Q Presumably, you didn't have my reason at that time to doubt Canaris' honesty, did you?
A No, there wasn't the slightest cause at that time. the Fuehrer postponed it again and again. I think there are 17 orders which postpone that attack again and again.
A It isn't quite correct that the Fuehrer had ordered the attack for the middle of November. He wanted to attack at the moment when the meteorologists would predict clear, frosty weather for about six or seven days. But the meteorologists let him down. Sometimes they thought they were expecting such a weather situation, and then all preparations for the attack were made. Then, they canceled their forecasts and contradicted them, and the final preparations for the attack would be discontinued. and then at the last moment refrained. Canaris, a certain formation of the French Army had crossed the Belgian frontier at a certain point. Whether or not that is true, I cannot say. and then failing upon them. What have you to say to that?
A The same thing applies as I have stated before. I was not a politician, nor was I the supreme commander of the armed forces militarily. I wan under the impression -- the impression which I can prove -- that the neutrality of these two states was in fact not being respected any more. And as far as the code of honor of my actions is concerned, I must say that there was obedience, that is, the ethical basis of the soldier's life. Far be it from me to extend it without limits. As far as slave-like obedience is concerned, I think that the testimony which I have given up to now will leave no doubt as far an that is concerned. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that particularly in such operational matters there is nothing else for the soldier but obedience.
at all, then they only owe it to that ethical principle of obedience of their brave soldiers.
Q We now turn to the Balkans. In your diary, PS-1809, on the 19th of March you made an entry saying that the Balkans must and shall remain quiet. That is on page 61 of the first volume of my book, GB-88, PS-1809, the entry of the 19th of March:
"Fuehrer returns from the conference with the Duce bearing with joy and very much satisfied. Complete harmony.
"Balkans should and must remain quiet."
What does it mean?
A Professor, I shall have to correct you. This isn't my diary.
Q Well, I went to interpose a question. Your diary is always being talked about, your diaries. Will you explain just what we are concerned with. One is an actual diary, isn't it, and the other isn't? 1938, a diary in which I used to make entries every evening.
Q Now, what is this diary, PS-1809?
A There isn't a diary of mine during the war at all, but of course I had dozens of little notebooks which I filled, and when such a notebook was full, then I would take important passages and underline them in red or make red marks in the margin, and later on my woman secretary would take them out red write them down because they were interesting for war historians and for the official, diary of the Army Command Staff.
Q Did you see it again?
A No, I no longer did. I no longer saw it. It fell/into the hands of the Prosecution. That is the diary of the Army command staff.
THE PRESIDENT: You said it fell into the hands of the Prosecution. Do you mean it was not one of the documents that you handed over to the Prosecution?
THE WITNESS: No. I didn't know where these extracts from my notebook had got to and the Prosecution must have captured it somewhere. Everything else was part extracts from the official diary of theArmy command staff. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Who made the entries in the official diary of the Army command staff? It wasn't you, was it?
A No. It was always done by a highly qualified expert whom I nominate
Q Did you check it?
Q Did you check the entries made in that official diary, or didn't you?
A I didn't usually have time. I had General Scherf read through it and if he found anything in particular in it he would draw my attention to it.
Q I ask leave to clarify the situation. We now return to the question of the Balkans. In your so-called diary it says it must remain quiet. What do you mean by that, or what was meant by it? that he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini regarding the fact that the Balkans must remain quiet.
Q Didn't we try really to keep the Balkan situation as quiet as possible
A Yes. That attempt was being made continuously, constantly. Our attitude toward Yugoslavia was so careful as to already assume it. That went as far as the fact that during the preparation of the Greek campaign the Fuehrer even refused application iron the General Quartermaster of the Army that field trains, replacement trains, should be sent through Yugoslavia, something which from the point of view of international law would have been permissible.
Furthermore, we visited our influence on Bulgaria to the effect that she should not participate in the imminent war against Greece, particularly so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Italian free war the Fuehrer was hoping again and again that the conflict, the direct military conflict between Germany and Greece, might be avoided. on page 66 of Volume I of the document book. It is an extract from PS 444, Exhibit GB 116. There in the last but one paragraph we find that the preparatory measures as exercised for the prosecution of the war were to be maee along the following lines. It is in the last but one paragraph of that page. It says:
"It will not be possible to count on the railway loading through Yugoslavia for moving these forces into position."
