What was not permitted, however, was their organization. That is to say, that my National Socialist friends would have not possibility to yet in touch with national Socialists in any loyal way.
This agreement, however, opened the gates without a regaulr procedure being in any way planned for. With that, I was always resolved to see Adolf Hitler myself, and to make sue whether my plan had not with his approval. I went with Dr. Schuschnigg's agreement and was given an Austrian diplomatic passport.
Q. But what did you talk to Hitler about?
A. Just now I mentioned the wrong date, it was on the 16th of February that I became Mininster and I went to Berlin on the 17th. than two hours. It was pointed out by the Prosecution here that I had saluted Adolf Hitler with the raised right arm. That was perfectly permissable under the agreement but I would like the Proseuction to admit that during every one of my interrogations, I have admitted that I had emphasised before Adolf Hitler at once that I was an Austrian Minister and in that respect, responsible for my actions to Austria. a letter. A few wholes later, I dictated those notes into a typewriter, and I should like to repeat the contents of my talk with Hitler on the basis of those notes. My explanation...
Q. Witness, will you be as brief as possible?
A. But this is the most important point with reference to my entire responsibility. I said that it was a condition for Chancellor Schuschnigg that I should stand on the basis of an independent Austria. Further developmen, including the Anschluss, would have to be based on the Austrian. The formation of the will of the Austrians would have to be allowed to proceed without interference, and on the basis of the policies given. I would have to be the guarantee for a proper development of Dr. Schuschnigg.
I said I did lid not offer myself as a Trojan horse driver. The Party and political movement would not be allowed, to adopt the part of a greater Party.
The Party in Austria must not aim at totalitarian conditions. The Socialists thoughts would only have to be reliazed in keeping with the conditions in Austria, and must not be forces upon the others in any way. The illegal Party as such, of course, did not disappear at once, but it must not be allowed to be active illegally, otherwise, in my capacity as Minister of the Interior and Security, I would have to lock up individuals. that the 25 points of the Party program were not necessarily material. "You cannot", he said, "announce a dogma;. You have to base your thoughts on German thoughts and you must cone to National Socialism trends through them." Those were ,the conyents of our discussion 17 February, starting at 12:00 and ending at 2:10.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I understand the witness to say that he made his notes of the meeting and later dictated it int* the typewriter. It Is not clear to re whether lie was reading from those notes. Furthermore, we have never seen such notes and I think it should be made clear on the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, had the defendant got the notes?
DR. STEINBAUER: The original was taken away from him when he was arrested.
THE PRESIDENT: You heard the question I asked, have you got the notes?
WITNESS: The original of the notes was amongst my files in Vienna. I have made application to have the files which were found with me searched for that note. A copy of that note which Iad in hand, was handed to the Prosecution by me on the occasion of one of my first interrogations, and are in the file of the Prosecution. I myself have only copies here, and not the
THE PRESIDENT: The copy would be just, as good for the purposes.
WITNESS: I have placed a copy at the disposal of the Defense.
DR. STEINBAUER: But Defendant, I gave it back to you. Perhaps you can let we have it and I will present it to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give it an exhibit number Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, number 61, so that I won't muddle it up with the other exhibit numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am still confused about this, and I am sure that my colleagues are. We have never received any copies of any notes which the Defendant claims to have made at the time of his conference with Hitler, be have no such copy in our files. What is not clear is whether he made these notes up immediately after the conference or a few weeks later, the original of which he claims he gave to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that what you say, Defendant, that the Document which you have just handed to your Counsel is a copy of your document which you say you presented to the Prosecution during your interrogations, which was a copy of the shorthand notes you made at that time?
WITNESS: Mr. President, the original notes I made in the afternoon of February 17 were made a few weeks later. I dictated these notes, which were in shorthand, to my secretary who took them down on a typewriter, so that I have several copies. One of the copies which I had;, I gave to the Prosecution on the occasion of one of my interrogations last summer. I have now given a second copy to my Defense Counsel. These are copies prepared in accordance with my notes a few weeks after the actual talk. The original is In my files in Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I wonder if we could learn just who it was that the Defendant gave those copies to?
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who the interrogating counsel was?
WITNESS: Mr. Dodd himself.
MR. DODD: We don't have it.
WITNEESS: I think I am quite right in saying so.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the contents, in its important point s, coincide with a voluntary statement made by this...
