".....It must, however, be recognized that the Concordats, in the years that followed, brought some advantages, or at least prevented worse evils.
In fact, in spite of all the violations to which it was subjected, it gave Catholics a juridical basis for their defense, a stronghold behind which to shield themselves in their opposition--aslong as this was possible -- to the ever growing campaign of religious persecution." on page 134 of my document bock. It has already been presented as USA Exhibit 685. It is a letter from the Deputy of the Fuehrer to the Reich Minister for Culture, and it deals with the dissolution of the theological faculties of the universities. I quote the last paragraph of that letter:
"In this case, as you have likewise pointed out in your letter, the clause of the Concordat and the Church Treaties are to be taken into consideration. In the case of certain faculties which are not mentioned by a specific clause in the Concordat and Church Treaties, as for example, Munich and a few others a removal can be begun without further ado. This is equally true of the theological faculties in Austria ("Ostmark") Vienna and Graz . . .".
Q. During subsequent years public arguments about church political questions were almost entirely suppressed, since the Catholic press, in violation of the concordate, and even Catholic pamphlets were prohibited. What did you do against these actions?
A. It appeared necessary to me, after the Catholic press had been completely throttled, that something should be done to revive public discussion regarding the fight against the churches. I had talked about this question very often to the Bishop, Dr. Hudal, who was a very outstanding clergyman in Rome. My defense will present to the Tribunal the book written by this Bishop in 1936. This bock, apart from severe criticism of the anti-religious tendencies, contains an objective appreciation of the positive social thoughts of National Socialism, and it is all the more remarkable because, in 1936, such high authorities of the church were making yet one more attempt to establish some coordination between the thoughts of the church and the healthy doctrines of National Socialism.
Q. In what respect do you consider that book of importance with regard to the accusation raised against you by the prosecution?
A. I consider it to be very relevant for the following reason: The prosecution were making it easy for themselves in that under recognition of the criminal target of National Socialism they were blaming entirely the initial years of the development, and all those who, for clear-cut motives, were attempting to give the movement a creative character, are being accused by the prosecution of being criminals; but here in 1938, a clergyman of high rank, arises and attempts, on his own initiative, to bring about an improvement of the conditions. Today we know that the aims were not achieved and that a world crumbled, but is it right that because of that millions of Germans should be accused of crimes when they tried to do something good in these days?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to extracts from this book of the Bishop, which is Document No. 36, page 116. Would you please take judicial notice of the passages I have referred to with reference to the question which the witness has just touched upon, namely, the position of high ranking clergymen.
With reference to that especially, I refer you to Document No. 50, page 136, which is on appeal to the Catholic bishops on behalf of Cardinal Innitzer. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, as you have stated, it had the aim of getting Hitler to alter his ways which he had adopted. Did Hitler do that?
A. First of all Hitler appeared to me to be extremely impressed by this book, but then later, the anti-Christian tendencies among his followers gained control and they convinced him that it would be the greatest possible danger if such a book were allowed to appear in Germany. This book had been printed in Austria and therefore a permit had to be issued in connection with it. All I could achieve was a permit for two thousand copies, which were supposed to be sent to leading party members to enable them to study the problem.
Q. Did you ascertain that the foreign policy of the Reich was in keeping with the principles which were stated when the government was formed?
A. Yes. During the time when I was a member of the cabinet it was conducted on the principles which had been designed. I want to mention the friendship treaty with Poland, which was concluded at the time and which was considerable protection for peace; this treaty was concluded by Hitler although it was most unpopulat because of the problem of the Corridor. I would like to mention the Four-Power Pact concluded in 1933, which emphasized the Locarno Treaty and the Kellogg Pact; and I want to mention Mr. Eden's visit in January, 1934, when we submitted proposals to him for demilitarization of the SA and the SS, all of which shows that by these means we were trying to do away wi th the discrimination which Germany had suffered from by peaceful means. In my opinion, it was a catasthropic mistake made by the major powers that during that phase Germany was not met half way, because radicalism could have been steered by means of such a friendly gesture.
Q. On the 14th of October, 1933, Germany left the Disarmament Conference. Was this a departure from that original policy which you have just explained?
