of which I can now remember. My total impression was that the discussion had a favorable outcome, and I recognized that the conference had been conducted with full loyalty to Chancellor Schuschnigg. As far as I can remember today, the Anschluss as such had not been dealt with at all. he wasSchuschnigg's living guarantor, and that he was not the driver of a Trojan horse?
A I don't wish to confirm just these words, that those were the words he used literally. The expression which Dr. Seyss particularly used was that he wasnot a Trojan horse leader. Furthermore, I remember that he had used the expression frequently that he was the living guarantor for adhering to the agreement of Berchtesgaden.
Q Did he also say that he refused to have a cultural fight?
A I think I can remember that. At any rate, that washis point of view, and I certainly expected that he would talk to the Fuehrer about that.
Q Did the Fuehrer agree to these proposals? suggestions from Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
Q Did Seyss-Inquart tell Schuschnigg that?
A That I must assume. At any rate, he did state that that was his intention.
Q Did he tellthe Austrian National Socialiststhe same thing?
A Yes, because that wasparticularly necessary. During a leader conference Seyss-Inquart made a speech -- and this was at the beginning of March. He pointed out that a revolutionary course and measures undesirable to the radical followers -- namely, the dissolution of the legal organizations had been specifically demanded by Adolf Hitler. and on the occasion of the demonstrations at Graz, he referred to that particularly. The visit to Adolf Hitler in Berlin gave him the necessary legitimate background in the eyes of the National Socialists.
been informed of preparations for revolutionary steps.
A May I ask you, Dr. Steinbauer, which revolutionary steps you mean?
A May I have permission to be a little explicit in this connection? The expression "revolutionary steps" is too far-reaching. The measures which were introduced were mainly these.
After Chancellor Schuschnigg's speech at Innsbruck, Major Klausner was convinced that with this, any basis of an inner political understanding had been destroyed and that this speech would be like a spot in a powder barrel.
which the vote might be "yes", it was now, with reference to the attitude of the masses, quite impossible. A clear-cut decision regarding the attitude of the National Socialist leaders had to be brought about. Still, during the night, the new Gualeiters were given their first news, according to which the Party was not agreeable to the proposed plebescite, and that therefore the rol would be to refrain from voting.
The keenest discipline was demanded, because we feared that the"waves" would soon run very high. On the 10th of March, the long prepared propaganda of Zernatto began, and clashes occurred. We had reports, in fact, to the effect that large groups of the protection unit, forbidden February, were being armed Strictest alert was ordered for the formations therefore, and the formations received orders to take care of the protection of nationals.
Principally, these were the steps ordered on the 10th; and regarding the atmosphere in the provinces, I think I informed Dr. Seyss generally in the afternoon. I probably did not inform him about the individual measures of organizations.
Q. Did he promote that atmosphere?
A. No.
Q. Did he ask people to demonstrate, or did he prevent them?
A. He neither promoted them, nor did he invite people to them. A prevention in that stage was no longer possible.
Q. Then what happened on the morning of the 11th?
A. On the 11th of May, in the forenoon, I was at the office of State Chancellor Jury, where I worked. I no longer know the details of what I was doing. We met Dr. Seyss, Glaise Horstenau, and several others about noon in the office of Dr. Fischboeck. Dr. Seyss-Inquart told us of the outcome of the conference with Dr. Schuschnigg. The result of our consultation was the letter which the ministers and state counsellors wrote to Dr. Schuschnigg, which had a time limit of two o'clock, and demanded the cancellation of that unconstitutional plebescite, and demanded arrangements for a new plebescite, a few weeks later, in accordance with the regulation of the constitution, announcing resignations if necessary demands were not met.
Q. Then what happened? Schuschnigg returned the plebescite, did he not, and you knew about that? Or how did you hear?
A. Yes. Schuschnigg postponed the plebescite, but he refused to give a date for a new plebescite, and he gave orders to Dr. Seyss, the Security Minister, to adopt severe measures. That solution was reported to the chancellory in Berlin by telephone in the afternoon, and it was because of the statement from the Reich that that solution, as a half-solution, was not acceptable any more. As far as I know, that started the intervention on the part of the German Reich.
