And that was done on the order of the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, how is the evidence about General Thomas relevant to the case of the Defendant in the witness-box or General Keitel? The evidence of Gisevius was relevant to the case of the Defendant Schacht. It seems to me -- and, I think, to the Tribunal -- that this is entirely irrelevant to the case of the Defendant you represent or the case of General Jodl. What does it matter to us whether General Thomas was acting in order to try to overthrow Hitler or not?
DR. NELTE: The questions which concerns the Defendant Keitel is whether Field Marshal Keitel submitted and presented the reports handed in by Thomas. The witness Gisevius said here, referring to Thomas as a source of information, that these reports of Thomas were kept from Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: We went into that yesterday and now the Defendant Jodl has said that the reports of Thomas were submitted to the Fuehrer. But what I was pointing out to you was that the question whether Thomas was making his reports honestly or not is a matter which is entirely irrelevant.
DR. NELTE: Not as to the credibility of the source of information, Gisevius, in my opinion; but I will put this question aside. However, in this connection I must ask one more question with regard to the other source of information, Canaris.
Q Canaris was frequently a guest in the Fuehrer's headquarters and a guest of yours. What was the relationship of Field Marshal Keitel to his oldest office chief? day to the last was an especially friendly and good one. Unfortunately he had too much confidence in him.
of July? Keitel did not believe the charges against Canaris and that after the arrest of Canaris he supported his family with money.
Q What was the relationship of Canaris to Heydrich?
A I mentioned that once before. Canaris always tried to Maintain an especially good relationship with Hitler and Heydrich so that they would not distrust him. Keitel to Hitler's plan in October, 1939, the plan to attack in the West? impressed by the attitude of the Commander in Chief of the Army and the General Staff of the Army and also raised a warning voice against this attack in the West. I know, although I did not experience it personally but somebody told me about it later, I know that during this time he had the controversy with the Fuehrer whi led to a request for his resignation. This is what Schmundt told no; I did not witness it myself. Field Marshal Keitel did not te me about it personally. those are the so-called directive and special field instructions 21 -- under Roman numeral I-B is the famous paragraph according to which, in the operational area of the Army, the Reichsfuehrer is instructed to prepare a political administration with a special * on behalf of the Fuehrer, resulting from the battle of two oppos* political systems. I am sure you are acquainted with the document
Q I will not hand it to you, and to make the matter br* I will only ask, please tell the Court what Field Marshal Keitel felt about this order, how he acted in regard to it? eignty of the Army and its operational area with Himmler led to days of bitter discussion with the Fuehrer.
The same argument had already taken place when Terboven was appointed in Norway. One need only read my entries in my Diary, PS 1780, to understand why the Fuehrer insisted on this point of view under all circumstances and why he forced the police, under Himmler, into the operational area. It was against all our rules. It was against all previous agreements with the police and with Himmler, but in the last analysis, the Fuehrer put this measure through in spite of resistance. Keitel gave the order to kill General Weygand, the Chief of the General Staff of the French Army. This statement is based, essentially, on testimony of the witness, General Lahousen. I have a few brief questions to you on this matter. Was yield Marshal Keitel competent to order the killing of a general?
A No. Any death sentence had to be confirmed by the Fuehrer. No one is competent to order murder.
Q I ask this because Lahousen's testimony presented it as if this order had been given by yield Marshal Keitel to Admiral Canaris. If we assume that such an order was issued by Hitler, this would have been a highly political act considering the importance of Weygand?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, this is all argument, and you are putting your questions in an entirely leading form. The real objection to it is that it is argumentative. BY DR. NELTE: unknown to you? with the ordering of murder, would not have spoken about it to me.
Q What did you hear about the Weygand case at all?
case. I heard only one thing, when Himmler reported to the Fuehrer in my presence: "I have given Weygand a very nice villa in Baden. He can be satisfied with it." That is the only thing I ever heard discussed in the name of Weygand. Giraud. Do you know anything of this case of Giraud which attrac* ed much attention at the time?
