He said that one of them was a psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any value. We should like to hear you upon that.
DR. STAHMER: In the minutes submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is made that members of the staff which was stationed near Katyn carried out the execution of those polish officers. They are mentioned by name, and I am bringing counter evidence--mentors of the same staff-- to prove that in the whole time that this staff was stationed there, no killing of Polish officers occurred. I believe that it is pertinent evidence. One cannot eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. In the first place, this is not a settled question,and it is not mentioned in the Protocol. by saying that he committed the deed. That is what is to be proved by the evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German Commission?
DR. STHAMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He was a member of it?
DR. STAHMER: Yes. At that time he was present, and he ascertained from the corpses that the shooting must have been carried out at a time before the occupation by the Germans.
THE PRESIDENT: But he doesn't actually say in the application that he was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the Military Commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced.
DR. STAHMER: I do not believe that he was an appointed member, but he took part in this inspection. As far as I know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment nearby.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we'll consider your argument. stand over? Is counsel for von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well then, we'11 consider that. answer to what Sir David said?
DR. NELTE: (Counsel far the defendant Keitel): My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent the interests of the defendant von Schirach. opinion of the defendant von Schirach, the witness von Wakano who made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points on which Mr. von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a witness. I therefore ask the court to examine this affidavit to that end, as to whether there are not individual points important for the defense of von Schirach, and then to decide on admitting it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the defendants Hess and Frank want to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it.
DR. SEIDL: I have nothing to add to the argument which I have already made on the application. My first application, to get information from the War Department, was decided upon. It has not yet been decided, however, to submit a questionnaire to Secretary of War Patterson.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no objection to theother three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters.
Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech through the earphones. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when Adolf Hitler became the head of the government. Now I should like to hear what you felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the skate in 1934.
A. The union of the two offices in one person gave me much concern. when we lost Hindenburg, we lost a man in the Wehrmacht, and the whole German people loved the Field Marshal. But what we received with Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the popular election was so overshelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will could not exist. Then, we soldiers had every right to take the oath to Adolf Hitler.
Q. The Prosecution speaks of your close relationship with Hitler. When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally?
A. I was presented to the Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel, in the command train on the 3rd of September 1939 when we were going to the Polish eastern front. On that day I spoke my first word to him.
A. Two days after the outbreak or war?
A. Two days after the beginning of war, yes.
Q. Did the Fuehrer have confidence in you?
A. That came about very slowly. The Fuehrer had a certain distrust of all general staff officers, especially of the Army. In this years, he was, in general, quite skeptical towards the Wehrmacht.
I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was overheard:
"I have a reactionary army, a Christian" -- sometimes he said "an imperial" -- "navy, and a National socialist air force."
The relationship between him and me was very varied. Until about the end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then his confidence in me increased until August 1942.
Then, the crisis arose and his relationship to me was decisively unfriendly. That lasted until the 30th of January 1943. Then, the relationship improved and was especially good, especially trusting after the Italian betrayal in 1943 had been wardef off. The last years was characterized by numerous altercations. tentions?
A Only to the extent that we needed to know then for our military work. Of course, for the military work of the thief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, a little more was necessary than for a battalian commander, for politics is part of strategy.
Q Did he permit discussions of political questions between himself and you? One example is especially characteristic, when I reported to the Fuehrer in September 1943 that Facism was dead in Italy, the streets were full of Party insignia in Rome, he said, and I quote; "Such nonsense could only be reported by an officer, one sees that generals don't understand politics." That after such remarks the desire for any political discussions was slight, can be readily understood.
Q Were political and military questions kept sharply separated?
Q And were you consulted on military matters or not? at the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if he was clear in his mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous decision, all discussion came to an end.
