I had a *ong struggle to have this man removed.
Q What did you do during that time regarding church matters? my position with respect to the Church. That means that I took all such institutions in Turkey under my personal protection.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 53, Page 141 and Document 51, Page 138. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: period in Turkey? Jews. A long party trial took place because German members of my embassy had consulted a Jewish doctor. I defended these officials of mine against this charge, and I refused to take the passports from the German Jews in Turke* and to deprive them of their citizenship.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 95, Page 227. This is the interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. In questions 4, 5, and 6 it discusses this problem. The answer to Question 6, the last paragraph, is so noteworthy; yet, on the other hand, the witness von Papen has not yet mention it.
I should like to quote it. Page 229, the last paragraph of the answer to Question 6: "I remember particularly clearly an incident in spring of 1944, when I called upon von Papen at the request of Herr Barlas, the Refugee's Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, in order to request his assistance in saving 10,000 Jews in France from deportation to Poland for extermination.
There Jews had formerly held Turkish nationality which they had later renounced. Herr von Papen complied with my wish and through is intervention the lives of these Jews were saved, which I learned a short time later from Mr. Barlas himself."
I continue: "Details of this incident, with which Mr. Steinhardt, then United States Ambassador in Ankara, Mr. Numan Menemencioglo, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, were acquainted, can be obtained by questioning Herr Baslas."
THE PRESIDENT: I would like to point out to you again, Dr. Kubuschok, that you have taken very much longer than you said you were going to take.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a very few minutes I will be finished, Mr. President. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q I ask the last question. When, on the 2nd of August, 1944, Turkey broke off relations with German, why did you return to Germany? Why did you not remain in Turkey and why did you not separate finally from Germany? and Germany were broken off, the English Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, said the following in the House of Commons: "The breaking off of relations between Turkey and Germany will have many consequences, including consequences for Mr. von Papen. On the 30th of June he escaped the blood bath. This time he will not succeed."As a result, I received requests from the Allies to remain in Turkey. I refused to do so. I said: "I shall return to Germany where I belong. I will not emigrate. Perhaps It will still be possible to do something for my Fatherland." And so I returned to Germany. When I arrived there I observed that, as a result of the terror methods which had been launched after the 20th of July, there was no possibility to do anything at all. For the rest of the time a Gestapo guard was placed before my door.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 95, Page226, which has already been mentioned, the interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. I refer to the answer to Question 3. I should like very briefly to read the last half of this answer in connection with the problem just mentioned by the witness: "The last conversation on this subject took place on the 2nd of August, 1944, on the eve of his final departure from Ankara after the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Germany and Turkey. To my advice not to leave Turkey and to address an appeal from here to the German people and the German Army to overthrow Hitler and discontinue the senseless war, von Papen answered in substance as follows: ' I have learned from history that dictatorships cannot be done away with from within a foreign country; one must be in the country itself in order to fight the regime effectively. I have therefore determined to return to Germany and there to conduct the fight against the Hitler regime and thereby hasten the end of the war. "
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of defense counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Dr. von Leudinghausen, for the defendant von Neurath? BY DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Papen, I should like to ask you a few questions, with the permission of the Court. Since when have you known von Neurath? von Hindenburg, that Mr. von Neurath wasto be taken into your government as Reich Foreign Minister, your government which you formed in 1932?
Q Did you know, from the previous activity of Mr. von Neurath in his various positions, as ambassador, specifically, that in his last position in London, Mr. von Neurath was a follower, one of the most prominent representatives of a peaceful policy?
Q Did you yourself approve this peace policy?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little too fist. Go on.
Q Did you yourself approve of this peace policy?
A Of course I approved this policy. Otherwise, we could not have been working together in this cabinet.
Q Did Mr. von Neurath, a few months later, take any part in the negotiations for the transfer of the Reich Chancelleryship to Hitler? dition that Mr. von Neurath was to be retained as Reich Foreign Minister in the new Hitler government? of Hindenburg.
Q And what was Hitler's attitude? Did he accept this condition only in order to be able to form the government or did he approve Hindenburg's choice? Minister.
Q Did you yourself ever talk to Hitler about this? fidence -- that he thought highly of Mr. von Neurath's experience.
Q And did you ever speak to Mr. von Neurath about it?
Q Was he ready to do this? Was he willing to do this or not? I imagine that Mr. von Neurath shared my inner reservations. what were the foreign political aims and efforts of Hitler?