A I heard a little here about the Giraud case. Shortly after the successful flight of Giraud, Field Marshal Keitel told me once in a conversation that he had had Giraud guarded by Canar so that he would not, as the Fuehrer always said, go to North Africa and direct the building up of the Commando Army against us or that he might not go to his family in the occupied territory where he could be arrested. That is what he told me. Several months later he said to me again: "I have now withdrawn this assignment to Canaris because the Fuehrer has given it to Himmler. If two agencies are concerned with it there will only be different. The third time I heard about the Giraud case was when Field Marshal Keitel told me that a deputy of Giraud -- I believe it was about the end of '43 or in the spring of '44 -- a deputy of Giraud approached the counter intelligence and said: "Giraud does not agr with De Gaulle in North Africa. He acquired information that he might not be permitted to return to France." I told Field Marshal Keitel then that the matter had to be looked into immediately, be cause that was extremely favorable for as politically. That is the only thing I ever heard about the Giraud case. Nothing else. Fuehrer's train in September, 1939, at which General Lahousen was present. In this connection you said: "I have no objections to Lahousen's statement." To avoid misunderstandings, I should like you to say whether yon meant by that that all the testimony of Lahousen is credible and correct, referring to Giraud and Weygand or only the part regarding your presence in the Fuehrer's train?
A Of course, I meant only those statements of Lahousen' which be made about me.
As for the other statements which were made here, I have my own opinion, but that doesn't belong here.
Q Yesterday, in answer to a question of Dr. Stahmer, you spoke about the dispute on the occasion of the right RAF flyers who escaped. In regard to this question, which the prosecution charged against Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to know the following: Did you hear that Field Marshal Keitel objected violently to the recaptured RAF flyers being turned over to Himmler, that is, to the Gestapo? utes, I heard the Fuehrer say: "That is terrible. That is the tenth time that dozens of the captured officers have broken out. These officers are an enormous danger. You don't realize that." meaning Keitel -- "In view of the six million foreign people in prisoners and workers in Germany, they are the leaders who could organize an uprising. Due to this careless attitude of the Commanders, these flyers who have broken out are to be turned over to Himmler immediately." And then I heard Field Marshal Keitel answer: "My Fuehrer, part of them have already been brought back to the camp. They are prisoners of war. I cannot send then over And the Fuehrer said: When they can stay there. That is what I heard with my own ears at that moment, until my telephone call called me away again.
Q Afterwards did you speak again with Field Marshal Keitel about this incident?
A We drove back to Berchtesgaden together from the Berghof. Field Marshal Keitel was beside himself. On the way up he had told me that he would not report the escape of these fliers to the Fuehrer. He hoped that on the next day he would have them all back. He was furious at Himmler, who had immediately reported it to the Fuehrer. I told him that if the Fuehrer, in view of the total situation in Germany, saw such a great danger in the escape of foreign officers, then England should be so notified so that the order might be made for officers not to attempt to escape. of these recaptured fliers being shot. They had done nothing except escape from a camp. German officers had also done that dozens of times. I imagined that he wanted to remove them from the disciplinary action of the army, which in his opinion would be too lenient, and wanted to have them work in a concentration camp for Himmler for a time as punishment. That is what I imagined.
Q- In any case, in your presence, in your hearing, Hitler's orders to Himmler to sheet these officers were not issued? I was when I suddenly received thenews that that they had been shot.
Q Now I should like to ask a few brief concluding questions. The Tribunal asked the defendant Keitel on the witness stand whether he had submitted written applications asking for his resignation. You were presents. What can you tell the Court about Keitel's efforts to resign from his position? 1940, probably, because of the Western campaign. Schmundt told me about it, but I did not see it myself. ember, when there was an enormous controversy between the Fuehrer and Field Marshal Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, we do not want the details. I mean, if he can tell us when Keitel attempted to resign -
THE WITNESS: This second case was in the fall of 1941; after the controversy Field Marshal Keitel wrote his request for his resignation. When I entered the room, his pistol lay before him on his desk, and I personally took it away from him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I have told you that the Tribunal does not want the details, and now we are being told about the details of the resignation, about the way in which it was made.
DR. NELTE: Can it be of no importance to the Court to know how serious the defendant Keitel was? As it is, he wanted to use his pistol.
