did you not, when you were interrogated by one American Officer on two sparate occasions? You said quite differently, did you not?
(No response) Colonel Thomas Hinkel? Do you remember that? Perhaps you won't remember the date.
Q Yes, and you were sworn when you gave your answers to the interrogator? of the shorthand notes of the interrogation?
"I show you a photostatic reproduction of a number of pages of a lecture, which was purported to have been given by you on the 7th of November, 1943, and ask you if these pages represent the lecture that was delivered. For the record, that is identified as L-172."
Then you answered:
"Yes. A number of things are not contained therein, which I explained with the map.
"Question; You interpolated the remarks that do not appear in the written part; is that correct?
"Answer: Yes, many particulars I set forth just with the map at hand.
"Question; Is that your handwriting appearing on the cover page?
"Answer: No; it is not mine.
"But the remaining sheets you identify as the written version of a lecture at Munich?
"Answer: I cannot say whether it was actually my lecture as it was, because I see the signature of Putlag. It isn't the lecture itself. That is the material of the brochures which had been furnished to me."
Now, witness, just follow this, will you?
"Do you identify the first 29 pages as constituting the lecture that you delivered?
"Answer: (after examining document) Yes, that is my lecture."
Do you want to alter that sworn answer now? Do you?
A I have not read the transcript of the notes which were taken there. I don't know the translation.
I made several statements in that regard. When I observed in the second interrogation that, that was not actually my speech, I said-
Q I will read you the second one two, witness. I have that for you. This was on the 16th of November.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, had you finished what you wanted to say?
THE WITNESS: No, I had not finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Then finish what you want to say.
THE WITNESS: I wanted to say that before I had looked over the whole document, at the first moment, of course, I had the impression that that was my speech, or a copy of my speech. However, when I looked at it more carefully in the course of the interrogations, I noticed that it was only the material selected for this speech, and I said clearly: "It contains the first draft, or the outline, by me. The whole middle part is only material furnished by my staff therefore, the whole thing is not at all the speech which I gave." That is what I told Colonel Hinkel BY MR. ROBERTS: ion. This is the 16th of November, 1945 four days before the trial:
"This document is identified for the record as L-172. I show you the photostatic reproduction again, in order to refresh your recollection concerning it.
"As I remember your previous testimony, it was to the effect that the first part of the document is the speech that you wrote for delivery to that meeting. The second part consists of various thoughts on the basis of which this speech was prepared; is that right?
"Answer: One moment, please. This is not my real lecture. This is a conglomerate of the pieces of writings which are partly drafts of my own, that is, the introduction, but all the appendices are the basis for my lecture, furnished me by my staff.
"The photostats appended to the criminal lecture--it was a photographed copy also, a number of maps which were drawn up were included.
"This is not my lecture as such, and the annotations male here, in this calligraphic manner, were not mine. I had made them in my own handwriting.
"I do not know the origin of this copy. Most likely it was furnished me by the OKW for the purpose of my giving this lecture. It is altogether a conglomerate of various pieces of writing, and it is usable only with limitations.
Now just listen to this, will you?
"However, as to the bread lines of it, this is what I have used as a lecture."
Then the next question was:
"I believe you stated before that the written speech that you had was not given as set forth in the text, because you interpolated various remarks in the course of the speech, particularly whenever you referred to one of the maps that you placed before the audience in order to follow the campaigns which you discussed. Isn't that correct?"
Now listen to this: text, written down by myself. But in regard to the momentary situation on the various fronts"--and that is part 3 and 4, where you will find a note "delivered extemporaneously"--"I had that so clearly in mind that I did not need to base my speech on any written statements.
Also, I referred to the maps freely."
Then the last question on this point:
"Is it not true, however, that the document before you represents, in general, the speech that you gave to this meeting in Munich in November 1943?"
The answer is:
"Yes; much, without doubt is the same. All the appendices in regard to these various theaters of war and other appendices I had not used during my speech. I had returned them."
Do you agree with your answers to that interrogation?
A On the whole, I will confirm what I said. However, I don't know why we have to talk so long about it. The case is completely clear.
