A. Mr. Hitler explained to me at that time that the shooting of Bose was first of all -
Q. No, I asked first of all about yourself. I asked did you believe for a moment that Jung had been guilty of treason against the Reich or of a plot against Hitler ?
A. No, certainly not.
Q. Well now, you knew very well that Hitler was worried from the point of view of foreign opinion as to publicity being given to the effect of a break between you and him, did you not ? of the German Reich and, as you have told us, a Catholic of old family with great position amongst the Catholic population -- the support of someone of that Kind would be of great value to him after this blood purge which had cause foreign opinion to be very disturbed, did you not ? You knew that ?
A. No, it appears to me from these letters that I continually requested Herr Hitler to ascertain why and for what reasons these actions were taken against my associates and myself. I want to tell this to the world.
Q. Her von Papen, if you, as an ex-Chancellor of the Reich and, as you said yourself, one of the leading Catholic layman of Germany, an ex-officer of the Imperial Army, had said at that time -- "I am not going to be associated with murder, cold-blooded murder as an instrument of policy" -- you migth at some risk to yourself have brought down the whole of this rotten regime, might you not ?
A. That is possible but had I said it publicly then quite probably I would have disappeared somewhere just as my associates did. And apart from that, the world knew from my resignation that I did not wish to identify myself with this affair.
Q. Just let us see what you were writing. If you look at 717 which will become GB-500, that emphasizes the importance that Hitler was attaching to your adherence. If you will look at the second paragraph -- I will read it, it is quite short. You say:
"I hope you have received my letter of yesterday's date and that you received it in the spirit in which it was intended.
"Today I ask you, for *---*al reasons, to excuse me from participating in the session of the Reichs *---* Yesterday you were indeed of the opinion that my staying away might create the impression that there are we disagreement between us. But this impression can surely not exist, if, during your speech, You refer to the case of the Vice-Chancellory in the form in which you promised me you would.
"During all these days I have behaved with the greatest possible reserve towards the outside and have shown self as little as possible, and you will surely understand my not wanting to appear in public again until every shadow has been removed from me.
"I have also asked the chairman of the Party representative in the Reichstag to excuse my staying away."
Who is the chairman of the Party representative ? Is that the chairman of the Nazi Party representative ?
A No, I believe the Chairman of the Party was Dr. Frick.
Q It was the Government Party, was it?
A Yes. The letter shows that I requested Hitler to make a statement before the Reichstag justifying it, dealing with the matters that had been taken against my associates. from your loyalty towards him; that is what you wanted, wasn't it will become GB 501, and see what you say the next day.
"Dear Chancellor: After you last night gave the nation and the world your great account of the internal developments which led up to 30 June, I feel the need to shake your hand, as I did on 30 January 1933, and to thank you for all you have given anew to the German nation, by crushing the intended second revolution and by announcing irrevocable and statesmanlike principles. painful, tragic circumstances have prevented me for the first time since 30 January from appearing at your side. You yourself excused me and showed understanding for the fact that a ViceChancellor cannot take his seat on the Ministerial Bench as long as he finds himself subjected to special treatment. (My confiscated files have still not been returned to me, in spite of Goering's and your own orders.)
"Your statements have clearly shown that any suspicion of a connection between my person and the treasonable goings-on was an intentional libel and calumniation. I thank you for stating this." the penultimate paragraph you say, "I should, therefore, be grateful if you could on some occasion point out positively that up to today--" that was 14 July-"up to today I have loyally stood by and fought for yourself, your leadership, and your work for Germany."
that all that you wanted was your loyalty to the regime to be made clear to the world? It was not worrying you at all that von Schleicher and his wife and von Bose and Jung and all these other people had been murdered by the government of the Reich; otherwise, why did you write a letter like that? cause I was still being accused of agreeing with the attempts on the lives of Goebbels and Goering and various other conspiracies. That is the reason why I am trying to have Chancellor Hitler state that I was not involved in this conspiracy against him during the various actions that occurred during the revolt. of course, to begin with, I am dealing in this letter with my position and the position of my associates. The re-establishment of Schleicher's honor was a task for the army, not for me. But at the moment, you see, what I am putting to you is this: That even after you knew that your own friends had been murdered, to say nothing of your old colleagues, your own friends had been murdered, you again and again protest your loyalty and the fact that you had always worked and cooperated with Hitler in all his work. Was that honest? Is want is contained in these letters honest, or do you say they were just lies in order to protect yourself? against me, the attempted murder by Himmler, the fact that I was locked up, were all based upon the supposition that I had participated in a conspiracy against Hitler's government. It had to be made certain, first of all, that as long as I was a member of this government, I had acted loyally to them. That is the reason why I am asking for that statement to be made. tions, putting an interrogatory to Baron von Lersner? It is Number 2(a) on page 212 of Defense Document Book 3. Question 2(a) "Did the defendant von Papen, through the impregnation of conservative ideas, continue o hope to change Hitler's policy to hiw own way of thinking until the murders taking place on 30 June 1934 and Hitler's approval of them had convinced him that his efforts and his hopes had been in vain?
question.
