As not only the Russians but also the Western powers are violating International Law by their actions against the defenceless population and the residential districts of the towns, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and also through this measure to urge our People to resist to the utmost. The Fuehrer orders the C-in-C of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his opinion as soon as possible. Then, further down: "The C-in-C of the Navy informed the Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff, General Jodl, and the representative for the Minister for foreign affairs at the Fuehrer's H.Q. Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany's possible renunciation of the Geneva convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages; even from a general standpoint it appears to the C-in-C of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the cuter world. The Chief of armed Forces Ops Staff and Ambassador Hewel are in full agreement." You were saying there, were you not, that you agreed with Reader when he said, break the Geneva convention but don't tell the world that we are doing so.
Q That is what you were saying, isn't it?
A No. The entire thing, as I have said, is a notice by Admiral Wagner regarding a conference from which one could gather only that Grand Admiral Doenitz rejected this and that he allegedly is supposed to have made this remark, the remark at the end which I can hardly explain today to my own satisfaction, for at that time we had been told by the Fuehrer as the reason only that it should be prevented that this tremendous number of soldiers in the Rest would desert for lack of good treatment. As I have said, I can not explain this remark, and in my written work which I submitted to the Fuehrer and which also shows the attitude of the Navy, that sentence was not contained. In this draft we counterbalanced advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages were overwhelming. The whole thing is not to be carried through; and this actually took place, it was not carried out.
I can not say anymore, and witnesses can confirm my statement.
MR. ROBERTS: Document D 606 has not yet been exhibited. I offer it as 492 GB.
Q Now that is signed by you, is it not? The subject is the breach of the Geneva convention. Is that signed by you?
A Yes; at the end you will find my signature. your headed notepaper: "Telegraphic report submitted to the fuehrer on the 23-2 through the Chief of the Ops Staff of the Wehrmacht. The following questions were to be examined --" I am not going to real it all. I f the witness would follow me, I will read anything he wants. But it is a discussion as to the various advantages and disadvantages of repudiating the various international agreements, and I think I am not doing the witness an injustice if I say from a utalitarian rather than a moral point of view.
and for that this document was compiled.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is the last page but one of lour Lordship's document, "C, Proposal of the OKW":
"At the present moment the disadvantages of repudiating the bands which were kept to up to now will in any case outweigh the advantages by far.
"Just as it was wrong in 1914 that we ourselves solemnly declared war on allthe states which for a long time had wanted to wage war against us, and through this took the whole guilt of the war on our shoulders before the outside world, and just as it was wrong to admit that the necessary --" Note the word "necessary" -- "passage through Belgium in 1914 was our own fault, so it would be wrong now to repudiate openly the obligations of International law which we accepted and thereby to stand again as the guilty party before the outside world.
"Adherence to the accepted obligations does not demand in any that we should have to impose on ourselves any limitations which will interfere with the conduct of the war. For instance, if the British sink a hospital ship, this must be used for propaganda purposes as has been done to date. That, of course, in no way prevents us sinking an English hospital ship at once as a reprisal and then expressing our regret that it was a mistake, in the same manner as the British do."
That isn't very honorable, is it? alone,brought about success with the Fuehrer, and this success was realized only in that way. If I had used moral or purely legal, arguments, then he would have said "Please leave me alone with that empty talk", and he would havecarried through the renunciation of the Convention, but these things gave him food for thought, and that is the reason why he did not carry through the renunciation of the Treaty.
how to achieve something good and to avoid something bad, and that I knewhow to use my method. I was after results, and I did achieve success with him. truth in 1914. In 1914 you said that you only regarded treaties as a scrap of paper. You are saying new, "What a pity we told the world the truth in 1914. We ought to have told them something untrue, and then we should have, possibly, a better world reputation."
A That was an argument which the Fuehrer used frequently. If you repeated his argument in that sane form, he was inclined to accept it, and we had to prevent his decreeing the renunciation in a fit of rage, and that is the approach one had to follow. If one cannot do good openly, it is better to do it in a roundabout way than not to do it at all.
Q I am now coming to quite another point. Were you an admirer of the principles of the Nazi Party? Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht which brought about the rejuvenation, the resurrection of Germany, after 1933?
A It could have been. I hoped that for a long time, andin general, the relationship in the course of the years,and especially during the war, improved. In the beginning it was poor, very poor.
Q I am reading now from your speech, L-172. It is page 290 of the document book 7, and it is page six of your lecture notes. Page 290 of the document book, 203 of the German:
"The fact that the National Socialist movement in its struggle for internal power, was preparatory to the outer liberation of the dictate of Versailles is a one I need enlarge upon in this circle. I should like, however, to mention how all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the Nazi movement in re-awakening the will to fight, in nurturing fighting strength, and in rearming the German people. Despite all the virtues inherent in it, a numerically small Reichswehr could never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at and has been so happily successful in bringing about was a fusion of these two forces."
