concerned, the most serious point brought up by the prosecution -- the accusation that as a Catholic am supposed to have cooperated to contribute to this conspiracy against world peace. I should like to have permission, therefore, that with a few brief words I may refer to my attitude in the church question. The Catholics in Germany had organized themselves within the central political party. Before 1918, the central party had always established the balance between the left and the right political wings. After the war, that picture altered entirely.
We now find the Center Party mostly in a coalition with the Left. In Prussia, this state of affairs was maintained during all the years from 1918 until 1932 and became a permanent institution. Undeniably the Center Party during the years after the collapse had manymerits regarding the maintenance of the life of the state, but the coalition with the Social Democrats, and in particular as far as the church-political sector was concerned -- had made it impossible for the Center Party to collaborate with the Right. Regarding the important political and personnel political questions, the Center Party there had advocated a policy of compromise, which in turn was achieved by making concessions regarding church politics. That this state of affairs -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, to what is this all relevant?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution have alleged that Papen, as a prominent Catholic, used that position to consolidate the Nazi regime, that he had worked for two masters, and that this was becoming particularly marked and was throwing light on his character. making now the details of his actions in the church-political sector, the attitude he adopted, and since he was a member of the Center Party, he wants to prove that, as he left it, it was necessary for him to underline the split which developed between him and the leadership of the party.
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it necessary to go into this extreme detail? Surely the thing that he wants to show is that he was not assisting the Nazi Party. He was undoubtedly a Catholic, and he wants to show that he was not assisting the Nazi Party. He does not want to go into all of these details about Catholic influences and his part in Catholic influences.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I have already finished, but, Mr. President, quite generally, with reference to the case of Papen, I should like to say that the difficulties are due to the fact that we are trying to prove that right from the beginning he adhered to principles. It is essential in this connection that the conditions at a certain period should be elucidated, and we are not very far from the point where we can leave the internal political circumstances. The other subjects that I shall come to will be very much briefer, but I do think that for the sake of completeness and for the purpose of painting the picture of the personality of the defendant, certain details will have to be gone into, in which connection we shall be anxious to dispense with any avoidable and superfluous details.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, we are perfectly well aware that the case of every one of these twenty-one defendants is different from the others. We are perfectly aware of that, but what we desire is that their cases should be put forward fairly but without unnecessary and burdensome detail. They hope that you will try to confine the defendant to the really essential matters will you go on?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well, Mr. President. We shall do our best. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Please, will you continue? within the party, in favor of using conservative forces, got me the reputation of being a bad Catholic. Something that a non-German judge can not possibly know is that in those years a Catholic who was not a member of the Center Party but who belonged to the Right wing parties was regarded as a bad and inferior Catholic, and this is the thing that I always fought against.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In his official statement of 4 June 1932, von Papen referred to the fact that the entire public life in Germany in those days had to be regarded as the outcome of the previous coalition policy in Prussia. In that connection I refer you to Document 1, Page 2, and I quote the last part of the first long paragraph:
"The disintegration of atheistic-marxist thoughts have already too deeply invaded all the cultural fields of public life, because the Christian forces of the State were all too easily ready for compromises. The purity of public life cannot be maintained or re-established by way of compromises for the sake of parity. A clear decision must be made as to what forces are willing to help reconstruct the new Germany on the basis of the unchangeable principles of the Christian ideology."
