THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendant Hess is not present in this session. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Please, will you continue.
A. In finishing off the first question, I was merely going to remark that I succeeded in having the body of my friend Bose properly buried and that on that occasion at his grave, I spoke words during which I emphasized that one day the same justice which had been the cause of that murder would be reestablished.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As far as this is concerned, I draw your attention to document No. 14 on page 62 and page 63. It is an affidavit of Maria Rose, who for years had been the private secretary of the witness. This is on page 63 and there she refers to the funeral services of Bose which we just discussed. I further refer to document No. 19 on pages 77 and 78. It is an affidavit from Schaffgotsch who is particularly referring in detail to the attempts of the witness to go and visit Neudeck and President Hindenburg. This last one was document No. 19 on pages 77 and 78. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, at that time you were offered the position to the Vatican, the post, I mean, of Ambassador to the Holy City. Please, will you tell us what the circumstances were?
A. It is true that Hitler tried to continue to tie me to him and that for about eight days after the incidents which I had described, he sent Secretary of State Lammers to me, who asked me on his behalf whether I was prepared to accept the position of Ambassador to the Vatican. Of course, I refused, and I am merely mentioning it here because a few weeks later I accepted this post in Vienna for an entirely different reason and to prove thi* to prove that I was not interested just in obtaining a job, I refused Hitler's request bluntly at the time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to document No. 18, on pages 75 and 76 of the document beek. It is an affidavit from Marth von Papen, the wife of the witness, who is describing the visit Lammers paid them.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is quite true. There are these different languages. One is in German and then it is in French -- pages 75 and 76.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but I haven't got 75, 76, 77, or 78.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are they lacking? I shall supplement it, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Very well.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is page 73 in the English document book; pages 73 and 74 in the English. With reference to the subject which we had just dealt with, namely particupation in the Reichstag meeting of July 13, I refer you to document No. 21, on page 79. It is an extract from the newspaper "Voelkischer Beobachter," referring to the Reichstan meeting and the names of the ministers present are listed therein and the name of the witness Papen is not amongst them. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. When did Hitler approach you, asking you to go to Vienna as Extraordinary Ambassador?
A. It was on the day of the murder of Dr. Dollfuss, on the 25th of July 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you remind me, Dr. Kubuschok, whether any question was put to the witness Lammers about this offcer?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the question was nut to witness Lammers. When he was examined, he was asked about it.
TEE PRESIDENT: What did he say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He has said that von Papen had refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
THE WITNESS: On the 25th of July, the day of the murder of Dollfuss, I was called by Hitler in the middle of the night. He asked me to go to Vienna at once as his Ambassador. I told him "Where do you get this peculiar idea from" and he informed me of Dollfuss' murder which at that time had not been known to me, and he said "It is absolutely essential that somebody should take over the affairs there at once, someone who is acquainted with the atmosphere" and I replied that I could not possibly decide on the telephone to take such a step, whereupon he asked me to come to a conference to Beyreuth at once.
Q. And how did these negotiations in Beyreuth proceed? Did you make conditions for taking over that office?
A. The conferences in Beyreuth took the turn that Hitler put in to me that I was the only person available who could reestablish the situation in Austria because Hitler knew, of course, from numerous protests raised by me in the cabinet against Austria's treatment, which attitude I had regarding that problem. He also knew that I was a friend of the murdered Dr. Dollfuss and that I war aquainted with von Schuschnigg. I made my conditions and they were the immediate recalling of the Party Gauleiter who, by Hitler's order, was in Austria at the time, his name being Habicht. Hitler was of the opinion that it he were to do this, then this would be a confession of guilt. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Gauleiter of where?
A. Habicht?
Q. I thought you said that was his name. I wanted to know what Gau he was the Gauleiter of.
A. Perhaps "Gauleiter" is the wrong word. He had been sent to Austria by Hitler in order to be liaison max and influence the business, the affairs of the Austrian National Socialists. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, perhaps you ought to point out that his title was "Landesleiter," county leader, which was the equivalent of the Gauleiter in Germany.
A. He was Landesleiter, county leader. It was the title for people who were running the affairs of the Party abroad. Hitler replied to me that if he were to recall this man, then this would look like a confession of his guilt, of his participation in Dollfuss' murder. I replied that the question of guilt on the part of the Party in Germany or its organization in its entirety was something of which the whole world was convinced in any case and that as far as I was concerned, it was only important that from now on these connections should be cut.
