Q When did you hear about the whole thing?
A That action in March, March of 1939. It was then through order of my divisional staff that I heard of it two or three days previously. plan which you had originally drafted, the plan "Green?"
A No. It had nothing whatever to do with that any more. There were completely different units, for instance. Not even half of the troops were there which marched into Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 in comparison to those that had been planned for in 1938. May 1939 you had a conference or there was a conference with the Fuehrer which has often been quoted here regarding the disregard of clarity, and all that sort of thing. There it says repeatedly that Warlimont was supposed to be present as your representative. What is the situation there, was he your representative?
Warlimont took part in the conference, who was the representative or even close assistant of Jodl. There is no question of that. He was my successor but not my representative. And if you repeat that again and again, it still does not come true. He was my successor.
Q You had left the OKW, hadn't you?
A Yes, I had completely left the OKW. The fact that quite accidentally Warlimont became my representative, my deputy, that has nothing whatever to do with the facts of May 1939.
Q When did you hear of this meeting for the first time, in May 1939? Socialists?
A No, not in the least at that time; nobody.
Q Or with these defendants here?
A No. Not either. once. I think they were there two days. Did you have to report to him on that occasion? and on that occasion I spoke to Keitel, General Keitel, for a brief period, but not to the Fuehrer.
Q You weren't presented to him?
Q What about your war service regulations? the head of the Army leader staff.
Q What about your private personal plans for that summer? journey into the eastern Mediterranean.
Q On the 23rd of September 1931? and I had even paid for the tickets.
Q When did you buy the ticket, by the way?
Q Then when did you return to Berlin? it was on the 23rd or 24th of September -- I mean August, of course. Because of a telegram which surprised me, on Bruenn.
Q Well, if you hadn't received that telegram,when would you have had to go to Berlin in that case? in any case.
Q And did you now have to report to the Fuehrer in Berlin?
A No, and I didn't report to him, either. I only reported, of course, to General Keitel and to the chiefs of the General Staff of the Army, the Air Force, and the Naval Command.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have now completed that subject and I thought that this would be a convenient time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us how long you are likely to be?
DR. EXNER: I very much hope, certainly it will be in the course of tomorrow morning, but shall we say after lunch-time?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, as Counsel for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I have to submit the request from my client to you for him to have permission to be absent from the session for two days,to prepare his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 5 June 1946, at 1000 hours).
THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that defendant Seyss-Inquart is absent.
PROF. KRAUS: (Counsel for Defendant Schacht) Mr. President, in agreement with the prosecution, I beg to be permitted to submit the memorandum of Hitler referring to the Four Year Plan, which is dated 1936. It is a certified copy, certified by a British officer. I have given it the number Schacht Exhibit No. 48.
In the afternoon session of May 1, my friend, Dr. Dix, referred to this memorondu, which could not them be incorporated into the record. Dr. Schacht quoted a few passages from that memorandum, and the President stated that we could present the memorandum later, provided, of course, that we agreed about it with the prosecution and the prosecution acquiesced.
Furthermore, I offer a number of English translations. Unfortunately I have not yet been able to provide translations in the other languages, and I therefore request permission to supply these translations later.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kraus, until the other translations are actually rendered, the documents will not become part of the record.
PROF. KRAUS: The English translations are available, and the others will be completed. May I submit it later?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. And it will then become part of the record.
PROF. KRAUS: Yes, quite. I will have them for the record; they will be available.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
Dr. Exner.
BY DR. EXNER: the Armed Forces Operational Staff and that your main task was operational plans which you had to make; that is correct, is it not?
Q Then where did the plans come from? Who decided which plans you had to make?
A My case was the same as that of any other military officer. In this case, the Fuehrer himself made the decisions, mastered the details, led troops into Poland; and that is where my work began. He said I was to submit the messages in military form, such as they were needed for the entire operations of the armed forces. which were never actually carried out. constructions, I actually know of only one that for certain was carried out, and that was the operation against Yugoslavia. For other plans, there was a long interval before it finally developed whether they were actually carried out or not. As examples of operational plans which had been drafted in every detail but which were not carried out, let us take the invasion of England, the march into Spain, the capturing of Gibraltar, the capturing of Malta, the capturing of the peninsula, near Petsimo, a winter attack on a point near the Murmansk Railway. were they not? theaters of war as such at all. The Fuehrer's orders referred only to general forces for the armed forces, and the navy, and the air forces. Only after the Norwegian campaign did the state of affairs develop for the first time that the Army Command staff was responsible for a certain theater of war. And this condition changed completely when at the beginning of 1942 the Fuehrer himself assumed supreme command of the army.
