The last question: The Prosecution called this whole series of campaigns a long prepared, long agreed plan of conquest which you as a conspirator provoked and carried out.
What do you have to say to that? torted has already been essentially corrected by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my having had any part in its preparation. It developed into a world war, against all the hopes of the soldiers. For this war, everything has to be improvised. There was nothing but theplan of attack against Poland. There was not enough bombs; there was not enough ammunition. No soldier at that time thought Norway, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, or Russia. There were no military agreements with Italy or with Japan. The presentation of the American Chief of Staff, General Marshall, I recognize as absolutely correct in almost all points.
DR. EXNER: And, Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defendant's Counsel wish to ask any questions? BY DR. LATERNSER: (Counsel for the General Staff)
Q. Colonel General, as Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, you were for many years thefirst general staff officer ofthe Wehrmacht? time a teacher at war Academy? which preceded the War Academy, and which were at that time held at the seat of the various commanders' defense commands. course, I ask you to tell us briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please confine yourself to the following points: how much time was given to instruction on attack, to wars of aggression; the attitude toward international law and to politics -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this question is completely irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Court believes that this question is irrelevant, I will dispense with the answer.
Q Do you know the points of view of the Prosecution that the military leaders formed a group with the aim of waging wars of aggression and to commit crimes against international law and the laws of humanity?
till you comment on this point, especially, and whether there was actually a group of high military leaders? understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were to meet on an ocean steamer; that must unit e them; they must follow the orders of the captain. This so-called group of high officers perhaps existed in the Kaiser's time, in absolute unity, but not entirely then, either. However, after the National Socialist revolution this group was divided in all aspects, politically and ideologically. The only thing that united them was soldiery and the necessary obedience.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours) (The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 5 June 1946). BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): 1938, there was a meeting at the Berghof, a meeting between Hitler and Military leaders. You were present at that Meeting. Up to now that conference has not yet been discussed here, and I now want to ask you what was the subject of that conference. Staff officers only and gave then a lecture that lasted for about two and a half hours. He spoke about the entire military and political situation. He went into detail, in particular, with reference to the Sudeten-German problem, about which he said that it would have to be solved under any circumstances. He described the various possibilities, and, particularly, he described clearly his intention, but also the confidence he had that he would be able to bring about that solution without France and England hindering him.
Q That was the subject of that conference? the various armed forces were not there? informed of the subject of that conference, and he told me that it was the Fuehrer's intention to speak to the senior staff officers directly at a time when they would not be under the influence of their senior officers, their superiors, so that they would realize the critical attitude which the Supreme Commander sometimes had. critical attitude indeed on the part of those officers, was there not? of the generals believed that he ought to draw the Fuehrer's attention to that one possibility that England and France might interfere after all if he did something against Czechoslovakia. That was General von Biedersheim.
the highest military leaders from such conferences again?
A The Fuehrer did that quite often. I want to say that he even did it on principle. For instance, after our attempt to attack the bridgehead at Nutono, southeast of Rome, which had failed, he ordered the junior officers from that battle to come to the Fuehrer Headquarters. They were regimental commanders down to company commanders. For days, and without the presence of their superiors, he interrogated each one of them. He did the same thing very, very often with air force officers, whom he interrogated without the Supreme Commander of the air force being consulted. conferences about the situation. Could the Supreme Commanders present at the Fuehrer's headquarters take part in such conferences without difficulties? subjects were discussed as had already happened in the past, the Fuehrer was very generous regarding the participation, but as soon as something was discussed which was, shall we say, an intention, an operational intention, such as for instance the Russian attack in 1942, a Supreme Commander from the Western Front would not be allowed to take part, nor would it be possible the other way around so that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only invite such officers who had to be informed for official reasons.
Q In such cases, the so-called "Smallest Circle" would be consulted?
A That is right. In that case the Chief Adjutant announced on behalf of the Fuehrer that now a discussion among the "Smallest Circle" would take place in which only these would take part who were officially concerned. energetic representations on the part of the Supreme Commanders?