A Hitler's foreign political aims at that time were quite limited, abolition of discrimination by peaceful means add strengthening of the German position in the world. dicatijg that he might be determined to use arms if his peaceful efforts did not have the desired result?
A I never heard from Hitler of any such intentions.
Q Was it always asserted in leading party circles? Were such bloody intentions expressed?
A I never learned that, in the Party. Even the most radical National Socialists ever spoke of the idea of a war. the peaceful policy of von Neurath?
Q Now, Mr. Von Neurath is charged with cooperating in the rearmament of Germany. What was the reason and the motive of Hitler for this rearmament?
had resigned from the cabinet. Butas far as I am informed, all of my former colleagues held the view that rearmament would only have the purpose of giving Germany defensive protection along her borders.
Q Now I come to the problem of Austria. Do you know the attitude of Mr. von Neurath on the Austrian problem?
A The position of Mr. von Neurath in the Austrian problem was the same as my position, and like myself he constantly protested in the cabinet against the terror measures instituted by the Party in 33 and 34. to Vienna, under von Neurath? Did you receive instructions from him or only from Hitler?
A I was not subordinate to Mr. von Neurath. I had asked that I might be directly under Hitler, but of course I reported to Mr. von Neurath and the Foreign Office about all steps which I took,as is shown by the documents submitted here.
Q What was the attitude of Mr. von Neurath toward the negotiations in the summer of 36 which led to the treaty of the 25th of July between Germany and Austria?
A The 11th of July. Mr. von Neurath had exactly the same opinion is I, that this treaty was to and had to serve a final cause of peace between these two peoples.
Q Did he attempt to influence Hitler to this effect?
A I don't know, but I assume so.
Q And was he honest and upright in this treaty? What is your opinion? I point out that the Prosecution asserts and charges Mr. von Neurath that this treaty was concluded with a treacherous intention. against the charge of treacherous intention. Mr. von Neurath had such intentions as little as I did.
Do you know what attitude Mr. von Neurath held as to Germany's leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1933?
A Yes, I know that very well. Mr. von Neurath was of the opinion that it was advisable to leave the Disarmament Conference, but like me he was of the opinion that it was a mistake to leave the League of Nations. With his approval, as I told the court yesterday, I followed Hitler to Munich in order to persuade him not to leave the League of Nations.
DR. VON LUEDINHAUSEN: I have no more questions.
DR. SEIDL (Counsel for defendants Hess and Frank): With the approval of the court, I should like to represent Dr. Stahmer and ask questions on behalf of the defendant Goering. BY DR. SEIDL: your friend Ketteler in 1938, you applied to Goering because he was in charge of the Gestapo. Is it not a fact, and were you not aware of this fact, that from 1936 on, at the latest, the Gestapo was exclusively under Himmler, and was formerly under the Reich Minister of the Interior? Austria I did not know that fact. It has been established here, in any case, I had the feeling when I applied to Goering that he was in a position to defend me against the Gestapo, and after Hitler had refused to speak to me on this matter it was only natural that I should turn to him as the second man in German
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross examine?
Sir David, would you prefer to start after the adjournment?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I was thinking that I might have the documents arranged then and it might be more convenient forthe Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 5 minutes to 2.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am very much obliged, your Lordship.
(A recess was taken until 1355 hours).
(The hearing reconvened at 1355 hours, June 18, 1946.) BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: ember of last year that your present view was that Hitler was the greatest cro* that you had ever seen in your life?
A That is quite true. That was the opinion which I arrived at after I learned here of all the crimes.
Q Well, that was on the 19 September,1945. But I am more interested in your next answer. Wasn't that when you were asked when you made your mind up that Hitler was the greatest crook you had over seen in your life.
"Only after I have known the facts after which he statrted to go to war."
Do you remember saying that?
Q Was not that rather a long time for you to discover that somewhat obvi* truth after your close cooperation with Hitler?
A My opinion about Hitler and his inner political significance was compl* ely clear after the 30th June, 1934. But somewhat as all other human beings, I could assume in the field of foreign politics at least he would be sensible and I was of this opinion until after the Munich agreement.
Q Well now, just let us see whether you had not had an opportunity of fo* ing that view much earlier. When you were Reichschancellor in 1932 it was necessary for you to aquaint yourself with the personalities and aims and methods of the Nazi Party, was it not?