Kesselring has already been asked, but he did not answer. However, it is obvious that the Fuehrer as supreme commander of the armed forces, with the assistance of Jodl, could not give orders to himself in his capacity as commander in chief of the army, which then were to be carried out with the assistance of Colonel General Keitel.
Consequently, there was that dividing line. And from that moment, he, with the General Staff of the army, was responsible for the entire eastern front, and the Army Command Staff became responsible for the general staff work of all the remaining theaters of war.
court room that the OKW had been responsible for the order to held Stalingrad and the Press outside has, in fact, accused Keitel and Jodl repeatedly of having been responsible for that unfortunate order; is that true?
A No, that is not true. This witness, for whom I feel the deepest friendship and with whom I have worked as excellent comrades, couldn't know the facts at all; and the fact is this: The decision, in the first instance when the danger threatened, that Stalingrad was to be held, was made by the Fuehrer during a personal discussion which he had alone with Colonel General Zeitzler and contrary to the suggestions made by Colonel General Zeitzler. He told me so himself when he came back from that conference At a later stage, when the blizzards were raging across the towns of the Don territory, there was the question of breaking out of the garrison of Stalingrad again. There Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Zeitzler and I myself were present.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I don't quite see how that is relevant although Field Marshal Paulus may have said something about it. I mean he may have given some evidence on the fighting at Stalingrad, and he undoubtedly did, but I don't see how it bears upon the case before us or how it bears upon the case for Jodl.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the matter is already settled. There was the desire to rectify the error made by the witness Paulus, but the matter is now at an end. Berlin from Vienna. Whatwas the situation you found when you came to Berlin impenetrable. Nobody knew what was serious, what was bluff. The pact with Russia was keeping all our hopes alive that peace would be maintained, a hope which was increased tremendously and strengthened even more when the attack which had been ordered for the 26th of August was surprisingly cancelled. No one among the members of the armed forces to when I talked expected a war against the Western powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared when the attack against Poland came, which was all that was prepared. There was only a defensive situation on the Western wall. The forces which had been stationed there were so weak that we couldn't even man all the emplacements.
All the efforts for the preservation of peace, such as I have heard about when the Reichsmarshal spoke in this court room, the name Dahlerus, all these negotiations remained unknown to me unless they were published by the Press. But there is one thing I can say in conclusion, and that is that when the declaration of war was received from Great Britain and France, that impressed us soldiers who had been in the last war like a terrible stroke. Through General Staff I heard confidentially, though it isn't confidential today, that the Reichsmarshal suffered the same shock.
Q Do you know when Poland mobilized?
A That I cannot say. I only know that at the moment when I arrived in Berlin and was only then put in the picture by General Stuelpnagel regarding the situation and our own strength, a Polish operation along the Don was already in progress, just like the German operation of taking up positions. in the Trial Brief, namely, turning against Poland, had you made a plan for a campaign against Poland?
A No. I didn't participate with a single stroke of the pen in the operation against Poland. was no plan for the campaign against Poland?
Q And when you returned to Berlin the plan was ready? the report was confirmed?
Q When did you hear of that report?
Q Do you remember a meeting in the Fuehrer's special train on the 19th of September, '39, which has been mentioned by General Lahousen here? Can you remember that?
Q What was talked about as long as you were in that special train? Marshal Keitel, Canaris and Lahousen were present; then Canaris made a brief oral report regarding the news he had from the West and he expressed the thought that a French attack in the Saarbruecken sector was pending. The Fuehrer contradicted and I also did. Apart from that, nothing also was talked about.
Q So that Lahousen's statement on this point is correct, namely, that you were only present during that part of the conference; is that right?
AAs far as I am concerned, I have no objections to Lahousen's testimony. It is absolutely correct. has been repeatedly mentioned. Were you a participant when these orders were given?