I also refer to Document No. 37 on Page 119, where in a speech at Munich on 1 March 1933 the witness refers to the points of view which he has just now mentioned.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Witness, did you think that the position of the churches was secure in the new government, and what did you do in that respect? regard to this problem, and he did, and he did it in a positive manner. In the preamble to my speeches held in those days, there is the remark that it was the first and most important task that there should be corrections of the Nazi program with reference to the religious problem, because that was a prerequisite for a united front of the two Christian confessions in that coalition. guard it, by giving it a certain foreign political meaning through the Concordat.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I refer to Document 37 on page 119 and 120. It contains extracts from several speeches delivered by the witness, and I draw your attention to Volume 1, page 38, and I shall begin about one-third from the beginning of page 119. It was a speech made at Dortmund in February 1933. The defendant von Papen said -
THE PRESIDENT: We have that document before us.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document 37, page 119.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have got that, yes. All I was suggesting was that it was sufficient to refer us to the document. As a matter of fact, you have already got to the time when he resigned his post as Prime Minister of Prussia in 1934, and now you are going back to 1933.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He retired, in Prussia, in 1033. At any rate, I shall refer to the speeches which are contained in that document, and I should like to draw your attention to page 120.
THE PRESIDENT: Did he resign in 1033 or 1934?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1933. of the Reich Government of the 1st of February, 1933. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. How was that agreement achieved?
A. I shall reiterate. I regarded a Christian basis for the Reich as an absolute necessity with which to safeguard it. For that reason, I suggested to Hitler, in April of 1933, that the rights of the churches should be safeguarded in a concordate; this concordate with reference to the Protestant Churches. Although there was a certain amount of objection in the Party, Hitler agreed, and thus the concordat was concluded. concordat was supposed to have been a maneuver of deception. Perhaps I may point out in this connection, the fact that those man with whom I signed this concordat--namely, Secretary of State Pacelli, who is now the reigning Pope, as well as Monseigneur Kaas, who was the Chairman of the Central Party for a number of years--had known Germany personally for thirteen years. If these two men were agreeable to concluding a concordat, then one could certainly not say that this was a maneuver of deception.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer now to document 39, at page 121. should like to read. After the conclusion of the concordat, Hitler published a decree, and that decree is worded as follows--I refer to the middle of page 122: "I therefore order:
"1. The dissolution of all Catholic organizations which are recognized by the present treaty and the dissolution of which took place without directions from the Government is to be rescinded at once.
"2. Any measures of coercion against members of the clergy and other leaders of those Catholic organizations are to cease.
A renewal of such measures is prohibited in the future, and will be punished according to prevailing laws". a change of mind on Hitler's part, presumably due to the influence coming from his immediate entourage. addressed to the Bishop of Trier, which appears on the same page. same problem. It is the affidavit of Baron von Twickel, and it is to take the place of an a ffidavit which was meant to be presented and which was to have been signed by the late Cardinal von Galen. The question had already been discussed with von Galen, but before he had a chance to put this in writing, he died. The person who discussed the question with him, Freiherr von Twickel, has now stated the details in his affidavit, document 43, on page 127. 139. This is an affirmation, in lieu of oath, from the Benedictine Abbey at Gruessau, signed by Friedrich Albert Schmitt, who has been the religious advisor to the defendant for a number of years. In the last but one paragraph on page 139, he discusses the question of the concordat, and states as follows:
"Herr von Papen was deeply upset by the illegal attitude adopted by the German Government, which appeared soon after the signing of the concordat. He also discussed with me, in detail, his great worries in this respect, as well as pondering ways and means of fighting against these violations. I can also testify, from my own personal experience, that he personally worked actively in the interests of the church for the loyal observance of the concordat".
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, did you adopt any measures, apart from view were taken care of?
A. Yes. On the 15th of June, 1933, I created an organ ization in Berlin which we called the "Cross and Eagle". A therein.
This working cooperative of Catholic Germans had the working cooperative of Catholic Germans, you yourself had violated the concordat.
What can you say about that? been described by the Prosecution as "The characteristic development of the church policy of a conspirator, and Papen's participation in it." of the concordat by my own person, is a tremendous accusation. It is connected with the dissilution of that working cooperative which I have just mentioned. The documents show that this working cooperative had already been aimed at on to the occasion of the Roehm revolt, on the 30th of June. 1934, and that its later dissolution, through me, was merely a formal affair. This was a political, working cooperative which never enjoyed the protection of the concordat.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I wish to refer to document number 45, on page 129. It is an exchange of telgrams between Hitler and Hindenburg regarding the pacifying action for the Protestant Church. to in document 74, on pages 130 to 132. This document contains an affidavitI beg your pardon; that has been erroneously quoted. I refer to document 47, at page 130, which is an affidavit from the Manager of the Industrial Association of Catholic Germans, Roderich Count Thun. It deals with the dissilution at page 131, and I quote the second paragraph:
"On the 30th of June, 1934, the Office of the Industrial Association of Catholic Germans was occupied by the Gestapo.