Have you heard then, and when did you? please limit yourself to the most important episodes of that type. question; otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. where the old, traditional conceptions regarding operations did not come into conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Fuehrer Apart from certain operations during the first part of the war, I can quite well state that during every such report made by the Supreme Commanders, there was a clash of opinions. I could quote every Supreme Commander who has over existed in that connection. I know of none to whom this would not apply. did you not? war I know up to and including Army Commanders. I know all of those. During the second half of the war, there were army commanders in the East whom I did not know. They generally did not come from the General Staff but were career officers who came from amongst the men. of an army, without difficulties announce himself for a discussion with Hitler?
A The commander of an army could not. The commander of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the Commander in Chief of the army. When the Commander in Chief of the Army no longer existed, the Army Group Commanders then applied to the military adjutant's office, or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for permission to be asked to report, but Army Commanders could not do that. tentions to protest against some measure which he did not consider right, then he would have to go to the Commander of the Army Group, and then he in turn would have to go to the Supreme Commander of the Army, so that only through all the official channels could a protest be made to Hitler?
Q. What do you know about Himmler's attempt to bring about a hostile attitude on the part of Hitler against the generals, and I mean the group generals?
A. Perhaps I have already given you part of my answer to that. I complained that we were not in a position to worn the Fuehrer against military information and news which he heard from irresponsible sources. It was a current phenomenon that particularly from circles of the police there was an incessant flow of news through Himmler, news referring to the traditional, or, as they called it, the reactionary attitude of the higher military leaders, through which these severe orders of the Fuehrer regarding a brutal action were continuously brought about. commanders, but it was concentrated on certain of them.
Q. Colonel General, you still haven't quite answered my question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler's attempt to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.
A. Well, the consequence of what I have just described was a report made by Himmler, of course alone with Hitler, in which he would talk against certain senior commanders -- men of the army exclusively, of course -- and complain about them. We noticed that because the following day the Fuehrer would suddenly begin to speak against a particular commander without our knowing why; he would make him look bad.
Q. What was the relationship between the OKW and the OKH?
A. Before the war, and during the first part of the war, the relationship between the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the Supreme Command of the Army was burdened by considerable tension. The reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one, because through creating the OKW a group of general staff officers had arises, who were outside the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the Army, and who were, I would say, in command of the General Staff of the Army and would give orders. distrust by the General Staff of the Army. I ought to add, however, that Field Marshal Keitel and other reasonable officers succeeded in removing this tension as the war went on.
Q. I think, General, that that is enough. war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal von Runstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?
A. I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when the Fuehrer had flown to the headquarters north of Rouen together with me. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field Marshal von Runstedt and Rommel stated in an unmistakeable manner how serious the entire situation in France was; tremendous superiority, against which ground operations were powerless. the end, "My Fuehrer, how do you imagine the continuation of this war will go on?" The Fuehrer was rather angry about this remark, and he only answered shortly, "That is a question which it is none of your business to put. You will have to leave that to me."
Q. Did you read a letter which Field Marshal von Kluge wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?
A. I stood next to the Fuehrer when he received that letter. He opened it, read the letter, and then gave it to me. It said exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Fuehrer's personality, by describing how he had admired him and the energy with which he had held out during this war. He said that he was probably psychologically much closer to him than the Fuehrer could guess. He had still begun his task in the West full of confidence, but after the promised support of our own air force had not arrived, he had now found himself convinced that the situation was hopeless, and in the last hour of his life he could give him only one piece of good advice, and that was to make peace now.
Q. Colonel General, can you give further examples regarding the efforts of the senior military commanders to end the hopeless war?
A. No supreme commander could touch the political questions because the ending of a war isn't a military but a political decision. But indirectly I have to say that there wasn't an officer in a responsible position who would not tell the Fuehrer soberly, honestly, and openly what the military situation was and describe it as so hopeless as it turned out to be towards the end. memorandum which I handed to the Fuehrer.
Q. I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign?
A. About the evening before the march into Austria, at 2 o'clock in the morning, I visited Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. I found him in a desolate mood. I didn't really see any reason for that, but apparently it was his conviction that this march into Austria might, under certain circumstances, develop into a military conflict either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia, or perhaps he was not alto gether very pleased politically speaking regarding this impending considerable increase of the South German element in the Reich. I don't know, but at any rate he was most depressed.
Q. What were the reasons for the tension which existed between Hitler on one side and the military leaders on the other after the Polish campaign?