A Yes, I was a participant insofar as these facts occurred. When the Commander in Chief of the Army applied to the Fuehrer to allow artillery bombardment, and after artillery positions had been occupied, the Fuehrer turned down that request and he said: "That is insane, what is going on here through these Poles." He ordered me to draft newpamphlets, new leaflets, which of course I did, personally and at once, and these leaflets were again to be dropped on Warsaw. Only when this renewed demand to stop the useless resistance had no success at all did he permit artillery bombardment and air attacks on the fortress Warsaw -- and I emphasize the word "fortress". Russian operations?
A Yes. When we were about three days march away from the River Weichsel I was informed, much to my surprise, by I think the representative of the Foreign Office to the Fuehrer headquarters, to the effect that Soviet Russia -
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, if it is convenient to you, I think you might speak a little bit faster.
A The Polish territories east of a certain/demarcation line were to be occupied at a suitable moment by Soviet Russian troops. When this demarcation line, which was shown to me on a map, was approached by us -that was, incidentally, the line of theEast Prussian Lithuanian frontier along the Weichsel -- I telephoned Moscow. I talked to the Military Attache and I informed him that quite probably we would reach the line at certain points in the course of the following day.
Russian divisions weren't yet ready. When, on the other hand, we had reached the demarcation line two days later and had to cross it because we were pursuing the Poles, I once again received news from Moscow at 2 o'clock in the morning, to the effect that at 4 o'clock in the morning the Soviet Russian divisions would be present along the entire front. That was carried out most punctually. And I then drafted an order to the effect that our German troops, wherever they were taking up contact with Soviet troops and had made arrangements with Soviet troops, would then have to withdraw behind the demarcation line.
Q Can you possibly remember what the date of these arrangements was?
A I can't tell you exactly when the arrival took place, the arrival on that line, but I would say it was on or about the 14th or 15th of September.
THE PRESIDENT: All that the Defendant has been telling us simply seems to be a waste of our time, with absolutely no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I don't know. close contact with the Fuehrer to attack quite a number of neutral states. Is that true?
A That is not true. I remember that a witness here was talking about what an uncanny influence I had with him and my incredible closeness to the Fuehrer. At any rate, he mentioned something -- something sinister. But my influence on the Fuehrer was unfortunately nowhere nearly as great as it really ought to have been, according to the position I held -- in fact, as it ought to have been. The reason is the tremendous personality of this man of power who couldn't suffer advisers very easily. invasion of Norway? At any rate, some time after Grand Admiral Raeder had talked to him about it for the first time. That first conference which I think took place on the 10th of October was reported to me and the Fuehrer didn't informme. But he talked to me in the middle of November. The details I didn't learn until the report of the Supreme Commander of the Navy which took place on the 12th of November and when I was present.
which is on page 46 of the Document Book, but I do not need to read it. It is the first volume, page 46. What was the Fuehrer's point of view? incidentally is available in writing, that he wasn't in any way interested in extending the theatres of war, but if the danger really arose, that Norway might be occupied by Great Britain, in that event the situation would be different.
Q Was anything ordered at that time?
A Nothing was ordered at all. He merely instructed me to think about that problem generally. The preparations, as proved by documents, were begun on the 27th of January, 1940.
DR. EXNER: That, Mr. President, can be seen from Document C-63, USA-8
Q Were you of the opinion at the time that Hitler's assurances during December and October, 1939, namely that Norwegian neutrality would be respected was given to allow Norway some safety assurances, as has been stated by the Prosecution. which I shallgive you. These political assurances were made by the Fuehrer or the Reich Government on the 2nd of September and the 6th of October. On the 9th of October the Fuehrer read that famous memorandum and signed it, which is known as Document L-52. I do not know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that that is a memorandum written by the Fuehrer personally.
DR. EXNER: This is Document L-52, USA-540, and it is contained on page 48 of Volume 1 of my Document Book.
Q Who was the memorandum prepared for?
A I think the document shows it. It went to the three commanders-in chief and the head of the OKW only. Every word of it was dictated by the Fuehrer personally, and it was completed during two nights.
Q I shall read the second paragraph on page 48:
"The Nordic States: Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed.
The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even if the war is of long duration." the Fuehrer could have mentioned anything other than his true intentions at that particular moment. But then that is all the more understandable, as only one day later, that is to say, on the 10th of October, Grand Admiral Raeder mentioned such worries to the Fuehrer for the first time.