I further demanded an assurance from Hitler in writing that the German-Austrian policy of the future -- something which had vulgarly been described as the "policy of the Anschluss" upt to then -- should move on a purely evolutionary level in the future; that is to say, any forcible measures and aggression should be refrained from and thereupon Hitler ordered the recalling of this man Habicht immediately and furthermore, with reference to the second question, he gave me a written assurance. Finally, I explained that I should be prepared to take over the pacifying action in Austria but only until ordinary relations, ordinary friendship had been reestablished. This meant and was the cause that later in Austria I had the title of Ambassador with a special mission.
Q Mr. Witness, we have heard of your inner political break with Hitler after the speech at Marburg and we have heard about your resignation from the cabinet and your actions on the 30th of June. I should now like to ask you to explain to us the reasons which were decisive for you to accept that post in Austria in spite of the events which have been described? accusation by the prosecution. If you are to understand this decision of mine then you must know German history and one must know that the Austrian problem was the central problem of Germany all together. Dr. Seyss-Inquart has spoken at length about this problem. I can, therefore, be very brief, and I only need to add that, on Germany's part also, the achievement of German unity, for which we had fought during three centuries, was considered the most significant and important target of our national policy. Now, with the 30th of June, the coalition, for the reasons which I had given on the 30th of January, had collapsed. It was proved in history that, inner politically speaking, my intentions and my aims had failed. Now, with Dollfuss' murder, the danger existed that Germany would now suffer bankruptcy even in that one great foreign political aim. All this was written in my soul when I considered that serious decision which should fulfill Hitler's request. Had it been a man of the party whom he put there, then it was quite clear that all hope was lost. If it were to be a diplomat from the foreign office whom he sent there, then it could be assumed that that official would have had no personal influence of his own upon Hitler. If, therefore, one was to save the situation, then it had to be someone who was at least in the position to influence Hitler and someone who, like I, was independent and had a political life of his own. Today, just as I was then, I am fully aware of the fact that many of my friends could not understand this step of mine and that they interpreted it to be lack of character. But it is my point of view that there was a decision which anyone would have to make without consideration or understanding or lack of it and only before his own conscience. My conscience told me that I would have to do everything to bring back order, at least as far as this one questionswas concerned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With reference to the general subject of Austria, I call your attention mainly to the documents which have been submitted, but to supplement them, I should like to only refer to Document 64, on Page 157, end Document 65, on Page 158; also, to Document No. 81, on Page 178.
The last named document has already been presented in connection with the case of Seyss-Inquart, and it refers to the views of State Chancellor Dr. Renner in connection with the Anschluss. I only want to quote the last four lines on Page 179: "As a Social Democrat, and therefore a representative of the last decision of the nation, and as the last Chancellor of the Austro-German Republic and the former president of its peace delegation, I shall vote with 'yes'." The reason why I have placed the do current in that particular position is because I want to support the testimony of the defendant, who considered that the Austro-German question, from both points of view, was a problem of great importance, and it is best expressed by the fact that in a very difficult situation even this leading statesman, Dr. Renner, was confessing that he was in favor of Austro-German friendship. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Witness, on the 26th of July Hitler wrote a letter to you which confirmed your appointment as Extraordinary ambassador to Berlin. That letter has been rationed by the prosecution. What is the explanation of the contents of this letter?
A The contents of this letter can be explained vary easily. If I were to have a chance to reestablish normal and friendly relations, if I were to have a chance to create a proper position myself with regard to the Austrian government, then after the events of the 30th of June there had to be a public statement of confidence. In that letter Hitler was to certify that my mission was one of pacification and that he would distance himself from his methods of terror. That is stated in that letter, and if the prosecution say that this letter was a "masterpiece of deceit", then I find that quite impossible to understand..
Q Mr. Messersmith, in his affidavit, alleges -- this letter being PS 2385 -- that from Vienna you had pursued a policy of aggression with reference to the southeastern states of Europe and he is quoting as your own personal statement something which you are supposed to have said when he visited you, the following words:
"that southeast Europe as far as Turkey would be the hinterland of Germany and it has become my mission to include it into the Reich. Austria is the first country in this program." Have you made any such statement?