Q And you did so, did you not? but you may take it as an exact quotation -- that on the 16th of November, 1932 Hitler wrote to you and said:
"You must be aware of my attitude, the attitude of my Party."
a coalition with another party it has to eliminate a great deal of its program and form a coalition program. That was what Hitler did on the 30th of January. your view in 1932. You had very little doubt in 1932, during the period of your chancellorship that if Hitler got into power Germany was in danger of being ruled by violent and unconstitutional methods, had you not, if Hitler got into power? this connection but I explained in detail to the Court that when we came to this forcible solution of the 30th of January we incorporated a number of safeguards and drew up a joint coalition program which in our opinion eliminated the points of danger which you have mentioned. of 1932, that it would be most dangerous to put power into Hitler's hands, was it not? ing his power which the Tribunal will find in document book 11A on page 43. This will be GB 495. The number is 3309-PS.
This was after, in August 1932. According to Meissner:
"Hindenberg stated that because of the tense situation he could not in good conscience risk transferring the power of government to a new party, such as the National Socialists, which did not command a majority and which was intolerant, noisy and undisciplined."
That is a very moderate statement of the Reich President's views at that time, is it not? talking about if the National Socialists came into power themselves -- It was obvious to you that they had few scruples and would make short work of their political opponents, is that not so?
A One cannot say that. In political life it is always so that a radical party, any party, but particularly radical parties if they come to power and are made responsible have to eliminate much of their program.
For example, we saw that in the case of the Socialist Parties of all countries. told you in 1932 that whtever else the Nazis would do Hitler would not become a "vice" or second man; that he would oppose any political set-up which did not give him the first place?
Is that correct? opportunity to put their program and intentions into effect, did you not?
A No, I did not know that. That is a statement which you make here which does not correspond to the conditions at that time. You need only to consider the Government program of our coalition of the 1st of February. coalition of January the 30th. For the moment I am just asking you one or twe questions about your view of Hitler and Hindenberg's view of Hitler in 1532 because I want to take it by very quick but very clear statges.
I am still asking you about 1932. The question I put to you was: wanted and would only be content with a full opportunity of putting their program and intentions into effect? 1933 to bring them into a joint coalition program. that your views as to what was necessary for Germany in the second half of 1932 was an easing of the political differences and strife internally and an adjustment of relations with the western powers to ease the requirements of Versaille. I am trying to put it quite shortly as I understand it from you. That is right? to be vice-Chancellor in your Government in August 1932, was it not? ber 1932, is that not right?
the position correctly in paragraphs six and seven of his affidavit. I will summarize it for you and believe me I will be most pleased to read anything of which you have any doubt. He puts it in this way. That in November, 1932 you thought that the general situation and the Nazi Party, in particular, could be controlled if the President gave you the power to make decrees under Article 48 and you had the support of the Reichswehr and the police and at that time General von Schleicher disgreed because he thought that the Reichswehr was not capable of keeping order in Germany. Is that right? graph of the constitution but constitutes a breach of the constitution. Otherwise it is correct. control, is that what you mean?
A Yes. As I have said here on the first of December he gave this assignment to me. after you had failed to get Hitler into your government, you desired to rule by decree and by keeping control with the Reichswehr and General von Schleicher said that it could not be done?
A No, that is not true. After President von Hindenburg had decided that he did not want to break the constitution he appointed General von Schleicher Reichschancellor. At that time Mr. von Schleicher wanted to create a majority by splitting the party and , of course, I supported that attempt of Mr. von Schleicher.
Q Just in case it is any mistake of mine may I just give you Meissner's own words, It is paragraph 5, page 44 of the document book 11A. I think, defendant, it would be convenient for you to follow it if you do not mind so that there is no possibility of mistake.
Q It is paragraph 5 of Herr Meissner's statement.
"Papen's re-appointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg would have been probable if he had been prepared to take up an open fight against the National Socialists, which would have involved the threat or use of force.
Almosttup to the time of his resignation, Papen and some of the other ministers agreed on the necessity for pressing the fight against Nazis by employing all the resources of the State and relying on Article 48 of the Constitution, even if this might lead to armed conflict. Other ministers, however, believed that such a course would lead to civil war.
"The decision was provided by Schleicher, who in earlier times had recommended energetic action against the National socialists even if this meant the use of police and army. Now, in the decisive cabinet meeting, he abandoned this idea and declared himself for an understanding with Hitler."
Is that correct?
A In part it is correct, and it in part it is not correct.