THE PRESIDENT: Which question was that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 2(a) on page 212.
THE PRESIDENT: It is not in our copy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I'm sorry-
THE PRESIDENT: 2(h).
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I'm so sorry. It is my fault entirely. It is rather blurred, and I thought it was an "a". I am greatly obliged. I read the question correctly as 2(a). BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q Does that correctly express your point of view-- "until the murders taking place on 30 June 1934 and Hitler's approval of them had convinced him--" That is you--that your efforts and your hopes had been in vain? Do you agree with that? It is an interrogatory put by your own learned Counsel. expressing this fulsome admiration of Hitler? rogatory is the question I wanted to put to the witness. The answers which I wished to have are these-It is one of the best examples of a leading question I have ever seen. You say that your interrogatory expresses your view, don't you?
A Yes. May I tell you something? This opinion was that with the 30th of June it became apparent that further cooperation with Hitler was no longer possible and that, therefore, the coali tion program which had been agreed upon between us had collapsed.
admiration and that you have cooperated:
"I remain loyally devoted to you and your work for Germany'' tions of your faith had been shaken, why do you write that you remain loyally devoted to Hitler's work for Germany? that, in spite of the collapse of the interior situation, Hitler would at least in foreign political sectors retain a reasonable policy. He was there; I could not remove him. We had to reckon with Hitler and his government. All these gentlemen continued to collaborate, and I was the only one who stopped out. All these letters with which you are trying to prove I am insincere or that I am not truthful, or, as you call it, that I am a liar and a deceiver, are not removing from world the fact that I resigned at that time.
Q And you took another job within eleven days. Eleven days after the last letter you had taken the job of representing this-- Well, I won't way a gang of murderers-- This government which had adopted murder as an instrument of policy, as plenipotentiary to Austria, within eleven days of your last letter.
Let's just see whether the murder motif did not come into that. Did you think that Hitler had been behind the July putsch in Austria which had resulted in the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss to lead the Austrian Nazi Party, was in connection with this affair, at any rate. That Herr Hitler himself could have approved this act, that was not known to me. been behind the July putsch? with the July putsch.
Q Did you think that Dr. Ried--if I have his name--yes Ried, the German Ambassador in Vienna--did you think that he had been behind the putsch?
A No, I know only that Dr. Ried had negotiated with the Austrian government.
Q You did not know that Hitler had been behind it. You deny that the German Foreign Office had been behind it. You did not know that Dr. Ried had been behind it. Just look at page 98 of document book 11-A. It is pages 79 and 80 of the German book.
This is a report, your report a year later. I am taking it slightly out of time because of this sentence where you recapitulate the facts, and if you will look at the paragraph--I think it is the last paragraph on page 79 in the German text.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is the second last paragraph on page 96 in the document book 11-A.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q "The hope that the personal conversation between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and the Head of the Italian State at Stresa would lead to a settlement of German-Italian differences has been changed into the exact opposite by the threatening attitude taken up by Mussolini after the assassination of his friend Dollfuss and by the partial mobilization of Italian Corps on the Brenner. It became apparent that the attempt to re-establish normal and friendly relations by sending me to Vienna was not an easy task after what had happened previously. Mistrust of the forcible methods of the Austrian NSDAP"-now look at the next words -- "influenced, as it became more and more apparent from the past trials, by leading Reich-German personalities, was too strong. The impression caused by the terrorist methods and the death of the Bundeskauslor was too lasting in the widest circles." personalities to whom you were referring as supporting the putsch in July 1934 and the murder of Dollfuss? Who were they?
A By no means the former German Ambassador to Vienna, Mr. Ried, but, exclusively, Herr Habicht and the persons who were subordinate,who, at the time, were running the Austrian Nazi policy. methods of force employed by the Austrian Nazis had become more and more apparent from past trials, which is a knowledge which we acquired later, not at the time when I was given the task.
Q What I want to know is this. My question was: Who were the leading German personalities? You are not going to tell the Tribunal that Habicht, who was a laison man with the NSDAP in Austria, was a leading German Reich personality. Who were they? You are not going to say that Austrian Nazis were leading Reich German personalities. Who were they? Who were the leading German personalities that you were talking about?
