THE PRESIDENT: Is that the 29th of May or March?
THE WITNESS: March, Mr. President.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, you will find this document on page 72 of the English text in my document book, and it is page 75 in the French text. I submit it as Exhibit No. 24. It is Speer's letter to Hitler, dated the 29th of March, 1945. BY DR. FAECHSNER:
Q Will you continue, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not to read the letter?
DR. FLAECHSNER: I was going to suggest it. I think the defendant wants to read it. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Will you read it?
A I quote:
"When on 18 March I transmitted my letter to you I was of the firm conviction that the conclusions which I had drawn from the present situation for the maintenance of our national power would find your unconditional approval, because you yourself had once determined that it was the task of the government to preserve a nation from a heroic end if the war should be lost.
"However, during the evening you made declarations to me, the tenor of which, unless I misunderstood you, was clearly as follows: If the war is to be lost the nation will also perish. This fate is inevitable. There was no necessity to take into consideration the basis which the people would need to continue a most primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be wiser to destroy even these things ourselves, because this nation had proved to be the weaker one and the future belonged solely to the stronger Eastern Nation. Besides, those who remain after the battle are only the inferior ones; for the good ones have fallen."
I go on to quote:
"After these words I was profoundly shaken, and when on the next day I read the order for destruction, and shortly after that the strict order of evacuation, I saw in this the first steps toward the realization of these intentions."
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, may I refer in this connection to a document of Speer which is the destruction order of Hitler, dated the 19th of March 1945, which the Tribunal will find on page 73 of the French and page 76 of the English text of my document book. communication systems which you will find on page 78 of the English text and page 75 of the French text. They become Speer Exhibit No. 26. Bormann dated 23 March, 1945, which is contained in the supplementary volume of my document book, where it appears on page 102. The latter exhibit will have the number 27. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, since these are orders with technical expressions, will you please summarize the contents briefly for the Tribunal?
THE PRESIDENT: You said that lost one was at page 102 of the second volume. In my copy that is a document of General Guderian of December 15, 1944.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, I have made a mistake. It isn't page 102, it is page 93. I beg to apologize; it is at pages 93 and 94. I have only just received the document book today. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, will you briefly elucidate these orders?
A I can summarize them very briefly. They gave the order to the Gauleiters to carry out the destruction of all industrial plants, public facilities, water works, gas works, and so on and so forth, and also the destruction of all food stores and clothing stores. My jurisdiction had specifically been excluded, by means of that order, and the right to give instructions to industry, which I had, had been cancelled.
destruction of all bridges, and over and above that, all railway installations, communications systems, the Reichsbahn, the German railway, and also the waterways, of all ships, of all railway transportation, and of all locomotives. tion of a traffic desert. center of the Reich, both from the West and the East, and the foreign workers and prisoners of war were to be added to it. on foot. No provisions for their existence had been made or could be carried out, considering the situation. unimaginable hunger catastrophe as its result. Add to this that on the 19th of March, 1945, there was a strict order from Hitler to all army groups and all Gauleiters, saying that the fight should be conducted without consideration for our own population.
broken, saying that it would not be necessary that the basic live principles for the leadership should have been saved, but it would be better to destroy these things. Considering the discipline which came into force in Germany in connection with every order, no matter what its contents were, it was to be expected that these orders would be carried out. the Greater German Reich. and by means of discussions with my associates, tried to stop the carrying out of the orders, and I ordered that the high explosives which were still available in the Ruhr should be dropped down the mines, and that the stores of high explosives which were on the building site should be hidden. We issued machine pistols to the most important plants so that they could fight against destruction. All this, I know, sounds somewhat exaggerated, but the atmosphere of the time was such that if a Gauleiter had dared to approach the coal mines in the Ruhr and there was one machine pistol on the spot, then they would have fired. character of the task which had been given to them, and furthermore, by talking to the local authorities, I succeeded in stepping most of the evacuation which had been ordered. Once again the secretary of the Party Chancellery, Klepper, earned my recognition by holding up the evacuation orders which were to be sent to the Gauleiters. This was on the 29th of March, 1945. I had intentionally resisted his orders so openly, and I had discussed the lost war with so many of his Gauleiters so openly that my resistance had to become known to him. Witnesses are available from that period who know that that is what I wanted to achieve.