A In the autumn of '34 I took up my position in Vienna. One of the first colleagues whom I met was Mr. Messersmith. Never at any time have I received the task to pursue such a policy as is described in Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, and never at any tire have I stated any such thing to Mr. Messersmith.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I refer to the interrogatory submitted to Horthy. It is Document 760, pages 172 and 173.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, before you turn to the Messersmith affidavit, you were speaking, or the defendant was speaking of some letter. Is that letter a document which is before us?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the prosecution have already presented that letter. It is the letter written on the occasion of the appointment of the defendant and it is No. 2799 PS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, if your Lordship has the British document book No.11, it is page 37.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just now the witness was speaking about statement No. PS-2385, Messersmith's affidavit. The same question, namely the question of the return visit Mr. Messersmith paid to Papen, is dealt with in Messersmith's further affidavit, PS-1760. statement referring to the influence of Germany on the South-eastern European states differs considerably in Messersmith's two affidavits. Messersmith claims that Papen had said that he had been designated to fulfill the task of including Southeastern Europe into the Reich. In comparison to that, in PS-1760, the statement is very differently worded, because there Mr. Messersmith says that Papen said on that occasion that he had been told that the whole of Southeastern Europe, upto the Turkish border, should become Germany's natural hinterland and be regarded as such, and that the German economic control should be facilitated in that entire territory through his work. Once there is the inclusion, and then there is mention of economic control. the witness whether at that time he had made such a statement, namely that the wole of Southeastern Europe, and as far as the Turkish border, was Germany's natural hinterland and that it had become his mission to facilitate Germany's economic control in that entire territory on Germany's behalf. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Did you make such a statement?
A My real statement to Mr. Messersmith is probably -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE(Interposing): My Lord, I don't know whether it would be useful for the Tribunal to have the two references, the two passages. The passage in 2385-PS your Lordships will find in Document Book 11-A, that is, the second document book, at page 24 at the bottom of the page. The reference in 1760-PS is in Document Book 11, page 22, about one-third down the page, and then it goes on to the next third of the page.
A (Continuing): My actual remark to Mr. Messersmith ispossibly not too far from the latter quotation given by my defense counsel. The difference between the two statements made by Mr. Messersmith becomes quite clear. It is perfectly possible that we discussed the Southeast Europe question, and it is perfectly thinkable that I had pointed out to him that the economic and political questions of that Southeastern area were of importance for Germany's and Austria's policy, and of particularly considerable significance. The extension of our commerce towards the Balkans was a perfectly legitimate target. regarding the policy of these countries in the southeastern areas because naturally that was one of the tasks of the Ambassador to Vienna. But over and above that, during my entire work in Vienna, I did nothing which might in any way tally with Mr. Messersmith's statement in this connection. to the most primitive rules of diplomacy if I, during one first conference, had spoken to an unknown, strange ambassador, making such revelations to him.
That would have been sensational and it would have been certain that the next day the Austrian government and the whole world would have known.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With reference to this question, I referyou to Erbach's interrogatory, Document No. 96, on page 238, and I refer to questions 8 and 9 which deal with this subject. That is No. 96, page 238. In the English text it is page 232. I am dealing with questions 8 and 9 of the interrogatory.
THE WITNESS: Perhaps, my Lord, I might add that the Prosecution are in possession of all my reports from these Viennese days, and that these reports must show it if I had pursued such a task. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: Czechoslovakia with the Hungarian or Polish government, because Mr. Messersmith makes such a statement.
A No, I never did. The embassy in Prague was exclusively responsible for the Reich's policy in Czechoslovakia.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to the Horthy interrogatory, Document No. 76, which has already been presented. I also refer to Document 68, page 162. It is a report from von Papen, dated the 31st of august 1935, and addressed to Hitler. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Messersmith alleges, in the affidavit, which was mentioned, that you had stated during this conferencethat you had come to Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian government.
Did you make any such statement? If I am to express myself diplomatically, then I shall have to describe it as most astonishing. In this affidavit, Mr. Messersmith states that on the occasion of my first visit he received me with an icy-cold attitude. That is perfectly correct. It was quite well known to me that Mr. Messersmith was the keenest opponent of the Nazi system. reads that during that second visit I am supposed to have opened my heart and my inner thoughts to Mr. Messersmith. and weaken the Austrian Government, was, of course, not used because such a statement, took would of course have been communicated to the Austrian government by Mr. Messersmith at once.
