That possibility existed before, but since 1938 it no longer existed. It was prohibited.
Q. General, I am now going to have a document shown to you. D-606, another document which the prosecution has submitted during cross examination. I am afraid I don't know the exhibit number at the moment. Perhaps Mr. Roberts might know it.
MR. ROBERTS: Exhibit 492, My Lord, and I put it in separately in cross examination. It is in no book.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. BY MR. JAHRREISS:
Q. Witness, do you know this document?
A. I am acquainted with the document. It has got my file reference on it.
Q. Did you write it yourself?
A. No, Colonel General Jodl personally wrote it, but I c an see a gap, on the other under, under Figure 11. I am not sure whether it is complete. The document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained in the one I have before me, but I can see that this is the file copy from my Quartermaster's Department, and that must have been together under the same file heading. the question of leaving the Geneva convention, and there was the question of dealing with this in my staff, and the decis ion we had was that all points of view should be underlines which would prevent the Fuehrer from coming to such a decision, that is, of leaving the Geneva Convention. From the point of view of international law and from the point of view of the psychological effect on the enemy and on our own troops, this document was carefully worked out. I myself did it. me. He had this document, the details of which I have not carefully examined now, and he told me that he was perfectly agreeable to this negative attitude but that he had felt obliged to complete all points even more clearly and to tally it with the information he had from the Navy and also to formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its success with the Fuehrer, because it could not be allowed to happen that he might put his thoughts into practice.
DR. JAHRRIESS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have not further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other Defendant's Counsel want to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): Mr. President, may I have your permission to ask whether the questions of not being allowed to put questions applies to this witness, and I want to point out that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not matter whether he is or not.
You can question him before the Commission. I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternse, if there is any witness who is not residing in Nurnberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q. Y ou have told us that Germany attacked the Soviet Union in breach of their non-aggression pact, because Germany feared an attack from the Soviet Union.
A. May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff officers in the Spuremem Command and Army Group--the one that was stationed in the Ukraine, did receive that reaons from our senior officer.
Q. Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that Hitler decided in July 1940 to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18 December 1940-- it is page 53 of Book 7--that on 18 December, Hitler stated that the Wehrmacht must be prepared to overthrow Soviet Russia in a single rapid campaign. We know that the attack was not until 22 June. It dies not look as though the leaders of Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russian breaking the non-aggression pact--the Soviet Union, rather.
(No response). BY THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle):
Q. Witness, you had to take retaliation measures in the Ukraine, did you not?
A. We did not use reprisals, as far as the troops were concerned in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no recollection of any such instances.
Q. What measures did you take against the resistance of the population?
A. During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was involved, a resistance of the population in the operational zone in the Ukraine was not apparent. Only in rear areas were there fights at that time with occasional troop units. A resistance on the part of the population did not occure, as far as I know, until later when the operational zone had already been limited, in the rear in the use of political commissioners.
Q. You were not there at that time?
A. The command staff to which I belinged was, in the early days of February 1943, taken back from the front.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
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DR. EXNER: Mr. President, finally, I have only two interrgatories which I have to submit to the Tribunal. I want to read a few lines from one of them, something which was forgotten. to the Tribunal, and I beg the tribunal to take judicial notice of its contents, and then there is AJ-6, an interrogatory of Brudemueller, with reference to which I wish to rake a similar request. berg's statement, I should like to quote the important part. It is questions concerning the attack against Jugoslavia and the question of whether, after the Simovitch Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken a position against us. This is the third volume of the document book on page 211. The Simovitch Putsch was over, and the question not was whether there appeared to be an immediate threat from Jugoslavia at the time.
"Questions: Is it a fact that Jugoslvia, immediately after the coup d'etat of the army, started to deploy her armies on all her borders?
"Answer: I know only the from which was opposite the German 12th Army, located at the Bulgarian border.
Here the Jugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border.
"Question: Is it a fact that the army unit of which you were the commander at the time, had the order before the coup d'etat in Jugoslavia to respect strictly the neutrality of Jugoslavia during the pending attacks against Greece and that not even replacement trains should be despatched through Jugoslavian territory?
"Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given to respect Jugoslavia's neutrality.
"Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order?
"Answer: No". have not yet come in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know, and at this moment I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart from that, I have completed my case at this stage.
THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not?
(The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June at 1000 hours).
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: (Counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart) Your Lordship, gentlemen of the High Military Tribunal.