I did not want to deceive him behind his back in this case. I wanted to put the alternative before him. At the beginning of the conference, he stated that he had had reports from Hermann showing that I considered the or as lost and that I had openly talked against his prohibition. He demanded that I should make a statement to the effect that I did not consider the war lost, and I replied by saying, "The war is lost". letter was written, the extract from which hasbeen quoted, and which hasbeen submitted to the Tribunal.
reply. But he refused to accept it. Thereupon, I declared to him that he could, rely on me, even in the future. And by that means, I achieved it that he handed over to me once more the carrying out of the destruction work.
DR. FLECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, may I refer to Hitler's order dated the 30th of March, 1945, which the Tribunal will find on Pages 83 of the English text and 19 of the French text in the document book, which I new submit as Exhibit 23? BY DR. FLAECHSNER: had? get around the destruction which had been ordered. I gave an order at once reestablishing all my old orders for the protection of industry. In this connection, I did not submit this now order of mine before Hitler, although it was expressly stated in his order, contrary to the promise which I had given him, namely that I would stand behind him unconditionally. stated here, and I said to him, too, that the war was lost. I then discussed the consequences fully. On that occasion I found a great deal of understanding from Seyss-Inquart. Both my decrees for the prevention of that destruction, as well asmy conferences, were contrary to the promise I had given Hitler on the 21st of March. I considered that this was my natural duty.
DR. FLEICHSNER: I submit under Speer Exhibit 29 the instructions issuer by Speer on the 30th of March with reference to the order which has already been mentioned. In the French and German texts that appear on Page 81, and in the English document book, on Page 85.
THE WITNESS: In spite of this, the orders for the destruction of bridges still remained in force, and everywhere in Germany, Austria and Poland you can see the result today. the commanders of the troops at the front. Perhaps that may have caused one relief or the other. the 3rd of April, 1945, stopped the destruction by means of a new order of the postal and wireless communication departments. Finally, on the 5th of April, I issued six OKW orders under the name of General winter, who has been a witness in this court room; and these orders were to sad to the preservation of important railway lines. The orders are still in existence. I gave these orders through my command channels and the channels of the Reich railway, and considering the tremendous muddle which there had been at the time, such order's, which I was not empowered to give, would at least have a distracting value. BY DR. FLEICHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, a number of attempts of yours to abbreviate the war became known to the press. Could you please refer to the problem, namely what has been hinted in the press, and state to the Tribunal what those were? I tried repeatedly to exclude Himmler and others from the government and to force them to make themselves responsible for their deeds. To carry that and other plans out, eight officers from the front joined me, all of whom were holding the highest decorations. Amont them were the two best known pilots in Germany, Galland and Baumbach. The Secretary of State of the Propaganda Ministry made it possible for me on the 9th of April to speak briefly ever the entire German radio system. All preparations were made, and at the last moment Goebbels heard about it and demanded that Hitler should pass on the text of my speech; so that I submitted to him a very changed text. But he even prohibited that. a speech at the broadcasting station at Hamburg, which was meant to be the instructions for the final phase; and the recording officials demanded that this speech should be broadcast only after Hitler's death, which would relieve then of their oath of allegiance to him.
in the East -- that is, the Army Group Weichsel -- and we were both aware that a fight for Berlin must not take place, and that contrary to their orders, the armies should by-pass Berlin. persons empowered with special authority by Hitler who succeeded in leading one division into Berlin. The original intention, however, that entire armies should be lead into Berlin, did not find itself carried through. The chief of staff with whom I had those conferences was General Kinsler. April, and later on?
A Yes. We expected that the war would last longer, because Churchill, too, prophesied at the time that the end of the war would come at the end of July, 1945. plants and other economic installations. Did you act equally on behalf of the foreign workers?
A My responsibility was the industrial sector. I felt it my duty, therefore, in the first place, to hand ever my sector undestroyed. In spite of this, several attempts of mine were in favor of foreign workers in Germany. In the first place, these foreign workers and prisoners of war, through the steps which I had taken to secure the food situation, were quire obviously the beneficiaries of my work during the last phase. Secondly, during local conversations, I did much to prevent detonations, contrary to the evacuation *---* which were available from the Party, and I worked a remaining-on-thespot of the foreign workers and prisoners, such conferences having taken place on the 18th of March in the Saar and on the 28th of March in the Ruhr.
