Q Do you now think that the leading men had aggressive intentions then? the brain of the Fuehrer there was a connection between that occupation and the thought that this was a prerequisite for actions later to be taken in the East. That is possible but I don't know because I didn't see in the Fuehrer's brain.
Q But you did not, presumably, see any outward signs of it?
A No, I didn't.
Q Did you know of the so-called "testament" of Hitler's dated 5 November, 1937, which has been read out in this court room?
Q What did you know at that time about it? had been a discussion with the Fuehrer, When I asked for the minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken; but I drew my own conclusions as the diary show What I was told wasn't in any way sensational and hardly different in any way from information which had been contained in general directives for the preparation of the war. I can only assume that Field Marshal von Blomberg at that time kept these letters to himself because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.
Q Was there a march plan against Austria?
A There was no plan for the march into Austria. That I must emphatically stat
Q Now we come to document C 175, a directive which has the number USA 68. It is in volume I, Page 18 and the following pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation for war of the armed forces of the year 1936, and the prosecuto has only quoted the operation order from the instructions, which seemed to creat the impression that this was a plan for the campaign against Austria. How does the importance of this directive really find its explanation? they were for any thinkable case. Such directives come out every year in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and compulsory military service. This theortical military work before us made a difference between two cases, namely, such cases of war which, because of their nature, were politically probable, or might be probable, and such cases which were improbable, As far as the first were concerned, a campaign was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force, while where the later is concerned, there were only to be the appropriate considerations.
If the Tribunal would turn to page 21 of the document, there appears, at the end of the page under Part 3, a sentence: "The following special cases are to be considered inside the High Command generally without participation by outside authorities", and the operation "Otto" appears a mong such the 1st of July '37, until, presumably, the 30th of September, 1938? That is just over a year and that, in turn, replaces another similar instruction which is referred to in the first paragraph, which had been in force and worked on for similar problems previously.
Did you participate in discussions regarding the Austrian case? had been to Obersalzberg, and Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry in the diary under the 12th of March, '38,is, therefore, based only on an account which you received through Keitel; is that right?
A Yes. It is merely the outcome, the reflection of a brief account given me by General Keitel about that day. Probably it is somewhat colorful.
Q But then it says, on February the 11th: "General von Keitel and General von Reichenau at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and G. Schmidt have been subjected to political and military pressure." In the English and French translations it says that Schuschnigg and Schmidt are "again" subjected to the most serious political and military pressure. This word "again" does not appear in my German original. Then you suggested maneuvers of deception again: Austria, and that is being held against you.
A I didn't suggest any maneuvers of deception. The Fuehrer ordered them, and I do believe that they are not illegal, because I believe that in the history of the world, both in peace and in war, false cards have always been used; but the Fuehrer ordered it and that is stated in the entry in my diary. I supplied Military information to Canaris, where our garrisons were situated, and Canaris dealt with it and took it to Munich.
Q What did you think was the purpose? amount of emphasis so that Schuschnigg would adhere to the agreement made at Obersalzberg; but he returned home.
Q How long previously did you know of the intentions to march in? How long before the actual march in did you know of such intentions?
A On the 10th of march, in the morning just before 11:00, I heard of it for the first time.
Q And the marching was when?
A On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who was then temporarily the chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff, were ordered to the Reichschancellery.
That is whom I heard of the intention for the first time.
Q Then did you have on expose'made or what? problem of Austria that had come up; and then they learned that there was a General Staff expose' memorandum called "Otto". They sent for me, together with these instructions, and heard from me that such an instruction was in existence, but in practice nothing at all had been prepared. Since it had only been thought about, and since it was only there for the case of an Austrian restoration and since such a restoration was not pending, the Supreme Commander of the Army had done nothing in practice.
Q How do you yourself understand the entire Austrian action? solve itself inside Austria in the shortest possible time.
Q And how did you arrive at that view? with which -- through relatives and acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club, to which I belonged as a commoisseur of Austrian mountains -- I had been in close contact. I was more interested in the Austrian mountains than the German mountains. I knew that in that country there had been a government against the will of the people for a long time and that the uprising on Styria was a characteristic example. C-175, wasn't it? and the result was accordingly. Seventy per cent of all the armored vehicles and cars remained on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna, because the drivers had been taken out of their recruit training and given this task. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Defendant, you said just now, didn't you, that the Fuehrer told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn't you? Viehbahn on the 10th of March, in the morning; that he informed him at that time. He didn't talk to me, because on that day I hadn't talked to the Fuehrer at all.