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into details about some desk on which the document wasput, or something of that sort. He made his efforts to resign in writing. That is of importance. BY DR. NELTE: in his resignation in writing? in your testimony, how did it happen that Keitel always remained? any circumstances. I believe that various attempts were made in this direct from other sources, too, but the Fuehrer did not let him go. were engaged in a war for existence, in which an officer in thelast analysis, could not stay at home and knit stockings. It was the sense of duty that exerted itself and caused us to bear all the hardships. for the sake of loyalty and that duty can only go to the point where it does not injure human dignity. Have you ever thought of that?
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is not a question for Counsel to put. That is an argument, is it not? It is argument, not evidence. It is not the sort of question to put.
DR. NELTE: I have finished.
BY DR. THOMA (Counsel for defendant Rosenberg):
gave you and General Zeitzler a draft of a proclamation to the peoples of Eastern Europe?
A That is true. It was after the situation discussion. Rosenberg was present in the headquarters. Ho asked me and Zeitzler to step into the next room for a moment. He said he wanted to report to the Fuehrer a proclamation to the Eastern peoples, and that he would like to read it to us first. I recall that.
Q Do you still recall the contents? these Eastern states. It was an outspoken attempt through a policy of reconciliation to avoid unrest and antagonism to the German system. doubts whether it was not already too late.
Q That was the success of this memorandum? often did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said, "Put that aside."
Q Did you have the impressions that Rosenberg's suggestions arose from concern about the danger caused by Koch's methods? by Himmler and Koch.
DR. THOMA: I have no more questions. BY DR. HAENSEL (Counsel for the SS): under your supervision? generally treated exactly like the divisions of the army. lection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions so that one will have a means of comparison.
The number increased to the end of the war to an estimated 35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of army divisions which varied, but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300.
Q In the set up of new divisions, what was the procedure? Who decided whether sue* *w division would be a Waffen SS division or a Wehrmacht division. he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so many divisions were to be set up, and so-and-so many Waffen SS divisions. He determined the number.
Q Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily? Fuehrer wanted to go as far as he could.
Q And when you say "could", what limitations do you see--in the methods, in the recruits, or where?
A The limitation was in the "act that the soldiers of those Waffen SS divisions were to be volunteers, and the time came very soon when Himmler had to report, "I do not get replacements for thedivisions", and from this time on, the condition arose that when the men came for military duty, the cream of them were taken by the SS, and these people, even if they were the sons of Catholic peasants, were drafted into the SS. I myself received bitter letters from farmers wives about this.
was the political viewpoint observed? Was a recruit first questioned politically before he was turned over to the Waffen SS, or was no consideration taker of this? promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive thing. was given to whether the men belonged to the SA or not. Is the same thing true of membership in the General SS? Was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion?
A Not to the sane extent as in the case of the SA. I believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the Waffen SS and volunteered But I know that very many did not do that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were treated in the Army just like any other German citizen. General SS who served in the army on the one hand, and on the other hand there were many many who neither belonged to the Party nor the SS, but served in the Waffen SS. second half of the war, yes.
Q when in the second half of the war there were the greater number? campaign of 1941.
Q How strong was the Waffen SS at the end of the war? this number?
Q And do you have any figures in mind about that?
BY MR. ROBERTS, K.C.: in the blood, is that right? the German soldier, is that right?
A Yes. I do that to a high degree. six or seven years, do you think your honor has become at all soiled?
Q Very good. You say your honor isn't soiled. which you say you had to circulate, has your truthfulness remained at the same high standard?
A (No response)
Q Can't you answer that question?
Q Well then, if you are too dumb, I won't persist in it; I will go on. I will leave the question and I will go on. Department of the Wehrmacht, is that right?
Q That is Department L, that is, Landesverteidigung, is that right?
Q And was Field marshal von Blomberg your superior? superiors.
Q Did you work a good deal with Field Marshal von Blomberg? nearly so much as the Chief of the Wehrmacht Office.
Q Did you attend staff talks with him?
A I did not attend conferences in a large circle with Blomberg. At least General Keitel and I and a few others were present.
Q And would they be called staff talks? Wehrmacht.
Q Did you go to staff talks?
Q Very good; I thought that.
Now, will you please look at Document C-139, US-53. Just look at the signature, will you. That is signed by Blomberg, is it not?
Q Now, that is dealing with Operation Schulung. Do you remember what Operation Schulung was?
A (No response.)