At the beginning of March, I made the proposal that five hundred thousand foreigners should be transferred from the Reich to the territories which we still held; that is to say, the Dutch to Holland the the Czechs to Czechoslovakia. The railways, however, refused to take responsibility for these transports, since the traffic system had already been so destroyed, that the carrying out of this plan was no longer possible. Finally, both in connection with the intended speech over the German broadcasting system on the 9th of April as well as the attempt of the Hamburg speech, I drew everyone's attention to the duties which we had towards the foreigners, the prisoners of war, and the detainees from concentration camps during this last phase.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to page 88 of the English text in this connection; it is page 84 of the French and I submit it as Speer Exhibit No. 30. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, you have described to us how much during the last phase of the war you were opposed to Hitler and his policies. Why did you not resign?
A. I had the possibility to resign on three occasions; one in April 1944, when my powers were considerably eliminated; the second time in September 1944, when Bormann and Goebbels were in favor of my being eliminated, by resigning; and the third time on the 29th of March 1945, Hitler himself demanded that I should go on permanent leave, which was equivalent to resignation. I turned down all these possibilities because beginning with July 1944, I thought that it was my duty to remain at my post.
Q. There has been testimony in this courtroom to the effect that the last phase of the war, say beginning of January 1945, had been justified because unnecessary sacrifices should be made to save the nation. Were you of that same opinion?
A. No. It was said that military protection towards the East had been necessary to save refugees. In reality, until the middle of April 1945, the bulk of our last reserves of armored vehicles and munitions were used for the fight against the West.
The tactical principle, therefore, was different from the one it should have been if the fight had been carried out with those aims, which has been testified to here. The destruction of bridges in the best and the destruction orders against the basis of life of the nation show the opposite. The sacrifices which were made on both sides after January 1945 were without sense. The dead of this period will be the accusers of the man responsible for the continuation of that fight, Adolf Hitler, just as much as the destroyed cities, destroyed in that last phase, who had lost tremendous cultural values and tremendous number of dwellings. Many of the difficulties under which the German nation is suffering today are due to the ruthless destruction of bridges, traffic installations, trucks and locomotives and ships. The German people remained faithful to Adolf Hitler until the end. He has betrayed, them knowingly. He has tried to throw it into the abyss. Only after the 1st of May 1945, did Doenitz try to use reason and act but it was too late.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I have one last question. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: phase of the war with your conceptions of faith and allegiance to Adolf Hitler; always the faith towards one's own people. That duty must come above everything. If I standing in a leading position and if I see that the interests of the nation are acted against in such a way then I, too, must act. That Hitler had broken the faith to the nation, that must have been clear to every intelligent member of his surrounding's and no later than January 1945, once Hitler was given the mission by his people, he had no right to combine and lose the destiny of the people with his own. That is why I found that it was necessary for me to do my natural duty as a German. I did not succeed in every way but I am glad today that with my work, I rendered the last service to the workers in Germany and the Occupied Territories.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I have now reached the end of my examination of the defendant Speer. May I perhaps draw the attention of the Tribunal to the following; namely, that with reference to the subjects which came up during this afternoon's session, there will be the witness Kehrl, or there is the witness Kehrl whose interrogatory has been referred in 10 and 12; Rohland, 5, 6, and 8; witness Schieber under 25; witness Guderian on the question, 1 to 3, 7 to 9, and with the same reference also under 6 and witness Stahl is mentioned under 1 and 2; the witness Kempf under No. 10. Still outstanding are the interrogatories from the witness Malzacher and the interrogatory which is most important to the defense, the statements of the witness von Peso, since he was the liaison man, the liaison officer between the General Staff of the Any and Speer's Ministry. Furthermore, still outstanding is the interrogatory referring to General Buhle, who was the Chief of the Army Staff, and Oberst Baumbach, General Baumbach, who was the commander of an airforce wing. The remaining documents I should submit at the end of the re-examination of the defendant Speer, to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. SERVATIUS: Dr. Servatius, counsel for Sauckel. BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q Mr. Witness, during the negotiations which Sauckel had in 1943 and 1944 with Laval in Paris, were there representatives present who came from year department and did they support Sauckel? partly present. They were present for the purpose of protecting the blocked restricted firms and also to see to it that there were no interferences with the production interests which I had proposed to protect. Sauckel's demands but they were against it?