Q The system of secrecy of ten has been discussed here. Were you also included in this secrecy?
this trial. All of the events and occurrences at the beginning of the war when the other countries had made efforts to prevent this war, Hitler informed us of these events only to the extent that they were in the press. He spoke to the politicians and to the party and in an entirely different manner from the Wehrmacht, to the SS differently again than to the Wehrmacht and to the politicians. Secrecy about the destruction of the Jews, about the events in the concentration camps was a masterpiece of secrecy, and it was a masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers photographs especially about these things and told us stories about the gardens and plantations on Dachau; about the ghettos in Warsaw and Theresienstadt, and gave us soldiers the impression that they were highly humane arrangements.
Q Did not news reach the higher headquarters from outside?
A The Fuehrer's headquarters was a mixture between a cloister and a concentration camp. There were no wire fences and no barbed wire surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to safeguard it and this was called Sperrkreis I. Constant passes to enter this Sperrkreis I were not even given to my staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to stop each officer whom he did not know. Into this holy of holies, aside from reports on the situation, only very little news from the outer world penetrated.
Q But what about foreign papers and radio reports? American and English papers gave us vary good information on new weapons. The foreign news itself was received by the civilian press at headquarters and cons red. I received only what was of military interest. To all internal polotical police, all reports on the situation were forbidden.
Q How did your cooperation with the Fuehrer take place?
A Every day I made at least two reports on the situation. It was established at one time that I took part in 119 talks or conferences. I took part in far mere than five thousand. These discussions of the situation and reports on the military situation was at the same time as the issuing of orders, and on the basis of the reports or events, the Fuehrer decided immediately what orders were to be given for the next few days.
I worked in such a manner that when my report was finished I went into the next room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and orders for the next few days, and while the report on the situation was still going on I read these drafts of these messages to the Fuehrer for his approval. General Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off.
Q Were you also present in political talks? discussed in these reports on the situation I did not hear. The same is true of Field Marshall Keitel who worked in a similar manner. situation and to what extent were you present in discussions of a political nature? extent that they were necessary for cur military work. On occasions when politics and the conduct of the war conincided, the Reich Foreign Minister was present and problems were discussed which lay on the border of politics and the conduct of the war. At the exclusively political talks with foreign neutral or allied politicians or with the Reich Foreign Minister I did not take part. I did not even take part in the discussions on the organization, on armament and administration of the occupied territories, but the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to take part often lasted up until six or eight hours a day. The time I had left then I really needed for my work. contradidt the Fuehrer, did you have any success with objections? him. Many, many times I contradicted him strongly, but there were moments when one actually could not answer a word. In many cases I induced the Fuehrer to desist from many things to which I objected.
Q Can you give an example? interest the Court, but in the field which interests the Court, there was, for example, the violation of the Geneva Convention. I prevented that. I objected to that.
something, which according to my convictions I had to prevent, there was still the means I often took, the means of delaying tactics, a kind of passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a psychological moment to bring the matter before Hitler again. This procedure was often successful, for example, in the case of the intention to turn certain low level fliers over to lynch justice. It had no success in the commando order.
Q We will speak about these things later. The witness Gisevius said, in answer to questions of the Prosecution, that Jodl had a key position with Hitler. Do you know this witness by sight, or have you heard of him in any other way?
A I do not have this honor. I heard the name of this witness for the first time here and I saw him here in the Court for the first time.
Q In what way could you influence Hitler? events.
Q What do you mean in your explanation to make sudden decisions? be that the witness meant that he was mistaken, but if he meant that he kept from the Fuehrer atrocities committed by cur own Wehrmacht or atrocities committed by the SS, that is false.
How would that witness know about it? On the contrary, any report of that kind, I immediately reported to the Fuehrer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give examples:
An affidavit was read here by Rittmeister Scheldt. He testified that Obergruppenfuehrer Fegelein told the Chief of the General Staff, Guderian, and Jodl of atrocities of the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. Ten minutes later I reported this fact to the Fuehrer and he immediately ordered the dissolution of this Brigade. when I heard from the American Radio through my press chief of the shooting of 120 American prisoners near Malmedy, immediately on my own initiative through the Commander-in-Chief I had an investigation started, then to report the result to the Fuehrer. When unimagineable horrors of the Ustascha company in Croatia came to my knowledge I reported this, too, to the Fuehrer immediately.
