This statement is clearly set forth and says that when it comes to difference of opinion as to the application of the basic principles of the policy, the Reich Chancellor alone will decide and that when it comes to basic problems, there is no voting and no majority decision. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: the developments? increased very obviously and visibly. The situation arose that the concessions which we as partners of the coalition had made did not lead to a final internal satisfaction but that the Party considered them only the beginning of a new revolutionary movement. This was quite obviously a digression from the pact which had been concluded on 30 January. My many objections in the Cabinet were in vain and fruitless. to change his policy in the Cabinet, which was something we told him, there was only way. That was the matter of a resignation or the way to public opinion. If I had resigned, then I could no longer speak. Therefore, I decided to speak now and to speak publicly, and I decided to turn to the German people on basic principles. would have remained silent, would have remained in office, or would have taken another office, but now I decided to go before the public and to shoulder all the possibilities and the consequences which might accrue therefrom.
Q On 17 June 1934 you gave your speech at Marburg. What did you wish to accomplish with this speech? the decision of Hitler which were essential to the maintenance of a reasonable policy in Germany. In this speech I turned against the demands of a certain group or party for a revolutionary, national monopoly,and I turned against the coercion and the suppression of others. I turned against the anti-Christian demands, and I turned against the suppression of critical opinions. I turned against the suppression and the regimentation of the spirit, and I turned against the violations of fundamental rights and against inequality before the law, and I turned against the Byzantium principles which were dominent and rampant in the Party.
ring could be broken, in just once instance, then the system would have been forced to order. For instance, we would have restored freedom of speech and freedom of the spirit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This speech, the significance ofwhich has been stressed by the Prosecution, may be found in Document 11, page 40. there is a misprint. The date is not 7 July, as is shown in the translation, but the date is actually 17 June. German history since 1933 for its critical nature, I should like to quote several extracts from it. I should like to have you turn to page 41, and I shall begin in about the center of this page:
"We know that rumors and whispers must be brought out from the dark where they have taken refuge, An open and manly discussion serves the German people better than, for instance, the airtight condition of a press ofwhich the Minister for Propaganda has stated that it 'no longer has a face. This deficiency no doubt exists. The purpose of the press should be to inform the government where deficiencies have crept in, where corruption has settled down, where grave errors have been committed, where unfit men sit in the wrong places, where sins are committed against the spirit of the German Revolution. An anonymous or secret information service, however well organized it may be, can never be a substitute for this task of the press. For a newspaper editor is under the responsibility of his conscience and the law. On the other hand, anonymous news sources are uncontrollable and liable to the danger of byzantinism. When therefore the natural organs of public opinion do not bring enough light into the mysterious darkness which at present seems to have fallen upon the German public, then the statesman must stand up and call the things by their right names."
Then on page 42, just a little beyond the center of the page:
"It is the historical truth that the necessity for a fundamental change of course was recognized and urged by those who shunned the path of revolution by a mass-party. A claim for a revolutionary or nationalist monopoly by a certain group, therefore, seems to be overweening,quite apart from the fact that such a claim prejudices the unity of the people."
And now page 43, a sentence from approximately the center of the page:
"Not all of life can be organized without becoming mechanized. The state is organization; life is growth."
And on Page 45, just a little beyond the center of the page:
"The dominance of a single party replacing the majority party system, which justifiably has disappeared, appears to me historically as a transitional stage, justified only as long as the safeguarding of the new political change demands it and only until the now process of personnel selection begins to function." about the center of the page:
"But one should not mistake the religious state which is based upon an active belief in God for a secular state in which earthly values replace such belief and are given religious honors."
Then, about five lines following:
"Certainly, the outward respect for religious belief is an improvement compared to the disrespectful attitude produced by a degenerate nationalism. But we should not forget that real religion meansto be bound to God and not to those substitutes such as have been introduced into the consciousness of nations especially by the materialistic conception history of Karl Marx. If wide circles of people, out of the very viewpoint of state totality and the complete amalgamation of the nation, demand a uniform religious foundation, they should not forget that we ought to be happy to have such a foundation in the Christian faith."