A It wasn't the task for these representatives to act for or against Sauckel's demands because Sauckel stated his demands in such definite language that a smaller official was not in a position to speak either for or against these demands in any way. This would have been a task which I would have had to carry out myself.
Q So that these representatives didn't fulfil any task, did they? later armament and war production in the Occupied Territories and as such, they had their special orders and their special tasks.
Q Mr. Witness, did you in 1943 act independently and without consultation with Sauckel, transfer fifty thousand French workers to the Ruhr?
A Yes, that is true. After the attack on the Moene Dan and the Eder Dam in April or May 1945, I went there and in that period I ordered that and action group from the Tdt organization should take over the restoration of there plants. The reason why I did it was because the machinery and the technical staff should been the spot at once and this action group of the Todt organization first of all, without asking me, brought the French workers along which for us had tremendous repercussions in the West because the workers on the side of the Atlantic Wall who had up to that time felt safe from Sauckel's reach -
Q. Mr. Witness, we are not interested in hearing what was done. I am only interested in the fact that these 50,000 workers were obtained without Sauckel's agreement and by yourself independently, and that you have confirmed, haven't you?
A. Yes, that is true.
Q. Sauckel was responsible for the ruling on working hourse in those works, wasn't he? Is it known to you that the ten-hour day was later on ordered by Goebbels in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for Total Warfare, applicable to both Germans and foreign workers?
A. That is probably true. I am not directly recollecting it but I think it is right.
Q. Then you have stated that the Geneva Convention was not applied to Soviet prisoners of war and Italian civilian internees?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Do you know that the Geneva Convention, although it was not recognized for Soveit prisoners of war, was nevertheless applied as far as meanings were concerned and that there were corresponding orders?
A. I can not give you an answer to that because that was too much detail and dealt with my department directly. I should like to confirm it for you.
DR. SERVATIUS: I shall later on submit a document to the Tribunal which will show this point. BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q. Do you know that Italian civilian internees -- let's say those who came from the Italian armed forces, were given free working conditions and that that was the reason why they didn't come under the Convention?
A. Yes, that is true and it was done by Sauckel's request.
Q. The responsibility for carrying out Sauckel's orders in the firms was up to the work leaders, isn't that right?
A. As far as they could be carried out, yes.
Q. And you have said that if, because of special events, the air attacks it wasn't possible to carry them out, that then the supreme authorities in the Reich should have taken care of the matter?
A. Yes.
Q. Which authorities in the Reich do you mean?
A. The General Plenipotentiary for Labor.
Q. That would be Sauckel?
A. Yes. And the German Labor Front, who was responsible for accomodations and working conditions.
Q. Which organization did Sauckel have at his disposal to stop these shortcomings? After all, this was practical assistance that was wanted.
A. No, I think you have misunderstood me. The catasthropic conditions were conditions which were brought about by bombing. Nobody could remedy them, not with the best of desires., because every day there were new air attacks. But it isn't possible, as Sauckel has testified, that the work leader should be made responsible even for the fact that those conditions could not be stooped. I wanted to indicate that in such emergencies the leaders in their entirety must get together and they must decide whether ands this is any longer a bearable state of affairs or not. In that connection, it was the special duty of Sauckel, as the reporting and causing official, that he should represent these needs.
Q. But then, who should he take it to?
A. To the Fuehrer.
Q. Mr. Witness, you have explained your own administration and you have said that you were an opponent of a bureauocratic administration. You had introduced self-administration for the firms, hadn't you, and on the professional side, you had formed expert agencies and above that committees and you were directing them, weren't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And then there was a closed, administration which could not be penetrated from the outside by other authorities?
A. Yes, I would have represented that.
Q. Then you were the representative of these firms to the above -
A. Only as far as the technical tasks were concerned which I carried out.
Q. Please, will you describe the technical tasks?
A. Well, otherwise I would also have been responsible for food conditions or health conditions or matters which effected the police, but that was expecting too much. In that case I should have been given another part.