MR. DODD: I think this is important enough a matter so that we have to clear it up here. I have a copy of the interrogation, one of the first ones of this witness, in which he said that he did not have a copy, but that they were in a flack leather brief case in Mendorf, and he asked me if we could yet it, and I said we would try but we never found it. That's in the record of the interrogation.
WITNESS: May I say that I did produce the black briefcase, and the notes were in it, and during a subsequent interrogation I took a copy and showed it.
(A short pause)
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: I was going to say that in principle Document No.490, page 113, corroborates these facts, and that the Defendant, wht witness, informed Schuschnigg of the contents of that talk. Document No:65 proves this. It is on page 158.
Q And now, Mr. Witness, I want to ask you this: Did Hitler agree to your proposal? to certain other points he expressed doubts whether the Austrian Government might agree. The principal impression was, however, that this policy was possible. Interior and the Police had placed executive powers in the hands of the Nazis. witness, Dr. Scubl. After Dollfuss's death Dr. Scubl was a confidence man in the Austrian Government and he became a Secretary of State and General Secretary for the Security System, in which capacity he was attached to my office. Quite obviously he had a certain amount of authority. I had no objection at all to that. In fact, I was very pleased to have such an export at my disposal. I only wanted to mention quite briefly that orders regarding all executive powers came from Scubl. I myself never gave any direct orders to the Austrian police. Scubl was given the instruction by Dr. Schuschnigg, particularly on the 10th and 11th of March, and I myself didn't introduce a single National Socialist into the Austrian police. servants -
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I want to refer to two documents, Nos. 51 and 52, on pages 117 and 119 respectively. We have now reached Document Book No.2. officials, and the second speech a radio talk he gave at length.
Q And now we reach the critical days in March. Did you -- and from whom did you -- hear of the plebiscite plans of Dr. Schuschnigg?
A The day before Dr. Schuschnigg announced the plan for the plebiscite in Innsbrueck he told me and informed me of his plans. At that time I asked him whether that decision was unalterable and he confirmed that. I expressed the view that this might lead to difficulties. But I promised him that I would help him wherever I could, either to get over the difficulties in connection with that plebiscite or to leave it to a suitable outcome, suitable, that is to say, even to the National Socialists. Of course, I had continuous contact with the Austrian National Socialists since I was the liaison man. I spoke with Zernatto's and Schuschnigg's knowledge at several meetings and I spoke about what I had said to Adolf Hitler and what we had discussed. I avoided demonstrations wherever I could. Then, o f course, as Minister of the Interior I prohibited demonstrations. In that connection I refer you to the prohibition of all demonstrations and meetings, published by me, and the special prohibition of a demonstration of an individual demonstration at that time at Graz, something which is proved by the interrogatory submitted to the witness, Dr. Ueberreiter.
Q Did Schuschnigg give you any promises?
A No. I want to say that still on that same evening I was approached by Dr. Jury who in some way or other had already heard of the plan for this plebiscite. I did not in any way express agreement with Dr. Schuschnigg, although I should, of course, not have allowed myself to exercise self-imposed silence,because there was this liaison man position of the 12th of February.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think, Mr. President, this would be an excellent moment to Interrupt the session.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
(A recess was taken.) It became known. Now we come to the 11th of March. What did you do in the forenoon of that day? consultation with the Austrian National Socialists, I wrote a letter to Dr.
Schuschnigg in which I commented on the plebiscite in an unfavorable sense. The reasons were primarily that a regular plebiscite result was not guaranteed because it was not a real plebiscite in the sense of the State Laws. It was not decided on by the Council of Minister but by the Fatherland Front, that is, the Party, and it was to be carried out by the Party too.
election should be held, with all the legal requisites for an election. a detailed conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg. We reached an agreement that the Government -- as well as the provincial governments, and so forth -- was to be filled with National Socialists, that in effect a coalition government was to be formed, in which case the National Socialists would vote "yes". differences of opinion, I reported to the Austrian National Socialists, but they were not much interested because news had come from Berlin that Hitler had refused the plebiscite. I was told that on the next day I would receive a letter from Hitler.
Q Did you receive such a letter?
A Yes. I received, by courier, a letter from Hitler. I believe I can say with some certainty that the letter contained the proposal of a march into Austria, but I cannot recall whether the draft of a radio speech was contained in it.