A. That was a phase of a particularly serious conflict, because the Commander in Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals did have just that view to which I testified this morning, namely, that one ought to remain quiet in the West to end the war, Since this was again a political argument which they couldn't possibly use, the Commander in Chief of the Army brought a military argument before the Fuehrer at that time, and that argument was that considering the condition in which our Army was at the time, it would not be in a position to fight against an army like the French Army, strengthened by the British Army, and would not be able to attack. every speech and every lecture before the supreme commanders.
The entire speech of November 23d, the entire memorandum which he wrote on the 10th of October, all arose and can only be explained from that conflict. groups have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you to state your views in connection with affidavit Number 12, U.S.557, which originates from Walter Schellenberg. There on page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the Frontal Zone the "Einsatzgruppen", the Action Groups, of the SD had been under the command of the Armies entirely. That is to say that tactically, factually and from the point of view of discipline, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Colonel General?
A It is only true to a very limited extent. At the beginning of my answer I am asked this sentence, named , that the "Einsatzgruppen" with "Einsatzkommando" is something I didn't know until I came her to Nurnberg. I must say that quite openly, even if it is decided that I am to be called a "Parcival", but it is a fact, I only knew of the Secret Police in the operational territory that the Army was divided into three sectors. The Front territory was called the fighting zone, and that went as far, approximately,as the artillery of the enemy could fire. In that sector everything that would be there at all, every one, would in every way be under the jurisdiction of the Army. But in that sector there wasn't any police anywhere except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case fully under the jurisdiction of the Army.
Q The Secret Field Polish was only a part of the division, wasn't it? amongst the men. Then behind that came the pear area which can under the various Army commanders ("Befehlshaber"); and then behind that came further rear area in which all replacement columns would be, and all the organization of the Qartermaster General of the Army. main section which represented 97 per cent of the entire operational area. There the entire police did anything that did not belong to the Army organically"; wasnot under the commend of the Army tactically; with such of the police, for instance, as came under the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler. And only from the standpoint of discipline or supplies or movements during advance or retreat did the Army of course have the jurisdiction to dispose of these troops regarding their movements and their accomodations and so on and so forth.
areas -- those Action Commanders and groups came under the R.S.H.A. as for as discipline and administration are concerned. Is that correct?
A That is correct. All those police regarding orders were only given orders by Himmler.
A Schellenberg also states in his affidavit Number 12, U.S.A. 557, that in this jurisdiction the question of discipline had also been dealt with. Is that true?
A That is wrong. Under me circumstances could an officer of the Army punish a member of the police or the SS. groups to carry out mass extermination of Jews and Communists. Schellenberg states in his affidavit Number 12 that he was convinced that the Army group on Army commanders had been clearly informed of those tasks through authoritative channels. Since Schellenberg is stating his conviction in this affidavit, I an asking you to give us yours, because I think I an right in assuring that you must be one of the most fully informed officers of the armed forces. living together at the front and what commanders might have had there and what they might not hove had, but I can say with absolute certainty that I myself had never seen an order containing anything other than the fact that these police groups had been sent into the operational zone for the purpose of taking care of the order and acquiring from the police point of view what happened during the life of the commanders at their respective front territory. I have never seen a report nor an order which contained anything other than that. commanders would have tolerated those conditions? case of much smaller episodes and events they raised the most violent protests.
There are hundreds of documents which have been offered by the Prosecution which prove sentence by sentence how the troops at the front had objected against measures which they considered either impossible from a human point of view or dangerous for the peace and quiet in the occupied territories.
Q I remind you of Blaskowitz's memorandum, which was one of the first. Did you read that memorandum?
A No, I didn't read it. I only heard about it. Major Wilhelm Scheidt. Its number is U.S.A. exhibit 558. Scheidt says in his affidavit, and I quote from page 1:
"It was the general fact that the partisan fights were conducted with cruelty on both sides."
Now I skip a sentence and he good on to say:
"It is out of the question -- it is quite clear, rather -- that this fact must have been known to the senior officers in the Army Operational Staff and the General Staff of the Army. It was also known that it was Hitler's view that in the fight against partisans only the use of cruel, scaring-off punishment could be successful."