I open the case with the last words spoke by Dr. Schuschnigg when he, on the 11th of March of 1938, retired as Austrian Chancellor. He spoke the words: "God protect Austria." There is a connection in history. At the foreign ministers, on the basis of similar events, are preparing peace treaties May I ask, therefore, that you would be good enough to allow me to be a little more lengthy than I had originally intended when I present my documents? the stand.
_________________
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath) BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Mr. Witness, when and where were you born? in Moravia. Moravia at that time was a crown county of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
And that former other island, Olmitz, where German was also spoken, also in Moravia--there I lived until I was 16. Then, together with my parents, I moved near Vienna, where I passed through secondary school, and I then joined the legal faculty of the Viennese University . In August of 1914, I joined the army.
Q Were you in the army during the entire war?
A Yes. I served with the Imperial Chasseurs. I served in the war in Russia, Roumania, and in Italy. obtained my Doctor's degree.
I was wounded once. I was decorated several times; three times because of bravery. youth? nationality fight in Moravia, which occurred between the Germans and the Czechs. The Germans, in those days, presented the joint Austro-German idea, while the Czechs were making a predominantly national policy. However, I believe it is significant that there was a coordination of languages at that time in Moravia.
Q Wnd what were the impressions you took away from the war? I remember most is the discussion, at the end of the war, about the fourteen points of President Wilson. peoples, did it not?
A Yes. It was clear to us that the realization of those fourteen points would mean the end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. ination the original territories would be allowed to return to the union of the German Reich which they had left less than 50 years ago, in 1866. That is of importance. Those countries, in the creation of the Reich and in the thousand years of their existence, had been integral parts of Germany. That is for 950 years.
Q What did you do after the war, when you returned from the front?
A I devoted myself to my work as a lawyer. In 1921 I opened my own practice, and as time went by I acquired a very good clientele.
Q What about your political attitude? Were you a member of any political party? to tie myself down politically speaking. I had very good friends in every party, including the Christian Social and Social Democratic Parties. However, the programs of these parties appeared too one-sided to me. They appeared to be much too much adapted to certain individual groups.
Q. Were you a member of any political club, say, for instance, the Austro-German People's Union?
A. I was a member of the board of the Austro-German National Union, because the only political idea to which I adhered in 1918 was Austria's Anschluss with the German Reich on the 11th. I experienced the 11th of November, 1918, when the provisional national assembly decided that Austria should be a part of the German republic. Furthermore, there was the constitutional meeting six months later which repeated the same decision. The dictates of St. German forbade the Anschluss.
The various districts attempted to vote. Salzburg and the Tyrol, with 98% of the voters, voted for joining the Reich. Dr. Schuschnigg describes it in the book "Three Times Austria". neighbors: but they could not agree.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, at this point may I submit several documents to the Tribunal, or may I quickly refer to them as they appear in my document book? The first document is the one to which I have given the number SJ-1. It appears on Page 2 of the document book, and it contains the proclamation of the Austrian members of parliament after the collapse of the Austrian monarchy on the 21st of October, 1918. There it ways in the second sentence:
"The German-Austrian state claims the territorial jurisdiction over the entire territory of German settlement, especially also in the Sudetan territories. The German-Austrian state will fight any annexation by other nations of territories which are inhabited by German farmers, workers, and citizens".
Then, as Exhibit No. 2, I should like to present on Page 4 of the document the resolution which the witness has already mentioned, passed by the provisional national assembly on the 12th of November, 1918, which says:
"German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public powers are installed by the people. German-Austria is a part of the German republic."
The leader of the greatest party of that state, Dr. Karl Renner, stated on the 12th of November something which appears on Page 6 as Exhibit No. 3:
"Our great people is in distress and misery, the people whose pride it has always been to be called the people of poets and thinkers, our German people of humanism, our German people which loves other peoples is deeply bowed in misery. But it is just in this hour in which it would be so easy and convenient and perhaps also tempting to settle one's account separately and perhaps to snatch advantages from the enemy's cunning, in this hour our people in all provinces wishes to know: We are one family and one people living under a common fate".
Then I come to Exhibit No. 4, which is on Page 18.
THE PRESIDENT: It is Page 8, is it not?