A The leading personality was no doubt Herr Habicht. But this letter, Mr. Prosecutor, was written to tell Hitler: "Here, look; see what you have done."
on which they will judge your veracity, that by a leading Reich German personality you mean Herr Habicht, and you have no one else in mind although you use the plural? Is that what you want the Tribunal to understand? I don't know if you remember, defendant -- just think of it before you answer -but General Glaise-Horstenau could not even remember Habicht's name when he was giving his evidence.
You can't seriously mean that you meant a liaison agent with the Austrian NSDAP when you referred to prominent Reich German personalities. Surely you can do better than that.
A Mr. Prosecutor, Herr Habicht was not an agent. Herr Habicht had been nominated by Hitler as the leader of the Party in Austria, so I am surely justified in calling him a loading personality. If Herr Hitler himself had knowledge of these matters at that time, then when reading my letter he would have known what I was hinting at. would, he is only one man. Who were the others? You referred to Reich German personalities. Who were the other people who had been behind this putsch and this murder? have now passed, I can no longer remember which people I might have had in mind when I wrote that. At any rate,it was the purpose of the letter -- and you will appreciate this -- to tell Hitler that the methods which had been employed were doing more damage and were much more incredible than we knew at the time.
Q Well, I will accept it. We will go on from the point that you knew there were some unsepcified, prominent Reich German personalities who had been behind the murder of Dollfuss.
Now, advancing from that, let's consider what you say with regard to Mr. Messersmith. As I understand it, you deny -- if I may say so, with some vigor -- what Mr. Messersmith says regarding you. Therefore, let's just look at what he says and see how much of it you can seriously suggest is not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think I gave your Lordship the references yesterday. The reference to the affidavit, 1760-PS, is document book 11, and page 22 is the relevant part. The other affidavit, 2385-PS, is 11-A, page 24. This is rather shorter. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: 1760-PS, and I think it begins on page 3. I want you to come to the bit in the affidavit -- and I am afraid I can't give you the exact German place -- where he deals with yourself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: It is page 22, My Lord.
Q (Continuing) The paragraph begins: "That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to no by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister."
Have you got the passage, defendant?
A Page 12?
A Yes, page 12; I have it.
Q Look and see if you can find the paragraph that begins; "That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to me by Franz von Papen."
Can you find that? It is about the middle of the page.
Q How, if you look down a few lines in Mr. Messersmith's statement, he says:
"When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation he greeted me with: 'Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation.' In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step.
He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and Southeast. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a Good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic."
Then Mr. Messersmith says that he told you that he was shocked, and that you merely smiled and said that of course this conversation was between you and Mr. Messersmith, and you would not talk so clearly to other people.
Then he says: "I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives." Mr. Messersmith. Apart from whether you said to Mr. Messersmith or not, do you deny that these were your aims and intentions?
A Yes; I absolutely deny that my purposes and aims had been those which Mr. Messersmith is describing in his affidavit here.
Q. Now I just want to take these quickly. Would you just refer back to the document you were looking at a short time ago, which is document 2248-PS.
That is page 96, My Lord. It starts there, in 11-A, and I want to pass on to page 97. That is page 81 of the German book. beginning of page 81 of the German text.
"The great historical speech of the Fuehrer on the 21st of May of this year, and later the Naval Treaty, caused a strong detente in the field of foreign policy with regard to England. But the clear and final definition of the attitude of National Socialism to the Soviet Russian doctrine of the State naturally redoubled France-Russian attempts to cripple us in the East and Souteast without at the same time achieving a detente in the other direction by clearly renouncing the annexation or incorporation of Austria.
"Any attempt at a commercial and, even more so, at a political offensive by the newly formed Third Reich in the direction of Southeastern Europe must inevitably come up against a front formed bythe whole of Europe" offensive in the direction of Southeastern Europe? Had you discussed that with the defendant von Neurath?
Q Do you think you spoke for yourself?
A Yes, of course. I am making a negative assertion, Sir David, namely that a crippling in the Far Eastern theater would have a considerable effect on the entire Far Eastern situation. at the moment. I can merely draw your attention to matters. All that I am asking you is whether you had gotten that idea from, say, the foreign minister, or whether it was your own idea. You say it is your own idea.
Q Page 28. There is a paragraph -- My Lord, it is the same Page, 97, in the English version -- you go on to say.