Q That is the reoccupation of the Rhineland, isn't it?
A (No response.)
Q Can't you answer me?
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the question was whether you remember what Operation Schulung was. It isn't necessary to read the document in order to answer that question.
AAccording to my recollection -- I don't know whether it comes from studying the documents here in Nurnberg -- the term "Schulung" was preparations for the occupation of the Rhineland after evacuation -
Q Now, wait a moment. That is then dealing with the reoccupation of the Rhineland; do you agree with that?
A No, that docs not deal with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. That is absolutely false.
"For the operation" -- I am reading it to you if you will follow it, and might I make this point first: It is apparently so secret that it couldn't be entrusted to a stenographer, isn't it? The whole document is written in manuscript, handwriting, isn't it?
A (No response.)
Q You can answer that question surely. Can't you see whether it is in handwriting or not?
Q Well, why not say so?
Now then, let's just look at the document. It is from the Reich Minister of Defense; that is von Blomberg, isn't it? It is the second copy, "By hand only". It is to the Chief of the Army High Command, Chief of the Navy High Command, and the Reich Minister for Air.
"For the operation suggested in the last staff talks" -- that is why I asked you whether you went to staff talks, you see -- "of the Armed Forces, I lay down the code name 'Schulung'."
Then, may I just refer briefly to the contents:
"This is a joint undertaking of the three services. The operation must be executed" -- and this is a phrase we have become familiar with later -- "by a surprise blow at lightning speed.
"Strictest secrecy is necessary....only peacetime strength...."
And No. 3, "Every improvement of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness."
Then, "I ask the Army: How many divisions ready for action?" Not one token battalion as you said yesterday.
"Reinforcement of the inadequate forces there" -- that is in the West -
"by the East Prussian divisions which will be transported by rail and sea.... The High Command of the Navy to look after the safe transport of the East Prussian troops."
had to be in manuscript, if it wasn't the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
A. If you will permit me to make a very brief explanation -
Q. Witness, answer my question first and then make an explanation after, if it is brief. The question is what could it refer to except the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
A. I am not a clairvoyant, I do not know the document, I have never had it; at this time I was not in the Wehrmacht office, it has entirely different signature; I was in the Operational Section of the Army. I neither saw nor ever heard of this paper. If you look at the date, the 2nd May '35, it is proven there. I entered the Wehrmacht office only the middle of June. Then, only on the basis of my general staff training can I give you some assumptions, but the Court does not want assumptions.
Q. Very good, if that is your answer. But you say that you who heard General Field Marshal von Blomberg's staff talk, you cannot help the Court at all as to what that secret operation order is about?
A. It was before my time. I was not with von Blomberg then.
Q. Very good. Now, will you look, please, at E.C. 405. Now -- let him see the German book, page 277.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lordship, that is page 26. -- Hasn't he a German book?
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said, did you not, that you remember that the operation "Schulung" was the preparation for the operation of the Rhineland?
THE WITNESS: No, I said the contrary. I said the word "Schulung" I heard for the first time here in the court, and then I wondered what could that have been.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will be able to judge as to what you said by the shorthand notes. You say, do you, that you did not say that "Schulung" meant the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland? Is that right?
THE WITNESS: I said as General Staff officer of the Operation section at that time I had to know what military preparations were made.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not what I asked you. What I want to know is what you said just now when you were asked if you remembered what "Operation Schulung" meant. What did you say? It may have come through wrongly in the translation. What did you say?
THE WITNESS: I said I believe I recall, I am not certain whether that didn't result from studying the documents here, this recollection -- or perhaps from earlier -- that the word "Schulung" means preparations concerning the evacuation of the western Rhenish territory in case of French sanctions. That was the only thing that we concerned ourselves with at that time; all the evacuation measures which I later mentioned in document EC-405. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q. Well, you remember the date of that last document, 2nd of May 1935. Now I refer to EC-405 which is in the big document book 7, page 261, and it is on page 277 of the German book. 277. This, Witness, is a meeting -- I want you to look, please, at pages 43 and 44 of the original which you have. Have you got 43 and 44?