Q Well, please don't worry yourself. I know I am stepping you, but I apprehend that I am stopping you from saying something quite irrelevant, and in the interest of time I regard it as my duty to stop you. Please don't worry about why I should do something. in the speech. It is quite a different thing than being in a waste paper basket. basic thoughts, were, of course, in the speech in this form basically. However, the whole speech was worked out on the basis of this first draft; it was shortened, changed, parts were eliminated, mistakes were eliminated, and so on. Then came the main part of the speech. There is no proof, and I am not in a position to say whether I used one sentence of the material given here.
Q Very good; I will accept that. found.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might as well adjourn now.
MR. ROBERTS: If your Lordship please.
(A recess was taken.)
DR. EXNER: (Counsel for Defendant Jodl) Mr. President, I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the following: when my client was interrogated at that time here, he was heard through an interpreter, since he does not understand English; and on the basis of this testimony of his, the minutes were established and set down in the English language. This record, was never submitted to the defendant; he had never seen it, and he did not sign these minutes. submitted to him in the German language through the interpreter, and in my opinion, it is quite impossible, under these circumstances, to tie the defendant down to certain words which are contained in the record. He will, of course, stand on what he said, and support it, but he cannot recognize that he said everything that is in that record.
THE PRESIDENT: That is true. We will keep these facts in mind. The Tribunal will keep these facts in mind, if you will craw them to their attention.
MR. ROBERTS: If it please the Tribunal, I am passing from that point. The witness, I think, said the document was the basis of the speech, and I accept that answer, and I pass to another point. 113 -PS. It is page 133 in the large document book. BY MR. ROBERTS: November, 1937, which I am dealing with, "Hitler develops his ideas of future development intentions and conduct of policy"; page 133 of the large book.
THE PRESIDENT: When you say "large book", you mean "No 7"?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, No. 7; I am sorry. I should have given it, a number. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q This is the 5th of November, 1937: "Hitler develops his ideas of future development intentions and conduct of policy to the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces", etc.
chief of armed forces' office and by the Commander-in-Chief of the air force.
"...the intention of L..." -- does that mean your department, Landesverteidigung, its intention to have these thoughts put on paper?
A (No response)
A That means "Intention L"; that means the intention of the department of defense to have these thoughts put down on paper, and to have these ideas transmitted through the Wehrmacht branches.
Q Very good. Now, the meeting that you were talking about was what we have called the Hoszbach conference, was it not, which is 386-PS? The Tribunal are very familiar with it. You remember the conference, do you not? You have read it many times here?
A Yes. I was not present at this conference, but I do recall the things that were read here.
Q I know you were not present. But presumably, you, as head of the home defense department, were told of what was said at the conference? ceived was in no way sensational. The directives for the preparation at this time are available to the Court in writing; and everything -which we prepared and worked with at the time is proved thereby. It is set down. We have the order of the 20th of May and of the 14th of June; all these are available.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were only asked whether you were told what happened at the conference. It was not necessary to make a long statement about that. BY DR. ROBERTS: simple answers. The last thing I want is to interrupt you.
* Were you told that at that conference Hitler said that Germany's problem was a question of space? only be solved by force? practically complete? said that the first aim in the event of war would be Austria and Czechoslovakia? Czechoslovakia, I believe, was contained in these statements. But I can say only the details which I received from Field Marshal Keitel are not in my recollection at present. I do recall one thing, that it was no surprise or no sensation for me in any way -- only small corrections of the directive which had been given out up to that point.
Q Very good. Thank you. Now, then, you were not present at Obersalzburg when Keitel was there with Schuschnigg in the following February, were you?
Q But Keitel later told you what had happened?
A He made a few brief remarks. He made a few brief remarks just in the manner of conversation, for after all, I was not concerned with this matter.
Q Did you make that entry in your diary; that is, the next entry to the one I was referring to, Page 133, Book 7, the same page, under the 11th of February, 1938: "In the evening, around the 12th of February, 'K' (Keitel) came with Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzburg.
Schuschnigg and Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure." Did Keitel tell you that?