DR. STEINBAUER: Page 18. I beg you pardon; Page 8. 145,302 voted for the Anschluss and some 18,000 against it. On the 18th of May, 1921, there were 98,546 votes for the Anschluss at Salzburg, and 877 votes against it. is my point of view that there are three component parts which led to the Anschluss: first of all, the economic emergency which runs through the entire history of the case like a red thread; secondly, that this unity amongst the democratic parties, which resulted from hunger; and thirdly, there was the attitude of the rest of the world, particularly the larger powers, towards war. Those thoughts are contained in my document book. exhibit Prelate Hauser's speech. Prelate Hauser was the president of the Austrian Parliament. He made a speech on the 6th of September, 1919, and it appears on Page 14 of my document book. He suggests the acceptance of the peace treaty of St. Germain, and he gives the following reason:
"The national assembly has no choice. Country and people need final peace which opens again the world to them morrally and economically and which can once again procure work for our people's masses at home and abroad."
Then in the second paragraph he says:
"It also has no other choice, because our country depends on the big powers for its supply of food, coal and industrial raw materials as well as in the re-establishment of its credit and money standard". Schober, which was proved by Document 17. Seipel, regarded as the greatest Austrian statesman of all times, said this at the time, that we should never believe that the Central European question is solved as long as the great state which makes up Central Europe, the German Reich, is not included in the solution. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. I want to ask you, Mr. Witness, do you still remember the time and the conditions after the year 1927?
A. The economic situation which you have just referred to was the reason why the great powers always fought Austria, to give a so-called voluntary forfeiture declaration regarding the Anschluss. The repercussions on Austrian politics were that the Austrians, resolved as they had been in 1918 to have pre-democratic parliamentary prosecution, turned to radical ideas which had an autocratic leaning.
Q. Then at that time a new party appeared. Which one was that?
A. At that time, there was the so-called fire of the Palace of Justice, which was an uprising of the Marxists, which resulted in the Marxist Party's connection with the so-called home guard, which was a para-military organization. Thus uniforms were introduced into the political life of Austria. and more clear. The only organization about the party was the German-Austrian People's Union at the time. The thought of the Anschluss was the only thought which still kept all the partices somewhat united.
Around the year 1930, the National Socialist German Laborers' Party became apparent.
Q. What impression did that party give you, particularly with reference to the seizure of power in the Reich?
A. I want to tell you quite openly that the impression the party made, as far as Austrian conditions were concerned, was a little strange. We had uniform politics in the national union because, I suppose, of the home guard. The N.S.D.A.P. gave uniformity to the actual political-leaders, and then made their march. But the type of politics which they presented to us was not in keeping with our accustomed political thoughts.
Q What about the reasons?
A Well, let me add first that that party wouldn't allow any pleasant courses in connection with other parties and that it never allowed cooperation with other parties either.
Q What possible concession of the party did you observe in the Reich? irrevocable will to attain the Anschluss. I think that the radical attitude can be traced back to preventing, for instance, the realization of the Austrian union, which might have been in favor of the democratic party leaders.
Q Were there not economic reasons which scored sucesses on behalf of the NSDA*
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I suppose you are hearing the words spoken by Dr. Steinbauer direct, and you are answering them without any pause, which gives the interpreter no chance. discrimination of the Versailles Treaty in the Reich, and secondly, the end of unemployment. In Austria, too, about ten per cent of the population were unemployed at that time. The Austrian workers, therefore, were hoping that there would be the end to their unemployment in the event of an Anschluss, and Austrian co commerce had the greatest interest in the food organization in the Reich and the marketing system there. of the Anschluss which took you, too, to the Party. The Party program which has been discussed again and again in this Court room, I need not touch upon.
I just want to ask you, please, when did you join the party? the membership number was above the seven million mark.
Q Did you have contact with Dr. Dollfuss?
A I met Dr. Dollfuss after the war. I knew that he wanted to include me in his Ministry in 1933, and eight days before the 25th of July of 1934, by his invitation, I had a discussion with him. murder of Chancelor Dr. Dollfuss?
A No, in no way. Dr. Dollfuss and I had planned to have another discussion.
He was interested in my opinion regarding the pacifying, calming down of that extremely radical situation at that time, and I told Dr. Dollfuss, even as early as that, that there were no mere Nattionalists in Austria then, only National Socialists. I told him that the National Socialists were doing only what Hitler told them.
Q But, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I must remind you that the prosecution have submitted a photograph which praises the murder of Dr. Dollfuss.