A. The leaving of the Disarmament Conference was not in any way meant to be a departure from our political principles. The leaving of that Disarmament Conference happened because the promised equality which we had been assured of in '32 had once more been cancelled.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, would you tell me, is the defendant saying that the principles adopted in 1933 were contained in any document or not?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a Proclamation of the Reich Government dated the 30th of January, 1933 -- I beg your pardon, the 1st of February, 1933. In that proclamation the principles of the policy of the new cabinet are contained, Theyare supplemented by the statement of the Reich government dated the 12th of March, -- I beg your pardon, -- the 23rd of March, 1933, and that proclamation then became the powering law.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me the reference to the first document that you mentioned?
Dr. KUBUSCHOK: If I may, I shall inform you, Mr. President, after the recess. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. What were the reasons -- what was your attitude with reference to Germany's leaving of the League of Nations?
A. The departure from the League of Nations was a question about which you could have many different points of view. I myself was in favor of remaining in the League of Nations. I remember that before the day when Hitler decided upon that step, I personally traveled to Munich to try to persuade him to remain a member of the League. It was my point of view that it would be more advantageous for us if we had remained in the League of Nations, because there we had many good connections, even from Stresemann's time. If one were to leave the League, however, then it might be a tactical question insofar as one might hope that direct negotiations with the major powers could be more promising, Apart from that, Herr von Neurath's discussion with Ambassador Bullitt, which is Document L 150, will show where Herr von Neurath says that a proposal on Germany part existed to rejoin a reformed, reorganized League of Nations.
Dr. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to Lersner's interrogatory, Document 93, and I come to question No. 5, where the witness speaks about the journey of the defendant von Papen to Munich. This is Page 213, Document No. 93.
And now, Mr. President, I shall come to a more or less lengthy question, and I was wondering whether this would be a suitable moment to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1410 hours, 17 June 1946)
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Before the recess, I referred to the proclamation by the Government issued on 1-3-33, to be found in Document 12, page 53. This is but a short extract, and I shall submit the entire speech. The proclamation of the 23rd of March 1933 may be found in Document 12, pages 56 to 58, and has been submitted, but only in the form of an extract, under USA-568. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
A. On the second of November 1933, in a speech made as Essen, you spoke on the occasion of the imminent plebescite and dealt with leaving the League of Nations, and you approved the policy set forth and represented by the government. The Prosecution drew conclusions which were unfavorable to you. What were the reasons which motivated you to make that speech at that time? foreign political decision for us. We wished to emphasize to the world that thid departure from the League of Nations was not to be constured as a change in our foreign politicalmethods. Therefore, Hindenburg and Hitler issued solemn appeals and emphasized that the German people, by a plebiscite, would decide on this question, and it would mean that our renunciation of the League of Nations would render service to our equality of rights, and service to *eace.
A. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document 60, page 160, 161, and 162, and pages 147 to 152, to be found in my document book. These are the statements made by Hitler and by Hindenburg and the Reich Government. The topic was a change in method, not a change in our objective attitude. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: the Saar Region. What was the policy that you followed in connection with the Saar Region?
A As far as the Saar question was concerned, I always worked on the basis of a friendly understanding with France, to this effect, that the Saar problem be regularized or put in order without a plebescite.
The fact that we did not want a plebescite was not to be construed egotistically, for this plebescite was assured Germany, and my proposal was rather a sacrifice which I willingly brought forward for understanding. France receive compensation in the amount of 900 million francs, and I should like to repeat that even after we left the League of Nations, my plenipotentiary for Saar questions, Freiherr von Lersner, always was in touch with the League of Nations organs and negotiated on the principle of a friendly and amiable understanding. French foreign minister on this question of the Saar.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to document 59, page 145. This document contains a proclamation issued by the defendant concerning his attitude on the Saar problem. Freiherr von Lersner, in his interrogatory which is document 93, page 212, in reply to Question 3 defined his attitude regarding the Saar question.
Q. Were there any signs to the effect that after leaving the League of Nations this generally considered peaceful policy was just a policy of expediency and that in the long run an aggressive policy was being considered or would be considered ?