Q. But was not that intervention brought about through Glaise Horstenau? It has been stated that Glaise Horstenau took a letter from Adolf Hitler, or a courier took a letter, from Adolf Hitler to Vienna.
A. It was my view that certain documents which Globocnik was showing me at mid-day, and which had been addressed to the county command offices, had been brought along by Glaise Horstenau, who come back from Berlin that morning. As I heard later, that was supposed to be done by a courrier. An intervention on the part of the Reich was not represented by that, in my opinion.
Q. Were there connections between the Party and the Reich on one side, and the Reich on the other? Did they work hand-in-glove?
A. If you mean, Dr. Steinbauer, "conspiracy" by "working hand-in-glove", then I must say definitely no. But the collaboration which seemed to be in the agreement at Berchtesgaden was, of course, carried out.
Q. Did Klausner give the order that the Party should be free to act and that it was to seize power?
A. Through a specific order from Adolf Hitler, it had become the duty of the Party not to undertake any revolutionary steps. That order had been repeated during the early days of March and transmitted by Hitler. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had talked to Hitler, who was already in his airplane
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Steinbauer, what was the question? Surely, the question was what Klausner did, and the witness did not answer it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. I have asked you, did Klausner give the order to the Gauleiters to seize power?
A. That order was given by Klausner on the evening of the 11th of March.
Q. Did SeyssOInquart approve?
A. Seyss-Inquart was not informed of that until sometime later.
Q. But then I shall have to put it to you that Gauleiter Eigruber, from Uppen Austria, has stated in an affidavit that he received a telegram in which he was addressed as Landeshauptmann. Do you know anything about that?
A. I know nothing whatever about telegrams, or a telegram. I know that Klausner's order was telephoned through from Seizer Gasse No. 1. That evening Globocnik was also putting through a call from the chancellery. I expect that Eigruber is probably referring to one of these telephone calls.
Q. Is it known to you that Gauleiter of Vienna has told you that he misused the name of Seyss-Inquart for the seizure of power?
A. Globocnik told me that several inquiring had been made to the chancellor's office which were passed on to him over the telephone, and that he did not always state his name in that connection. One special case in connection with Salzburg is, in fact, known to me in detail.
Q. In this Rainer letter, you have also made a statement which mentions same assistance on the 25th of July, 1934, and the prosecution considers that this has a connection with the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss. Will you clarify that for us?
A. That remark goes back to a conversation during which Seyss-Inquart told me that he, after the 25th of July, had been afraid for a few days to be connected with the events of these days, but that after a few days it had turned out that there was no such connection. Consequently he used, or tried to exert, personal influence, and he took over some defense cases.
Q. That is your explanation for the special help? I sec.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know that pressure was exercised on the president, Dr. Miklas, pressure on the part of the Austro-National Socialists, so that he would appoint Seyss-Inquart?
A. The negotiations which occupied the entire afternoon and late evening were under a certain amount of pressure, because practically in the whole of Austria the transfer had already been carried out. It was the overthrow of Schuschnigg's cabinet which caused a tremendous avalanche. During the negotiations,that found its expression.
Q. In other words, you mean that visibly there was pressure but not physically upon the person of the president ?
A. No. Of course there is no question of that.
Q. But, then how do you explain that at that time forty SS men marched into the Chancellery building and occupied it ?
A. An occupation by the SS is hardly the right expression. When, towards 8,00 o'clock in the evening, Niklas had again refused to nominate a National Socialist for the chancellor's position, Kepler stated that at 8,00 o'clock his fear for the safety of the negotiators. In fact, as one said, things in Austria were generally upside down and the situation appeared very unsafe. The building of the chancellor's office was occupied by the police and the guards and was transferred into a state of defense. I informed the county command offices of that situation and I asked them to introduce measures of safeguarding so that wilful acts would not cause tremendous misfortune; but the measures which were introduced caused, as one consequence that no earlier than 1),00 o'clock that same evening an SS leader reported in civilian clothes, stating that he and his men had been attached to us to protect the negotiators. Seyss-Inquart considered that step unnecessary; but I asked him to consider the facts and be careful, and he allowed these men to pass through the police and guards and they were admitted to the courtyard of the building. There was never any pressure nor were there acts of force. That was merely a measure of safeguarding.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
DR. SERVATIUS: Dr. Servatius, counsel for Sauckel. BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q. Mr. Witness, you were Gauleiter of Corinthia. Did you have administrative powers during the war and during the subsequent Italian era ?