Q What did you do in the morning, after receiving the letter?
AAfter receiving this letter I went to Dr. Schuschnigg, with Minister Glaise, and we were at the Federal Chancellor's office at 10 o'clock. I informed Chancellor Schuschnigg of the contents of this letter, without reservation. In particular, I pointed out that in the case of refusal, Adolf Hitler counted on unrest amongst the Austrian National Socialists, and that he was ready, if disturbances occurred, to march in in answer to an appeal for help. In other words, I called Chancellor Schuschnigg's attention to the possibility of such a development.
Q Did you demand an answer from him?
A The letter set a deadline for 12 o'clock noon. Our talk lasted until about 11:30. I asked Chancellor Schuschnigg to give me an answer by 2 o'clock. I know that in the meantime, and on the day before too, be had taken security measures, through Dr. Scubl, which I did not approve of. Several year classes of the Austrian Federal Army were called up; the police was alerted; and a curfew was set up in the evening.
Q What about the afternoon of the 11th of March?
AAt 2 o'clock I went to the Chancellery office with Minister Glaise. First we had a talk with Dr. Schuschnigg, and Dr. Schuschnigg refused to postpone the matter. At about the same moment I was called to the telephone; Reichsmarshal Goering was on the telephone. That telephone conversation is here under the number USA-76. the postponement, he declared, in the name of the Reich, that he had to ask for Schuschnigg's resignation because of the agreement of the 12th of February, and the Reich had confidence in him. Dr. Schuschnigg was ready to postpone, but not ready to resign. Thereupon Reichsmarshal Goering demanded not only Schuschnigg's resignation, but my appointment as Federal Chancellor.
In a talk with Chancellor Schuschnigg at 3:30 in the afternoon, the latter said that he would offer the President the resignation of the whole cabinet. When I was informed of this I left the Federal Chancellor's office because I considered my function as a middle-men, in the sense of the agreement of the 12th of February, concluded. I did not want to intervene; I did not want to do anything to become Federal Chancellor myself. This is an excerpt from the record of the telephone conversation with Goering where Seyss-Inquart spooks about the relationship between Germany and Austria and it states here: "Well, he means that Austrian independence has to be preserved."
What happened on the 11th of March, in the late afternoon? formations were to come to Austria. From that bane telephone conversation it can be seen that I did not want this, that before the entry of any formations I wanted an election or a plebiscite in Autria. asked me for information. I then went to the Federal Chancellor's office ag* Berlin repeatedly asked no to intervene with the Federal President to become Federal Chancellor; I always refused to do so.
Q What did the Austrian NSDAP do?
A The party in Austria began demonstrations. The Party members went out and filled the streets. Further, they were only Party members or followers, and it became an enormous demonstration against the system and for the National Socialists.
Q What was the feeling in the Federal Counties?
A I had no contact. Quito late that night, or the next day, I learned that there, even more than in Vienna, there were big demonstrations by large crowds against the Fatherland Front and for the National Socialists. about in this situation?
A I cannot say from my own knowledge; until 8 o'clock in the evening I had nothing to do with chat. No one spoke to ran about the Chancellorship. No other possibility of solution was discussed with me. I heard that the President wanted to make Dr. Ender, of Vorarlberg, Chancello and me Vice Chancellor. I believe that would have been a good suggestion, but I could not discuss it, least of all with Berlin, because no one said anything to me about it. resignation, did you set up a cabinet list? and the Reich would not permit any but a National Socialist Government. Therefore I considered it my task, in order not to be taken by surprise, to think of whom I would take into the cabinet. I remarked that the suggestions mentioned in the telephone conversation were not made to me. National Socialists. They included people with Catholic ties, such as Professor Mendin, Dr. Wolf, and others.
I asked Foreign Minister Schmidt to enter the cabinet. When he asked why, I told him I would like to keep Austria independent, that I needed a for minister who had connections with the Western Powers. Schmidt refused, remarking that Chancellor Schuschnigg introduced him into politics and that would remain loyal to Schuschnigg.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit some documents now: No. 50, Page 115, from Zernatto's book, on Seyss-Inquart's attitude; then, on Page 125, Document No. 54, also from Zernatto's book. It says, "Seyss-Inquart no longer retains the developments in his hands". the witness, Dr.Seuss-Inquart, and says that there were two points that Seyss-Inquart would not discuss and would not compromise on:
"The first is Austria's independence and the second, the possibility for the conservative-Catholic element to develop its own life". BY DR. STEINBAUER: speech in which you called yourself a minister, although Schuschnigg had already handed in his resignation.