A. Not at all. Our leaving the league of Nations was for us purely and simply a change in our methods. At that time we were interested in having direct negotiations with the major powers. The fact that we were following and pursuing a policy of peace, that fact I emphasized repeatedly in many public addresses. In this connection I should like to refer to document 56, which will be submitted by my attorney.
Q. Document 56, page 144, contains a speech by the Defendant at Kottbus. The date of that speech is the 21 of January, 1934, and I ask the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. supposition that an aggressive policy was being contemplated ?
A. It seems to me that all the proceedings which have taken place in this courtroom itself is clearly evidence that the actual rearmament took place much later. If Hitler , in fact, in the year '33 or '34 did take rearmament measures then they were measures which he personally and the Armament Minister and the Luftwaffe Minister discussed. In any event I never concerned myself with them and I was never a part of any of these discussions. Reich Defense Committee, which has been mentioned very frequently here, in the years '33 and '34 was purely and simply a committee of experts under the direction and chairmanship of a Lt. Colonel.
Q. Just a short time ago you mentioned the safeguards which were taken by you at the time the Hitler Government was formed, the safeguards which you took, so that the influence of the Party would be minimized.
How did the position of Hitler and the influence of the N.S.D.A.P. expert themselves in the course of that year, 1933 and the beginning of '34 ?
A. Gradually there developed a relationship of confidence between Hitler and Hindenburg.
This led to the practice of a common or joint report, a procedure which we agreed upon at that time. A very decisive factor in this development was the influence that Hitler exerted on the Reichswehrminister Blomberg. Even at that time, that is in 1933 Hitler tried to exert a decisive influence on the army. He wanted to have the then General von Hammerstein removed and wanted him replaced by General von Reichenau, who was considered a friend of the Party. At that time I persuaded the Reich President not to grant Hitler's wish in this connection and suggested to him that he take General von Fritsch instead. "Steelhelmet", that is the rightist conservative unit into the N.S.D.A.P.
Then there were new cabinet members who were party members. These cabinet posts were filled with party members. Hugenberg, the leader of the conservative right was not in the cabinet and the two ministries, Economy and Agriculture, the two important ministries which he had had, went to the National Socialists. mentioned, was the election results of the 5th of March. Now in the government of all the states there were National Socialist majorities. From these local governments there was constant pressure exerted on Hitler. Hitler based himself on party dynamics und was supported thereby in ever increasing degrees and thus from a partner in a rightist coalition set-up he turned into an autocrat without compromise, that is a complete autocrat.
Q. I should like to refer to the affidavit of the former Minister Hugenberg, document 88, page 196 to 198, in the document book. I should book, which is an affidavit deposed by Dr. Conrad Josten. upon ?
A. In my position as vice-chancellor it was intended that I would be the deputy of the Reichschancellor but I was not to have any department. It developed very quickly that my position as Vice-Chancellor was quite out of the question since Hitler dealt with each and every question himself.
The fact that I did not have a department weakened my position as well as the fact that my position was based only upon the confidence Hindenburg had in me, a confidence which decreased as the importance of Hitler increased. There was a direct ratio there.
Q. How was the position of Hitler in the cabinet reconciled with the provisions of the constitution ?
A. In Article 56 of the constitution there is defined the position of the Chancellor in the cabinet. In this article it says that the Reichschancellor will lay down the general guiding principles of policy and will carry the responsibility for measures put before the Reichstag. If the policy of a department minister is not in accord with the directives set down by the Reichschancellor the decision is not to be taken by the cabinet or a majority thereof, but the Chancellor himself will decide on this point. cannot be outvoted by the cabinet when there is a difference as to questions involving the policy that he has laid down. DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with this question I should like to refer you to a question which has been incorrectly set down. I should like to refer you to the leading commentary by Gerhard Anschuetz, document 22, page 80 and 81 I should like to refer to page 81, Figure (4) under Article 56.