Did that represent your honest opinion or not?
A Yes. That is an historical truth, an indisputable truth. The Nazi Party did bring that about. That is certain.
Q Very good. Then, I now want to put to you the last document that I put in.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it has not been exhibited. It is 1808-PS. I offer it as GB 493. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q You made a speech, did you not, after the attempt on Hitler's life to your staff? These are the notes of your speech on 24 July?
A I have never seen this document before. I am seeing it for the first time now. It is unknown to me. It has remained unknown to me that any notes were made about the speech at all.
Q Let's go by stares. Did you make a speech to your staff shortly after the attempt on Hitler's life on 24 July 1944? document which comes from your files? Look at the cover, if necessary.
A I assume so. Most likely these are notes by Major Schramm.
Q Let me begin at the beginning of those notes. Just see if you can remember what you said. Did you begin, by saying "The 24th July was the blackest day which German history has seen as yet, and will probably remain so for all time?" a man whom you now admit was a murderer? opponents of the regime, was attacked in such a cowardly manner? That to me was the worst thing that ever happened to me in all my life. If aman with a pistol in his hand had shot the Fuehrer and then had given himself up, that would have been something entirely different. This method was, for me, the most repulsive thing that could have happened to any officer, and I said these things under the impression of these events, and I am still standing on that today.
dastardly than shooting those 50 American soldiers who landed in the north of Italy to destroy a military target, shooting them like dogs?
A That was murder as well. There is no doubt about that, but it is not the task or the mission of a soldier to play the judge against his commander in chief. That is a mission reserved for history or for the Almighty on High.
Q Very good. I have only about three mere questions to ask you.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am going to read from page two of that document, about ten lines from the top. It begins, "The Fuehrer--" BY MR. ROBERTS:
"The Fuehrer ignored this and ether things, and now the attempted assassins wished to eliminate him as a 'despot.'" Do you remember saying that or something like that? "The Fuehrer ignored this and other things,and now the attempted assassins wished to eliminate him as a 'despot'." Do you remember that? "Yes, they themselves experienced how the Fuehrer did not come to power by force, but borne up by the love of the German people." Do you remember saying that?
A Yes, that is true. Through the love of the German people, he was borne up to power, and everything that I experienced is tremendous. We were almost smothered through this love of the people and of the soldiers for the Fuehrer.
Q I beg your pardon. Have you finished? I didn't mean to interrupt you.
Q Borne up by the love of the German people. You have forgotten the SS, the Gestapo, and the concentration camps for political opponents, haven't you? things, almost nothing. Of course, this has a different aspect now, knowing these facts now.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, this is a new document, 1776-PS, I offer it as GB-494, BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q Just have a look; see if it is signed by you, will you. attacks. Just see what this document says. Note the date first, the 30th of June 1940. That is just after the temporary fall of France:
"Chief of the Wehrmacht: General Staff.
"The continuation of the war against England.
"If political means will be without results, England's will to resist will have to be broken by force:
"a) by making war against the English mother country, "b) by extending the war to the periphery.
"Regarding point a, there are three possibilities:
"1) Siege "2) Terror attacks against English centers of population.
"3) A landing of troops."
And now I read this as an example of historical prophesy:
"Germany's final victory also over England is only a question of time."
Then I go down several paragraphs:
"Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks -said to be reprisal actions -- this increasing weakening of English food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and finally break and thus force its government to capitulate."
It is signed "Jodl".
"Terror attacks against English centers of population" -would you like to say anything to justify that sentence?
A Yes, just a few words. This proposal -- and after all, it was just a proposal -- proves three things: any intention and did not know about the intention and the possibility of entering into a war with Russia, as is seen by the statement that the final victory of Germany is only a question of time. carried through by the Angle-American Air Force to a wonderful completion. the civilian population was started by the English Air Force, even though constant warnings had gone out. Fuehrer tried again and againm to the utmost, to avoid this war and this form of war against the population. But it was clear at that time that he would not be able to do so.
Q Now, I have finished, Witness. You will notice that all the documents I have put, except for that one American report, were German documents, originating at the time of these events about which I have been cross examining. an honorable soldier and a truthful man? stating that the submission of these documents is proof enough that this is actually so.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 7 June 1946 at 1000 hours) States of America, the French Republic; the THE PRESIDENT:
The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoo at 4:00 o' clock to sit in closed session. The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in opnen session from 10:00 to 1:00. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: Operational Headquarters of the OKW. That was the central headquarters of the OKW, was it not? question. the OKW, of which you were in charge, was the central operational headquarters, the direction body. certainly say that the operational staff was one of the most important parts of the OKW.