Q What forced us to abandon that program? the part of Italy, about which the Reich Marshal and the Grand Admiral have already spoken. I have really got to make one brief addition: As usual, the Italians were beat, and they were now sending calls for help -- they were sending the Chief of the Operational Command to come and see me. In spite of that emergency the Fuehrer did not interfere in the fight with Albania. He did not send a single German solder there, even if there had been talk about it. All he did was to order for the following spring there should be an action on Bulgaria -- there should be preparations for an action from Bulgaria, in Greece. And even if that failed to serve thepurpose for the time being, to occupy the Saloniki Plain, by meansof which the pressure or the Italians would have been relieved. Only for the case, which of course was one we were afraid of, that through the insanity on Italy's part some British divisions might appear in the Balkans, only in that case was there a plan in the entire country of Greece where it was to be thought best, because we could not possibly allow a base or bases for the British airport to be established immediately next door to the Rumanian oil fields. This difference of opinion becomes particularly clear from the order which has been offered to the Tribunal under the number PS 1541, GB 117, and found on page 63 of the document book, and on page 64.
Two passages from that I would like to quote. They are brief passages. First, on page 63, Figure 2, paragraph B. There it says:
"Operation Marita. My plan therefore is: After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, andif necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland."
Then I quote from page 64, figure 4, at paragraph A:
"The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and by the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth." occupation of Greece was only intended for the case that the appearance of British troops would force us to do so, something which to that time had not yet occurred.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
BY DR. EXNER:
Q You said that we had the plan to leave Yugoslavia neutral. The Simovitsch Putsch, apparently, changed that. Why did this event change our policy toward Yugoslavia? after Yugoslavia had joined the tripartite pact, had to be anti-German. We were about to begin the campaigns against all of Greece; English divisions had landdedthere in the meantime. This campaign could be waged only with a Yugoslavia that would be certain to remain neutral.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the defendants --defendants Goering and Keitel--have dealt with the political aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is anything new for this defendant to give evidence about, it seems to be entirely cumulative. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Do you have anything new to say? ration for an attack on Yugoslavia, I suggested to him, or at least I mentioned, that we should first issue an ultimatum to clear up the political situation. He refused to do so; he said that would not do any good. Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.
Q That was on the 27th?
A Yes. May I give some proof of this?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary if the defendant Keitel said it and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.
DR. EXNER: One thing seems important to me.
THE WITNESS: A document was submitted, PS-1745 GB-120, which is at page 70 of the document book. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Page 71? with the sentence on page 69 of the document book, there appears to be a difference. Page 69 contains the instructions signed by the Fuehrer, beginning with this sentence, which I shall quote;"The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia must in spite of her protestations of layalty for the time being, be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible."
that the whole matter was a surprise. I worked that whole night in the Reich Chancellery. General Rintelen -- the liaison officer with the Italian High Command -- this Aide Memoir, which I shall quote. Here I wrote:
"In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention", and so on. I must admit that I ventured a little into the field of politics in this instance, but I thought if Germany did not clear up the political situation, Italy might do so.
Q. The next document is evidence of the suddenness of this decision. That appears on page 73 of the first volume. It is the instructions issued by the OKH on the basis of this order. It is R-95, GB-127. As I said, it is on page 73 of the first volume. "As a result of a change in the political situation", and so on. The last paragraph states: "For camouflaging purposes, the operation shall be called 'Action 25'."
What can we conclude from this?
A. The order was issued on the 30th of March.
Q. "The operation shall be called 'Action 25'."
A. It was issued three days after the Putsch, and not until that time was a name ordered for this action. This proves that it was not planned in the year 1937, as was stated here once.
Q. Now a last question on this subject of the Balkans. the attack of the German Air Force on the territory of Crete was permitted? 24th of March 1941. As I just stated, this order permitted air attacks on Crete. Now, whom about Greek neutrality from the 24th of March, 1941?
A. It did not exist at that time from the point of view of international law.
The English had, in the meantime, landed on Crete and on the Pyreus. We learned about that on the 5th of 6th of March. The order fulfills all the principles of international law. which is made here by the prosecution, that the plan to attack Yugoslavia originated in Jodl's office, has not been proved by anything and cannot be proved by anything.
THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to? The 24th of March, 1941? You said "360", which did not indicate anything to us
DR. EXNER: That is C-60, AJ-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page?