This statement is clearly set forth and says that when it comes to difference of opinion as to the application of the basic principles of the policy, the Reich Chancellor alone will decide and that when it comes to basic problems, there is no voting and no majority decision. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: the developments? increased very obviously and visibly. The situation arose that the concessions which we as partners of the coalition had made did not lead to a final internal satisfaction but that the Party considered them only the beginning of a new revolutionary movement. This was quite obviously a digression from the pact which had been concluded on 30 January. My many objections in the Cabinet were in vain and fruitless. to change his policy in the Cabinet, which was something we told him, there was only way. That was the matter of a resignation or the way to public opinion. If I had resigned, then I could no longer speak. Therefore, I decided to speak now and to speak publicly, and I decided to turn to the German people on basic principles. would have remained silent, would have remained in office, or would have taken another office, but now I decided to go before the public and to shoulder all the possibilities and the consequences which might accrue therefrom.
Q On 17 June 1934 you gave your speech at Marburg. What did you wish to accomplish with this speech? the decision of Hitler which were essential to the maintenance of a reasonable policy in Germany. In this speech I turned against the demands of a certain group or party for a revolutionary, national monopoly,and I turned against the coercion and the suppression of others. I turned against the anti-Christian demands, and I turned against the suppression of critical opinions. I turned against the suppression and the regimentation of the spirit, and I turned against the violations of fundamental rights and against inequality before the law, and I turned against the Byzantium principles which were dominent and rampant in the Party.
ring could be broken, in just once instance, then the system would have been forced to order. For instance, we would have restored freedom of speech and freedom of the spirit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This speech, the significance ofwhich has been stressed by the Prosecution, may be found in Document 11, page 40. there is a misprint. The date is not 7 July, as is shown in the translation, but the date is actually 17 June. German history since 1933 for its critical nature, I should like to quote several extracts from it. I should like to have you turn to page 41, and I shall begin in about the center of this page:
"We know that rumors and whispers must be brought out from the dark where they have taken refuge, An open and manly discussion serves the German people better than, for instance, the airtight condition of a press ofwhich the Minister for Propaganda has stated that it 'no longer has a face. This deficiency no doubt exists. The purpose of the press should be to inform the government where deficiencies have crept in, where corruption has settled down, where grave errors have been committed, where unfit men sit in the wrong places, where sins are committed against the spirit of the German Revolution. An anonymous or secret information service, however well organized it may be, can never be a substitute for this task of the press. For a newspaper editor is under the responsibility of his conscience and the law. On the other hand, anonymous news sources are uncontrollable and liable to the danger of byzantinism. When therefore the natural organs of public opinion do not bring enough light into the mysterious darkness which at present seems to have fallen upon the German public, then the statesman must stand up and call the things by their right names."
Then on page 42, just a little beyond the center of the page:
"It is the historical truth that the necessity for a fundamental change of course was recognized and urged by those who shunned the path of revolution by a mass-party. A claim for a revolutionary or nationalist monopoly by a certain group, therefore, seems to be overweening,quite apart from the fact that such a claim prejudices the unity of the people."
And now page 43, a sentence from approximately the center of the page:
"Not all of life can be organized without becoming mechanized. The state is organization; life is growth."
And on Page 45, just a little beyond the center of the page:
"The dominance of a single party replacing the majority party system, which justifiably has disappeared, appears to me historically as a transitional stage, justified only as long as the safeguarding of the new political change demands it and only until the now process of personnel selection begins to function." about the center of the page:
"But one should not mistake the religious state which is based upon an active belief in God for a secular state in which earthly values replace such belief and are given religious honors."
Then, about five lines following:
"Certainly, the outward respect for religious belief is an improvement compared to the disrespectful attitude produced by a degenerate nationalism. But we should not forget that real religion meansto be bound to God and not to those substitutes such as have been introduced into the consciousness of nations especially by the materialistic conception history of Karl Marx. If wide circles of people, out of the very viewpoint of state totality and the complete amalgamation of the nation, demand a uniform religious foundation, they should not forget that we ought to be happy to have such a foundation in the Christian faith."
Then, the third last line on this same page:
"It is my conviction that the Christian doctrine is the **solute religious form of all occidental thinking and that, with the reawakening of religious forces, the German people also will be permeated anew by the Christian spirit, a spirit the profundity of which is almost forgotten by a humanity that has lived through the nineteenth century. A struggle is coming for the decision as to whether the now Reich of the Germans shall be Christian or will be lost in sectarianism and half-relgious materialism". little beyond the center of the page:
"But once a revolution is terminated, the government only represents the entire people and never is it the exponent of individuals groups". bottom:
"Therefore, it will not do to dispose of the intellect with the catchword of 'intellectualism'. Deficient or elementary intellects cannot yet justify a war on intellectualism. And if today we corp in sometimes about the 150 percent Nazis, then we mean those landless intellectuals without a foundation, people who would like to deny the right to exist to scientists of world fame just because they are not Party members".