Q Is that the reason why you took Keitel's place in his absence, because it was so important?
A I was the deputy only in operational matters. As to war ministerial questions, as a rule Admiral Canaris took that part of in.
Q Do you deny that you took Keitel's place when he was away, or do you admit it? of course, whenever the Fuehrer had anything to say to the OKW he talked with me because I was the senior officer next to Keitel. about the fact that either you or Keitel usually represented OKW at all important staff meetings at which Admiral Wagner was usually present?
Do you remember that testimony? translating difficulties.
Q I shall repeat the question. On the 13th of May, here in this room, the witness Wagner -- do you remember him?
A Yes, I remember the witness Wagner. He testified that Field Marshal Keitel and I were present at every situation report, and that is undeniably true. I do not dispute it. General Jodl were present. Is that correct? Do you catch the difference in way this question is phrased? arrangement, would it be correct to come to the conclusion that it was you, specifically you, Jodl, who was Keitel's functional deputy That is, in the eyes of the whole military machine of the Reich it was you who were held responsible when Keitel was away; you were looked up to as the second most responsible person? Is that correct? and in unimportant things, yes, but when it came to important thing I could always reach him by telephone at any time, and that is what I did in actual practice. He was never ill; he was never away on leave; he was, perhaps, away at Berlin at headquarters. cident which you affirmed yourself here in this room on the 6th of June, while testifying to the Tribunal about the motives which made you sign Document RF-1438. You stated then that this document had no relation whatsoever to your work directly as it concerned the deportation of Jews from Denmark, it did not actually have any direct relationship to your function but you signed it because Keitel was away at the time.
You did say that; do you remember? Is that correct?
A That is absolutely correct. It was an urgent matter which was of pressing importance and had to be signed immediately. type, but I do not find it necessary to spend any more time on making the point clearer. that you were well aware of the work and the operations of the OKW, that you usually knew what bothered or what worried the OKW, and what important questions it was working out at the time?
A That applies only to a limited field. As to a number of matters, everything that was handled in the many, many offices in Berlin, it was impossible for me to have a picture of those things, and many of them did not concern no. I have testified already that my time was more than taken up, that I had much more to do than I had time for. I considered finished. Will you please look now at our new exhibi USSR 476.
The document consists of excerpts of Keitel's testimony giv 9 November 1945, Keitel's interrogation. It is stated there -- an I am quoting now:
"Question: Was it possible for a situation to have develop where General Jodl, without any knowledge on your part, conducted a meeting?
"Answer: Yes, it was quite possible for Jodl to conduct or important staff meeting, as I was frequently away and Colonel Gene Jodl had full authority to call a meeting."
Have you found the place? Are you reading it now? Do you see it? things, it is very hard to have everyone follow them. These were my general staff officers with whom I worked and who were under me That was my office and my duty, and that was my mission.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary for you to raise your voice in that way.
questions. First, have you read the document now, the one that has just been given you? Please answer this first question. Have you read the particular place which I have just cited on page 1?
A Yes. In this case, Field Marshal Keitel says, "Since I was away on official journeys..."
Q Don't read it out loud yourself. I have read it already. I merely want to know: Have you finished reading that paragraph?
A Yes, I read that, and it says here, "To consult the Colonel General about this." at the present. We will get to the place which you just cited a little later. Look above, at the phrase which states that Keitel was often away, and when he was away you acted in his place.
Do you remember? Keitel's answer is right there.
A (No response.) so, he was at the front, and that frequently for perhaps a few day he was at Berlin, but he was at those offices which were subordinate to him. Those were the offices that he called on. I was alone with my operational staff, and I could do whatever I please with my staff. As far as conferences of other offices were concerned, I never attended them or never called them, and as a deputy of Keitel I didn't know a thing about these matters. a clear answer to my very short question, namely: Do you affirm the correctness of Keitel(s statement given in that testimony? Yes or no; it is easier to answer yes or no.
ridiculous.
Q We will evaluate it later. I merely want to establish a fact.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: I am submitting USSR 263, Exhibit USSR 264. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:
Q You 111 now have the pleasure of reading it yourself, Mr. Defendant. It is a document consisting of excerpts of the statements of one other officer who worked with you, General Warlimont. Please acquaint yourself with that paragraph which is parked on the exhibit before you, while I read it out loud. That will be quicker.
The question is posed to Warlimont: to prepare the plan of attack on the Soviet Union?"