A. Yes. In September, 1943, I became the Supreme Commissioner in the operational zone of the Adriatic coastland with my seat in Trieste and I had six provinces under my command.
Q. Did you recruit foreign workers there for work in Germany ?
A. Yes.
Q. In what manner was this done ?
A. It was done through recruiting; that is to say, without employment of any coercion, since for many decades these workers were used to going to work northwards.
Q. These workers were used in your Gau, were they ?
A. The majority were put to work in my Gau, but also in other parts of the Alpine country.
Q. What were their living conditions, the conditions these people in your Gau lived under ?
A. Their living conditions were the general, ones, the normal ones.
Q. Where were they accommodated ? In camps ? Did you see any such camps ?
A. They were housed by their employers. Where larger numbers of them appeared they lived in camps which were looked after by the Italian Consulate and the German Labor Front.
Q. Did the D.A.F. look after conditions in practice ?
A. Yes. An agreement made the necessary provisions, an agreement of which I was informed. It was their duty and they went to great pains to carry out that task.
Q. Did you yourself inspect the camps ?
A. Yes. I have inspected camps frequently and I found conditions to be good and orderly. In the case of certain industries, I found that conditions were exceptionally good, for instance -
Q. Can you give us the names of these camps ?
A. The particularly good impression one camp made on me was that attached to some waterworks at Muent; the same applies to Schwabeck.
Q. How did those foreign workers behave at the end of the war ? Was there disquiet?
A. No. Because of the considerable number, considering my small district I was worried about the food supplies, The relation to the population was good because the Corinthian is a kind and agreeable type. I have experienced it myself, that French workers, who had already been collected by the British in camps to be transported away, went back to their farmers, preferring to wait there rather than waiting in the other camps.
Q. Was the National Socialist Party strongly represented in Corinthia ?
A. Yes. There were so many National Socialists in Corinthia that Schuschnigg had said on one occasion that one ought to put a barbed wire around that county and there you would have a concentration camp.
Q. But their relationship to the foreign workers was good ?
A. Yes, naturally.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. BY MR. DODD:
Q. Mr. Witness, when did you come to the conclusion that this defendant, Seyss-Inquart, was not a member of the party as you stated in your letter ? When did you, change your mind about that ?
A. I didn't learn until fairly late, after the Anschluss, that he wasn't a member of the party. I can't tell you the year for certain now.
Q. But it was not long after you wrote this report, was it, that you found out that what you had said in here was not exactly so ? That you had misunderstood ?
A. In that report I made several attempts to describe matters in a way favorable to Seyss-Inquart, because I refused to support the prosecutors against Dr. Seyss-
Q. Now that isn't what I asked you. I asked you if it was a fact that you found out seen after you wrote this letter that you were in error in stating that Seyss-Inquart had been a member of the party ? Now you can answer that very directly I think, without any long statement.
A. I don't believe that I noticed it shortly afterwards.
Q. Wel, when was it ? That is all we want to know. If at any time, you actually did receive such information, when did you receive it ?
A. That I can no longer say and it didn't appear important to me at the time.
Q. Now when did you change your mind or find that you were in error in saying that Seyss-Inquart knew about and participated in the staged demonstrations or the arrangements for the demonstrations which were to take place in Vienna ? When did you find that that was misinformation or a mistake ?
A. I am not aware that Dr. Seyss-Inquart participated in demonstrations in Vienna.
Q. Now that isn't what I said. If you misunderstood me, I am sorry. Now turn around and maybe if you will look at me it will help a little. You told the Tribunal, in answer to a question from Dr. Steinbauer, that Seyss-Inquart did not provoke the demonstrations and he could not prevent then at that stage. But what Dr. Steinbauer asked you was if what you said in your letter about his participation in the plans was ture. You know what you say in your letter or your report, don't you ? Do you remember what you said in this report about Seyss-Inquart and his particiaption ?