DR. EXNER: Page 76 of the first volume. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Now we come to the question of the Soviet Union. How many troops did you have in the East during the campaign in the West?
AAt first it was 10 divisions. In the course of the Russian campaign they were reduced to six or five divisions.
Q Why did we send troops to the East after the West campaign? these weak forces he could not keep Poland quiet across the line of demarcation page 83, you write, on the 24th of May "Position in the East threatened by Russian advance against Bessarabia." That is on the 24th of May, 1940. You wrote that. Why did you do that? Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the concern which I wrote down originated with me or was a part of the Fuehrer's attitude, I cannot say today regrouping should not give the impression of offensive preparations. How should we understand this? the proposed attack on Russia. It is Page 78 of the first volume, PS 1229, USA 130. It is an order signed by Jodl to the Foreign counter-intelligence: "It is in the Eastern territory that demands will be stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October, the statue indicated on the enclosed map will be reached." in the next paragraph, which is important for the understanding of the documents It ways "For the work of our own intelligence service, as well as for the answers to the questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply."
THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph are you reading?
DR. EXNER: It is the second paragraph in my document, page 78.
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated.
DR. EXNER: Yes. That is what I said. That is the point; that is why I am reading it slowly now.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is nothing here.
DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the ear-phones, then. Read the passage.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British document book No. 7, page 102.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on. BY DR. EXNER:
Q "For the work of our own intelligence service, as well as for the answers to the questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply", and so forth. six weeks. That was a basis for the work of the so-called counter-intelligence which I do not want to discuss in detail here. which we had in the East at this time appear stronger. That can be seen from No. 3, for example, which says, "When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially of the armored divisions, things ought to be exaggerated, if necessary." exaggerated. All of this was done because at this time there was already concern that a Russian operation against Rumania might develop. In order to avoid this, these instructions were issued, which were intended only for the intelligence service.
Russia, I would have said exactly the opposite, for this order as I issued it would have indicated that I was acting in the interests of friends of Gisevius. I would have been informingthe Russians that we were ready to attack.
Q When did you hear for the first time of the Fuehrer's concern that Russia could be hostile to us? Berchtesgaden.
Q In what connection? said to me -- and this is a surprise to me -- that he was worried that before winter Russia might occupy more territory in Rumania, and thus the Rumanian oil territory, which was the "sine qua non" for all conduct of the war, would be taken away from as. immediately, so that we would be ready in the fall to meet such a Russian intention with strong forces. That is almost the exact words which he used. All other versions of the matter are false.
Q You have just mentioned Hitler's concern about the seizure of the Rumanian oilfields. Did the Fuehrer do anything on the basis of this concern? I answered him that it was quite impossible and that it would take four months and that it could not be done immediately, the Fuehrer ordered that these conditions would have to be improved. Two orders were issued following this: One, I believe, is of the 9th of August. It was called "Building up the East, and included all those measures to improve deployment conditions.
The second order was issued on the 27th of August. We do not have it here, but it was recorded in the War Diary of the Naval war Command.
DR. EXNER: That is Page 85 of the first volume of my document book. At the end of the page there is an entry: "Navay War Diary; displacement of ten divisions and two armored divisions to the Government General in view of possible necessity for prompt intervention for protection of Roumanian oil producing area." That is an excerpt from C 170, U.S.A. 136.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you
DR. EXNER: Yes, Page 85 of the German. I don't know the page in the English book. "Displacement of ten divisions and two armored divisions to the Government General."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
THE WITNESS: This entry is proof of that intention the Fuehrer had at that time with the strengthening of his forces in the East. BY DR. EXNER:
Q When was the Fuehrer Order issued to prepare for attack? issued in writing by the Wehrmacht Operational Staff and submitted to the Fue on the 12th of November. That is Document Ps 64, and is already known to the Court.
DR. EXNER: Page 66 of the first volume of my document book.