Is Scheidt's statement correct, namely, that the officers of the Army operational staff and the general staff of the Army must have had knowledge of this cruelty employed by both sides in the partisan fights? is as it was conducted by the opponents. That is already before this Tribunal. I refer to the instructions which I have signed regarding the combating of partisans' bands in document R.S.665. There at the beginning you will find a lengthy discourse on how the partisans were conducting this war. Of course, we didn't invent that. That was the up-shot of hundreds of reports, that troops in such a fight being on their own personal impression of the methods employed by the opponent, would be also on their part not exactly mild. That is something which we can imagine. that no prisoners were to be taken in these partisan fights. To the contrary, It was clear from all reports that the number of prisoners was by far larger than the number of dead; that it was the Fuehrer's view that our forces in their fight against the partisans should not in any Way be limited.
That is an authentic fact, and my and the general staff's arguments with the Fuehrer prove it.
committed by our own soldiers?
A Then there would be courts martials against them. And that, again, can be found in documents. I remind you of an order issued by the Fuehrer, which begins with the sentence: "It has been reported to me that individual soldiers of the armed forces have been dealt with by courts martials because of their behavior in the partisan fight." case like that?
A He had no other possibility. And after that order, too, he always acted in accordance with his own legal conception. "he could stop him, anyway? Roettiger, which has the number USA-559. In this affidavit Ge neral Roettiger states, in the middle of page 1: "Only now, on the strength of documents put before me, do I realize that with the order for the most severe handling of bandit fights, from the highest source, the final aim may have been that the guerrila fighting of the army might have been utilized to achieve the relentless extermination of Jewry and other undesirable elements." did they have such a final aim?
A No. of course, after church one is wiser than before. I too have learned many things today which I did not know before. However, this realization is quite misguided because there were next to no Jews amongst the partisans. In the main these partisans were fanatical, steel-hard Russian fighters, mostly white Russians. And, upon a question put by my defense counsel, even von Gem Bach-Zelewski had to admit that there were next to no Jews amongst these partisan fighters. that the Slavs who were killed in the partisan fights amounted to no more than one-twentieth or one-thirtieth part of the numbers who would fall in the normal, large-scale battles withthe Russian armies, and who would be lost, or dead or wounded. As far as figures are concerned, that carried no weight at all.
Therefore that is quite a misguided view. which was used by the prosecution under the number USA-560. In the last sentence General Roetigger states the following and I quote:
"Although one knew generally what the special tasks of those SD units were, and although this apparently happened with the knowledge of the supreme leaders of the armed forces, we fought against these methods as far as possible, since it meant endangering our own troops." the special tasks of the SD units must have come about, apparently, with the knowledge of the General Command of the Armed Forces. If that is correct, then, you, Colonel-General, must have known about the tasks. You have already denied that earlier.
A Yes, I have already answered that question. I never talked to a single officer who had knowledge of these matters, or who might have told me that he did. prosecution has submitted affidavit 17, under the number USA-562. That affidavit comes from SS Commander Rode. Rode states, at the top of page 2:
"As proof, you can regard the OKW-OKH order, which stated that all members of bandit groups who had been captured, like Jews, agents, and political commissars, were to be handed to the SD by the troops for "special treatment", without delay. Apart from that, that order contained instructions at the time that in guerrila fighting no prisoners, apart from the above-mentioned, were tobe taken." prisoners were to be taken?
A Such an order never existed; I have never seen such an order. It was not contained in the instructions regarding guerrila fighting. Apart from that, practically every word in that statement is untrue. An order of the OKW-OKH never existed, that is, one order which came from both sources.
"Jews amongst the bandits"--that I have already dealt with.
"Agents among the bandits"--agents are an entirely different matter.
"Political commissars"--that is quite a different point.
They were never handed over to the SD for "special treatment", because the task of the SD was an entirely different one. They may have been handed over to the Security Police. the prosecution has used under the number USA-563. Rode states as follows in this affidavit.
"As far as in known to me, the Einsatz groups of the SD were attached to the various army groups and fully under their jurisdiction.
That is to say, both tactically as well as any other way. For that reason, the tasks and methods used by these units must have been known to the Supreme Commanders. They approved of the tasks and months since, apparently, they never raised any objections to them".
Do you know SS leader Rode?
A. No, I don't know him. I don't think it is necessary to say much about this, because General of the Police Schollenberg -- who led such an action group himself, and who really must know -- has state quite clearly, on this witness stand, what his position was and from when he received his orders.