A My re-appointment as Chancellor by Hindenburg, as Mr. Meissner says, would have been possible if I had been ready to wage an open battle against the Nazis. That is completely false historically. On 1 December I suggested to von Hindenburg to violate the constitution and wage open battle against the Nazi Party. Mr. von Schleicher contradicted that. That is the historical truth. graph 6 of the same document, about the second sentence: it begins :
"When it became clear that Hitler was not willing to enter Schleicher's cabinet and that Schleicher on his part was unable to split the NationalSocialist Party, as he had hoped to do with the help of Gregor-Strasser, the policy for which Schleicher had been appointed Chancellor was shipwrecked. Schleicher was aware that Hitler was particularly embittered against him because of his attempt to break up the Party, and would never agree to cooperate with him. So now he had changed his mind and decided to fight against the Nazis--which meant that he now wanted to pursue the policy which he had sharply opposed a few weeks before, when Papen had suggested it."
Is that right ?
Q Now, you see-- I want to get this position quite cleqr. You have told us that you had approached Hitler first in August; before you approached Hitler you had already legalized the position of the SA and the SS, which had been made illegal by Chancellor Bruening. You did that on 14 June, didn't you ? SA, the terror of the streets ? came about. The reason was to bring Hitler and his party to tolerate my cabinet. The second reason was that the prohibition against these formations was one-sided, if the Socialists' and communists' fighting formations were not also prohibited.
government, and get control of Prussia, and the Prussian police under your own hand ? of Prussia and the Prussian police under your own hands, had you not ?
A I did not have the Prussian police in my hands. The Reich Commissar for Prussia, whom I had appointed--a very moderate man-- now governed the police. to dictate all lines of broad policy, and the Commissar for Prussia and every other Minister had to take his broad policy from you; wasn't that right ?
AAfter I had appointed a commissar. I had the right to determine the general lines of policy for Prussia. made at Essan in November 1933, where you speak about this time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIVE : It is Document Book 11, page 54, and it is page 47 of the German document book. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE :
Q Now, you see the introductory words :
"Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of the national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have tried to support with all my strength the work of the National Socialist movement and its leader."
Is that true ?
Q I just asked you if it is true. I may come back to it again.
" Just as I at the time of taking over the chancellorship--" That is you taking over the chancellorship--'have advocated to pave the way to power for the young, fighting liberation movement."
fighting liberation movement to legalize the SA and to turn out the moderate government in Prussia and centralize the control of the police? Tell the Tribunal how you had paved the way to pow er for the young, fighting liberation movement, if it was not by doing that.
A Yes, I will say that very exactly . The program of the National Socialist arty provided for the liberation of Germany from the discriminations which had been imposed upon us by the Versailles Treaty. I have spoken here in detail about this. I have explained what efforts I made to obtain the cooperation of the big powers in this connection. We wanted to become a big power, from being a secondrate nation. you every opportunity of repeating what you said on that point, but I do want you to answer my question. If I am wrong in what I have put to you as the two things you had done to pave the way, just tell us quite shortly what else had you done to pave the wa y for this fighting liberation movement? That is the question. What had you done? the end of January 1933 there was no other way out, I formed a coalition at Hindenburg's request with the National Socialist Party. essary for Germany? in the government, had 36.8 per cent of all German votes in the presidential election, that that man and his party had to be included in the responsible government work. his personality, aims and program, was essential for Germany at that time?
A I do not know how a party which controlled 36.8 per cent of all German votes could be dealt with.
Q Look at your own words in the next paragraph of that letter. You do not seem to refer to merely electoral success.
"The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep distress a leader who will lead it through all diseases and weaknesses, through all crises and moments of danger with the assured instinct of a statesman into a happy future."
Thatwas, shall we say--we won't say extravagant, but, rather, strong language for an ex-cavalry officer to use of a political figure if he did not think or if he did not want other people to think that he firmly believed in him. Did you really mean what you are saying there?
A I may say the following. After I had formed the coalition with Hitler, I was convinced that he would keep this pact of coalition, and repeatedly--not only in this speech--I professed my allegiance to Hitler and to our joint program, and I have already told the Court precisely why I took his part in thisspeech. This was a question of stating before the whole world that Hitler's solemn undertaking to keep peace was meant weriously, which we all emphasized.
Q Well, now, I am not going to delay. You understand that what I am putting to you, defendant, is this: That during the early months of your chancellorship you took action and tried to get Hitler to come in with you. When he refused you for the second time, you then, according to Meissner, were prepared to use force against him. When that was refused to you through Schleicher, you resigned. When Schleicher took over and got into difficulties, you turned around to Hitler again. That is what I am putting to you, and it was at your request, was it not, that you and Hitler had the meeting at the house of Kurt von Schroeder on 4 January 1933?