"This realistic survey of the European constellation shows immediately that the German-Austrian problem cannot, at least in the near future, be successfully approached from the direction of foreign politics. We must for the time being be content with not allowing Austria's international status to deteriorate for a later solution. In this connection the danger of a non-intervention pact with bi-lateral treaty of assurance seems to be successfully avoided. The maturing of a solution was and still regains dependent on nothing but the state of German-Austrian relations". that there should only be a revolutionary solution of Austria based on Austria's will? Why were you afraid of a non-intervention pact which would bind the Reich to not interfering in Austria?
A For a very simple reason. All political combinations which the political opponents were making at the time had only one end, that Austria should remain within the constellation, a situation which made it impossible to advance the thought of the Anschluss. For that reason, it had to be our natural political aim, and remain it, that the international status of Austria should not deteriorate, as I have expressed it here.
Q Yes. That is the answer which I thought you would have to give. Now, just look at Page 83, which is in the very next paragraph:
"The German nation has for centuries had to pursue a real path of suffering, to secure its unity. With the dawn of National-Socialism and the founding of the Third Reich by the final overthrew of all State Particularism, a unique and never to be repeated opportunity seemed to be given to complete Bismarck's work and to bring the problem of the relations between Germany and Austria nearer to a solution, as a dynamic result of internal events in Germany". of this man's work, because I hope we shall not disagree about ancient history, whatever we do about the ether. As I understand your view is that this Bismarck's setting up the German Empire in 1881 was merely an attempt at a solution which left the Hapsburg empire separated from Germany, and the final completion of his were was that the old Hapsburg dominions should be brought back with the spates which had been in the Holy Roman Empire Is that roughly the truth?
A Quite right; not allthe Hapsburg dominions, but the German share of Austria.
Q The original Hapsburg domains?
QQuite right. I hope I am putting it objectively enough. of the relations between Germany and Austria should be brought about by a "dynamic result of internal events in Germany"? What did you mean by that?
By that I mean the following. Never in Germany's history had it happened that a large party which Germany united had also gained support in Austria. That was a unique historical event, And I wish to state that the type of movement in the two countries which was urging unity showed promise for a solution.
Q You see, Defendant, the difficulty that I want you to explain is thi* How do you square an approval of centralizing in Germany with a Nazi government whose unscrupulous message you then know them after the affairs from the 30th of June, 1934 -- how do you square an unscrupulous centralized Germany with an evolutionary solution of the Austrian problem?
That is what that paragraph is saying, you know. What I am suggesting is that it means a much simpler thing than you have told us. It means that you were out to get an annexation of Austria at the earliest opportunity under the National Socialist Reich.
A Yes. Of course, I had to reckon with the existing circumstances, and I did reckon with them, as any realistic politician would. I wanted to attempt with the help of the factors which were available, to come to a solution in the national system in both countries. But I see no contradiction, Sir David. You are saying, how could I achieve my centralizing. But if you would be good enough to lock at the end of this report, then you will find that Hitler pronounced this as a decentralization. what you meant by the expression "dynamic result of internal events in Germany". In short, I want you to realize, defendant -- I am not going to argue with you, because I ought not to -- the first point of Mr. Messersmith was a question of this action in Southeastern Europe. The second point is that Austria was the first line, the first thing to be dealt with. Now, I wonder if you will be good enough to take the same bundle and turn over to Page 106 which is a report of your own, dated the 18th of October, 1935. I want you to deal with Mr. Messersmith's third suggestion against you, which you deny, that you were going to work in Austria by a weakening of the Regime. into your mind. The report that I am dealing with is on the 18th of October 1935. You are dealing with the Austrian government re-shuffle, and you are saying -- My Lord, this is a now document. It is BG 502. It is in 11-A, Page 106. It begins:
"Yesterday's cabinet re-shuffle resembles a bloodless insurrection by Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr. It becomes clear that Minister Fey heard early of his intended dismissal and that already yesterday afternoon he had the public buildings in Vienna occupied by the Viennese Heimwehr, which is loyal to him. The government countered this measure by simultaneously reinforcing the occupation by police."
Now you go on to discuss the matter. That is at the beginning of the report. Then, if you turn to the next page, and refer about half way down the page, you say this:
"In spite of the Vice-Chancellor's clear victory and of the diligent efforts of the Austria Press to make it appear plausible that the cabinet re-shuffle was carried out for reasons of internal consolidation, the feeling of moving towards completely uncertain developments prevails among the Austrian public, including the Heimwehr circles.
"From our point of viewthe change of affairs is only too welcome. Every now weakening of the system is of advantages, even if it at first seems in fact to be directed against us. The fronts are starting to move and it will have to be our task to keep them moving." that so long as there is political uncertainty or political trouble in the Austrian state, it does not matter whether the move may be an anti-German one so long as the struggle grows with distrust spreading. That was an advantage to Germany, and that is what you want ? That is what these lines mean , is it not ?