The files were confiscated and taken away. I myself was arrested." other than a declaration is referred to in a statement in the last paragraph of Page 131:
"Even after my release which was effected after a time, the confiscated files were not returned. In view of the attitude taken up by the Party offices, a revival of or any further activity on the part of the organization could not be considered. Furthermore, any further practical activity of the 'industrial Association of Catholic Germans' could no longer be possible, as the only person who could undertake the current interventions, Herr von Papen, having moved to Vienna, was out of the picture. The only question which remained for the management was how to terminate its activities officially. In so doing, it had to be taken into consideration that in the event of an official compulsory dissolution, the large number of Catholics, who had distinguished themselves through their work for the organization, would accordingly be persecuted. In order to prevent this, the dissolution was pronounced by the management of the Industrial Association of Catholic Germans."
Then I quote the last sentence:
"In order to do everything possible to maintain Catholic interests, they did not neglect to point out again in this pronouncement that official authorities, above all, Hitler himself, had solemnly vowed to protect Christian and ecclesiastical interests."
THE PRESIDENT: W ill you remind me of the date when the defendant von Papen moved to Vienna?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the 15th of August, 1934, he went to Vienna. He was appointed at the end of July, 1934. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: the Condordates, and that Hitler's assurances were not kept. How can you explain Hitler's behavior in this respect?
keep his religious assurances, but that the radical elements in his party did not wish it, and that most of all it was due to Goebbels' and Bormann's influence, who again and again would urge Hitler to violate the interests of the church political sector.
I often and repeatedly spoke to Hitler and objected to these violations. And in my speech at Marburg I branded it publicly. I stated at Marburg: "How can we fulfill our historic mission in Europe if we ourselves erase ourselves from the list of Christian peoples?"
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I draw your attention to Document No. 85 on Page 169, and beg you to take judicial notice of it. It is an affidavit of Dr. Glasebock, the former leader of the Front of Conservative Catholics in Germany. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Mr. Witness, on the 14th of March, 1937, Pope Pious XI spoke about his anxiety and objected solemnly to the violations of this Concordate. The prosecution said that if you had meant to be serious with the assurances contained in that concordate, then you would know, at that point, have handed in your official resignation. What do you have to say to that?
A What could I have improved by taking such action? Apart from the Austrian matters, I had no longer any political influnce on Hitler. And to leave my post in Austria was prohibited me by my own conviction thatin critical times particularly asthey were in 1937, it was anardent necessity for me to remain at work.
Later on, we shall see that, from the developments. But apart from that, may I say that if the Prosecution assumes that I on the basis of that certainly perfectly justified protest from the Pope, should have left my post, then I must ask, what did thechurch do? They did not recall the Papal Nuncius. And Bishop Berning, who was looking afterthe Catholic interests in the state council, did not leave that state council, either. It was all perfectly true, because wehad all hoped at the time that there would be interior changes.
Q I draw your attention to Document 48 on page 133. The document has already been submitted as USA Exhibit 356. It is pay 133 in my document book. It is the allocution of His Holiness Pope Pius XII to the Sacred College on the 2nd of June, 1945, and I quote:
".....It must, however, be recognized that the Concordats, in the years that followed, brought some advantages, or at least prevented worse evils.
