of the Fuehrer conferences which I had, you must divide this question into two phases, one ending October 1942, during which there were frequent joint conferences with Hitler during which Sauckel and I were present. During these conferences, the distribution of labor was discussed with reference to the individual months in details. After that time, there were no longer further conferences with Hitler in my presence , which would go into detail. I merely know of the conference of January 1944, and then there was another conference in April or May 1944 which, however, I have mentioned. distribution in detail was then carried out in accordance with the directive by Sauckel.
Q But that is just what I am asking you. These were demands based on a program. They were principle decisions, saying, for instance, "Two million workers will have to be got from foreign countries," and then the subsequent distribution was carried out by Sauckel.
A Yes, that's right, and I can go on to confirm Sauckel's testimony, saying that he always got his orders from Hitler with reference to the occupied territories, since he needed Hitler's authority to assort Himself in foreign territory.
DR. SERVATIUS : In that case, Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 21 June 1946 at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Do any other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions? BY DR. KRAUS: (Counsel for the defendant Schacht)
Q Mr. Witness, on the 25th of January 1946 you gave two statements to my client in the prison here at Nurnberg. During his examination, Dr. Schacht has referred to those two statements very briefly, and I should like to have the Tribunal's permission, in order to make this brief, to be allowed to read the statement which the defendant gave on that day so that I can have it confirmed, that the statement is correct. They are very brief. The first statement reads as follows:
"I was on the terrace of the Berghof at the Obersalzberg and I was waiting to submit my constructional plans--this was in the summer of 1937--when Schacht appeared at the Berghof. I heard a loud argument on the terrace, taking place between Hitler and Schacht in Hitler's room. Hitler's voice increased to maximum volume. At the end of the discussion, Hitler came out on the terrace and, visibly excited, he told his entourage that he could not collaborate with Schacht, that he had had a terrific argument with him, and that with his methods of financing, Schacht was disturbing his plans."
New, this is the first statement. Is it correctly represented? July. The statement says:
"It was on the 22nd of July that Hitler said in my presence"--
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) What year?
DR. KRAUS: 1944, your Lordship.
Q (Continuing): "---that Schacht, as one of the opponents of the totalitarian system, should be one of those to be arrested. Subsequently, Hitler spoke very severely against Schacht's activities, and he spoke about the difficulties which he, Hitler, had experienced through Schacht's economic policy with reference to rearmament. He said that actually a man like Schacht, because of his activity before the war, ought to be shot."
The last sentence of the statement says:
"Because of the severity of the statement, I was surprised to find that I was meeting Schacht alive."
Is that statement correct, too?
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendant's counsel want to ask questions?
Then, does theProsecution wish to cross examine? BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: he described first as your personal responsibilities, and secondly as the political part of the case, and I will follow the same division. responsible, and I want to make clear just what your sphere of responsibility was. held high rank in the Party, didyou not?
Q And what was the position which you held in the Party? labor Front, working for improvement of working conditions in German firms. Then I became Official in Charge of Construction in Hess' staff, both positions being dropped by me when I resigned in 1941. The minutes of the conference which I had with Hitler in thatrespect are available, and after the 8th of February 1942 I automatically became Department Chief of the Reich Command of the NSDAP.
Q And whit was your official title? complicated that I can't tell you at the moment what they were. But the activities I carried out were these of the Department Chief of the Reich Command of the NSDAP, Reichsdienst Leiter. fuer Technik. in the Army. formed in a general way as to the party program, were you not? because I was a participant in my capacity as an architect. Apart from that, naturally, I was generally present during official Party meetings or Reichstag meetings. program of the Nazi Warty in its broad outline, were you not? Will you tell me whether you were a member of the SS?
A. No, I was not a member of the SS.
Q. You filled out an application at one time, or one was filled out for you, and I believe you never went through with it, or something of that sort.
A. This was in 1943, when Himmler wanted me to get a high rank in the SS. He had desired that earlier, quite frequently, while I was still an architect. I extricated myself from the situation by saying that I would be willing to become an ordinary SS man under him because I had already been an SS man once before. Thereupon, Group Leader Wolff filled in a questionnaire. He wanted to ascertain how my previous SS activity in 1932 had happened and what it looked like. It turned out that at the time I was not kept on the membership lists of the SS, a fact which therefore made it impossible to carry out the SS membership affair because I did not want to be a new member of the SS.