A No, that is a completely false conception. Unfortunately, the Court did not permit me to tell of this meeting on 4 January. request that the meeting took place?
A Yes, I am of an entirely different opinion. This meeting took place at the-
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask him to tell us about that meeting on 4 January?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, certainly; I am going to deal with it.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Well, now, do you say that Hitler asked for the meeting? I am suggesting to you, you see, that von Schroeder, who was the intermediary, says that you asked for the meeting. Do you disagree with that?
A Yes, I am of an entirely different opinion. What Mr. Schroeder says doesnot correspond to the facts.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I object to the use of this Schroeder affidavit. The document was to be submitted by the Prosecution. I asked that the witness be called. The Court asked the Prosecution to bring the witness. The Prosecution did not call him. Now, in cross-examination, the affidavit is to be used. I do not believe that that is permissible. The decision of the Court would be crossed. The Court decided to use the witness. Now it is being used without the witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is quite true. I should submit that it is a different matter, using it in cross-examination, when Dr. Kubuschok has put it in, as part of his own evidence, evidence from Schulthess' Calendar of European History, an account of this very meeting, which you will find in Volume 1, page 27, of his document book.
If evidence of this kind has been put in a document book, surely, then, I am entitled to challenge that evidence in cross-examination by the affidavit of von Schroeder.
My Lord, I an sorry, I should have gone further. My friend has put in an actual statement from Baron von Schroeder, which appears on page 26. He says that, at the same time, Baron von Schroeder handed the following declaration to the County Bureau to correct the false press news. "The initiative for bringing about a discussion between former Reich Chancellor von Papen, as the representative of the widest national conservative circles, and Herr Hitler, as the sole leader of the National Socialist movement, emanated exclusively from me personally". von Schroeder has been put in, I am entitled to challenge that with another statement of von Schroeder.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I say something, Mr. President?
There are two entirely different things here. Sir David is referring to a document from Schulthess' Calendar of History. That is a joint communique of Papen and Schroeder, which was published in the papers at that time. I object, however, to an affidavit of the witness Schroeder, and I pointed it out at the time. The prosecution could see, at that time, that Schroeder was a suspected person under the indictment, and that he himself was concerned in the matter to such an extent that producing an affidavit would be possible only if we had an opportunity to question von Schroeder here. documents from a historical calendar of Schulthess. These docu ments,,in agreement with the prosecution, were accepted by the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, can't you put the facts without relying on the document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I can quite easily, My Lord; I will do that. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. At this meeting, defendant, didn't you suggest-- I art sorry, I apologize. I think we should have gotten the surroundings. First we will get where it was and who were there.
It was in Baron von Schroeder's house in Cologne, I think, or his flat in Cologne; isn't that right?
A. Yes, but no friend of mine.
Q. Now, the people who were in the house--and I will come to who were present at the meeting: Hitler's party was himself, the defendant Hess, Himmler, and Keppler, was it not?
A. That is possible, yes.
Q. Keppler is the gentleman of whom the Tribunal have heard as being in Vienna in March of 1938, isn't that so?
A. He was the man who was always in Hitler's entourage.
Q. Now, the actual discussion took place between you and Hitler, with von Schroeder present. Isn't that so?
A. No. Perhaps I may sketch this meeting to the court, according to their wish.
Q. Well, I think it is easier to put the facts to you. I will take them quite shortly. I am in the hands of the Tribunal.
Do you say that von Schroeder was not present?
A. Schroeder nay have been present at parts of the talk. I recall that in the main I talked to Hitler alone.
Q. The meeting started at about 11:30 in the morning, did it not? The meeting between you and Hitler?
A. Yes.
Q. And the first point that you raised was to explain to Hitler that although you had not been able to release the two Nazis who had been condemned for killing a Communist, you had tried to get President vonHindenburg to pardon them.
Isn't that right?
A. I recall that Hitler reproached me because of the death sentence against these National Socialists.
Q. And the second point that you raised as an explanation to Hitler was that it was not through any intrigue or machinations of yours that President von Hindenburg had refused to discuss with Hitler the question of Hitler being Chancellor. Wasn't that the second point, it wasn't you who had caused von Hindenburg to refuse the discussion?
A. Yes. I explained to him that my offer of the 13th of August, 1932, to him had been meant absolutely honestly.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that was an answer to your question.