A The situation was as follows: The resignation of the whole cabinet wan not accepted by the president; that is, he and I remained ministers. When Dr. Schuschnigg held his farewell speech, he did not speak of the resignation of the whole cabinet. He only said, "We yield to force." that I should not be expressly appointed chancellor. But the power to muster the German troops for the entry was turned ever to me. President Miklas.
A I did not see President Miklas at all until 9:00 or 10:00 in the evening, after Schuschnigg's speech on "We yield to force."
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit to the Court this speech of Schuschnigg on the 11th of March, No. 53, page 122, in whichSchuschnigg says:
"The Bundes President has commissioned me to notify the Austrian people of the fact that we yield to force. Because at any price even in this serious hour we do not intend to spill German block, we have ordered our army to withdraw without resistance and in case the march into Austria, is carried out to await the decision within the next hours." BY DR. STEINBAUER: SS units were called to the chancellor's office. What do you say about that?
A I believe it was after Schuschnigg's farewell speech, in the anteroom, I saw ten or fifteen young non in black trousers and white shirts; that is, SS. I had the impression that they Guards for State Secretary Keppler and others. In the rooms which Chancellor Schuschnigg and president Miklas were occupying, I ordered guards from the Austrian Guard Battalion. I placed them before those rooms. These were selected non who were well armed according to theAustrian point of view, and the SS men, who were at most 40 in number had only pistols. That is, fifty steps from the Chancellor' office were the barracks of the Guard Battalion, with about 100 picked and well armed men. President Miklas and Chancellor Schuschnigg had had no other concern than what happened, in the chancellor's office and on the street in front of us, They could easily have settled the whole matter by calling out the Guard Battalion. Austria, Eigruber, which states that before you become chancellor, you ordered the seizure of power in the various federal offices.
A That is completely untrue. The Gauleiter of Upper Austria does not claim to have talked to me. I believe he says he received a telegram signed by me. I did not send a telegram to any Gauleiters or to anyone. I did not give oral instructions to seize the power. Later I heard from Globetehnick that he had carried out the seizure of power. He told men that in these words:
"Do you knew that I seized the power for you and got the government for you? But I did not tell you, because you would have been against it."
Q You say "you would have been against it". The entry had taken place meanwhile which the defendant Reichsmarshal Goering has described. Was the population against it, in your opinion?
A I cannot call it an invasion. It was an entry of German troops which was widely welcomed, Except for a small percentage of the Catholic population, there was no one who was not widely enthusiastic. There was no district in which it was not the desired thing.
I was in complete agreement with Dr. Schuschnigg. In 1937, he at once agreed with me, saying that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be stopped by anything except by the ovations of the population.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection, I should like to refer to a document, No. 37, Page 86. This is a quotation from the book by Summer Welles, "The Time for Decision". It describes the conversation between him and Count Ciano. It says:
"Before the occupation of Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome. He frankly admitted that in case of on occupation of Austria by Germany the majority of the Austrians will partake in this occupation and that the Austrians would join the Germans like a single man for the fight against Italy, if Italy should send troops to Austria in order to prevent the occupation." BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Now, witness, we will go to the 12th of March. Did you not at this time have a telephone conversation with Hitler?
A Yes; I called Hitler up. That goes back to the occasion of the entry. I should like to repeat, on the day before, at about7 o'clock, activity suddenly stopped, and everything was waiting. At 7:30 State Secretary Scubl came with the report that the entry of troops had actually begun, and that border guards had reported. Reich Marshal Goering repeatedly announced it. When the entry was actually in progress, Schuschnigg made his farewell speech. The system of the Fatherland Front resigned. further the taking of the control of Austria, or the seizure of power by the National Socialists. What I did was only to negotiate, in the sense of a treaty of the 12th of February. the responsibility to take action. First I made a radio speech myself, not the one which was submitted. I did not mention the provisional government, I called myself Minister of the Interior. Only at that moment did I call on the SA and the SS and the auxiliary police, and just like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no resistance to the entry.