Q. And why did you not want to be a member of the SS, which was after all one of the important Party formations?
A. No, I was known for the fact that I turned down all these honorary ranks. I did not want to have them, because it was my opinion that one should only hold a rank when one had the responsibility.
Q. And you did not want any responsibility in the SS?
A. I had too little contact with the SS, and I did not want any responsibility in that connection.
Q. Now there has been some testimony about your relation to concentration camps, and, as understand it, you have said to us that you did use and encourage the use of force labor from the concentration camps.
A. Yes, we did use these in German armament industry.
Q. And I think you also recommended that persons in labor camps who were slackers be sent to the concentration camps, did you not?
A. That was the question of the so-called idlers or slackers, (Bumelanten), and under that name we understood workers who did not come to their places of work in good time or were pretending to be ill. Against such workers, during the war, there were severe measures. I approved of those measures.
Q. In fact, in the October 30, 1942 meeting of the Central Planning Board, you brought the subject up in the following terms, did you not -quoting Speer:
"We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the sick list decreased to one fourth or one fifth in factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and Police taking drastic stops and putting those know as slackers into concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen several times, and the news will soon go around."
That was your recommendation?
A. Correct.
Q. In other words, the workmen stood in considerable terror of concentration camps, and you wanted to take advantage of that to keep them at their work,did you not?
A. It was certain that, as far as we were concerned concentration camps had a bad reputation, and the transfer or threat of transfer to a concentration camp would, right from the beginning, reduce these deficiencies in work. But in that meeting, as I have already said, no more was talked about that. That was one of the many remarks which one might make during wartime when one is upset.
Q. However, it is very clear -- and if I misinterpret you, I give you the chance to correct me -- that you understood the very bad reputation that the concentration camps had among the workmen and that the concentration camps were regarded as being much more severe than the labor camps as places to be.
A. That is correct. I knew that, but I did not know, of course, what I have heard during this trial. The other things were generally known facts.
Q. Well, it was know throughout Germany, was it not, that the concentration camps were pretty tough places to be put?
A. Yes, but not in the sense which has been uncovered in this trial.
Q. And the bad reputation of the concentration camp, as a matter of fact, was a part of its usefulness in making people fearful of being sent there, was it not?
A. No doubt concentration camps were means of threats to keep order.
Q. And to keep people at work?
A. I wouldn't like to say so in that form. I should like to say that foreign workers in our country worked voluntarily once they had come to Germany.
Q. Well, we will take that up later. You used the concentration camp labor in production to the extent that you were required to divide the proceeds of the labor with Himmler, did you not?
A. That I am afraid I did not understand.
Q. Well, you made on agreement finally with Himmler that he should have five percent, or roughly five percent, of the production of the concentration camp labor while you would get for your work 95 per cent?
A. No, that is not quite true.
Q. Well, tell me how it was. That is what the documents indicate, if I read them a-right.
A. Yes, that is contained in that manner in the Fuehrer record, but I should like to explain it to you. Himmler, as I explained yesterday, wanted to open factories and build them in his concentration camps. Then he would have had production under his control, which Hitler, of course, knew. This five percent of arms which were to be handed to Himmler was in a certain sense compensation for the fact that he had to forego -- that he did forego the construction of the factories in the camps. As far as I was concerned, it was not psychologically easy that Himmler, who continually suggested to Hitler that these factories should be constructed in the camps, should be deterred from his idea. I was hoping that the five percent of arms or weapons would satisfy him in fact. Actually, these five per cent were never handed over. We worked with the Chief of the Army Staff and the OKW, General Buhle, who was handling it in such a way that he did not receive the arms at all.
Q. Well, I am not criticizing the bargain, you understand. I don't doubt you did very well to get 95 per cent, but the point is that Himmler was using, with your knowledge, concentration camp lanor to manufacture arms, or was proposing to do so, and you wanted to keep that production within your control?
A. Would it be possible to turn the translation up in volume a little, because I can not understand it very easily? And could I possibly have it repeated?
Q. You knew at this time that Himmler was using concentration camp labor to carry on independent industry and that he proposed to go into the armament industry in order to have a source of supply of arms for his own SS?
A. Yes.
Q. And you also knew the policy of the Nazi Party and the policy of the government towards the Jews, did you not?
A. I knew that the National Socialist Party was anti-Semitic, and I knew that the Jews were being evacuated from Germany.