Q. That wasn't the eitness Schollenberg, that was Ohlendorf.
A. That is right; I meant Ohlendorf.
Q. Now a few questions on the Commissar order. Were you present when Hitler orally gave the Commissar order to the Supreme Commanders?
A. It was right at the beginning. He only spoke to the Supremem Commanders of the Army, or the Chiefs of the General Staff, about this Commissar order, and perhaps a few officers of the OKW. In his speech to the Commanders, on some later occasion, he referred to that instruction of his again, so far as I recollect. I believe that at that time, during that second conference, he used the words: "I cannot expect that my generals understand my orders, but I must demand that they obey them".
Q. Do you know any senior officers who resisted that order?
A. Later on someone told no -- and I don't know whether this is true -- that Field marshal Rommel had burnt the order.
Q. Doesn't that recollection of yours refer to the Commando order?
A. Oh yes, of course, that was the Commando order. You are talking about the Commissar order, are you not?
Q. Right.
A. I remember that there were continuous objections from the OKH, which, unfortunately, had to carry out this order. That extended over quite a period. Officers of the General Staff told no, confidentially, that on the whole it was hardly ever being carried out. whereby this order was to be officially withdrawn. That was done, although I don't know when.
Q. Who made that application?
A. The OKH. Whether it was the Chief of the General Staff or the C in C, that is something I can't say.
Q. When was this application made?
A. I believe it was in the spring of 1942.
A. Siring of 1942. And upon that application --
A. This is something I know for certain; the order was withdrawn.
Q. Did you talk to any senior commander who approved of that order?
Q No. All officers to whom I spoke considered firstly, that that order should be turned down from the human point of view, and secondly, that it was wrong practically.
you have already told us, Hitler is supposed to have mentioned further additional reasons for that order which I should like you to tell us so that that subject willbe brought out quite clearly. necessary to convince somebody.
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing) Have not these reasons already been given
DR. LATERNSER: As far as I aminformed, Mr. President, they have not yet been completely supplied. BY DR. LATERNSER:
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) One moment. Haven't you already given the reasons which you say Hitler gave for this order?
THE WITNESS: I cannot hear the translation. I am hearing the English,
THE PRESIDENT: Haven't you already given the reasons which Hitler gave for making this order?
THE WITNESS: I have not given some very important, principal reasons, which the Fuehrer drew our attention to.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Laternser, I have already had to ask you to be more brief on many an occasion in which you have examined witnesses, and really you have spent over an hour already on this High Command Staff. Every witness who comes to the box you take a very long time over, and the Tribunal thinks that a great deal of their time has been wasted by you. Now, this witness can give any further reasons, but I do not want any argument about it. He can give his explanation now.
THE WITNESS: I have only to add that the Fuehrer said on that occasion, "If you do not believe what I am telling you now, then you ought to read the reports from counter intelligence which we have regarding the behavior of the Russian Commissars in the occupied Baltic States. Then you will get a picture of what these Commissars will do."
BY DR. LATERNSER:
by the Russian prosecution on the 13th of December, and it is on pare 151 of the second document book for Colonel General Jodl. Under "II" of that document, on pare 153, there is the following statement:
"In opposition to this memorandum, Reichsleiter Rosenberg suggests . . . and I do not want to go on reading, because that is a suggestion. included in that document?
A I can only make a guess, because I did not know it. But I have no doubt -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): We do not want his guesses, you know. If he can only guess, then he had better not guess. We want evidence, not guesses.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, certainly, sir; but I assumed that the witness would have personal knowledge about that. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Mr. Witness you said yesterday that the Command Order of the 18th of October, 1942, had been changed by application of the Supreme Commander in the West. Who was that commander in the West who had applied for that alteration? order withdrawn. Russian prosecution used on the 13th of February, as USSR 12? It is dated the 10th of October, 1941. Do you know the reasons for which this order was issued?
A Yes. Reichenau at that time was the commander of the 6th Army, and in his army sector was the town of Kiev. I have already described events in Kiev at the end of September, or began to describe then this morning. And that was the cause of that order. martial? Very strictly, or not so strictly?
A The reason why I know this is that Dr. Leymann -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): That has nothing to do with the charge against the High Command.