Q. Mr. Witness,weren't you referring to it earlier, that particularly as far as food was concerned, you had given instructions which the workers had the benefit of, and aren't you in that way confirming my view, that you should bear entire responsibility for that sector?
A. Not in the least. I believe that I took the action of the last phase within my entire responsibility, but not the individual responsibility for that sector?
A. Not in the least. I believe that I took the action of the last phase within my entire responsibility, but not the individual responsibilities which I had.
Q. Then, Witness, you have spoken about the responsibility of the Gauleiters as Reich Defense Commissioners with reference to the armament industries. Could you describe in detail what the scope of that responsibility was, because I just didn't understand it?
A. Since 1942, to an ever increasing degree, the responsibility transferred to the Gauleiters as Reich Defense Commissioners. This was the intention which mostly Bormann represented.
Q. What tasks did they have.
A. Just a minute. He desired the centralization of all the forces of the State and the party in the Gaulieter. This state of affairs, the centralizing I mean, beginning in 1943, had almost been achieved in full, the only exception which still existed being my armament department, the so-called Armament Inspectorates, which, as they had previously come under the OKW, had remained military service departments which I had staffed, which, in turn, made it possible for me to remain outside the jurisdiction and influence on the part of the Gauleiters. But the Gauleiter was the central department in his Gau and he assumed the right to give orders if he didn't have them. The situation in our case was, as you very well know, that it wasn't a question of deciding who had the powers; it was a question of who would help themselves to the right to give orders.
Just a minute. And in this case most Gauleiters did assume the rights and powers, all of them, by which means they were the responsible and centralized departments.
Q What do you mean by "centralized departments"? Perhaps I may put something to you for a change. The Gauleiter, as Reich Defense Commissioner, only had the task of summarizing and centralizing certain authorities if a decision was necessary in the Gau. Take, for instance the case of an air attack, the removal of the damage, construction of a new plant, so that the various departments would be brought to one conference table, but he did not have orders or rights to decide, is that right?
A. No; I should like to recommend to you that you should talk to a few Gaul eiters who will tell you how it was.
Q. In that case, I will drop the question. I will read the law. Mr. Witness, then you went on to say that during a certain period there had been a surplus of labor in Germany.
Was this due to the fact that Sauckel had brought too many foreign workers into Germany?
A In this case there may be the possibility of an error. My defense counsel has pointed to two documents, according to which, during the time from April, '42 until April, '43, Sauckel had supplied more labor to the armament sector than armament had requested. Is that the passage you mean? workers than were required.
Q You don't want to say, therefore, that this had been brought about through the fact that Sauckel had brought too many workers in from foreign countries?
A No. I wanted to say by that answer that even according to Sauckel's opinion of the time and because of the demands to reach the top level that he was not caused, by these factors, to bring workers to Germany from France, because if, in a report to Hitler, he asserts that he had brought more workers to the Armament sector than I had demanded, which is what you can see from the letter, then it becomes clear that he has done more than I wanted him to do. The facts, however, were different. In fact, he didn't supply these workers at all, and we had quite a row because it was my opinion that he had supplied less and he had made a terrific report to Hitler; but of course during this trial the document is valid. of an argument between you and Sauckel regarding the question of whether there were sufficient labor reserves in Germany, and if I have understood you rightly, then you said that if workers were brought to work in the manner used by England and the Soviet Union, then one wouldn't have needed any foreign workers at all; is that true?
A No, I didn't say that.
Q Well then, hiw am I to understand it?
A I have expressed quite clearly enough that I consider Sauckel's policy, labor policy of bringing foreigners into Germany -- it was considered right by me.
I did not try to dodge that responsibility, but there were considerable reserves of German labor and there again is only proof for the fact that I wasn't responsible for the high level of the demands which were made, and that was all I wanted to prove. youth were used to a very considerable degree?
Q Do you also know that officers' wives or the wives of high officials also had to work in factories? speaking?