Then, the third last line on this same page:
"It is my conviction that the Christian doctrine is the **solute religious form of all occidental thinking and that, with the reawakening of religious forces, the German people also will be permeated anew by the Christian spirit, a spirit the profundity of which is almost forgotten by a humanity that has lived through the nineteenth century. A struggle is coming for the decision as to whether the now Reich of the Germans shall be Christian or will be lost in sectarianism and half-relgious materialism". little beyond the center of the page:
"But once a revolution is terminated, the government only represents the entire people and never is it the exponent of individuals groups". bottom:
"Therefore, it will not do to dispose of the intellect with the catchword of 'intellectualism'. Deficient or elementary intellects cannot yet justify a war on intellectualism. And if today we corp in sometimes about the 150 percent Nazis, then we mean those landless intellectuals without a foundation, people who would like to deny the right to exist to scientists of world fame just because they are not Party members".
Then, on the next page--page49--on the first line; it says:
"One should not make the objection that spiritual people lack the vitality necessary for the leaders of a people. True spirit is so vital that it sacrifices itself for its conviction. The mistaking of brutality for vitality would *---* a worship of force which would be dangerous to a people."
" They oppose equality before the law, which they criticize as liberal degeneration, wheras in reality it is the prerequisite for any fair judgement.
"These people suppress that foundation of the state which always, not only in liberal times, was called justice. Their attacks are directed against the security and freedom of the private sphere of life which the German has won in centuries of hardest struggle".
In the next paragraph he speaks against Byzantinism; and the second sentence reads:
"Great men are not made by propaganda, but rather, they gain eminence by their acts and are recognized by history. Byzantinism cannot deceptively disregard those laws". should like to be in my reading with the second sentences:
"But one should not disregard the biological and psychological limits of education. Coercion ends at the will of self-expression of the true personality. Reactions to coercion are dangerous. As an old soldier I know that rigid discipline must be supplemented by certain liberties. A good soldier who submitted joyfully to unconditional obedience counter the days of his service, because the need for freedom is rooted in human nature. The application of military discipline to the whole life of a people must remain within the limits which are not contrary to human nature". something from the last paragraph, beginning with the second sentence:
"The movement must come to a standstill at same time; a solid structure must once begin to arise, which is hold together by an unprejudiced administration of justice and ab uncontested governmental power. By constant dynamics nothing can be achieved. Germany dare not becomes a passage into the unknown, of which no one knows where it will stop". on the following page:
As my last quotation, I shall read the first paragraph on the following page:
"The Government is well informed on all those things, all the selfishness, lack of character, want of truth, unchivalrous conduct and arrogance which would like to spread out under the cover of the German revolution. It is also aware that the rich store of confidence bestowed upon it by the German people is threatened. If one wants close connection and association among the people, one must not underestimate their good sense, must return their confidence, and not try to hold them constantly in tutelage. The German people know their situation is serious. The people feel economic distress; they recognize well the deficiencies of certain laws born from emergency; they are sensitive to force and injustice; they smile at clumsy attempts to deceive them by false optimism. No organization and no propaganda, however good it may be, will in the long run, be able to preserve confidence.
"I therefore looked at the wave of propaganda against the so-called foolish critics, and I looked at it differently from the way others looked at it. Not by provocation, especially of the youth, not by threats against helpless parts of the people. but only by confident discussion with the people can confidence and readiness for corporation be promoted. The people know that heavy sacrifices are expected from them. They will bear them and follow the Fuehrer in unflinching loyalty.
If they are allowed to have their part in the planning and working, if not every word of criticism is taken for ill will, and if despairing patriots are not marked as enemies of the state." BY. DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Witness, what were the consequences of your Marburg speech? Minister Goebbels. Only two papers could feature it, but that sufficed so that attention was called to it both at hone and abroad. I want to the Reich Chancellor at once and said that I wished to submit my resignation. I told him: "it is quite impossible that the Vice Chancellor of the Government cannot speak; I have nothing left to do except to take my leave.' Hitler said: "That was a mistake on the part of the Propaganda Minister. I shall speak with him and have him recind this decree which prohibits your speech from being published."
In that way he stalled me along for several days. However, I know that even at that time he lied to me because, as co-defendant Funk has stated, he war instructed by Hitler to go to Hindenburg and tell Hindenburg that the Vice Chancellor had taken a stand against the Cabinet and Hitler, and would have to be dismissed. Mr. von Papen was silent, that he should have stirred up the diplomats instead, then I should like to point out that from Mr. Dodd's diary we can see very, very clearly that the outside world was very well informed about this, my last appeal.