THE WITNESS: This first written order, which is known to me, had to be preceded by oil instructions of the Fuehrer to the High Command of theArmy. BY DR. EXNER:
Q That can be seen from the document itself, Page 66, Page 67. It reads: "Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued," showing that oil preparations had already been made previously. issued to the Army.
of things such as Lebensraum, extension of our food bases, as a basis for a war of conquest, and so forth? reason than a purely strategic one. For months, one can say, he repeatedly said: "There is no doubt any longer, England is hoping for this; otherwise she would have stopped the war. Secret agreements have doubtless already been made. Russian deployment is quite clearly recognizable. One day we will suddenly be strangled politically or attacked." One could speak about this for weeks. No other word was said to me except of such purely strategic reasons. how had things developed in the East after the Polish campaign? campaign the relationship was rather cool. Insight into the troops or equipment was carefully prevented. There were constantly unpleasant incident. The Russians shot at everything, Poles or German soldiers. There were wounded and dead, and the line of demarcation was crossed in many cases. The extremely strong forces which Russia used for the occupation of the Baltic states and Poland and Bessarabia we had not had from the first moment. reinforcements for the Red Army? counter intelligence reports, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there were about a hundred Russian divisions along the border. In January, 1941 there were one hundred fifty divisions. They were given by number; they were reliable reports. In comparison with this strength, may I add that the English-American-French forces operating in France against Germany, to my knowledge, were never as strong as a hundred divisions. means? well known, and I must say that I placed great hopes on this talk.
The military situation for us soldiers was such that with a definitely neutral Russia in our rear which supplied us, we could not lose the war. An invasion such as took place on the 6th of June, '44, was completely out of the question. We had had all the forces available, which we used up and lost in this enormous struggle in Russia; and that our statesmen -- and in the last analysis, our commanders, too -- should give up such a situation -- it never occurred to me for a moment that that might happen. It is a fact that for months the Fuehrer struggled with himself about this decision. He was surely influenced by the many counter ideas which the Reichsmarshal the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and the Foreign Minister suggested.
Q. On the basis of the reports which you received, how did you see a further military development?
A. From January, '41 on, the Intelligence Service was activated. The divisions on our borders and on the Roumanian borders grew rapidly. On the 3rd of February, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army told the Fuehrer about the operations which he intended to carry out. He presented a map on the Russian deployment. This map included a hundred infantry regiments -
THE PRESIDENT: Do we need all these strategic details of plans made by the German generals?
DR. EXNER: I believe it is of great importance to ascertain what picture the General Staff had at that time. An enormous deployment of Russian troops -
THE PRESIDENT: He is telling us about February, 1941, the OKW had produced plans to show the deployment of German troops?
DR. EXNER: No, that was the plan which was developed -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to go into such details as to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Please tell us, in generalk how the picture developed in February, 1941; how many divisions were deployed.
A. There were 150 Russian divisions deployed, against us in February
THE PRESIDENT: He said that already.
Q. And how many were there on our side?
A. I should like to say that at this sane time our deployment had just begun, which General Halder reported at this time. And I should like to point out further that Document C-39, USA138, page 92 of the first Document Book, shows the time-table for the deployment. One the first of June attack formations consisting of fourteen panzer divisions and twelve motorized infantry divisions were moved up end as the note shows -- on the extreme right they were moved up only from the 10th of June. I mention this so that one can't say the German intention to attack was recognizable as early as February 1941. It was not.
Q. The Prosecution emphasized especially that long before this a plan for the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up. Can you say anything about that?
A. I will point out in one sentence, for this deployment we have ten thousand trains, and if one could have used a hundred a day, it would have lasted a hundred days. But we never reached this figure. In other words, only from the technical point of view this deployment took four months.
Q. Did the Yugoslavian events have any influence on the decision of the Fuehrer?
A. They gave the last impetus. Until that time, the Fuehrer still had doubts. On the 1st of April, and not earlier, his decision was made to make the attack. On that date he ordered preparations for about the 22d of June. The order for the attack itself, the real start of the campaign, was issued only on the 17th of June, which is also proved by documents.
Q. Then in your opinion, the Fuehrer waged a protective war. Did later events prove this military necessity?
5 June
A. It was doubtless purely a preventative war. What we learned afterwards was the certainty of an enormous Russian military preparation on our borders. I will dispense with details. But I can only say we succeeded in a tactical surprise on day and hour, but not a strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.
Q. As an example can you perhaps tell the Court the number of now air fields which had been built in the Russian-Polish area?
A. I recall that among the air fields in Eastern Poland there were about twenty, which was increased to about a hundred in the meantime.