Have you found the place? the testimony or a statement by Warlimont as to the organization of the offices of the OKW. On the next page something follows about the preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union.
Q Have you found it now ? Very well. prepare the plan for the attack on the Soviet Union?"
Answer of Warlimont: "Personally I first heard about the plan on 29 July. On that date Colonel General Jodl arrived in a special train at Bad Reichenall where Section B of the headquarters was situated at the time."
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lords, I do not think that it is necessary for me to read too much of the testimony of Warlimont because the facts are well known to the Tribunal; that is, the facts of the conference during which Jodl gave his operational colleagues a command or an order to prepare the plans for that attack. This has come out in Court previously. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:
Q Warlimont states: "Warlimont surprised us exceedingly by his announcement of the coming attack." Have you found the place? Please look at the document. Jodl, will you please take the document in your hand and see whether it is correct?
THE PRESIDENT: Isn't it coming through?
DR.EXNER (Counsel for defendant Jodl): I just wanted to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the translation or the transmission to us is coming through so very poorly that I understood almost nothing at all only half a question at a time, and I am surprised that the defendant could answer at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it coming through better now? Is the translation coming through better now?
DR. EXNER: I am of the opinion that the translation itself is poor, not the technical transmission of the interpretation. It is often very difficult to understand the question. It makes no sense at all, and my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, confirms me in this. It is very, very hard for us.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had better go on and see, perhaps, if it will improve. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:
Q I would like you to read one other sentence. It is the sentence in which Warlimont states to whom the responsibility for carrying out the plans was given. The sentence goes on to say -- still on page one in the middle of the page, witness. Have you found the place?
A I could not find the sentence which you have just read: "Jodl surprise us." That sentence I cannot find.
Q In that case, I shall begin with the preceding sentence. Perhaps you can find it more easily:
"Besides me he ordered to appear at the staff meeting three other senior officers, Colonel Norberg, Colonel von Falkenstein,and Captain Junge."
Do you see those three names in the middle of the page?
Q "Then Jodl surprised us by the announcement for which we were not prepared."
Then a little further down you see, witness:
"Jodl stated that the Fuehrer had decided to prepare a plan for the attack on the Soviet Union. The Fuehrer based his decision on the fact that war with Russia must come about sooner or later and for that reason it would be better to carry on that war in connection and at the time of the present war."
Now, I would like you to read one more paragraph. It is from USSR 476, which you have already looked at, from page one of the exhibit, the first exhibit that you looked at today, and I told you then that we would come back to it. It is the place where Keitel is asked whether he know anything about that meeting, and he answered -- and I quote:
"I know nothing whatever about a staff meeting with regard to the plan of attacking the Soviet Union. I heard about that meeting for the first time when I was already here in imprisonment."
Have you found the place?
A No, I haven't found it. but I do recall it. I read just a little bit ago.
Q I would like you to have this exhibit before you; we don't want anything which isn't entirely clear here between you and me. sequent to that staff meeting you had not even reported to him what took place at that staff meeting or at subsequent staff meetings.
Do you agree with those facts? Would you say that Keitel testified correctly? framework; you can speak about it in a civilian or a parliamentary system, but not in a military framework, I talked to my general staff officers as I often as I pleased.
Q Excuse me, but I would like to interrupt you here. You may add all that you wish to say a little later, but at the present moment I merely want a direct answer.
Is Keitel's testimony correct, to the effect that you had not reported to him on the staff meetings? but that doesn't play any role at all. However, so far as what the Fuehrer told me was concerned, I am certain that I reported to him on that because that was an important matter. Then, later, because of this matter, he wrote a memorandum. That is why I believe I told him about it, but that is only a supposion, a more or less certain supposition, which I am voicing on this point. just one more question, namely: Would you agree with the fact that only the most responsible person, such as Keitel's representative, could, quite independently and without the knowledge of Keitel himself, without any directive from Keitel himself, and without reporting to Keitel subsequently -would you agree that only such a responsible man could conduct meetings and make decisions with regard to plans for attacking another foreign power?
Have you understood my question? is concerned. because you asserted that I did not report about the preparation for an attack on a neutral country. That is an assertion on your part which, on my oath, I refuted yesterday. We were not concerned with an attack on the Soviet Union at this conference. We were concerned with the turning back of a Soviet attack on the Roumanian oil fields. That is established through Document C-170, the War Diary of the Navy. That is established therein.
Q Very well. I do not plan to enter a discussion, I merely want to say that we have two types of evidence relating to this: First, your testimony in which you deny the fact that the plan for attacking the Soviet Union took place; and second, the testimony of Warlimont, who was also present at the meeting and who states directly that the meeting was concerned specifically with the plan of attacking the Soviet Union and that the plan was announced by you.