A Yes. You only included the word "again." That word is not found in my diary. This entry I made personally, and I made it for this reason, since Keitel had told me at the luncheon period Reichenau and Sperrle had carried on warlike conversations to the effect that they had talked about the rearmament of Germany.
Q Very good. Now, in March -- I think this is common ground -- you signed or initialed one or two orders for the operation "Otto."
A Yes; but at that time, it was not called "Operation Otto"; rather "marching into Austria." of the people by plebiscite, he decided to invade at once, did he not? of public opinion through the trick of a plebiscite, he said "I will certainly not tolerate this under any circumstances." This is what I was told.
Q He would not tolerate public opinion's being ascertained?
A No; he would not tolerate public opinion's being abused through this trick.
Q So the armed forces of Germany then marched into Austria' A That is right; the Wehrmacht did march in.
Socialism; is that right?
A That is a political question. It could have become the happiest country on earth.
Q. I wasn't asking what it could have become, but what it received.
It received the SS, the Gestapo, the concentration camps, suppression of opponents and the persecution of Jews, didn't it?
A. These are questions with which I did not concern myself, and these questions you have to put to the competent authorities.
Q. Very good. You say the people appeared pleased to see you?
A. The people who were under my jurisdiction were very happy about this, that I can tell you.
Q. They had to appear to be, whether they were or not, didn't they?
A. No, they did not have to be. After I had been away for a long time, they certainty didn't have to write enthusiastic letters to me, letters which I received throughout the war, and from Austrians to whom my heart belonged.
Q. There was one man who wasn't please to see you, wasn't there?
A. I know no such person.
Q. Don't you?
A. No.
Q. What about Schuschnigg?
A. I never saw Schuchnigg. I do not know lain and he doesn't know no.
Q. He wasn't pleased to see you cone in, was he? What happened to lain -
THE PRESIDENT: he know that, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: I quite realize that. I can't imagine my question is not admissable, but if you don't want me to put it -- it is one of a series of questions -- I won't.
Q. Schuschnigg was put in a concentration camp, wasn't he?
A. I was told that the Fuehrer had decreed that he did not want him to become a martyr, but he could not liberate him and he had to put him in honorary (sic) (honorable custody.
That was the impression I had during the entire war.
Q Honorary?
Q Was he an honorary member of Dachau?
A That I don't know. Those are not questions that you can put to me, for I was a soldier and not the commandant of a concentration camp. with, isn't it? during these years.
DR. EXNER: I am sorry but I have to object to questions like that. They are political and based on legal matter, matters which the Defendant cannot answer through his own knowledge. It is not a concern whether Schuschnigg was happy or not.
MR. ROBERTS: In my respectful submission, these questions are perfectly proper, the like of which have been put over and over again by Defense and Prosecution Counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, the Tribunal thinks that the cross-examination is proper.
MR. ROBERTS: I am grateful to you, but I am passing from that point.
Q. The only question I ask in conclusion is that Schuschnigg was kept in prison or kept in confinement for several years without any charge and any trial. That is right, isn't it?
A. It may be, although I don't know.
Q. You know, did you not, when you signed those orders for the march into Austria, that Germany had given an assurance in May 1935, that she would respect the territorial integrity of Austria, and that on the 11th of July 1936, there had been entered into by your government and the Austrian government an agreement by Germany to recognize the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria?
Did you know of these things?
A. At that time, no, I did not know that. In my position in the General Staff that matter did not concern me.
Q. I am passing from Austria with this one last question: Is there an entry in your diary -- it is a passage in I-172, the basis for the draft of your speech -- that after the Anschluss, Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim? That is page 290 of Book 7. Do you know that passage?
A. In the first draft which I made for my Gauleiter speech it said exactly what strategic improvements through the various actions of the Fuehrer had taken place, in that respect. But only these strategic -
Q. Again I don't want to stop you, but did you say something to this effect -- and I will give you the document if you like -that Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim?
A. In the first draft I set down that through the Anschluss of Austria the strategic situation of Czechoslovakia had become so utterly hopeless that at any time it could fall a victim to a pincers attack. That is the strategic retrospect about facts, indisputable facts.