Q. What under these conditions were the results of Russia's acting first -- briefly?
A. I don't want to go into the strategic basis, operation on the inner line. I will only state briefly that we were never strong enough to have been able to defend ourselves in the East. And events since 1942 have proved this. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this front of over 2,000 kilometers, we needed at least 300 divisions, and we never had them. If we had waited until perhaps the simultaneous invasion and Russian attack, we would certainly have been lost. If the political premise is correct, then, that this attack was imminent, then from a military point of view the preventative attack was justified. The political situation was presented to us in this way, and as a result we based out military work on this promise.
Q. Now, a few questions in regard to Japan. What siginificance did instruction 24 of the 5th of March 1941, to attack in cooperation with Japan have? It has already been mentioned but it is not quite clear. That is page 94 of the first volume of our document book. It is Document C-75. Then Admiral Raeder as a witness has already said something about this directive. Can you add anything?
A. The document is quite important. First, I must make a confession: so far I have only been charged with having received this document, but it originated with me; I instigated it; my staff worked it out -- in ours and the group of the navy.
As a result, I know this document better than anyone else. That is not an operational order. That concerns German officers.
Q. What does that mean?
A. That means that all German officers who officially or unofficially had to do with, came in contact with Japanese officers, were to be told exactly what the aims of the German policy was, to attack England in the Far East as well, and to keep America out of the war just by doing so.
Q. Under No.3 of the directive, "(a) the common aim is to defeat England as quickly as possible and thus keep the U.S.A. exit of the war"-
A. Such an instruction was necessary so that thoughtless statements of German officers would be prevented, and Japanese Army and Navy officers could not use this for their political aims. For this reason, the Foreign Office received a copy, as is shown below in the distribution on page 96. That would never have happened in the case of an operational order. For that reason, the Fuehrer did not sign it.
Q. On page 96, at the top, the German war aims are stated:
"Furthermore, attacks on other systems of bases of the English sea power, on the American ones, can only when the entry of the U.S.A. into the war cannot be prevented, are appropriate to shake the system of power of the enemy there". entry of the United States into the war, and only if that is not possible to attack.
A. I may add that the purpose of this document was not to influence Japan. That world have been political action. It was only to give officers instructions as to what they should say in such a case.
Q. Then Admiral Raeder has already told us that naval orders issued to keep America out of the war. Have you anything to add?
A. Only one point which the Grand Admiral did not mention.
That is shown in Document C-119 and AJ-14, and can be found on page 98 of Document Book 1.
Q. Page 98 of the first volume. This is special orders on conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway.-
A. Only the last sentence need be read. ships engaged in foreign commerce flying the U.S. flag, as well as planes -
Q. And on page 98 the last sentence at the bottom speaks of a prohibition against departure of warships, merchant vessels and planes. Americans are to be excepted.
A. America was given a certain exception here for a long time in all war measures of the Naval War Command.
Q. Before the attack of Japan on America, did you have anything to do officially with Japanese officers?
A. No, not at all. No.
Q. Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. The attack was a complete surprise to me, and I felt it was a surprise to the Fuehrer too. He came in the middle of the night to my map-room in order to give this news to Field Marshal Keitel and to me. He was completely surprised.
Q. Now, there is a mistake in this letter that I should like you to clear up. It is page 81 in the first volume of our Document Book.
There is a letter, PS-376, USA-161. That is a letter from one Falkenstein to you -
Q It says, "The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands" -- was that interpreted to mean that these intentions of attacking America -- "with a view to prosecution of war against America at a later date." What was meant by that? How did you understand it? occupy the Atlantic Islands which the Fuehrer always wanted to do.
Q For what purpose?
A. As a certain basis of security, in case of American intervention. We had to consider these things, although the Navy as well as the Wehrmacht operational staff and the chief of the Wehrmacht strictly restricted this, we at least had to think about these things. And in this matter he says this General von Waldau, if something is said in the document, in the order, PS-444, the same thing that he writes here -
Q Did we have any interest in extending the war?
A I personally not. I can only say that the extension from the North Cape to Tobruk and from Brest to Rostof and the Don was greater then I liked.
Q. Did we have any interest in having Japan at war with America? enemy.
Q How did Italy get into the war?
A I don't know what was done politically, but after thecollapse of France, Italy wanted to participate in this war. We tried to prevent it, we soldiers in the OKW. We succeeded only in delaying Italian intervention four to six days. The Fuehrer could not refuse entirely, but felt that during the whole war Italy would be no aid but only a burden. That will be confirmed by future history of the war. documents which Goering, Ribbentrop, Raeder, Doenitz submitted. I do not know whether such a reference is necessary.