BY. DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer you to the last remark made by the witness. to be found in document 17, at pages 71 and 72, the diary of ambassador Dodd. I beg your pardon, in the English text it is at pages 69 and 70. I should like to quote from the second paragraph, and I should like to start with the first line.
There is new great excitement all over Germany." The Marburg speech had been referred to. "All old and intellectual Germans are highly pleased." been cabled to the New York Times and that the papers in London and in Paris were featuring the "von Papen episode", as he called the Marburg speech.
I should also like to have you refer to the beginning of page 72, at the top of the page.
In the English text, that is Page 70. Speech and its dissemination were concerned, I should like to have you refer to document 15, Page 66, which is an affidavit by Westphalen, which shows that even the possession of a copy of the speech would be sufficient to hqve disciplinary action taken against any official who was in possession of a copy. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK : took place. How did these incidents concern you personally ? phone call from Minister Goering, with the request that I come to see him to discuss matters with him. I went to Goering, and he told me that there had been a revolution which had broken out in the Reich, a revolution of the SA, and that Hitler was in Munich so that he could quell this uprising there, and that he, Goering, was charged with the task of restoring law and order in Berlin.
Mr. Goering then asked me, in the interests of my own safety, as he put it, to return to my flat and to remain there. I pretested quite vehemently against this demand of his; but Mr. Goering was insistent. office, the office of the Vice-Chancellor. On arriving there, I found my office occupied by the SS, and I was permitted only to enter my own office, so that I could pick up my files.
I continued my journey and went home to my flat. There I found a strong formation of SS units. The telephone was blocked; the radio was turned off. I was completely cut off from any and all contact with the outside world for a matter of three whole days.
Q What measures were taken against your co-workers ?
only on the 3rd of July, after I had regained my freedom once more.
At that time, I learned that my press export, Mr. von Bose, had been shot in his office, and I further learned that two of my male secretaries, Mr. von Schuschki and one other gentleman, had been taken to a concentration camp. colleague, a private co-worker of mine, Mr. Edgar Gunk.
Q Did you then try to inform the Reich president ? establishing a telephone connection with Goering. I demanded that I be set free at once. Mr. Goering apologized and said that it was a mistake that I had been arrested and kept under arrest for this long period of time.
I then went immediately to the Reich chancellery. There I met Hitler, who was about to start a cabinet session. I asked him to step into the next room so that I could speak with him. I did not want to enter this cabinet meeting, I said to him : "These things which were done to a member of your government are so incredible and fantastic that I can give you only one answer; and that is the repeating of my request for the acceptance of my resignation. I want it immediately."
I said him, Mr. Hitler, there is no explanation possible, and there is no apology for this incident, I demand a research into the facts and an investigation of those incidents that concerned my co-workers. I further demand of you a publication of my resignation, immediately". to remain in the government, that he could not make the matter of my resignation public because the agitation and excitement among the German people was too great, and that he could only make my resignation public in, say, three of four weeks.
When I left Hitler. I tried personally and through one of my secretaries to get in touch with von Hindenburg. That attempt, however, failed. I must say that Mr. von Hindenburg was in Neudeck in East Prussiam at that time; and my secretary, who travelled to East Prussia, learned that it was quite impossible to reach von Hindenburg.
Everything had been blocked. My own telephone calls did not go through. I went to my friend, the Chief of the Wehrmacht , General von Fritsch, and said to him, "Why doesn't the Wehrmacht intervene ? Why doesn't it do something ? The Wehrmacht is the only thing that can keep order in the country, and the only factor of pence in the country". and other officers, in my opinion - it would have been quite proper for the Wehrmacht itself to try to restore order in this situation.
Mr. von Fritsch said to me, " I can ask questions only when I have a command from Field Marshal von Hindenburg in my hands." But Hindenburg was not accessible to us. The other side had obviously advised him about the complete legality of events as they had take place, which Hitler declared in the Reichstag to be legal. the witness Gisevius testified. And during the time that elapsed between the 30th. of June and my appointment in Austria, I did not participate in one single government act. asked the Reich chancellor to give me the body of my friend,Bose. We knew that the Gestapo had cremated the bodies of the other victims.
THE PRESIDENT : I believe it would be a good time to recess now.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendant Hess is not present in this session. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Please, will you continue.