Q Not quite ?
A If I may, I should like to give you an explanation. Here in this report we are concerned with the Austrian government and the influence of Prince Starhemberg and the Home Guard. Here Starhemberg and the Home Guard had allied with Mussolini against the German Reich. A loosening up of that inner-political front which was working against the interests of a joining together could only be advantageous, in the light of my policy.
Q But what I do not understand as this. You see, you have said, "In spite of the Vice-Chancellor's clear victory and of the diligent efforts of the Austrian Press ..." And you go on to say, "Every now weakening of the system is of advantages". You see, Prince Starhemberg and the Italian party, according to you, had von, because you say "In spite of"... this... "clear victory".
Then you say, "Every now weakening of the system". That could not be Starhemberg's alliance because that had been successful.
By "the system" you mean the government's of Austria, do you not ? You cannot mean anything else.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, perhaps I should not continue the argument. But it is a somewhat complicated subject.
THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: I was thinking that you should perhaps draw attention to the few remaining sentences.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Yes, I think you should perhaps draw his attention to the remaining sentences.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, My Lord, certainly I will read on: "The continuation of negotiations for compensation which had renounced since the Geneva declaration seems to be entirely superfluous for the time being. It will be a good thing to strengthen the increasingly excited public feeling against the Italian trend by clever and tactful handling via the press without, however, giving the Government justifiable cause for having recourse to the desperate measure of starting a new propaganda campaign against us. I would be very grateful if the Reich Minister for Propaganda were to put a few experienced journalists into this work. For the rest, we can confidentially leave further developments to sort themselves out in the near future and I am convinced that the shifting of powers on the European chess board will permit us in the not too distant future to take up actively the question of influencing the southeastern areas."
Extraordinary -- if I may say so -- extraordinary how Mr. Messersmith had got your ideas if you had never had this conversation with him, wasn't it?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this ti me.
THE WITNESS: But may we come back to that question tomorrow?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 19 June 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that defendant von Neurath is absent. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE:
Q Just before we leave Mr. Messersmith, defendant, I want to ask you thre questions about the other countries in Southeastern Europe that Mr. Messersmith mentioned. Did you know that the German Foreign Office financed and directed the Henlein movement among the Sudetendeutsche?
A I do not believe that I learned of that at that time. In 1935 when thi report was written, the Sudeten German question was not an actual problem.
Q When did you larn about it?
Q I see. Did you know that the Reich was supporting M. Codrianu and the Iron Guard in Rumania?
Q You learned that sometime later than 1935, did you? when did you learn that?
A I cannot say; but I believe that these events of the Iron Guard in Rumania were about in 1937. I could be mistaken, but I believe so.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think perhaps you have the microphone a little too near you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: If your Lordship please, I am sorry. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: ited by the defendant Kaltenbrunner as being a possible person to do the same thing in Hungary, to arrange for Hungary's acquisition by the Reich, doing the internal work inside Hungary in order that Hungary should be acquired: did you know that?
A No. In the first place, I did not know it, and in the second place, may I say this? This is such an impossible idea. I was a close friend of the regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy.
In my interrogatory to Admiral Horty I asked him a question which he unfortunately did not answer because he did not remember. It says that in the fall of 1943 the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, KerestyFischer; handed in a document which showed that German or German Hungarian for wanted to bring about an incorporation of Hungary through a revolt. At the wis of Horty, I turned this document over to Mr von Ribbentrop and asked him to ta the necessary measures against it. That is all set down in the document, and the Hungarian minister of the interior will be able to confirm it.
Q You See my point. I do not mind whether you would have taken it or not The point that I am putting is that you were the choice. Don't you know that? You know the document I am referring to, D-679, with many comments by Kaltenbr in which you were discussed as being the possible person to do the internal we in Hungary.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, it is Page 78 of Document Book 11-A,GB BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: submitted it here.
Q I will not trouble you with it if you only learned it here. The only point I want to know is this. Did you know in 1944 that you were being suggest in a German state document as being the person who might do the internal work Hungary in order that Hungary might be acquired by the Reich. If you say you d not know, I shall not trouble you with it any further. Yuo say you only knew t* since the day before yesterday? opposed these efforts in Hungary which attempted in anyway to lead to occupati or to make Hungary a part of the German Reich. I considered that the most mist and most inconceivable policy possible. will come to another point.
You remember Gauleiter Reiner, the gentleman with whom you had the fortit* tous, and I am sure very interesting talk, on the eve of the Anschluss, Dr. Reiner, the witness? I would just like you to look at Dr. Reiner's view of the position when you took over, and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with that.