My entire pacification would have been made impossible from the beginning through it.
eign Minister Schmidt in connection with how many of such activities of mine were entirely unkown.
Q. I also refer to Glaise-Horstenau's testimony in this connection.
Further, Mr. Messersmith says that you had said to him during this discussion that you were using your good reputation as a good Catholic in connection with certain Austrian clergymen, for instance, Cardinal Innitzer. He "goes on to say that even without any scruples you had used your wife's reputation,who was a devout Catholic, for the same political ends. Messersmith?
A. Of all the accusations raised against me, this is the one that hurt most deeply. I can understand that you can criticize the policy pursued by a diplomat and how it is interpreted, but I cannot understand that one can accuse somebody of using his own religious conviction for dirty, political, commercial purposes. And I can understand it even less, and I find that it lacks taste that someone states that I even used the religious beliefs of my wife for such a purposes. Tribunal.
Q. Mr. Messersmith in his affidavit, refers to a document, the authori of which, however, he fails to mention. This document had been shown to Foreign Minister Berger-Waldeneck in 1939, and although the contents of your conference with Hitler, Schacht and von Neurath on the occasion of your visit to Berlin had yet to become known for the next two years, the avoidance of intervention iito Austria's inner political affairs was supposed to have been mentioned and finally Dr. Schacht is supposed to have promised two hundred thousand marks monthly for the support of the National Socialists in Austria.
What do you have to say to that statement of Dr. Messersmith?
A. According to Mr. Messersmith's statement, this is quite obviously the report of an agent which the Austrian Foreign Minister had received with reference to my returning to Berlin. The contents of that report are mostly wrong. The incorrectness with regard to the passage referring to Dr. Schacht has already been emphasized passionately by Dr. Schacht, but in that report there is something which is true. Austria, which was managed by a certain Langott. It has already been testified in this courtroom that this support fund for the women and children of Austrian National Socialists who had emigrated into Germany existed with the knowledge of the Austrian Government and police. But I had neither requested Mr. Schacht to make available official funds for this support fund, nor have I paid any such finance over myself. Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection therewith, I refer to GlaiseHorestenau's testimony before this Tribunal when he said that the Austrian Government know of the Langott support fund. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Messersmith believes that from information received from the Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Waldeneck, he can permit himself to re-produce the following statement made by you in 1935.
"Yes, now you have your French and English friends and your independence can be maintained a little longer".
Had you said anything like that?
A. Such a statement would not only have been extremely foolish diplomatically, but impossible, because it would have meant an end of any diplomatic activity. In no case could the cooperation, which Mr. Messersmith states went on for years, or as he calls it "the policy of deceit"-- in no case could that be tallied with such an open admission to the effect that I would only allow Austrian independence to remain intact for a brief period.
Q. Mr. Messersmith goes on to say in his affidavit, that you had publicly assured that you wished to get rid of certain members of the Austrian Gove nment, among then Chancellor Schuschnigg. Is that true?
A. The contrary is true. I never aimed at removing Chancellor Schuschnigg. On the contrary, it was my aim to see that he should have confidence in my policy and a policy of understanding. I knew von Schuschningg as an upright Austrian patriot but also as a man who did not by any means deny his German ties.
In spite of many pertinent differences of opinion this German trend, German streak of his always presented an excellent basis for our collaboration and I could only add that if a diplomat desires that changes in a government should come about to which he is accredited, then would he state that before the broad public. and they have submitted it as proof for the fact that you wanted to tempt Schusehnigg into a government collaborating with the National Socialists -which is document U.S.A. Exhibit 64. In my document book it is once more contain ed under document number 66 on page 159 and 160.
What, Mr. Witness, were your real intentions?
A I must be a little more explicit with reference to this document. This report was written eight months after Dollfuss assassination, that is to say during a *ime of which even the Prosecution themselves have said that during the first two years it had been my instructions to remain entirely passive. When this report was written we had news that Starhemberg was pursuing a policy together with Mussolini which would place serious hurdles in the way of an understanding between Austria and Germany. That is the reason why I am suggesting to Hitler an acute and immediate intervention. And I proposed that Schuschnigg should be played up against the hostile Christian Socialists elements in the country. I suggest that there should be an offer of a final coordination of Austrian and German interests. a state and if it were to undertake that the national opposition in Austria, that is to say the Nazis, are to remain uninfluenced, then that would have to lead to a coalition between these powers. situation.