In fact, in spite of all the violations to which it was subjected, it gave Catholics a juridical basis for their defense, a stronghold behind which to shield themselves in their opposition--aslong as this was possible -- to the ever growing campaign of religious persecution." on page 134 of my document bock. It has already been presented as USA Exhibit 685. It is a letter from the Deputy of the Fuehrer to the Reich Minister for Culture, and it deals with the dissolution of the theological faculties of the universities. I quote the last paragraph of that letter:
"In this case, as you have likewise pointed out in your letter, the clause of the Concordat and the Church Treaties are to be taken into consideration. In the case of certain faculties which are not mentioned by a specific clause in the Concordat and Church Treaties, as for example, Munich and a few others a removal can be begun without further ado. This is equally true of the theological faculties in Austria ("Ostmark") Vienna and Graz . . .".
Q. During subsequent years public arguments about church political questions were almost entirely suppressed, since the Catholic press, in violation of the concordate, and even Catholic pamphlets were prohibited. What did you do against these actions?
A. It appeared necessary to me, after the Catholic press had been completely throttled, that something should be done to revive public discussion regarding the fight against the churches. I had talked about this question very often to the Bishop, Dr. Hudal, who was a very outstanding clergyman in Rome. My defense will present to the Tribunal the book written by this Bishop in 1936. This bock, apart from severe criticism of the anti-religious tendencies, contains an objective appreciation of the positive social thoughts of National Socialism, and it is all the more remarkable because, in 1936, such high authorities of the church were making yet one more attempt to establish some coordination between the thoughts of the church and the healthy doctrines of National Socialism.
Q. In what respect do you consider that book of importance with regard to the accusation raised against you by the prosecution?
A. I consider it to be very relevant for the following reason: The prosecution were making it easy for themselves in that under recognition of the criminal target of National Socialism they were blaming entirely the initial years of the development, and all those who, for clear-cut motives, were attempting to give the movement a creative character, are being accused by the prosecution of being criminals; but here in 1938, a clergyman of high rank, arises and attempts, on his own initiative, to bring about an improvement of the conditions. Today we know that the aims were not achieved and that a world crumbled, but is it right that because of that millions of Germans should be accused of crimes when they tried to do something good in these days?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to extracts from this book of the Bishop, which is Document No. 36, page 116. Would you please take judicial notice of the passages I have referred to with reference to the question which the witness has just touched upon, namely, the position of high ranking clergymen.
With reference to that especially, I refer you to Document No. 50, page 136, which is on appeal to the Catholic bishops on behalf of Cardinal Innitzer. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, as you have stated, it had the aim of getting Hitler to alter his ways which he had adopted. Did Hitler do that?
A. First of all Hitler appeared to me to be extremely impressed by this book, but then later, the anti-Christian tendencies among his followers gained control and they convinced him that it would be the greatest possible danger if such a book were allowed to appear in Germany. This book had been printed in Austria and therefore a permit had to be issued in connection with it. All I could achieve was a permit for two thousand copies, which were supposed to be sent to leading party members to enable them to study the problem.
Q. Did you ascertain that the foreign policy of the Reich was in keeping with the principles which were stated when the government was formed?
A. Yes. During the time when I was a member of the cabinet it was conducted on the principles which had been designed. I want to mention the friendship treaty with Poland, which was concluded at the time and which was considerable protection for peace; this treaty was concluded by Hitler although it was most unpopulat because of the problem of the Corridor. I would like to mention the Four-Power Pact concluded in 1933, which emphasized the Locarno Treaty and the Kellogg Pact; and I want to mention Mr. Eden's visit in January, 1934, when we submitted proposals to him for demilitarization of the SA and the SS, all of which shows that by these means we were trying to do away wi th the discrimination which Germany had suffered from by peaceful means. In my opinion, it was a catasthropic mistake made by the major powers that during that phase Germany was not met half way, because radicalism could have been steered by means of such a friendly gesture.
Q. On the 14th of October, 1933, Germany left the Disarmament Conference. Was this a departure from that original policy which you have just explained?