A. In finishing off the first question, I was merely going to remark that I succeeded in having the body of my friend Bose properly buried and that on that occasion at his grave, I spoke words during which I emphasized that one day the same justice which had been the cause of that murder would be reestablished.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As far as this is concerned, I draw your attention to document No. 14 on page 62 and page 63. It is an affidavit of Maria Rose, who for years had been the private secretary of the witness. This is on page 63 and there she refers to the funeral services of Bose which we just discussed. I further refer to document No. 19 on pages 77 and 78. It is an affidavit from Schaffgotsch who is particularly referring in detail to the attempts of the witness to go and visit Neudeck and President Hindenburg. This last one was document No. 19 on pages 77 and 78. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, at that time you were offered the position to the Vatican, the post, I mean, of Ambassador to the Holy City. Please, will you tell us what the circumstances were?
A. It is true that Hitler tried to continue to tie me to him and that for about eight days after the incidents which I had described, he sent Secretary of State Lammers to me, who asked me on his behalf whether I was prepared to accept the position of Ambassador to the Vatican. Of course, I refused, and I am merely mentioning it here because a few weeks later I accepted this post in Vienna for an entirely different reason and to prove thi* to prove that I was not interested just in obtaining a job, I refused Hitler's request bluntly at the time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to document No. 18, on pages 75 and 76 of the document beek. It is an affidavit from Marth von Papen, the wife of the witness, who is describing the visit Lammers paid them.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is quite true. There are these different languages. One is in German and then it is in French -- pages 75 and 76.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but I haven't got 75, 76, 77, or 78.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are they lacking? I shall supplement it, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Very well.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is page 73 in the English document book; pages 73 and 74 in the English. With reference to the subject which we had just dealt with, namely particupation in the Reichstag meeting of July 13, I refer you to document No. 21, on page 79. It is an extract from the newspaper "Voelkischer Beobachter," referring to the Reichstan meeting and the names of the ministers present are listed therein and the name of the witness Papen is not amongst them. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. When did Hitler approach you, asking you to go to Vienna as Extraordinary Ambassador?
A. It was on the day of the murder of Dr. Dollfuss, on the 25th of July 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you remind me, Dr. Kubuschok, whether any question was put to the witness Lammers about this offcer?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the question was nut to witness Lammers. When he was examined, he was asked about it.
TEE PRESIDENT: What did he say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He has said that von Papen had refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
THE WITNESS: On the 25th of July, the day of the murder of Dollfuss, I was called by Hitler in the middle of the night. He asked me to go to Vienna at once as his Ambassador. I told him "Where do you get this peculiar idea from" and he informed me of Dollfuss' murder which at that time had not been known to me, and he said "It is absolutely essential that somebody should take over the affairs there at once, someone who is acquainted with the atmosphere" and I replied that I could not possibly decide on the telephone to take such a step, whereupon he asked me to come to a conference to Beyreuth at once.
Q. And how did these negotiations in Beyreuth proceed? Did you make conditions for taking over that office?
A. The conferences in Beyreuth took the turn that Hitler put in to me that I was the only person available who could reestablish the situation in Austria because Hitler knew, of course, from numerous protests raised by me in the cabinet against Austria's treatment, which attitude I had regarding that problem. He also knew that I was a friend of the murdered Dr. Dollfuss and that I war aquainted with von Schuschnigg. I made my conditions and they were the immediate recalling of the Party Gauleiter who, by Hitler's order, was in Austria at the time, his name being Habicht. Hitler was of the opinion that it he were to do this, then this would be a confession of guilt. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Gauleiter of where?
A. Habicht?
Q. I thought you said that was his name. I wanted to know what Gau he was the Gauleiter of.
A. Perhaps "Gauleiter" is the wrong word. He had been sent to Austria by Hitler in order to be liaison max and influence the business, the affairs of the Austrian National Socialists. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, perhaps you ought to point out that his title was "Landesleiter," county leader, which was the equivalent of the Gauleiter in Germany.
A. He was Landesleiter, county leader. It was the title for people who were running the affairs of the Party abroad. Hitler replied to me that if he were to recall this man, then this would look like a confession of his guilt, of his participation in Dollfuss' murder. I replied that the question of guilt on the part of the Party in Germany or its organization in its entirety was something of which the whole world was convinced in any case and that as far as I was concerned, it was only important that from now on these connections should be cut.