Subsequently I was appointed chancellor, and approved. On the same night I drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid that something might happen to him through provocateurs. I asked Dr. Keppler to call up the Fuehrer and say that the entry should not be carried out. Reichsmarshal Goering spoke about that here.
The next morning I called up again. I not the Fuehrer at the airport at Linz. Since the entry was in full progress, I tried to see whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the German Reich, so that symbolically, at least, equal rights would be maintained. The Fuehrer agreed, and actually Austrian troops entered Munich, Berlin, and so on, in Austrian uniform.
the further development of the situation? of a coalition government could not be realized. I saw that a National Socialist government, with a very strong Catholic tendency, would be in charge, but not in theform of an immediate Anschluss, but in carrying out corresponding elections, plebescites, with an economic and possible military union with the German Reich.
R. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to submit an extremely important document. It is quite new. It shows how the Anschluss came into being. It is the testimony under oath of the former State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Stuckhardt, who is imprisoned here. I submit this to the Court and I should like to note the following from this testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the document?
DR. STEINBAUER: That is not in the document book because I received it only later. I will read only briefly to establish the connection. I have submitted the original to the Court. The witness says the following -
THE PRESIDENT: You are giving it a number, are you?
DR. STEINBAUER: No. 92. The witness says that probably Hitler would become president of Austria. He says thathe was told by Frick to work out such a law. He was ordered to Linz -
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Dutch matter, a few affidavits are missing which have just come in. Perhaps it would be exedient to read these documents when they have been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will have the affidavit, I suppose?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, they have it.
If I may continue. He says that he was given the assignment in Linz, to his surprise, to direct a total Anschluss. Austria was to become a province of the German Reich, such as Bavaria and the other German provinces. He worked out this law as he had been instructed to do. He flew to Vienna and submitted it to the assembled ministers there for acceptance.
The impression of theAnschluss on the population I should like to prove through three documents.
First, No. 30. This is the welcoming celebration for theFuehrer on the Heldenplatz in Vienna by the Vienna population. On this occasion, on the15th of March, the witness welcomes the Fuehrer and said the following: "The goal for which centuries of German history had struggled, for which untold millions of the best Germans bled and died, the last aim of hot fights, the last consolation in the bitterest hours -today it has been accomplished. Austria has come home." Now Hitler ordered that this Anschluss be sanctioned by the Austrian population by a plebescite. The other documents have shown theresults of this plebescite to the Court. I should like to point out, in addition, the attitude of the Catholic bishop. This is document No. 32, page 73; Dr. Karl Renner, who was President at that time, document 33, page 76. As for the attitude of the other powers in the surrounding world to theAnschluss question, I shall question the witness Schmidt, who was Foreign Minister. I should like to submit only one document. That is Document 38, page 89. This is the speech by Chamberlain, who was then Prime Minister in the House of Commons, on the Anschluss. He says the following: "Nothing would have stopped Germany's action unless we and the others had been ready to use force in order to prevent it." BY DR. STEINBAUER: Reich, Syess-Inquart was Chancelor. I ask you, did you remain Chancelor? Did you receive other State functions after the seizure of power? the occasion to discuss three questions with the Fuehrer. That was not easy. The Fuehrer was quite excited. First, I asked if theAustrian Party would return to relative independence under an Austrian as the provincial leader; second, that Austria as a state might receive a certain degree of independence. To the first request the Fuehrer said, it was possible. To the second he said, yes, that Austria would receive a governor of her own. At this time I stood up and asked theFuehrer to be allowed to return to private practice as a Lawyer. Third, I asked thatthe unjust relationship of two schillings to one mark be changedto one to one fifty. The Fuehrer agreed to do this.
On the 15th of March, on the occasion of the demonstration which has already been mentioned here, the Fuehrer told the radio announcer to announce that Reich Governor Seyss-Inquart was going to speak.
That was the first I had heard that I was Reichs Governor. I became Reich Governor and remained so until the end of April, 1939.
Q Who was the real leader of Austrian politics? Party and to do thepreliminary work for the plebescite. The instructions of Buerckel and his co-workers was a plan somewhat foreign to Austria. I had occasion, on the 8th of April, in Buerckel's presence, to call the Fuehrer's attention to this type of coordination and the Fuehrer said: "Buerckel, you must not do that. If you do, the enthusiasm of the Austrians for the Anschluss would evaporate." A few weeks later he was made Reich Commissioner for the Reunion. He handled all politics and propaganda, including church policies, and he had the right to give instructions to me in State matters.
policy in Austria shortly after the Anschluss. The first charge is that in the Jewish question you participated in this unfortunate treatment of the Jewish population, that you were responsible for it.
what have you to say about this?