Q. How I go very shortly to the case of Czechoslovakia. I only want to deal really with a couple of documents. I want to deal with It on 17, which will be found on page 29 of Book 7. And I have flagged that for you, Witness. Item 17.
A. Yes.
Q. You are familiar with that?
A. Yes, I know that.
Q. I don't propose to read it again, because it was read very recently; but you said yesterday that the problem was this:
First of all you must have a surprise attack; if you were going to attack at all, you must have a surprise attack.
A. Yes, on the basis of the stipulations put by the Fuehrer.
would take four days to get into their battle position. which is going to be the cause of the attack; you must know the time when the incident is going to take place.
A Yes, I said that. You would either have to predetermine the time; otherwise the situation could not be net.
A I testified to that at length yesterday. Something had to be utilized and exploited that would help the situation along, but those are meditations in the General Staff and whether we captured these natters from the French they were considered irrelevant and insignificant. that either the Wehrmacht or the Counter-intelligence Section would be charged with the manufacture of the incident.
A Yes, I said that in case the Abwehr (Counter-Intelligence) is charged, but these were all theoretical meditations of the General Staff as to applying that to a situation which I depicted at great length yesterday, and incidents like that occurred every day. been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go to war? fied as to that. I believe the true reason would have been told the world, and the actual reason, which was made known through the press, that three and a half million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people, and that was the question at issue. the earthly good of manufacturing an incident? what I said then at length: I knew the world history and the his tory of war too well not to know that in every war things like that happen -- the question about the first shot, as to who fired the first shot.
And the Czechoslovak State at that time had fired thousands of shots on German territory. are not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is, if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you want to manufacture an incident? If you can't answer it, say so.
A It isn't at all confirmed that, but I wanted to bring about or create an incident. I said, "in case." We never prepared an incident and that, to me, seems the decisive factor.
Q I won't argue any further with you. I have put my point and will leave it. last paragraph on page 29, the sane document:
"Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack."
And then:
"... deaths of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers." tion of war or any warning to the civilian population, doesn't it?
A That meant that I called the attention of the Fuehrer, through this document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result would come about.
A Would you call that a terror attack? plade. These are all theoretical words for our General Staff, just theories. Just how and if thought was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with justice or not. tice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were recalled to the OKW on the 23rd of August, 1939, from your artillery employment. We know that, don't we? of you, wasn't it? do not know whetherhe knew about it at all. I rather doubt it.
Q Very good. On a very smallpoint, Witness, you told the Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with the Fuehrer, I think, until September 1939, but your Diary, on the 10th of August, 1938 -- it is Page 136 of Bock 7 -- your Diary said you attended a conference at the Berghof with the Army Chiefs and the Air Force groups. Didn't you meet the Fuehrer then? What I said was, word for word, verbatim, on the 3rd of September I was introduced to the Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke the first word I ever addressed to him. That is what I testified to word for word yesterday. I had seen the Fuehrer a dozen times before then and I had listened to him when he had delivered his speeches
Q Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I was wrong. Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you aright when you said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflets had been dropped?
A That applies to the beleaguring of the city of Warsaw at that time.
The terror attack which was to hit the entire city through artillery, that took place after a forewarning which had come through twice. with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of September, 1939, before any declaration of war? Isn't that a matter of history? Kesselring, who is very well informed, on this problem, testified to that in detail. He said that on this date the militarily important bases and objectives of Poland were attacked but not the population of Warsaw.
MR. ROBERTS: If the Tribunal want the reference, Kesselring gave evidence as to the bombing of Warsaw, the English transcript, page 5731. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q Now, I suppose the result of the polish campaign was *aturally a source of satisfaction to all of you? military view, was quite satisfactory to us. Of course things happen in life that would give were satisfaction than a military action.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, this is a new exhibit, D, for Donald 885, and it is GB-484. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q That letter is in your handwriting, is it not? Is it in your writing?
Q Very good. Now, it is written to Police President, Dr. Karl Schwabe, Brunn (Moravia), Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939. "My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of September 22, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought about for us an unusually favorable point of departure politically as well as militarily.