Q I only wanted to know the date. You said it was the 10th of March. BY DR. EXNER: districts, into the Austrian territory?
A Yes; in fact only peacetime units were used, which were meant to take part in the parade in Vienna. All units which might have been necessary for an military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.
Q What about Munich's columns? moment on that occasion? Reichschancellery that the armed forces were not to move in, but that the police should pass through the armed forces and were to move in on their own. In the evening, however, on the 11th of March -- at 8:30 P.M. -- the final decision reached me, which was that the armed forces were to move in after all. The reason for that hesitation I never heard.
Q So that altogether there wasn't a forcible march in?
A No, it was a purely peaceful march. It was characterized by the fact that the chief of the operations staff of the Army had it suggested to him by me that he should have the bend marching at the head of the column and that all drivers should definitely wear spectacles -- otherwise the flowers would hurt their eyes. march? It has been put before you under the number, C-182, USA-77. You can remember it, can't you?
A Yes, I can remember. That is nothing other than the note for the fi of something which had previously been orally ordered and which was already being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too late a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that? there must be -- even for the most unlikely eventuality -- information as to how to behave, how the troops were to behave. I clarified the matter over the telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Fuehrer, and I then clarified -- put his decision down in writing -- by his order.
Q And how did action actually progress?
A He had progressed exactly as expected. There was a triumphant para* a triumphant march, such as could hardly have happened in history today -- even if today one doesn't like to remember it.
The population met us as early as during the night. The customs barriers fell, or were taken down, and then the entire German forces experienced that march only under the hail of flowers.
Q We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia: Did you participate during the conferences on the 21st of April, 1938, and the 28th of May, 1938, which the Prosecution have described as"Conspirators' Conferences"? Green -- which is, of course, the Operation Czechoslovakia? 17 of the first volume of my Document Book. important cases were being dealt with, or were to be dealt with, a defensive action, against a France which might start the war. That is Operation Red. And an offensive action -- that is Case Green -- against Czechoslovakia. That would have been dealt with in just the same way, even if there hadn't been an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a war on two fronts -- which was the problem we always faced -- could never be conducted in any other way than by means of an attack against the weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be dealt with anew at the very moment that Austria automatically became new or operational territory. Thus, on the 20th of May, 1938, a new draft was created for Operation Green. It was done by me and it began with the customary words, "I do not intend with a reasonable time to proceed against Czechoslovakia."
Q That quotation is PS-288, USA-26. It is the document dated the 20th of May, 1938. "I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia within a reasonable time." Now, what were you going to say?
A That, as I was going to say, was the 20th of May. On the 21st, the day after, an incredible incident occurred, however. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even took up positions along our borders. The Czechoslovak chie of the General Staff explained this by saying that twelve German divisions had been stationed in Saxony. I can only state -- and my diary entries prove it -that not a single German soldier had been moved. Nothing -- absolutely nothing had happened.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a questionnaire, an interrogatory -- AJ-9. It is an interrogatory submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the German military attache in Prague. And he confirms the mobilization of that time. Third volume, at 199. On page 201 of the document there is a question, "What was the reason for the Czechoslovak mobilization in May, 1938?" And he answered it, "It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovak government wished to force her political allies to take up a definite position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of the General Staff, informed me, as reason for the mobilization, that he had exact information that ten to twelve German divisions had assembled in the Dresden area and that he could no longer bear the responsibility of not taking any counter-measures."
And then there should be a diary note from Jodl, volume 1, page 26: "The Fuehrer's question, not to touch on the Czech problem yet, is altered by the Czech deployment on the 21st of May which took place without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. Among its consequences, owing to the silence of Germany, this leads to a loss of prestige for the Fuehrer, which he is not now willing to accept. Hence the issue on May 5th of the new directive for the Case Green."
That is from Jodl's diary, page 26, first volume.
THE WITNESS: Well, then, that was the information which I received, partly through General Keitel and partly through the former Major Schmundt, regarding the impression made on on the Fuehrer. The result was that he personally changed my draft on 20 May and put th e words at the beginning, "It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be smashed within a short period of time. To decide upon the opportunity and the time is a matter for the political leaders."