A. The leaving of the Disarmament Conference was not in any way meant to be a departure from our political principles. The leaving of that Disarmament Conference happened because the promised equality which we had been assured of in '32 had once more been cancelled.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, would you tell me, is the defendant saying that the principles adopted in 1933 were contained in any document or not?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a Proclamation of the Reich Government dated the 30th of January, 1933 -- I beg your pardon, the 1st of February, 1933. In that proclamation the principles of the policy of the new cabinet are contained, Theyare supplemented by the statement of the Reich government dated the 12th of March, -- I beg your pardon, -- the 23rd of March, 1933, and that proclamation then became the powering law.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me the reference to the first document that you mentioned?
Dr. KUBUSCHOK: If I may, I shall inform you, Mr. President, after the recess. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. What were the reasons -- what was your attitude with reference to Germany's leaving of the League of Nations?
A. The departure from the League of Nations was a question about which you could have many different points of view. I myself was in favor of remaining in the League of Nations. I remember that before the day when Hitler decided upon that step, I personally traveled to Munich to try to persuade him to remain a member of the League. It was my point of view that it would be more advantageous for us if we had remained in the League of Nations, because there we had many good connections, even from Stresemann's time. If one were to leave the League, however, then it might be a tactical question insofar as one might hope that direct negotiations with the major powers could be more promising, Apart from that, Herr von Neurath's discussion with Ambassador Bullitt, which is Document L 150, will show where Herr von Neurath says that a proposal on Germany part existed to rejoin a reformed, reorganized League of Nations.
Dr. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to Lersner's interrogatory, Document 93, and I come to question No. 5, where the witness speaks about the journey of the defendant von Papen to Munich. This is Page 213, Document No. 93.
And now, Mr. President, I shall come to a more or less lengthy question, and I was wondering whether this would be a suitable moment to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1410 hours, 17 June 1946)
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Before the recess, I referred to the proclamation by the Government issued on 1-3-33, to be found in Document 12, page 53. This is but a short extract, and I shall submit the entire speech. The proclamation of the 23rd of March 1933 may be found in Document 12, pages 56 to 58, and has been submitted, but only in the form of an extract, under USA-568. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
A. On the second of November 1933, in a speech made as Essen, you spoke on the occasion of the imminent plebescite and dealt with leaving the League of Nations, and you approved the policy set forth and represented by the government. The Prosecution drew conclusions which were unfavorable to you. What were the reasons which motivated you to make that speech at that time? foreign political decision for us. We wished to emphasize to the world that thid departure from the League of Nations was not to be constured as a change in our foreign politicalmethods. Therefore, Hindenburg and Hitler issued solemn appeals and emphasized that the German people, by a plebiscite, would decide on this question, and it would mean that our renunciation of the League of Nations would render service to our equality of rights, and service to *eace.
A. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document 60, page 160, 161, and 162, and pages 147 to 152, to be found in my document book. These are the statements made by Hitler and by Hindenburg and the Reich Government. The topic was a change in method, not a change in our objective attitude. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: the Saar Region. What was the policy that you followed in connection with the Saar Region?
A As far as the Saar question was concerned, I always worked on the basis of a friendly understanding with France, to this effect, that the Saar problem be regularized or put in order without a plebescite.
The fact that we did not want a plebescite was not to be construed egotistically, for this plebescite was assured Germany, and my proposal was rather a sacrifice which I willingly brought forward for understanding. France receive compensation in the amount of 900 million francs, and I should like to repeat that even after we left the League of Nations, my plenipotentiary for Saar questions, Freiherr von Lersner, always was in touch with the League of Nations organs and negotiated on the principle of a friendly and amiable understanding. French foreign minister on this question of the Saar.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to document 59, page 145. This document contains a proclamation issued by the defendant concerning his attitude on the Saar problem. Freiherr von Lersner, in his interrogatory which is document 93, page 212, in reply to Question 3 defined his attitude regarding the Saar question.
Q. Were there any signs to the effect that after leaving the League of Nations this generally considered peaceful policy was just a policy of expediency and that in the long run an aggressive policy was being considered or would be considered ?