The most difficult part for the people as well as the Army is naturally still ahead." I propose to read it without comments and comment afterward. "But the Fuehrer and his associates are full of the greatest confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry. Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of. This time to will show that we have the better nerves and the greater unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and to not letting then perk up, of this I am convinced." Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the troops. "Tahnking you once more heartily for your words of appreciation which exceed by far my modest contribution in the shadow of the powerful personality of our Fuehrer. I am with Heil Hitler." Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties and don't have concentration camps and don't persecute Jews? Is that why you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don't break treaties?
A No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political situation generally was such that I was of that opinion.
Q Thank you. Now, you say: "Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of." Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the Gestapo?
Q The Gauleiters? Sauckel, for instance, in a largo area like Thuringia, he couldn't do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or Gestapo, wouldn't he?
A We are not concerned with that here. The fact was that these Gauleiters were concerned with the organization of the State and they carried their offices through in a noteworthy way. Despite these catastrophes the people were much better taken care of them in other years, that is in 1938, and that is to the credit of these people.
Q The people were better taken care of? his regular rations. It was a model of organization.
government or the Party was allowed, was it?
A Yes. It made it easier on one hand and on the other hand brought about terrible and tremendous catastrophes about which I have just learned here.
Q Your letter speaks for itself, and I will go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence: "That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and to not letting them per up --", what did you mean by that? that quiet and order were maintained and not to tolerate a Czech uprising while we were at war. That is a matter of course and taken for granted. I did not say that he was to murder or Germanize the Czechs at all, but he had to keep order.
Q Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect the integrity of Norway and Denmark, d id you not?
A Yes, I believe I recalled that at the time. I am quite sure. reassure all these Western centrals, and there was another assurance on the 6th of October, and you say that in November Hitler decided to invade Denmark and Norway?
A Yes. I testified as to that at length yesterday.
Q I know you did. please don't always say that. I have got to go over the same ground from the other angle, you see. "In the meantime", as your speech said --and I am quoting from Page 291 of Book 7, page 11 of your notes.
MR. ROBERTS: It is in the middle, my Lord, under Paragraph 8.
Q "In the meantime, we were confronted by the problem of the occupation of Norway and Denmark. In the first place, there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the North would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was with the realization of our own maritime necessities -- 'Notwendigkeiten'" -- that is the word, isn't it -'Notwendigkeiten' -
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that ought to be "necessary" and not "imperative. "Erforderten" is the German word. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q "-- which made it necessary for us to secure free access to the Atlantic by a number of air and naval export points." You wanted air bases and naval bases, didn't you?
A. Militarily they were tremendously important to us. There is no doubt about that, but the stipulation to take them, those were the reports which we had.
Q. What I suggest to you, you see, is this: That in this, like the case of the other three low countries, in this case, you simply made an excuse. You thought England might do something, although she had not done it for months, and you breached Norway's neutrality at your own chosen time. Is that right?
A. In order to answer that question Yes or No, one would have to undertake a very thorough study of all the historical documents on both our own and the enemy side. Before that has been done, only a subjective opinion is here. I have mine, and you have another.
Q. Yes. I point out to you that it was Germany on every occasion who violated the neutrality. The Allies did not.
A. In the case of Norway, the English did that for the first time in the case of the "Altmark" by the shooting of German ships in Norwegian territorial waters, and that has been determined and proved indisputably. There is no doubt about that at all.
Q. The "Altmark", as you very well know, Witness, was not an occupation at all: it was merely the act of the British Navy in taking British prisoners from a German prison ship, and I imagine that your navy would have done the same if they had had the chance. What is the good of talking about the "Altmark". It was not an occupation at all.
A. But it was a violation of international law, as far as Norwegian sovereignty was concerned. You could only request that Norway do the same thing, but you personally had no business to carry through a combative action in those Norwegian waters.
Q. Why should you break your word to Norway and cause untold suffering and misery to the inhabitants of that country because the British went into the territorial waters and took out a few hundred prisoners? That is the logic of it? Why should the Norwegians suffer for it.
A. You are just quoting one small example, but there are hundreds of them