I further demanded an assurance from Hitler in writing that the German-Austrian policy of the future -- something which had vulgarly been described as the "policy of the Anschluss" upt to then -- should move on a purely evolutionary level in the future; that is to say, any forcible measures and aggression should be refrained from and thereupon Hitler ordered the recalling of this man Habicht immediately and furthermore, with reference to the second question, he gave me a written assurance. Finally, I explained that I should be prepared to take over the pacifying action in Austria but only until ordinary relations, ordinary friendship had been reestablished. This meant and was the cause that later in Austria I had the title of Ambassador with a special mission.
Q Mr. Witness, we have heard of your inner political break with Hitler after the speech at Marburg and we have heard about your resignation from the cabinet and your actions on the 30th of June. I should now like to ask you to explain to us the reasons which were decisive for you to accept that post in Austria in spite of the events which have been described? accusation by the prosecution. If you are to understand this decision of mine then you must know German history and one must know that the Austrian problem was the central problem of Germany all together. Dr. Seyss-Inquart has spoken at length about this problem. I can, therefore, be very brief, and I only need to add that, on Germany's part also, the achievement of German unity, for which we had fought during three centuries, was considered the most significant and important target of our national policy. Now, with the 30th of June, the coalition, for the reasons which I had given on the 30th of January, had collapsed. It was proved in history that, inner politically speaking, my intentions and my aims had failed. Now, with Dollfuss' murder, the danger existed that Germany would now suffer bankruptcy even in that one great foreign political aim. All this was written in my soul when I considered that serious decision which should fulfill Hitler's request. Had it been a man of the party whom he put there, then it was quite clear that all hope was lost. If it were to be a diplomat from the foreign office whom he sent there, then it could be assumed that that official would have had no personal influence of his own upon Hitler. If, therefore, one was to save the situation, then it had to be someone who was at least in the position to influence Hitler and someone who, like I, was independent and had a political life of his own. Today, just as I was then, I am fully aware of the fact that many of my friends could not understand this step of mine and that they interpreted it to be lack of character. But it is my point of view that there was a decision which anyone would have to make without consideration or understanding or lack of it and only before his own conscience. My conscience told me that I would have to do everything to bring back order, at least as far as this one questionswas concerned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With reference to the general subject of Austria, I call your attention mainly to the documents which have been submitted, but to supplement them, I should like to only refer to Document 64, on Page 157, end Document 65, on Page 158; also, to Document No. 81, on Page 178.
The last named document has already been presented in connection with the case of Seyss-Inquart, and it refers to the views of State Chancellor Dr. Renner in connection with the Anschluss. I only want to quote the last four lines on Page 179: "As a Social Democrat, and therefore a representative of the last decision of the nation, and as the last Chancellor of the Austro-German Republic and the former president of its peace delegation, I shall vote with 'yes'." The reason why I have placed the do current in that particular position is because I want to support the testimony of the defendant, who considered that the Austro-German question, from both points of view, was a problem of great importance, and it is best expressed by the fact that in a very difficult situation even this leading statesman, Dr. Renner, was confessing that he was in favor of Austro-German friendship. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Witness, on the 26th of July Hitler wrote a letter to you which confirmed your appointment as Extraordinary ambassador to Berlin. That letter has been rationed by the prosecution. What is the explanation of the contents of this letter?
A The contents of this letter can be explained vary easily. If I were to have a chance to reestablish normal and friendly relations, if I were to have a chance to create a proper position myself with regard to the Austrian government, then after the events of the 30th of June there had to be a public statement of confidence. In that letter Hitler was to certify that my mission was one of pacification and that he would distance himself from his methods of terror. That is stated in that letter, and if the prosecution say that this letter was a "masterpiece of deceit", then I find that quite impossible to understand..
Q Mr. Messersmith, in his affidavit, alleges -- this letter being PS 2385 -- that from Vienna you had pursued a policy of aggression with reference to the southeastern states of Europe and he is quoting as your own personal statement something which you are supposed to have said when he visited you, the following words:
"that southeast Europe as far as Turkey would be the hinterland of Germany and it has become my mission to include it into the Reich. Austria is the first country in this program." Have you made any such statement?