A That is the so-called annual Celebration, isn't it? During that celbration Dollfuss wasn't even thought of. That was a Party Festival, a Party celbration in memory of the seven SS men who, during that attempted revolt ot in connection with that attempted revolt, had been hanged. None of us ever referred to that death as a murder.
Q Well the, after Dollfuss, Dr. Schuschnigg became chancelor, and then I want to talk to you regarding the conclusions drawn by the NSDAP from those event
A The NSDAP thought it shoud be completely disorganized. A small circle of men at that time formed itself, which I joined. They drew the following conclusions from the events of the 25th of July: Firstly, that it presented considerable danger from the point of view of foreign policy. I remind you of the meeting of statements like Stressor and the resolutions passed with reference to Germany; and even though we were never worried about Italy, we had learned nevertheless to realize that in this very troubled atmosphere something might quite easily bring about a war. We were all agreed that it would have to be the main task of the heads of the German State to avoid a war. But here is something I must add, the 25th of July was the worst possible thing that could have happened in regard to the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be done and we came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich would have to cease interfering with the Austrian National Socialist Party. The Austrian Party, so far as Anschluss was concerned, considered that a foregone conclusion. We decided that the National Socialists in Austria would have to once more be permitted to be active and we decided that most of all, there should be elections to ascertain the balance of power.
Q. What I am interested in is the question of whether you had contacts with sources in the Reich at that time, in 1936, and whether you entertained any such contacts?
A. I had no contact with any sources in the Reich. Only, as Reichsmarshal Goering has said, when I became a State councilor did I for the first time meet the leading Erman politicians.
Q. When was that?
A. That was in June or July of 1937.
Q. What was your position at that time? As a State Councilor, what was your attitude regarding the NSDAP in Austria?
A. when, on the 11th of July, 1936, an agreement was reached -- without my having had any part in that -- Dr. Schuschnigg had Minister Glaise ask me to cooperated in politics. At that time I had particularly close contact with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the National Front. Upon a suggestion made by Zernatto and his friends, I became an Austrian State Councilor, and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in writing, of investigating the prerequisites for having the National Front join our political work. In order to fulfill that task I did, of course, have to get in touch with the National Socialists, because the national opposition only consisted of National Socialists.
Q. Who was the head of the NSDAP in Austria?
A. The Party in Austria had collected again illegally and Captain Leopold was the head.
Q. How was your relationship to him? Was it good?
A. I could not define Captain Leopold's way of thinking; he did not understand my political thoughts. He thought that, on the basis of the agreement of the 11th of July, Dr. Schuschnigg ought to allow the NSDAP again in its original form. I think I only talked to Leopold twice, perhaps three times. He demanded that I be subordinated to him, something which I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, draw your attention to the following documents without reading from them:
Exhibit No. 44, on page 103 of the document book, excerpts from the document USA 583.
Then there is Exhibit No. 45, on page 105. That is USA 581 Exhibit No. 47, on page 109, is a statement from Zernatto stating that Seyss-Inquart entirely disagreed with Leopold's endavor played a double game.
In rebuttal, I applied to have an interrogato* submitted to the former Gauleiter Ueberreiter. He has interrogated I want to quote from the interrogatory, which is Document No. 59. T were questions put by the Prosecution, and I want to read the follow which appears on page 140:
"Question:" -- put by the Prosecutor -- "Was not the defend Seyss-Inquart, before the time at which the Nazi Party had been legalized, i.e. declared as being legal, in February 1938, was he not in constant contact with the illegal Austrian Nazi Party?
"Answer: No. I personally did not know Seys-Inquart until his visit to Graz. In Nazi circles he was considered as a non-party member. I think -- I do not know for sure -- that he joined the NSD only when it was legalized. For this reason, he personally encounte strong opposition among the illegal Nazi circles."
Then, on page 6 of the same document it says:
"Question: Did not the defendant Seys-Inquart play a double game on one side his legal position with Schuschnigg's Cabinet and on the other side his cooperation with the Nazi party which was unlawful and illegal at that time and the activity of which had then been legalized to a certain extent through the efforts of the defendant at Berchtesgaden in February 1958?
"Answer: I do not know to what extent he was in touch with the illegal Nazi party before the 12th of February. I do not know about it because I was not in Vienna. But from the 18th of February the fact of being in contact with the Nazi party was not a double but his duty. Schuschnigg himself had discussions with Leopold, Nazi leader before Klausner.
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q This brings us to 1938. At the beginning of that year you were State Councillor in the Austrian Government. How did you find the political situation?