DR. EXNER: These words appear in the document PS-388, which I have already referred to, which is USA 26, and I refer to the order of 30 May 1939. BY DR. EXNER: as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise. That is to say, politically and after a lengthy period of tension. Most undesirable, because there would be a lack of military supplies. The best solution would be if it happened after an incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, which would justify us morally and before the world if we decided to intervene. break through the forticications, thus making it possible for the armored divisions to go through and operate freely, and then, after four days, a situation should be created which would make the military position of Csechoslovakia untenable.
Q why was the entire directive redrafted in June? This was done, gowever, because on 1 October a new draft year began, the new calling-up period, and because the instructions C-175 were in any case only planned until 30 May 1938. So the old directive, which of course was still in force until 1 October, did nevertheless become invalid on 1 October through that directive which on 24 June, or 18 June, had been drafted by me. In that directive the Case Gruen was once more mentioned in the sense of the Fuehrer's intention--namely, that it was the immediate aim of his policy that beginning with 1 October 1938--hot on but beginning with 1 October 1938--any favorable opportunity was to be utilized to solve the Czechoslovakian problem, but only if France would not interfere or march.
starting of a war against Czecheslovakia, but that with the directive of 30 May, the date was left open altogether, but the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June only stated that beginning with 1 October and on the first favorable occasion.
DR. EXNER: That is on page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: "I have decided, beginning on 1 October--" and so on and so forth. plain events quite precisely, that, in fact, before 14 September and as far as the military forces were concerned, nothing at all was done.
DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl's diary. It is an extract from PS 1780, USA 72, and is the entry under 14 September 1938:
"At noon it is announced abroad that the general order for mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia...This, however, did not take place, although approximately eight age groups were called up with short term induction orders. Since the Sudeten-Germans are crossing the border en masse, we are requesting at around 1730 at the suggestion of the High Command of the Army, 2nd Department, the calling up of the Frontier Guard Service-- the G.A.D.--along the Czech border in the service commands VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The Fuehrer gives his authorization from Munich."
THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then?
DR. EXNER: I have read from page 32 of my document book, volume I, page 32, first volume, and it is an excertpt from Jodl's diary of 14 September, which is in that critical period. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Just what were these military measures which were being introduced? Czechoslovakia. Please notice that we used the increased border protection squads so that the many escaping Sudeten-Germans could be taken care of.
previous agreement, again without telling us beforehand. Previously it had been agreed that these Sudeten-Germans were to join the Reserve Army.
Around about that time political discussion had already started. The first one at the Berghof had already started. Benes ordered mobilization in Czechoslovakia, and only beginning with that time and in accordance with political discussions, did the military action against Czechoslovakia commence.
purpose in the event that Czechoslovakia would not submit to an agreement which we had made with the western powers, since the Fuehrer had clearly expressed that he would only act if France and England would not intervene politically or militarily.
Q. You made two more entries in your diary on the 22nd and 26th of September, which prove that you were worried at the time. These, incidentally, are in the first volume of my document book, on page 34, excerpts from PS-1780, dated 22 September:
"The Chief of the Foreign Department, Captain of the Navy Buerkner, report that according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation between Prague and the loval Czech Legation Councillor the German Embassy in Prague was just about to be stormed. I am immediately initiating liaison by telephone and wireless with Prague through Colonel Juppe. At 1030 hours, Buerkner reports that the report has not been confirmed. The Foriegn Office has spoken with our Embassy.
"At 1035 hours I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint. To my question as to how he is getting alone, he replied, 'Tanks; excellently.' The Commander-in-chief of the Air Force who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion to think over what measures would have to be taken if the Fuehrer requests an immediate bombardment of Prague is informed through Counterintelligence about the false report which may have had the purpose of causing us to perform a military act."
Then, on the 26th of September, it says:
"It is important that because of false reports we do not permit outselves to be induced to perform military actions before Prague replies." decided on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that date, the 1st of October 1938 had for Operation Green?
A. I have already said that at the beginning. I have already explained that the new mobilization year had started, and that in no order was there a date fixed for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia.
Q. Did you believe that the conflict might be localized?
A. I was certainly convinced of that, because I couldn't imagine that the Fuehrer would, in such a situation as the one we were in, start a conflict with France and Britain which would have had to lead to our immediate collapse.
Q. And the entries in your diary probably show your concern.
A. Yes. In my diary on the 8th of September there is mention of a conversation with General Stuelpnagel, and that contained the statement that Stuelpnagel was at the moment quite worried that the Fuehrer might depart from that basis which he had so often quoted, and might decide to allow himself to be dragged into military actions. There was the danger that France and Britain would become our opponents. was also worried about the same thing.