A It was a tremendous decision. To be brief, it meant risking the entire German Fleet. It meant that we had to defend a coast of more than 3,000 kilometers; and that meant that at least 300,000 men would be taken up with the task. That is why the decision was subject to really reliable information, and that meant that there really was danger for Norway. That is the reason why nodefinite date was fixed for that operational plan. And that is the reason why I later made the proposal that the forces for the Operation Norway, should it become necessary to attack in the West, be kept separate. every detail?
A The reasons are quite open and quite clear. They are contained in the directive of the 1st of March,1940, which is Document C-174 -
THE PRESIDENT: Is that 174-PS or what?
DR. EXNER: It isn't in print here, before me. He is referring to a document which the British Prosecution have submitted under GB-89.
THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, mustn't it? The Defendant said Document 174.
DR. EXNER: C-174.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS (British Prosecution): And it was put in by Mr. Elwyn Jones, in Document Book 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
something which has already been mentioned here. What might that mean? You yourself must know. diary but into my little note book, "Tocarry out such a decision, I require absolutely reliable information with which i can really justify it before the world, and, if necessary, prove it." I can not say that; I only heard that from Quisling. That is why he was particularly trying to get counter-intelligence at that time to supply him continually with information regarding all these movements and changes. one to draw conclusions about England's plans. Have you anything to add to that? about all we knew. There is, though, one more thing which I do remember, which is down in my little note book. It is that particular pressure was quite openly applied in the French press for cutting off Germany from Swedish ore supplies, and then there was the mine laying operation in the Norwegian territorial waters, and the case of the Altmark, which according to my investigation, was a flagrant breach of internation law regarding the righ ts and duties of neutral states in naval warfare. Article I and II.
DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has mentioned, I want to draw your attention to document 1809-PS, which is the diary, GB 88, page 53 of the first volume of my document bock. On 30 March there is an entryin the diary about the negotiations of Finland and Russia:
"The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very favorable, from a political point of view. The French press rages about it because they consider it necessary to out Germany off from the Swedish ore."
Then the entry of 25 March:
"The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian territorial waters, or even fire at them." BY DR. EXNER:
Q What was the cause of the decision for the attack?
A The final decision of the Fuehrer was made on 2 April. Two bits of information were the cause.
First reports from the navy regarding the repeated shotsfired on merchant beats in Norwegian and Danish territorial waters. The second report came from Canaris, saying that in the Northern part of the British east coast, British troops and transport ships had been readied for transport operations. there first?
A I can refer to Admiral Raeder's testimony in that connection, and I need add only that Norway in British hands would have meant that half of the war would have been lost fo us. Strategically, we would have been surrounded in the North, and we would have been incapable, because of our small fleet, of ever putting that right again.
Q Was there definite proof later on that the British plan existed? in Namsos and elsewhere, and we surprisingly captured the British war correspondent Rommilly. He expected everything there except German ships. Otherwise, he would have been able to escape being taken prisoner, To the question of what he was doing trying to report about a war in peaceful Narvik, he could not give us any information at all. Later on we captured all the files of the French general Staff. which have been in part presented by Admiral Raeder's Defense Counsel. the British officers and NCO's whom we captured in Norway were carrying on them. They proved at least one thing. That was that all these troops had already been shipped and, at the moment when our German fleet was advancing towards Norway, had been put back ashore.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I want to refer to two entries in the diary, page 54, first volume of my document book, the entry of 24 and 26 June--I beg your pardon--26 April. There it says:
"Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of command. At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All material is handed over to the Foreign Office."
I then draw your attention to Soltman's interrogatory, which is document AJ, Number 4, which I now present. It is on page 173 of the second volume, but I need not read it. I merely draw your attention to Soltman's answers to questions(4) and (5). BY DR. EXNER:
Q Now, one last question about the Norwegian affair. The Prosecutor has stated that honor of the soldiers who were attacking Norway was in doubt. problem. They have put it on the level of soldierly or manly honor. Up to now, that has not been the custom in this world, I can only say that I have neither attacked in Norway nor have I used lies or excuses, but I have used all my strength to contribute to the successful outcome of that operation, which I considered absolutely necessary in order to anticipate a similar British action. my contention will become clear, but, even if I have been wrong, then the honesty of my own subjective opinion of that time cannot be changed in any say.