Q. Just now you explained that you were pursuing the honest policy of coordinating the interests -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal would like to understand more clearly what the defendant means by what he just said.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have just been told that the English translation came over extremely badly. Would you suggest, Mr. President, that the defendant repeat the entire answer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, most certainly. That is the best way. I think it is very unlikely that the English translation came over badly. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, will you please answer once again, but this time more slowly so that the interpreters encounter no difficulties.
A. When this report was written, we had news that Starhemberg-Starhemberg being the chief of the Home Guard - had joined Mussolini in a policy which would in the future mean a fight against any pro-German tendencies in Austria. In order to counter that maneuver of Starhemberg's, I am telling Hitler that he should suggest to Schuschnigg that, instead of coming to a condition with the Home Guard, he should do so with the Christian Socialists, who were not opposed to an understanding between Austria and Germany. In order to cause him, Schuschnigg, to enter into such a coalition, it was porposed that Hitler should offer him one final coordination of Germany's and Austria's interests; in other words, Hitler should tell him that Germany recognizes the independence of Austria and will undertake that in the future she will not intervene in the internal affairs of Austria. this being the combination of the French, Italians, the Czechoslovaks, who were always in favor of the pact of the Danube powers, with the inclusion of Austria. we feared that if Austria were to join a Danube Pact, then this would estrange Germany once and for all. If, on the other hand, we were to be good friends with Austria, and our relations were once more put in order, then we could, as I say here to Hitler, we might and could join this Danube Pact and by this means achieve something most constructive in favor of European pacification.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not forgetting your hopes that you expressed this morning? DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Just now you said that you were in favor of an honest policy and coordination of interests. Is it true that you were influencing Hitler with reference to his Reichstag speech on 31 May 1936 and he should make a statement in favor of Austria's independence?
A. Yes, that is perfectly true, because that statement was the prerequisite for normalizing the conditions and exchanging the views and interest of a revolutionary nature. Our joint policy could only be advanced from Austria. Austria was the country which, in the peace treaty of St. Germain and the protocol in Geneva, had been ordered to remain away from Germany. if Austria, therefore, were to take up the initiative and improve relations with Germany, then it was a prerequisite that we should first recognize its sovereignty.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw your attention to a mistake in the translation In the translation of the words spoken by the defendant, it was said "revolutionary character", instead of "evolutionary character". BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Will you please refer to the pact of July 1935.
A. The agreement of July 11 was described by Sir David as a maneuver of deception. It was described as an attempt to get the Austrian government into renewed difficulties, to undermine it by means of introducing pro-German men like Glaise-Horstenau or Foreign Minister Schmidt. This judgment passed upon the pact is entirely incorrect, and I think historically untenable. The examinations here and the statements made by the Austrian Foreign Minister have, in fact, proved it. normal relationships between the two brother nations. The agreement was the wish of both governments, not only the German government, and Chancellor Schuschnigg admitted that himself.
It is contained in a report of mine of 1 September 1936, which deals with a speech made by Schuschnigg before Austrian workers. Why should the Austrian government have concluded this pact -- there was no coercion to conclude it -- unless they themselves had wanted it, unless they themselves had wanted to bring about normal, friendly relations with the German Reich?
It was for that very reason that I had asked Hitler to declare Austria's sovereignty in his Reichstag speech. That agreement was by no means meant to forego all wishes for a later joint getting together, but it recognized Austria's independence to act, Austria's freedom to act. The aim of the joining to the two states was now to be pursued in a proper and evolutionary manner. July. There was a second part of that agreement which had not been published. That second part contained all the elements necessary for a pacification. There was to be an amnesty, and the press relations were to be regulated, and the so-called "1,000 mark bar" was to be lifted, which was a frontier bar imposed upon people travelling into Austria which had been decreed by Hitler. Any German wanting to travel to Austria would have to pay 1,000 marks, and this bar was removed. promised that men in his confidence, members of the national opposition, were to be brought in to cooperate in Austria. It appeared to us that the inclusion of the Austrian opposition into the Parliamentary procedure of Austria would hive to be a condition for that peaceful solution; in other words, the Party should gradually emerge from its illegal status and become a legal factor.