DR.EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on page 26 of the first volume of my document book. Once again, it is an extract from PS-1780, and it is the entry of the 8th of September 1938. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. You have already said, haven't you, what your worries were?
A. Yes. Well, it was out of the question that with five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions we should have held western fortifications which were nothing other than a large building site, and that we should have held out against one hundred French divisions.
Q. On the 24th of August, in a latter addressed to Schmundt, you referred to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the armed forces in this Operation Green. You have been accused of that, and I want you to tell me what the significance of that statement is.
DR. EXNER: It is PS-388, and it is on page 35 of the third volume. It is an extract from the often-quoted Document PS-338. It is a report dealing with the time of the X Order, and the measures to be introduced in that connection. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Please, will you state what you intended when you prepared this work?
A. The Fuehrer's order of the 30th of May, which I have already explained, left no choice whatever.
If such a case were to come about, then one would have to attack on a previously decided date. This could only happen on the basis of an incident, because without a cause, this wasn't possible, and after such a long period of extension, it wasn't to be. fortifications, required four days of preparation. If nothing happened after those four days, then military preparations could no longer be kept secret, and the surprise did not come off. There was, therefore, no other possibility than either to have an instantaneous incident with Czechoslovakia, which would then, four days later, be the cause of military action, or that date had to be definitely decided on previously. In that case, and during those four days which the army required for its taking up of position, an incident had to happen.
The Fuehrer's demands, from the point of view of the General Staff, could, in fact, not be solved in any other way. This emergency was the cause of my letter, which was meant to explain the situation to the Fuehrer.
At that time, these incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans, who were subject to being called up, had in the majority escaped the call-up. They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovak border police shot at them. Daily the bullets made hits on the German side. All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in that manner.
As far as that was concerned, the conception of an incident wasn't anything mean and criminal as I would describe it if, for instance, one considered such a thought with reference to peaceful Switzerland. If I said, therefore, how keenly interested we would have been in such an incident, then that was meant to express that if one took military action at all -- there are always such theoretical considerations, of course -- one might use just such an incident as the causus belli
Q. And how do you explain that remark of yours about counter-intelligence not being ordered to handle this incident in any case? That is on page 38 in the second paragraph, at the end of page 38. It is an extract from PS-388.
tary history not to know that the question of the first shot was not the deeper cause of the war, but the deeper cause of the war, in each war and on each side, played a more important part, but that the outbreak of the war is always attributed to the enemy is something which I think is not a typically German habit, but it was characteristic of all European motions who have ever been at war with one another. As far as the case of Zcechoslovakia is concerned, the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need not describe this condition of three and a half million Germans who were supposed to be used to fight against their own people. I can only say that I watched the tragedy from the closest distance, in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of the war, is, there fore, a fact, and Lord Runseran who was the attache from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a situation I would, of course, not have any moral qualms about extending one of those incidents, and by means of a counter action one might reply closely to the Checks, and as I said, extend such an incident, and provided the political situation allowed it, and England and France would not interfere, one might, therefore, in this connection find the obvious and visible reason for an action.
DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point I want to draw your attention to. In my opinion, it is once more a mistake of the translation. I refer to the second and last paragraph on page 36. That is the report about the incident, the second and last paragraph on page 36 states in German "that the Operation Green may be set in motion as a result of an incident in Czecho Slavakia, which will give Germany the 'cause' for military intervention." The translation in English of these last words is a "provocation", should it be "cause" or "provocation"?
PRESIDENT: What are you saying? What is the alteration?
DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is correct. I am not absolutely certain but I want to point out to the Tribunal I am referring to the word "cause", and "provocation" in the English and it should be "cause" as far as we know.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of the words, whether it is provocation or whether it is cause.
DR. EXNER: It sounds a bit different, doesn't it? I just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is "cause" and not "provocation". Now the prosecution are calling these considerations which we have just talked about criminal thoughts as to the supposedly planned murder of the German Ambassador in Prague. They planned that matter so as to have a cause for the marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say to that? the Fuehrer used in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague. That wasn't even known to me. General Keitel did not even tell me. I only read it here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it, but apart from that we did exactly the opposite way, we gave the order to General Toussaint to protect the German Ambassador in Prague and to protect the lives of it's inhabitants, because in fact at one stage it had been seriously threatened. document, page 200, and refers to the interrogatory of General Toussaint, who was a military attache in Prague at that time, the third question is as follows:
"Q Is it true or not that in the summer of 1938 you received the order to defend the German Embassy at Prague and to protect the lives of all the Germans in the Embassy?"