A. The details of my report are no longer in my memory, but -
Q. Would you like to look at it ?
A. Yes, please.
Q. While you are waiting for it I can clear up some other things here. Now as a matter of fact, you gave us an affidavit in November, swearing that this was true, didn't you ?
A. I have specifically stated in this connection that I was relying on information received from others and that afterwards I had further information showing me that not everything had been correctly represented. I stated that specifically and had it included in the record that I had made. These statements were included in an appendix and added to my affidavit.
Q. Just a minute. On the 15th day of November, 1945, right here in Nurnberg, under oath, you executed this affidavit in which you said that you confirmed the facts of this report and that they were all true to the best of your knowledge and belief. Now what information have you received since the 15th of November and from whom, that warrants you in making statements contrary to this report today before this Tribunal ?
adopted on the 16th of November is maintained by me today. on the 15th day of November ?
A The report must not be taken literally. Partly it is based on statements made by reliable people, and I executed it to the best of my knowledge and ability, based again on the situation existing in July 1939, and it has a certain tendency.
Q Well, you told us it was true in November, didn't you ?
Q (Interposing) Your affidavit is attached to that document that you have, and that is your signature, isn't it, and you have sworn to the truth of it ? made a short note about it afterwards. The formulation of the affidavit was discussed at length.
Q Now you answer my question. Is that the affidavit that you executed under oath on the 15th of November here in Nurnberg ? Yes or no ? form the basis of the above mentioned letters and reports are true to the best of my knowledge and belief," And you also say further up that you have read the letters and the report.
Now, is that affidavit true ? Were you telling the truth when you said that to us under oath in November ? gave in connection with it and which were taken down at that time in shorthand, be added to it.
Q Why didn't you ask that there be included in the affidavit anything that you wanted about this report if it wasn't altogether true ? You were swearing to it. Did you ask that something be added to it or that it be changed ? the document which had been submitted to me. The record of my statements contained my attitude towards the contents of these documents, and as a precaution I added a statement that in this case, too, I wished certain reservations to be taken down.
They were subsequently formulated by one of the gentlmen interrogating me, stating that "to his best knowledge and conscience..." and then he went on to say that all these reservations which I had stated had not been included in accordance with the method to which they were accustomed. about this affidavit? Are you really serious about this last statement? you make. I have another one here that you haven't seen. You made a speech in 1942.
MR. DODD: This is Document 4005-PS. It becomes USA 890. BY MR. DODD:
Q You had better have a copy of this in front of you. Do you remember that speech that you made on the 11th of March 1942in Klagenfurt before the leaders Corps and the bearers of honor insignia and blood orders of the Gau Karinthia, in which you told the whole story of the development of the events of March of 1938? Do you remember the day you made that speech?
Q All right. Now, let's look at it. Were you telling the truth the day you made that speech? audience would understand it.
Q Were you telling the truth? That is what I want to know. Were you telling the truth when you made that speech? I didn't ask you if you made it interesting; I asked you if you told the truth. there were certain things which I didn't knew correctly.
Q Now, let's take a look and see what you said in 1942 with reference to this report, PS-812. trying to locate for you the sentence that begins, "Only in cooperating with us -- Jury and a number of co-workers of Leopold..." That is on page 2 of the English text, about the middle of the page, the lower third of the page.
Do you find that?
A No. Did you say page 18 of the German text?
Q Do you find that, "Only in cooperation with us -- Jury and a number of co-workers of Leopold and also with Leopold's consent, it was possible to achieve Seyss-Inquart's appointment to the post of State Council, Staatsrat. More and More Seyss turned out to be the clever negotiator."
Q Do you find that?