A. 43 and 44, yes.
Q. Well, now, you see there it is a meeting of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council. It is dated the 26th of June 1935, and at letter "F" Colonel Jodl talks about participation in mobilization preparation, and the first three paragraphs deal with general mobilization and I don't want to read them but the fourth paragraph reads:
"Demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of 21st of May 1935 and other utterances the Fuehrer has stated that the stipulations of Versailles and Locarno regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the "Aide memoire" of the French charge d'affaires of 17 June 1935 on recruiting offices in the demilitarized zone the German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war or in preparation therefor."
Now, if von Blomberg's hand-written letter of the 2nd of May 1935 did refer to preparations for occupying the Rhineland by surprise, it was highly dishonest of the Fuehrer 19 days later on the 21st of May to say that the Locarno and Versailles treaties are being observed, wasn't it?
A. No, it wasn't dishonest. If it is true at all that the term "Schulung" -
TEE PRESIDENT: I think that is a matter of comment.
MR. ROBERTS: I shall of course, My Lordship, let you make certain comments on the witness as I proceed. No doubt Your Lordship will realize that I am not endeavoring to depart from this particular ruling which is on this particular question.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that the Court stated that you ought not to make comments but ought to confine yourself to cross-examination about the facts.
MR. ROBERTS: Regarding Your Lordship's ruling, I have had a very extensive experience in cross-examination in many courts, but it is very difficult for a cross-examiner to confine himself entirely to the facts. But I shall do the very best I can. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q. I shall read on:
"Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of such preparations or the intention of them must be kept in strictest secrecy, in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich."
I want to refer to the last paragraph:
"Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized zone, and without exception such material must be kept in safes. Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-gray uniforms and other items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight."
were you?
A. They were weapons and items of equipment of the police, the gendarmerie; there were no troops there. Consequently, there were no weapons there for them.
Q. Did the police wear field-gray uniforms?
A. To my knowledge the police wore a gray-green uniform or a green uniform.
Q. What was the need of this great secrecy if this was only police equipment?
A. It was the equipment in addition for the reinforced border guards, which I have already said.
Q. My question, Witness, was what was the need for s ocrecy? That was the need for secrecy if you weren't breaking the treaty of Versailles? Can't you answer that?
A. The reasons for keeping all these measures secret I testified to in detail and I said that in all those preparations it was a question in case of an occupation of the western Rhenish territory by France, to set up a blockade along the line with the aid of the police, the gendarmarie and the border guards. That was the intention at that time. Only in this eventuality I have already testified under oath that I meant occupation of the Rhineland, only six days before hand.
Q. You have, and I an suggesting to you that your evidence was quite untrue on that point, and I am going to suggest it is quite untrue on many points. Now then, will you please go back to the first paragraph that I read. You say: To the "aide memoire" of the French Change d'affaires the German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities not other offices have been entrusted. with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war. Doesn't that subsequent paragraph about the weapons, equipment, insignia, and field gray uniforms show that the truth was not told to the French Charge d'affaires?
A. I only repeat that this was answered -- that answer was given to the French Charge d'affaires. I believe that that was essentially true: He mobilization tasks, establishment, equipment and forming of formations for the event of war. There was no thought of war, no one mentioned at with one word.
Q. Well, now, may I just remind you -- and I think there are copies for the Tribunal too -- of Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty.
Article 42 defines the area, the left bank of the Rhine and the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east.
Article 43:
"In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, cither permanently or temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden." the Treaty of Versailles. Do you agree, or don't you?
A. No, I do not agree to that. They were taken in the event that the enemy did not hold the treaty and would attack us again as in the Ruler.
Q. Very good. Now I propose to refer to a document which has been described as your speech, L.172, from time to time. clear first as to what you say the document is, because you wouldn't say one thing one day and the opposite the next, would you, witness? The document has your writing in places, has it not? I can refer to the pages if you like. If you look at page -
A. That is unnecessary. For many hand written notations and words crossed out by me -
Q. Thank you, Witness, for saving me that trouble then. And is that a speech, the notes of a speech, which you delivered at Munich to the Gauleiters in 1943?
A. This -- I have already clearly said that this was a waste-basket, root the speech that I held but parts of the first draft, a mass of matter in it of notes of reports of my staff which they gave to work out this speech. I crossed out whole pages and sent the whole waste-basket back again and then I made my speech.