A. Not at all. Our leaving the league of Nations was for us purely and simply a change in our methods. At that time we were interested in having direct negotiations with the major powers. The fact that we were following and pursuing a policy of peace, that fact I emphasized repeatedly in many public addresses. In this connection I should like to refer to document 56, which will be submitted by my attorney.
Q. Document 56, page 144, contains a speech by the Defendant at Kottbus. The date of that speech is the 21 of January, 1934, and I ask the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. supposition that an aggressive policy was being contemplated ?
A. It seems to me that all the proceedings which have taken place in this courtroom itself is clearly evidence that the actual rearmament took place much later. If Hitler , in fact, in the year '33 or '34 did take rearmament measures then they were measures which he personally and the Armament Minister and the Luftwaffe Minister discussed. In any event I never concerned myself with them and I was never a part of any of these discussions. Reich Defense Committee, which has been mentioned very frequently here, in the years '33 and '34 was purely and simply a committee of experts under the direction and chairmanship of a Lt. Colonel.
Q. Just a short time ago you mentioned the safeguards which were taken by you at the time the Hitler Government was formed, the safeguards which you took, so that the influence of the Party would be minimized.
How did the position of Hitler and the influence of the N.S.D.A.P. expert themselves in the course of that year, 1933 and the beginning of '34 ?
A. Gradually there developed a relationship of confidence between Hitler and Hindenburg.
This led to the practice of a common or joint report, a procedure which we agreed upon at that time. A very decisive factor in this development was the influence that Hitler exerted on the Reichswehrminister Blomberg. Even at that time, that is in 1933 Hitler tried to exert a decisive influence on the army. He wanted to have the then General von Hammerstein removed and wanted him replaced by General von Reichenau, who was considered a friend of the Party. At that time I persuaded the Reich President not to grant Hitler's wish in this connection and suggested to him that he take General von Fritsch instead. "Steelhelmet", that is the rightist conservative unit into the N.S.D.A.P.
Then there were new cabinet members who were party members. These cabinet posts were filled with party members. Hugenberg, the leader of the conservative right was not in the cabinet and the two ministries, Economy and Agriculture, the two important ministries which he had had, went to the National Socialists. mentioned, was the election results of the 5th of March. Now in the government of all the states there were National Socialist majorities. From these local governments there was constant pressure exerted on Hitler. Hitler based himself on party dynamics und was supported thereby in ever increasing degrees and thus from a partner in a rightist coalition set-up he turned into an autocrat without compromise, that is a complete autocrat.
Q. I should like to refer to the affidavit of the former Minister Hugenberg, document 88, page 196 to 198, in the document book. I should book, which is an affidavit deposed by Dr. Conrad Josten. upon ?
A. In my position as vice-chancellor it was intended that I would be the deputy of the Reichschancellor but I was not to have any department. It developed very quickly that my position as Vice-Chancellor was quite out of the question since Hitler dealt with each and every question himself.
The fact that I did not have a department weakened my position as well as the fact that my position was based only upon the confidence Hindenburg had in me, a confidence which decreased as the importance of Hitler increased. There was a direct ratio there.
Q. How was the position of Hitler in the cabinet reconciled with the provisions of the constitution ?
A. In Article 56 of the constitution there is defined the position of the Chancellor in the cabinet. In this article it says that the Reichschancellor will lay down the general guiding principles of policy and will carry the responsibility for measures put before the Reichstag. If the policy of a department minister is not in accord with the directives set down by the Reichschancellor the decision is not to be taken by the cabinet or a majority thereof, but the Chancellor himself will decide on this point. cannot be outvoted by the cabinet when there is a difference as to questions involving the policy that he has laid down. DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with this question I should like to refer you to a question which has been incorrectly set down. I should like to refer you to the leading commentary by Gerhard Anschuetz, document 22, page 80 and 81 I should like to refer to page 81, Figure (4) under Article 56.