A In the autumn of '34 I took up my position in Vienna. One of the first colleagues whom I met was Mr. Messersmith. Never at any time have I received the task to pursue such a policy as is described in Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, and never at any tire have I stated any such thing to Mr. Messersmith.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I refer to the interrogatory submitted to Horthy. It is Document 760, pages 172 and 173.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, before you turn to the Messersmith affidavit, you were speaking, or the defendant was speaking of some letter. Is that letter a document which is before us?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the prosecution have already presented that letter. It is the letter written on the occasion of the appointment of the defendant and it is No. 2799 PS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, if your Lordship has the British document book No.11, it is page 37.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just now the witness was speaking about statement No. PS-2385, Messersmith's affidavit. The same question, namely the question of the return visit Mr. Messersmith paid to Papen, is dealt with in Messersmith's further affidavit, PS-1760. statement referring to the influence of Germany on the South-eastern European states differs considerably in Messersmith's two affidavits. Messersmith claims that Papen had said that he had been designated to fulfill the task of including Southeastern Europe into the Reich. In comparison to that, in PS-1760, the statement is very differently worded, because there Mr. Messersmith says that Papen said on that occasion that he had been told that the whole of Southeastern Europe, upto the Turkish border, should become Germany's natural hinterland and be regarded as such, and that the German economic control should be facilitated in that entire territory through his work. Once there is the inclusion, and then there is mention of economic control. the witness whether at that time he had made such a statement, namely that the wole of Southeastern Europe, and as far as the Turkish border, was Germany's natural hinterland and that it had become his mission to facilitate Germany's economic control in that entire territory on Germany's behalf. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Did you make such a statement?
A My real statement to Mr. Messersmith is probably -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE(Interposing): My Lord, I don't know whether it would be useful for the Tribunal to have the two references, the two passages. The passage in 2385-PS your Lordships will find in Document Book 11-A, that is, the second document book, at page 24 at the bottom of the page. The reference in 1760-PS is in Document Book 11, page 22, about one-third down the page, and then it goes on to the next third of the page.
A (Continuing): My actual remark to Mr. Messersmith ispossibly not too far from the latter quotation given by my defense counsel. The difference between the two statements made by Mr. Messersmith becomes quite clear. It is perfectly possible that we discussed the Southeast Europe question, and it is perfectly thinkable that I had pointed out to him that the economic and political questions of that Southeastern area were of importance for Germany's and Austria's policy, and of particularly considerable significance. The extension of our commerce towards the Balkans was a perfectly legitimate target. regarding the policy of these countries in the southeastern areas because naturally that was one of the tasks of the Ambassador to Vienna. But over and above that, during my entire work in Vienna, I did nothing which might in any way tally with Mr. Messersmith's statement in this connection. to the most primitive rules of diplomacy if I, during one first conference, had spoken to an unknown, strange ambassador, making such revelations to him.
That would have been sensational and it would have been certain that the next day the Austrian government and the whole world would have known.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With reference to this question, I referyou to Erbach's interrogatory, Document No. 96, on page 238, and I refer to questions 8 and 9 which deal with this subject. That is No. 96, page 238. In the English text it is page 232. I am dealing with questions 8 and 9 of the interrogatory.
THE WITNESS: Perhaps, my Lord, I might add that the Prosecution are in possession of all my reports from these Viennese days, and that these reports must show it if I had pursued such a task. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: Czechoslovakia with the Hungarian or Polish government, because Mr. Messersmith makes such a statement.
A No, I never did. The embassy in Prague was exclusively responsible for the Reich's policy in Czechoslovakia.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to the Horthy interrogatory, Document No. 76, which has already been presented. I also refer to Document 68, page 162. It is a report from von Papen, dated the 31st of august 1935, and addressed to Hitler. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Messersmith alleges, in the affidavit, which was mentioned, that you had stated during this conferencethat you had come to Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian government.
Did you make any such statement? If I am to express myself diplomatically, then I shall have to describe it as most astonishing. In this affidavit, Mr. Messersmith states that on the occasion of my first visit he received me with an icy-cold attitude. That is perfectly correct. It was quite well known to me that Mr. Messersmith was the keenest opponent of the Nazi system. reads that during that second visit I am supposed to have opened my heart and my inner thoughts to Mr. Messersmith. and weaken the Austrian Government, was, of course, not used because such a statement, took would of course have been communicated to the Austrian government by Mr. Messersmith at once.