Q. In fact, you participated in that evacuation, did you not?
A. No.
Q. Well, I gather that impression from document L-156, Exhibit RF-52 -a letter from the Plenipotentiary for Manpower, which is dated 26 March 1943, which you have no doubt seen. You may see it again, if you wish. In it he says -
A. I know it.
Q. "At the end of February, Reich Leader SS, in agreement with myself and the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, for reasons concerning the security of the State, removed from their places or work all Jews who were still sorking freely and not in camps and either transferred them to a labor corps or collected them for removal."
Is that a correct representation of your activity?
A. No.
There is no question that they were removed and put into labor corps or collected for removal, is there?
Q Now you say you did not do it, so will youtell me who did? Party that Jews still working in armament firms should be removed from those armament firms was already well in existence. In those days I objected, and I achieved it so that Bormann issued a circular letter to the effect that those Jews should continue to work in armament firms and that Party departments were prohibited from making political accusations against the heads of those firms because of these Jews working there. These political accusations were usually made to the work leaders by the Gauleiter. That happened mostly in the Gau of Saxony and in the Gau of Berlin. Consequently the Jews could, therefore, remain in those businesses. Party was published by me in my information pamphlet, which went to all the leaders of all the firms in question, so that I would get the complaints from the work leaders in case the Party should not obey that instruction. September or October of 1942. At that time there was a conference with Hitler, during which Sauckel also was present. During that conference Hitler demanded very emphatically that now the Jews would have to come out of these armament firms, and he ordered that this should be done, something which becomes clear from a Fuehrer protocol which is still available. in these firms, and only in March of 1943, as this letter shows, did the resistance against that action collapse and the Jews finally did have to come out. we are not here concerned with the total problem of the Jews. However, during the years of 1941 and 1942, Jews joined the armament factories to do essential war work there, which essential war occupation, in turn, would enable them to escape the evacuation which was already in full swing at that moment.
They were mostly occupied in the electrical industry, and Geheimrat Buecher of AAG, and Siemens, no doubt helped the matter along a little bit so as to receive the Jews to a considerable extent. The Jews were still completely free and their families were still in their original apartments and houses. by Gauleiter Sauckel; and Sauckel says that he himself had not seen it. It is not doubt quite true, however, that before this action I had knowledge of the facets because the question had to be discussed as to how one should get replacements. But it is equally certain that I protested against it at that time also, that I protested having the experts removed from my armament industries because, apart from the various other reasons, this would mean a burden for me.
Q That is exactly the point that I want to emphasize. As I understand it, you were struggling to get manpower enough to produce the armaments to win a war for Germany. trained technicians away from you and disabled you from performing your functions. Isn't that the fact?
A I am afraid I didn't understand the sense, or the meaning of your question. was made very much more difficult by this anti-Jewish campaign whichwas being waged by others of your co-defendants.
A That is a certainty; and it is equally clear that if the Jews who were evacuated had been allowed to work under me, that would have been a considerable advantage to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, has it been proved who signed that document L-156? It apparently has asignature on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is a signature on it, I believe; the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower is my thought on it. We willlookat that.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the defendant could tell what the signature is.
(A document was submitted to the witness.)
THE WITNESS: This man is unknown to me; I don't know who he is. It must be a subordinate of an official of thePlenipotentiary for Manpower, because I knew all the immediate associates of Sauckel personally.
I beg your pardon. The document comes from the Government President of Koblenz. It is an associate in the Government District of Koblenz, who therefore is, of course, unknown to me.
BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: as you have explained it? labor. As I understand it, you knew about the deportation of 100,000 Jews from Hungary for subterranean airplane factories, and you told us in your interrogation of October 18, 1945, that you made no objection to it. That is true, is it not? it was no secret to you that a good deal of the manpower brought in by Sauckel was brought in by illegal methods. That is also true, is it not? pression was used by the interrogating officer, and the expression he used was that they came against their wish; and that I affirmed. were brought in in an illegal manner? Didn't you add that yourself?
A No, no. That was certainly not so. ference in August of 1942 the Fuehrer had approved of all coercive measures of obtaining labor if they couldn't be obtained on a voluntary basis, and you knew that that program was carried out. attention to the legal side of this thing, did you? You were after manpower; isn't that the fact?
Q And whether it was legal or illegal was not your worry? dering the views which we had, that was justified. ment, and that was as far as you inquired at the time, was it not?