Mr. Messersmith, if I may add this, states in his affidavit -- and erroneously -- that Part 2 of this pact or agreement contained a clause that a number of persons who were in the Chancellor's confidence should be called to positions in the Cabinet. That, obviously, is an error of thought on Mr. Messersmith's part, because we were not here concerned with people who had Hitler's confidence, but such person's who had Schuschnigg's confidence. This was an agreement or an arrangement made by Schuschnigg.
Apart from this, Mr. Messersmith says in this connection, with reference to this agreement, that the first penetration of German nationals into the Austrian Government was achieved through the nomination of Dr. Guido Schmidt to the position of Secretary of State for foreign Affairs. This is utterly incorrect. Dr. Schmidt was an Austrian and he was making Austrian policy. He was representing Austrian interests, which was absolutely natural. At no time did Germany exert any influence to make him, Dr. Schmidt, Foreign Minister. agreement as an instrument of peace and a great step forward. It was left to the prosecution to call it a maneuver of deception.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Erbach's affidavit, document number 96, which, in the English book, is on page 233 and 234. I refer to questions numbers 4 to 7, and questions 12 and 13. They deal with the subject which we have just discussed. That is questions 4 to 7 and questions 12 and 13. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: mission in Austria as terminated?
A Yes, I considered it as being at an end. That is proved by my application to resign, which I wrote on the 16th of July, 1936, and addressed to Hitler.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to document number 71, page 165, and I quote the beginning. That is the second document.
"On the 26th of July, 1934, you proposed to the late Field Marshal that I should be sent to Vienna on a temporary mission, for the restoration of normal and friendly relations.
"With the agreement signed on 11 July, the decisive stop has been taken in this direction."
go on to quote the last but one paragraph:
"Even though the German question will need very careful and considerate handling in the future too, especially after the incredible difficulties which have gone before, I would like now, at the end of the task you entrusted to me, to lay my office back in your hands." BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: September 1936 -- the number is PS-2246 -- and they are accusing you of having remained in contact with the illegal leaders of the Austrian National Socialists, that you had attempted to bring that opposition into the Fatherland Front, and also that you intended to change the Schuschnigg regime. normalizing the relations to Germany, which was hindered by the staying power of the Ministry of Security, where the old officials opposed to National Socialism were located, and that therefore changes of personnel were urgent. If, therefore, I used the expression in this report "changes of the regime", then that means, in its proper sense, "changes of personnel". In that connection I go on to say, in the following sentence, that there will be economic negotiations in the near future. This shows quite clearly that with those words we are not concerned with the removal of Schucchnigg's person. in the Danube theater, and it contains a proposal for a peaceful solution. communicated with the Nazi opposition, although the July agreement had excluded any intervention in Austrian affairs, then I must say that I was perfectly entitled to such keeping in touch because I was interested in ascertaining whether and how far Herr von Schuschnigg would keep his promise if he were to bring the National Opposition in for collaboration. of July is proved by the statement of Leopold of January 1937, which Mr.
Messersmith has attached to his own affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to document number 75, on page 171, which contains this file reference of file note of Leopold's. The document is identical with the appendix, which has the number USA Exhibit 57. There is an error in the English translation. In the fifth last line, on page 1, the word "Anschluss" has been translated by "annexation". BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Witness, what do you have to say about Leopold's statement?
A Leopold's proposals show the following:
The leaders of the Austrian Nazis were fully accepting the policy containe* in the July agreement. They recognized that in the future the question of the Anschluss would be an internal Austrian affair, which would be solved by the Austrian Government. It was proposed that the solution would be found in an evolutionary manner by the Austrian Government. They were in favor of a solution where, by means of the declaration of sovereignty for Austria, these arguments would, in the future, no longer represent foreign political dangers for the Reich. 17 June-A-JF-23-1-Williams by the Austrian National Socialists and approved of, and that they are prepared to find a legal way, together with the Austrian government.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(An adjournment was taken until 1000 hours, Tuesday, 18 June, 1946) Official Transcript of the International Military BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:1937.