Then, on the next page--page49--on the first line; it says:
"One should not make the objection that spiritual people lack the vitality necessary for the leaders of a people. True spirit is so vital that it sacrifices itself for its conviction. The mistaking of brutality for vitality would *---* a worship of force which would be dangerous to a people."
" They oppose equality before the law, which they criticize as liberal degeneration, wheras in reality it is the prerequisite for any fair judgement.
"These people suppress that foundation of the state which always, not only in liberal times, was called justice. Their attacks are directed against the security and freedom of the private sphere of life which the German has won in centuries of hardest struggle".
In the next paragraph he speaks against Byzantinism; and the second sentence reads:
"Great men are not made by propaganda, but rather, they gain eminence by their acts and are recognized by history. Byzantinism cannot deceptively disregard those laws". should like to be in my reading with the second sentences:
"But one should not disregard the biological and psychological limits of education. Coercion ends at the will of self-expression of the true personality. Reactions to coercion are dangerous. As an old soldier I know that rigid discipline must be supplemented by certain liberties. A good soldier who submitted joyfully to unconditional obedience counter the days of his service, because the need for freedom is rooted in human nature. The application of military discipline to the whole life of a people must remain within the limits which are not contrary to human nature". something from the last paragraph, beginning with the second sentence:
"The movement must come to a standstill at same time; a solid structure must once begin to arise, which is hold together by an unprejudiced administration of justice and ab uncontested governmental power. By constant dynamics nothing can be achieved. Germany dare not becomes a passage into the unknown, of which no one knows where it will stop". on the following page:
As my last quotation, I shall read the first paragraph on the following page:
"The Government is well informed on all those things, all the selfishness, lack of character, want of truth, unchivalrous conduct and arrogance which would like to spread out under the cover of the German revolution. It is also aware that the rich store of confidence bestowed upon it by the German people is threatened. If one wants close connection and association among the people, one must not underestimate their good sense, must return their confidence, and not try to hold them constantly in tutelage. The German people know their situation is serious. The people feel economic distress; they recognize well the deficiencies of certain laws born from emergency; they are sensitive to force and injustice; they smile at clumsy attempts to deceive them by false optimism. No organization and no propaganda, however good it may be, will in the long run, be able to preserve confidence.
"I therefore looked at the wave of propaganda against the so-called foolish critics, and I looked at it differently from the way others looked at it. Not by provocation, especially of the youth, not by threats against helpless parts of the people. but only by confident discussion with the people can confidence and readiness for corporation be promoted. The people know that heavy sacrifices are expected from them. They will bear them and follow the Fuehrer in unflinching loyalty.
If they are allowed to have their part in the planning and working, if not every word of criticism is taken for ill will, and if despairing patriots are not marked as enemies of the state." BY. DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Witness, what were the consequences of your Marburg speech? Minister Goebbels. Only two papers could feature it, but that sufficed so that attention was called to it both at hone and abroad. I want to the Reich Chancellor at once and said that I wished to submit my resignation. I told him: "it is quite impossible that the Vice Chancellor of the Government cannot speak; I have nothing left to do except to take my leave.' Hitler said: "That was a mistake on the part of the Propaganda Minister. I shall speak with him and have him recind this decree which prohibits your speech from being published."
In that way he stalled me along for several days. However, I know that even at that time he lied to me because, as co-defendant Funk has stated, he war instructed by Hitler to go to Hindenburg and tell Hindenburg that the Vice Chancellor had taken a stand against the Cabinet and Hitler, and would have to be dismissed. Mr. von Papen was silent, that he should have stirred up the diplomats instead, then I should like to point out that from Mr. Dodd's diary we can see very, very clearly that the outside world was very well informed about this, my last appeal.