A During many conversations I had with Dr. Schuschnigg, but most of all during many continuous conversations I had with Zernatto, I had developed the plan which was in keeping with the conclusions I had drawn from the events of the 25th of July, that the Reich, and particularly Hitler, should be asked to refrain from interfering with Austrian politics through the Austrian National Socialist Party. should be given permission to become active again. That didn't mean at all that I would forego the thought of the Anschluss, but I was perfectly convinced that any policy which could be considered legal and responsible in Austria would have to be carried out by the Austri National Socialists who were collecting a clear majority amongst the Austrian voters -- I should have said, rather, the Germans in Austria I thought that such a demonstration of a leading majority would remov any resistance put up by the members of the League of Nations. such a policy, and the means would have to be that such an organization would support the Fuehrer and the aims of the German Reich. It was in the interest of that plan that I talked to Field Marshal Goeri and Mr. Hess. I reported the outcome to Dr. Schuschnigg and to Zerna and I recommended a coalition government including National Socialist ministers, subject, of course, to the corresponding guarantees being given by Adolf Hitler. make any headway, without directly turning me down. Meanwhile, Austr National Socialists continued to be active illegally. The police would interfere; there were arrests, and we had three concentration camps in Austria. In short, that was the predecessor of the de-nazi fication system of today.
February 1938? came about. First of all, there were renewed radical tendencies which were introduced into the Party. In 1938, the legitimate tendencies in Austria were being promoted. The State Councillors recommended laws regarding the return of the Habsburg property. For the moment, my own position became untenable, and I retired, something of which I informed Zernatto and Secretary of State Keppler wh had officially been nominated in the Reich to conduct the political affairs related to Austria. I felt that considering my task it was my duty to inform Keppler. Sport Leader von Tsehammer and Oston, went to Gramisch-Patenkirchen There I met von Paper without our having an appointment. We told each other of our companies and we reached the point of view that both parties, that is to say Hitler as well as the Austrian Governm Dr. Schuschnigg, would have to be made aware of the fact that a cle cut decision in the sense of my suggestions was necessary. At that time, participation of the National Socialists in the government was certainly amongst the points on discussed, and quite possibly the Ministry of the Interior was discussed. It is quite certain that my name was not mentioned but it appeared an obvious one, discussion which Herr von Papen had with Hitler, but I myself informed Zernatto of the contact of our conversation. Zernatto, at that time, was agreeable regarding certain questions I brought up, in particular with reference to the expansion of the National Socialist sections of the government. He did, in fact, place finance at disposal for that purpose. informed me that Hitler had invited Dr. Schuschnigg to Berchtesgade Dr. Reiner was a member of the circle who were working with me; so was Dr. Jury, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Langhof, and several others.
discussion at the Obersalzberg?
A. I was only informed by Zernatto of the outcome of this conference. On the evening of the 11th, before Dr. Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden, I had a discussion, a detailed discussion with Zernatto and Dr. Schuschnigg. There was considerable agreement amongst us regarding the inclusion of national Socialists war instance, Jury, Reinthaler and Fischboeck, and that they should he given certain public functions. Not, however, ministerial positions. I myself did not touch upon the subject of ministerial positions at all Because I did not have the sufficient information.
Regarding Adolf Hitler's reaction to my suggestion which I made to Herr von Papen, on 13 February, Zernatto called no and communic ated to me the results and contents of the Berchtesgaden conference, which, of course, are known to you.
Q. In this connection, I want to refer to document 48, page 111, in which Zernatto states, "I had the defininte impression that Seyss-Inquart did not know about the result of the discussions and the contents of the agreement of the 12th of February.
Mr. Witness, on the basis of the strength of that agreement, you became Minister of the Interior and police, did you not?
A. Yes, on 17 February 1938.
Q. You had orders to create and improve contact with the Reich. Did you have a discussion with Hitler himself?
A. Yes. In the agreement made at Berchtesgaden on 12 February, there was a defininte clause that I was to be liaison man be two on the Austrian Government on one side, and the Austrian national Socialists on the other side, and the German Reich as well. The contents of the minutes of which I had been informed appeared to me unsatisfactory, and there was not doubt that my appointment to the Position of Minister of the Interior and Polic meant the signal to the Austrian Rational Socialists to expect an early realization of their political target. attitude, to state it openly, that is to say, that they were allowed to wear the swastika and to salute with the raised hand.