A I was talking about the period 1943. In 1943 I demanded, in the Central Planning Board, that the German labor reserve should be drawn upon, and in '44, during the 4th of January conversation, I said the same thing. Sauckel at that time stated in his speech, and his ppeech of the 1st of March, 1944, shows it, which I have submitted as a document, that there were no longer any reserves of German workers, but at the same time he also testified here that he had succeeded, in 1944, to still mobilize 2,000,000 workers from German sources, and that, according to the conference we had with Hitler on the 1st of January, 1944, appeared impossible to us. He himself has proved here that at a time when I desired the use of internal labor, he didn't think that this fact existed but that he was later forced, through circumstances in the blocked firms, to use and mobilize these workers from Germany after all; so that therefore my statement at the time was right.
Q. Mr. Witness, these two million workers you have mentioned, were they people who could he used in industry ?
Q Were they used directly as experts in industry ?
Q Didn't they first of all have to go through complicated transfers from one firm to the other which would make them free ? fine mechanical industry and other firms, and this is something which everyone knows who knows American and British industry, that the modern machines are perfectly suitable to be worked by women, even for serious and difficult work.
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal isn't interested in all these details, Dr. Servatius.
DR. SERVATIUS : Mr. President, a principal question in which I am very interested is whether there was a surplus of workers from foreign countries, and if, therefore, there wasn't any necessity for the state to got them. That question is of the greatest importance from the point of view of international law. That is the thing I wish to clarify.
THE PRESIDENT : Yes, you can put two more questions, but not on those details.
DR. SERVATIUS : No, it is something different. BY DR. SERVATIUS : Sauckel failed. Didn't you achieve that subordination in practice by the fact that on the medium of the center level Sauckel's department would have to do what your armament commission ordered ?
A No. I am afraid I shall have to go into broad detail before you can understand my answer.
Q But then you have said no, haven't you ? if my answer "no" is sufficient for you, splendid. clearly say no, that is enough.
Mr. Witness, one last question. You said that Sauckel had discussed and deciced the question of distributing labor within his labor staff. He, on the other hand, says that the Fuehrer had made certain decisions.
Mustn't one draw the dividing line between the considerable demands of a program where one is dealing with the distribution of labor for a lengthy period, and the distribution which was carried out currently, taking into consideration the demands of the program of the time ? of the Fuehrer conferences which I had, you must divide this question into two phases, one ending October 1942, during which there were frequent joint conferences with Hitler during which Sauckel and I were present. During these conferences, the distribution of labor was discussed with reference to the individual months in details. After that time, there were no longer further conferences with Hitler in my presence , which would go into detail. I merely know of the conference of January 1944, and then there was another conference in April or May 1944 which, however, I have mentioned. distribution in detail was then carried out in accordance with the directive by Sauckel.
Q But that is just what I am asking you. These were demands based on a program. They were principle decisions, saying, for instance, "Two million workers will have to be got from foreign countries," and then the subsequent distribution was carried out by Sauckel.
A Yes, that's right, and I can go on to confirm Sauckel's testimony, saying that he always got his orders from Hitler with reference to the occupied territories, since he needed Hitler's authority to assort Himself in foreign territory.
DR. SERVATIUS : In that case, Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 21 June 1946 at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Do any other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions? BY DR. KRAUS: (Counsel for the defendant Schacht)
Q Mr. Witness, on the 25th of January 1946 you gave two statements to my client in the prison here at Nurnberg. During his examination, Dr. Schacht has referred to those two statements very briefly, and I should like to have the Tribunal's permission, in order to make this brief, to be allowed to read the statement which the defendant gave on that day so that I can have it confirmed, that the statement is correct. They are very brief. The first statement reads as follows:
"I was on the terrace of the Berghof at the Obersalzberg and I was waiting to submit my constructional plans--this was in the summer of 1937--when Schacht appeared at the Berghof. I heard a loud argument on the terrace, taking place between Hitler and Schacht in Hitler's room. Hitler's voice increased to maximum volume. At the end of the discussion, Hitler came out on the terrace and, visibly excited, he told his entourage that he could not collaborate with Schacht, that he had had a terrific argument with him, and that with his methods of financing, Schacht was disturbing his plans."
New, this is the first statement. Is it correctly represented? July. The statement says:
"It was on the 22nd of July that Hitler said in my presence"--
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) What year?
DR. KRAUS: 1944, your Lordship.