BY. DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer you to the last remark made by the witness. to be found in document 17, at pages 71 and 72, the diary of ambassador Dodd. I beg your pardon, in the English text it is at pages 69 and 70. I should like to quote from the second paragraph, and I should like to start with the first line.
There is new great excitement all over Germany." The Marburg speech had been referred to. "All old and intellectual Germans are highly pleased." been cabled to the New York Times and that the papers in London and in Paris were featuring the "von Papen episode", as he called the Marburg speech.
I should also like to have you refer to the beginning of page 72, at the top of the page.
In the English text, that is Page 70. Speech and its dissemination were concerned, I should like to have you refer to document 15, Page 66, which is an affidavit by Westphalen, which shows that even the possession of a copy of the speech would be sufficient to hqve disciplinary action taken against any official who was in possession of a copy. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK : took place. How did these incidents concern you personally ? phone call from Minister Goering, with the request that I come to see him to discuss matters with him. I went to Goering, and he told me that there had been a revolution which had broken out in the Reich, a revolution of the SA, and that Hitler was in Munich so that he could quell this uprising there, and that he, Goering, was charged with the task of restoring law and order in Berlin.
Mr. Goering then asked me, in the interests of my own safety, as he put it, to return to my flat and to remain there. I pretested quite vehemently against this demand of his; but Mr. Goering was insistent. office, the office of the Vice-Chancellor. On arriving there, I found my office occupied by the SS, and I was permitted only to enter my own office, so that I could pick up my files.
I continued my journey and went home to my flat. There I found a strong formation of SS units. The telephone was blocked; the radio was turned off. I was completely cut off from any and all contact with the outside world for a matter of three whole days.
Q What measures were taken against your co-workers ?
only on the 3rd of July, after I had regained my freedom once more.
At that time, I learned that my press export, Mr. von Bose, had been shot in his office, and I further learned that two of my male secretaries, Mr. von Schuschki and one other gentleman, had been taken to a concentration camp. colleague, a private co-worker of mine, Mr. Edgar Gunk.
Q Did you then try to inform the Reich president ? establishing a telephone connection with Goering. I demanded that I be set free at once. Mr. Goering apologized and said that it was a mistake that I had been arrested and kept under arrest for this long period of time.
I then went immediately to the Reich chancellery. There I met Hitler, who was about to start a cabinet session. I asked him to step into the next room so that I could speak with him. I did not want to enter this cabinet meeting, I said to him : "These things which were done to a member of your government are so incredible and fantastic that I can give you only one answer; and that is the repeating of my request for the acceptance of my resignation. I want it immediately."
I said him, Mr. Hitler, there is no explanation possible, and there is no apology for this incident, I demand a research into the facts and an investigation of those incidents that concerned my co-workers. I further demand of you a publication of my resignation, immediately". to remain in the government, that he could not make the matter of my resignation public because the agitation and excitement among the German people was too great, and that he could only make my resignation public in, say, three of four weeks.
When I left Hitler. I tried personally and through one of my secretaries to get in touch with von Hindenburg. That attempt, however, failed. I must say that Mr. von Hindenburg was in Neudeck in East Prussiam at that time; and my secretary, who travelled to East Prussia, learned that it was quite impossible to reach von Hindenburg.
Everything had been blocked. My own telephone calls did not go through. I went to my friend, the Chief of the Wehrmacht , General von Fritsch, and said to him, "Why doesn't the Wehrmacht intervene ? Why doesn't it do something ? The Wehrmacht is the only thing that can keep order in the country, and the only factor of pence in the country". and other officers, in my opinion - it would have been quite proper for the Wehrmacht itself to try to restore order in this situation.
Mr. von Fritsch said to me, " I can ask questions only when I have a command from Field Marshal von Hindenburg in my hands." But Hindenburg was not accessible to us. The other side had obviously advised him about the complete legality of events as they had take place, which Hitler declared in the Reichstag to be legal. the witness Gisevius testified. And during the time that elapsed between the 30th. of June and my appointment in Austria, I did not participate in one single government act. asked the Reich chancellor to give me the body of my friend,Bose. We knew that the Gestapo had cremated the bodies of the other victims.
THE PRESIDENT : I believe it would be a good time to recess now.
(A recess was taken)