Q "We know he was the one who would best represent the interests of the movement in the political forefield. He also unconditionally subordinated himself always to Klausner's leadership. He always conducted himself as Klausner's deputy and conscientiously followed Klausner's instructions. With Seyss' appointment to the post of Staatsrat, we found a new possibility to enter into further negotiations. At that time, there were a number of grotesque situations. We were informed on events in the Schuschnigg camp by the political apparatus; our own connection to Ribbentrop, Goering and Himmler we have via Keppler." and how do you reconcile that now with what you have told the Tribunal about the report to Buerckel?
A It isn't known to me where that record of the speech originates. I should have to have an opportunity -
Q I'll tell you. It is a captured document that was found down there in the files, so you needn't worry about that. What I want to know is whether or not you now admit that you made this speech and you said these things at the time that you made it. have said under oath today about that point was true. This is a broad statement designed for the audience of the times, which can't be taken so carefully as something which I say today, conscious of my responsibility. today, are you?
Q Let's turn a page and see what you said about Papen, and about the conference. You go on to say how you get information, how you met in the Ringstrasse, and so on. If you will follow right along now, we won't lose the place.
"Papen had been exressly told to handle preparations for the conference confidentially. In Austria only Schuschnigg, Schmidt and Zernatto knew about it. They believed that on our side only Papen was informed. Papen, too, thought that only he knew about it, but we too were informed and had had conversations with Seyss about the subject."
That is the Berchtesgaden conference. Now, were you telling the truth when you said this in 1942, or not? Or was that a broad statement for the benefit of the audience? of those days corrector.
Q Well, why not? It was in 1942. Don't you remember? Do you mean that you don't know whether you told the truth or not, or you don't know whether you said this or not?
Q Did you tell them the truth? under oath before this Tribunal, having to make concrete statements about concrete points. It seems impossible to me that I should today be able to read individual points of a speech which was made four years ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you have an answer? He is not answering your question
MR. DODD: No, sir,he is not. BY MR. DODD: and if you did so, were they true? Now, you can tell us that very simply and we don't need any long answer. You have read it over and you have heard me read it. Now, please give us an answer.
You don't need to read any more. You have read it once and I have read it to you. Was that true and did you say it?
Q Well, is it true in any respect? Is it true that Papen was informed and that Seyss-Inquart know about that conference long before it took place or sometime before it took place? That is what we want to know.
met -
Q Now, just a minute. You are hot answering my question. That is the next sentence which you are reading. I know that is coming and I am going to ask you about the meeting in Garmisch. I am now asking you if what you said about von Papen and Seyss-Inquart is the truth, and that is all I want to know. about the intention of having a conference.
Now, let's go on a little bit further and find out about this Garmisch meeting. You were invited down there to the Olympic games, you say, and you had a meeting with Papen and Seyss-Inquart, and theywent through some negotiations, and then you went to Berlin.
Now, I want to move down a little bit. There is a lot of interesting material here. We don't have the time to go into it all just now. You go on down quite a bit, and I want to ask you about what you say you had already prepared.
"We had already prepared the following" -- and you are talking about Schuschnigg and the impending conference. It is on the back of page 9 of your text, Mr. Witness, and it is on page 5 of the English text, the last paragraph. You say:
"We had already prepared the following:
"The last result of the conversation Seyss communicated to me in a place in the Kaertnerstrasse. I called the telephone number where Globus was to be reached in Berlin " -- by the way, for the benefit ofthe Tribunal, Globus is Globocnik. He is the same person, isn't he?
Q " -- and told him about the negative result of the conversation. I could speak with Globus entirely freely. We had a secret code for each name, and besides we both spoke a terrible dialect so that not a sould would have understood us. Globus immediately wrote down this report ..." and so on.
"In themeantime, Keppler had gone to Munich by sleeping car."
Then, a sentence or two further down:
"I then forwarded instructions by Party member Muehlmann, who proved to be an excellent liaison men to Party and government offices in the Reich.