A I can't deny it. Certainly, in my field of activities as Chief of the Civilian administration I issued orders along that line. But as to treatment of the Jewish question as such, Buerckel claimed that as his field. In a document which has been submitted here, he called the Jewish question a matter connected with the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, refer to two documents. One is Document No. 64, page 154. It is a decree of the Fuehrer concerning the appointment of Buerckel as Reich Commissioner for too Reunion of Austria with the German Reich. I point out especially Article 4, which expressly gives Buerckel the right to issue orders to the witness.
The second document is No. 67, pare 163. The Court already has it It is 2237. In this long document, I only want to point out that the execute of the Jewish question, particularly in November 1938, was a matter with which the defendant had nothing to do. an affidavit which came to me from Australia unsolicited. This is Document 70, page 175. I know the point of view of the court, that the circumstances that one defendant or another submits letters from Jews is not a very weighty proof according to the proverb, "One swallow doesn't make a summer". The reason I submit this document is Paragraph 12 on page 4. It is from the witness Dr. Walter Stricker, who comes from a respected Jewish family in Linz, and who says the following:
"After my departure from Austria, I heard of other cases in which Dr. Seyss gave similar help to Jews, and that in May 1938, when persecutions of Jews became particularly severe, he protested to Gauleiter Buerckel." by the defendant.
BY DR. STEINBAUER: placing a double game. What was the attitude of the Party toward you after the Anschluss?
A I know that this charge is made against me. The radical circles of the Party made the sane accusation. I will admit openly that I can understand why this accusation is made. I attempted to bring two groups together which as history shows, could not be brought together. It is clear that the radic elements of both groups, since this realization was impossible, had to come toe the opinion that the man who attempted this was not honest in his attempt.
The more important point is something else. The solution which the Austrian question received was not my solution. It was the solution of the radical elements in the Party. I myself, from the 11th of March at 8 in the evening, participated in this solution. As a result, it is easy for people to say that I participated in it beforehand and prepared for it , but that is not true. At 8 in the evening, alter Schuschnigg and the Fatherland System resignation, I took this point of view, because another one was impossible in reality. There was no other political power in Austria except the National Socialist one or civil war. my co-workers. On the 13th of march, of course I welcomed the moment, and included answer to the question of whether I had misgivings about the execution of the matter, I considered the question and I did not need to have any misgivings included regard to foreign politics. As for internal politics, there was never so muc enthusiasm in Austria. I was aware that no Austrian statesman, no responsibl Austrian, ever had the whole population behind him to such a high degree as I had. But it was good and useful, and it was better to have the responsibility outwardly. supervised by Heydrich very closely.
A The circles which distrusted us included Heydrich. At the end of 1937, Heydrich issued a, secret report which I received later. In this report he said that the solution of the Austrian question in favor of the Party was unavoidable; the only obstacle could be the policy of Staatsrat Seyss-Inquar who would be in a position to call for something like an Austrian National Socialism.
no other task than to issue constant reports to Heydrich on what I was doing. of Security my telephone conversations were listened to. reward did you receive for your activity? Were you given an estate or a sum of money or anything?
A No, there was no question of any such thing. My reward was the knowledge of having cooperated in the formation of the greater Germany.
Q Did you over receive anything?
A Gruppenfuehrer of the SS. On the 15th of March, I was appointed Gruppenfuehrer of the SS as an honorary title. I did not try to obtain it. I took no examination.
In general, honorary rank in the SS was not Membership in the SS. One has no power to issue orders, no disciplinary powers. I learned that myself when I complained to Himmler about Buerckel. The letter has been submitted here. I demanded proceedings. Himmler told me that he had no disciplinary, power over Buerckel; it was only an honorary rank.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, as I understood it, the defendant said that he received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich. What was that secondary post? Is that what you said?
THE WITNESS: Heydrich issued a secret report against me -- pardon me.
THE PRESIDENT: You said in 1937 Heydrich issued a secret report about Austria,and then said that the solution was unavoidable except for the policy of Seyss-Inquart.