And his answer is:
"A. Yes, it is true. I remember this order was given to me by telephone probably in September, 1938" and so on and so forth, and then in question No, 4 THE PRESIDENT:
The witness has already said once it was so.
DR. EXNER: Then I shall only refer to the testimony other than wherein it has been said that the incident had been stage by us.
We need not 30 into that in detail. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Did the incident really happen? nor was it necessary. Incidents happened day after day, and the solution was a political one and quite an entirely different one at that. repeatedly, that remained purely theoretical, did it?
A It was a train of thought which wasn't really necessary at all.
Q Has that already been described?
A I don't know. At the time the political discussions started I naturally made efforts to achieve the fact that the provocation on the port of the Czechs were apparently desired, that they were not to be the cause of any military measures on our part. the pact at Munich, did they know we were militarily prepared? the distinct impression as one and only one side out there in the autumn of 1938 at Munich, but that is quite out of the question. These people knew of the calling up of the age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The whole world knew of the total mobilization on the 23rd of November. A political correspondent of "The Times" wrote on the 28th of September on article against this Czechoslovakia mobilization. Nobody was surprised, that we immediately, after the signatory in Munich, on the 1st of October, mobilized. plan for action to be used against each area after the 7th of July, a new plan for action? my own initiative I prepared a secret plan for all of the German borders. It was so prepared that the borders were to be closed off, and that the army was to be centralized in the center of Germany.
That design was mentioned during my interrogation and it seems to have been available. It is now no longer contained in Document 388 P S, but it was that plan. tract from PS 388. It states at the very end the following: "There must be the possibility of having a straight-out concentration and --- I have already also said it will be important that the air force will take care of and protect the German territory in this matter of newly acquired lands and that the power of the air force will remain at our disposal."
separately, the various branches. cause of that? slovakia would be superfluous, then we had no plan for any campaign at all. And since no other intention of the Fuehrer was known to me, I made a plan for that particular campaign which could be applied to any possible cause; and I did that on my own initiative. agreement, to even go further and occupy Bohemia and Moravia?
A No, I hadn't any idea of that. I know his speech of the 26th of September or August. Ithink it was September.
Q All right. Let us assume it was September. us which must be solved. during these days of on or about the 10th or 11th of September I suggested to Field Marshal Keitel that he should ask the British troop to come to Iglau in Moravia, because there were Germans who were living there who had been threatened by Armed Czecho-Slovakian Communists. This of course was a suggestion which I would never have made had I any idea that the Fuehrer had any other intentions regarding attacking Moravia. of October '38. Did you still experience that in the OKW?
A No, I didn't. I didn't see it. I only saw it here in this court room; that is to say, rather, during my preliminary interrogations.
Q Now, you were being transferred to Vienna, and as what?
Q That was the end of October, wasn't it?
Q Then how did you imagine everything military? Although of course you have already answered that.
I can certainly say peace.
Q And your personal fate, how did that work out? Vienna. I moved to Vienna with my furniture; something I would never have done if I had had as much as any imagination of a pending war. Because I knew that in the event of a war it had been planned that I should become the chief of the leader staff of the armed forces which would have meant my return to Berlin. I asked General Keitel that he should assist my to become the commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall on the 1st of October '39, a request which again I would not have thought of if I had guessed the things which were coming to us. you were there did you have contact with the OKW?
A No, none at all. I had no connections withthe OKW. I didn't receive any military documents from the OKW during all that period.
Q And who informed you about the position at that time?
A Nobody. During that time I knew nothing about what was going on or what was intended, no more than every lieutenant in my artillery.
Q Did you have private exchange of letters with them?
A I received one letter from General Keitel. It was I think at the end of July 1939. He personally gave me the happy news that quite probably I would become the commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Holland on the 1st of October and that as the chief of the armed forces command staff now staffed for peace there would be General von Zodenstern, on the 1st of October. remaining part of Czecho-Slovakia?
A No, I did not participate. First of all, as this occupation went on I remained in Vienna and afterwards temprarily I occupied the position of Chief of Staff of the 8th Army Corps at Vienna. On the other hand, later on, together withthe entire 44th Division I was transferred to Bruenn in Czecho-Slovakia.