He left for Salzburg on the same train as Schuschnigg. While Schuschnigg had his car taken off at Salzburg and spent the night there and continued by auto to the Obersalzburg, Muehlmann continued on and was in Berchtesgaden. Keppler and he went to the Fuehrer before Schuschnigg and could tell him everything. Schuschnigg arrived in the morning, was received, and lived to see the boundless surprise that the Fuehrer took up the negotiations where they had been broken off without results the day before between Seyss and him. The Fuehrer did not conduct the negotiations as Schuschnigg expected. He went the whole hog. Schuschnigg was finished off that time. The Fuehrer got hold of him, assaulted him, and shouted at him and reproached him for all the dirty tricks Schuschnigg had committed during the years past. Schuschnigg had become a heavy smoker. We had connections even into his bedroom. We know about his way of life. Now he was smoking 50, now 60 cigarettes. Now at the Fuehrer he was not allowed to smoke. Schuschnigg could not smoke even.
"Ribbentrop told me he really pitied Schuschnigg. He only stood at attention before the Fuehrer, had his hands against the seams and all he said was 'Yes, sir', 'Jawohl'."
Now, what about that? You said all these things in your speech. Were they true when you said them?
Right up to that point, Mr. Witness, you have read it with me. Did you say this or not, and was it true when you said it?
Individual expression of mine which I am reading here are not mine. In that point, that document has been supplemented by somebody else. Whether the evidence repeats in it or goes into detail, that is something I cannot say for certain because much of it did not happen in my presence.
Q I just wanted to know if you said it, that's all. Very well, we will go on. asked him to give Schuschnigg one cigarette and so they gave him one. Let's go on quite a few pages to a more important matter. It's on page 13.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you be able to finish tonight, because we were planning to adjourn at a quarter to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I have only a few more questions and I'll need only two more minutes to finish. BY MR. DODD: Seyss-Inquart came to this meeting and told you that he had been bound by his word of honor not to speak of what he had heard. You will find it on page 13, it's on page 13 of the English text.... Well, you can find it, I am sure you will take my word if I tell you that it is there, and that it is on page 13 of the English text. But you say, "We asked Seyss: 'Is it true?' Seyss said: 'I am bound not to speak by my word of honor, but we want to act as if it is true' (diplomat that he was). The matter was clear for us."
He let you knew, didn't he, that Schuschnigg had told him about the plan. He lot you know, didn't he? Please, can't you answer my question? questions for you.
You also said, "In the night from Thursday, March 10, to Friday, March 11, all Gauleiters were in Vienna waiting for information. National Socialists were attacked, and so on 10 March we issued orders to the SA, and SS, Lukesch and Kaltenbrunner, on our own initiative, to call out beginning Friday, half of our formations for the protection of National Socialists in the streets, whereas the best men were to remain armed in their barracks in the event of a civil war.
We had to be ready to deal not only with the executive authorities, but also with the red mob."
A With arms and under barracks, that cannot be right. That's no question of barracks anyway, and weapons, we didn't have any. speech was included in detail in your report to Buerckel. The truth of the matter is that you, in both instances, passed up the truth, isn't it? That's the truth of the matter. When you made your report to Buerckel, you were reporting what you thought were the facts, and what you know now are stories, and not facts.
MR. DODD: Well, I certainly do not have many more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 13 June 1946.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the question of the time to be taken by counsel in their concluding speeches. The provisions of Article 18 of the Charter directing the Tribunal to confine the trail strictly to an expeditious hearing must be observed, and counsel clearly could not be permitted to speak at any length they choose. Necessity dictates that there must be some limitation, or this already lengthy trial might be prolonged beyond all reason. concluding speeches to three days in all, and some voluntary limitation should be made by counsel for the defense. The evidence for the defendants has been fully heard in great detail, and what is now needed is not a detailed analysis of the evidence, but a concise review of the main matters. from failure to mention any particular matter in argument. On this view, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the speeches of the counsel for the defense -including the speech to be made on behalf of all the defendants on the submission of law -- should be concluded in fourteen days in all. This will allow the defense double the time taken by the prosecution, both in opening and in summing up. By mutual arrangement between counsel, there fourteen days could be apportioned as they think fit, and the Tribunal would prefer that the; make the apportionment rather than make the apportionment itself. prepare their speeches in accordance with what I have said, and will advise the Tribunal as soon as possible of the apportionment of time that they have made. If they find themselves unable to agree on this apportionment, the Tribunal will give further consideration to the matter.