Q We are now talking about the war in the West. After the Polish campaign, were operational plans for an attack in the West in existence? On the contrary, there was a wide-spread opinion, particularly in the army, that the war would die down on its own, if only we kept quiet in the West. That went so far that the C. in C. of the army even moved mobile infantry divisions and made them into fortress divisions; that is to say, he took away from them all their means of mobility.
Q Did you learn during the Polish campaign about the Fuehrer's intentions as far as the Western Countries were concerned? He could not find a plausible explanation about the complete lack of action on the part of the British and Fre nch forces stationed in France. It was only by means of their war reports that they were conducting a sort of sham war, whereas in reality not a single shot was being fired at the front.
Toward the end of September, however, the Fu ehrer became clear, if I remember rightly, that once England had got into a war, she would fight such a war to the bitter end.
Q. As a General Staff man, you must be able to answer the following question: Speaking purely strategically, could we behave purely defensively as far as the western powers were concerned?
A. I will be very brief because such problems are not directly connected with this trial. I only want to say that it would have been the greatest strategic error because our superiority of that time would diminish proportionate ly with the hesitation of using attack. Britain was currectly bringing further divisions to France, and the same applied to the French who brought them from their colonies. I believe I need say no more about that. volume of my document book, on page 56, but I need not read from it again. This contains directives for warfare, and again, these are the basic thoughts which we have just heard.
A. But there is one thing, I think, which I ought to add. The danger that we might not preserve our superiority for any length of time was being taken so seriously by the Fuehrer that he actually wanted to attack during winter, although every soldier who was available advised him against it.
Q. In that connection, I ought to draw your attention to our document in Volume 1, page 48-49, which is the Fuehrer's memorandum. That is Document L-52, USA-540. It contains a list of reasons. neutrality of Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium?
A. It wasn't an unimportant matter for the Fuehrer to create new enemies amounting to 400,000 or 500,000 men, which was the strength, of course, of the Dutch and Belgian forces.
We started the attack in the West with inferior forces. We had 110 divisions, and the enemy had approximately 135, and except for an emergency, no military commander would do that.
Q. But what were the reasons?
A. We were not in a position to break through the Maginot Line at its strongest points, which would then have remained, that is, the part between the Rhine and the Luxembourg border, or the Upper Rhine where the Vogesen mountains were added to it.
The Maginot Line couldn't be penetrated at those points. We lacked heavy artillery for that. But that wouldn't be a moral reason; it would, in fact, be an immoral one. all the mobile British and French forces would go through Belgium and Holland and hit us from the rear. They were ready for just that task. It was the decisive factor for the Fuehrer, but we also, the military men, were under the definite impression from the reports which we were receiving that the Belgian and Dutch neutrality would finally be only a bogus one and a deceptive one.
Q. How did you arrive at that conclusion?
A. The reports individually are of no interest, but there was an endless flow of reports coming from Canaris. They were supplemented and confirmed through letters we received from the Duce. But the certain fact which was quite evident, something which I could see on the maps every day, was the nightly flights of the British Air Foce, quite unconcerned by neutral Dutch and Belgian territory. That had to bring us to the conclusion that even if those two states wanted to -- and I think at the beginning they did want to -- they could not possibly remain permanently neutral.
Q. What danger would an Anglo-French occupation of Holland have meant to us
A. Those dangers were quite clearly stated by the Fuehrer, firstly in his memorandum L-52, which has already been repeatedly quoted from. There, on page 48 of the document book, at the lower portion of the page, there is a reference to the tremendous importance of the Ruhr, of which, incidentally, there seems to be quite sufficient evidence even today. Document 180-PS, USA-23, on page 59 of the document book, he says once more how tremendously that danger would be for the Ruhr,if, surprisingly, one day British and French forces would stand outside that territory. There he refers to it as the Achilles heel of Germany, and that it was indeed.
Q. It says on page 59 of my document book:
"We have one Achilles heel, the Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger."
A. Of course, at that time I could not judge the absolute truth of the information we received from Canaris. I couldn't have sworn to it at that time, but the material we captured War Council in London on the 17th of November 1939 -- generally speaking confirmed the correctness of these intelligence reports.