One more question. Would it be correct to state that you were either the first or one of the first, staff directors in Hilter Germany who were engaged in preparing the plan for attacking the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940? I would like to know your opinion here.
Have you understood the question? who know of the concern of the Fuehrer with reference to the political attitude on the part of Russia. However, I was not the first one who made preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. to my surprise, through the witness Paulus, I found out that long before we, in the General Staff of the Army, even concerned ourselves in a direct way, these plans of attack were already worked on. I cannot tell you with absolute assurety where that information came from. Perhaps Halder can tell us about that. I can only express that as a supposition on my part.
Q Suppositions interest us less that facts. You stated, the day before yesterday, the 5th of June, that the attack on the Soviet Union, whereby Germany broke its neutrality pact with the Soviet Union, had the character of primitive war. That is what you stated then, is it not?
Q Very well. Do you remember that in the testimony of Milch, Raeder, and Goering, as well as in the testimony of Paulus and Keitel, it was stated that they were all against the attack on the Soviet union? I shall cite one sentence from Keitel's testimony here in Court to remind you. While General Rudenko was cross-examining Keitel, Keitel was asked this question:
"You stated that you went to Hitler yourself with the request that he, Hitler change his plans with regard to the Soviet Union."
Keitel's answer:
"Yes, I asked him not only to change his plans, but to do away with these plans altogether; that is, not to attack the Soviet Union."
Do you remember that testimony of Keitel's?
Q Very well. Do you not find it somewhat strange, in that case, that a man next to Keitel in authority tries to discern the facts and that he, at the same time, tries to state that he was not responsible for certain things, and that he denies the accuracy of the testimony of Goering, Keitel and others with regard to this question?
Q I will be more specific: I mean, that a man like Keitel did not seem to find any necessity for what you call "primitive war", and that all those person whose testimony I have just referred to here also saw no reason for carrying on this so-called primitive war. They did not believe that the Soviet Union's intention was to attack Germany, whereas you disagreed with all of them.
A Now.I understand you.
Q Would you like to answer the question?
A Yes, I can give an explanation. First of all, it is not certain what position Field Marshal Keitel took in the spring of 1941 with regard to this question.
Secondly, the Commander in Chief of the Navy and the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces--with the respect to both of these gentlemen--saw the total picture and problem only from the point of view of naval or air strategy. And they saw no danger whatsoever on the part of the Russian Navy or the Russia Air Force. Whatever was taking place on land, of course, was of minor interest to them. In that way it can be explained why that position was taken by the Luftwaffe and by the Navy,The Army, in this case, was more inclined to see and evaluate the tremendous danger with which it was confronted. expressly and urgently about this experiment, which should have been undertaken only if there was no other way out. I do not wish to overestimate and say that there might not, perhaps, have been a political possibility which was not exhaus ed; I cannot judge. that you characterize the breaking of the treaty and the attack on the Soviet Union with the word "experiment". That satisfies me particularly.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should, not make comments of that sort. You must ask questions and not make comments.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My remark, My Lord, is in connection with my next question. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:
Q Witness, please look at Exhibit PS 865. Do you have the exhibit before you?
Q Very well. In reply to the questions of your defense counsel, you stated that Reichminister Lammers, by pure accident, told you that Rosenberg collaborated. In your hands, there is a very brief document which I shall now read from orally, a document signed by Keitel. It consists of a secret letter of the 22nd of April, 1941, addressed to Rosenberg. It is written by hand and states as follows:
"The Chief of the Bureau sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's decree which appoints you as his plenipotentiary on the questions of Eastern European problems. The supreme Command of the armed forces designates you to inform the chief of the questions that develop under you, and in his absence, or whenever he is away, to General Warlimont. Kindly confer only with these two persons."
What will you say in response to this exhibit? I will ask you now whether you remember that Rosenberg, you and Warlimont as your chief deputy were appointed by the OKW as early as in April, 1941 to work on the practical plan connected with Hitler's expansion in the East? Did you understand that whole question?
A Yes, I understood it. I already told the Court yesterday everything that can be said in connection with this matter, formally. Reich Minister Lammers sent the same circular to all Reich ministries. He asked every minister to designate a plenipotentiary and a deputy; and thereupon Field Marshal Keitel naturallydesignated those two officers who were at headquarters. I never worked together with Rosenberg. It was not necessary at all. I had one single conference with him. I mentioned this conference yesterday as well. My propaganda section conferred with the Eastern Ministry about leaflets, and these are, of course, matters which any soldier can understand.