Q I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary PS-1807, you write, on the 12th of June, 1942 -- page 119, Second Document Book: "The German field police disarmed and arrested an Ustascha company in Eastern Bosnia." I should like to add that this is noteworthy, since this Ustascha company was something like an SS group in Croatia and was fighting on the German side. Because of the atrocities the German field police arrested this Ustascha company. "The Fuehrer did not approve of this order of the commander 708th Division, as it undermined the authority of the Ustascha on which the whole Creation State was founded. This was bound to have a more harmful effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the population created by the atrocities." This was the incident of which you were thinking just now?
Q Have you another example? lations of international law by the enemy to the Fuehrer only when he would have heard of them by other means. Cases of commando under takings, capture of commandos, I reported only when I had to assume with certainty that he would hear it by other means, in another way.
In this connection I did try to put a bar up against new spontaned decisions.
A I can only say, unfortunately not. There were many ways in which the Fuehrer could learn about military matters, as well as others. Everybody and every agency could report to the adjutant directly. The photographer sent out by the Fuehrer to take pictures at the front found it expedient on this occasion to reports to the Fuehrer on military matters. When I objected to this, the Fuehrer answered, "I don't care from whom I hear the truth; the main thing is that I hear it." just the opposite; and unfortunately, in many ways hostile to the Wehrmacht, reports against the correct and chivalrous attitude of the Wehrmacht reached the Fuehrer. It was these reports which brought about these decisions for brutal proceedings. Much damage would have been avoided if we soldiers had been in a position to keep this information from the Fuehrer.
Q What role did Canaris play in this connection?
A Canaris saw the Fuehrer dozens of times. Canaris could report to him what he wanted and whatever he knew. It seem to no that he knew much more than I, who was concerned exclusively with the operational conduct of the war. But he never said one w He never said one word to me, and it is quite clear why. This witness, this man who is now dead, had the very best understanding w Himmler and with Heydrich -- and he needed that, so that they would not become suspicious of this nest of conspirators. intentions. Did you know anything about that? tions. considered a putsch possible?
A The witness spoke of putsches as washing one's hands That proves to me that he never had any serious thought about it, that he never thought about it seriously.
The results of the Kapp putsch in 1921, the Hitler putsch of 1923 are well-known. If more proof is necessary, there is the result of the 20th of July. At that time no one hoped for victory in the true sense of the word. Nevertheless, in this putsch -- in this attempt -- not one soldier, not one weapon, not one worker, rose up. All the members of the attempted putsch were alone. In order to overthrow this system, a revolution would have been necessary -- a mightier, a bigger revolution than the National Socialist one. And behind such a revolution there would have to be the mass of the workers and the whole Wehrmacht, and not the commander of the Potsdam garrison, of whom the witness spoke. ence, and at the same time carry an a revolution and expect to gain anything positive for the German people, I do not know. Only geniuses who live in Switzerland can judge that. The German Wehrmacht and the German officer were not trained for revolution. Once the Prussian officers struck the ground with their sabres -- that was the only revolutionary deed of the Wehrmacht that I know of. That was in 1848. If today people who cooperated actively in order to bring Hitler to power, who had a part in the laws which we soldiers with our triple oath were bound to support, and to Hitler -- if these people demanded revolution and mutiny from the Wehrmacht, when they didn't like the man any more, when reverses occurred, then I can only call that immoral. with Hitler? You have already said something in that connection. a brief answer. I should only like to say that aside from many moments my life in the Fuehrer's headquarters was a martyrdom for us soldiers. It was not a military headquarters; it was a civilian one. And we soldiers were guests there. It is not easy to be a guest anywhere for five and a half years. I should like to add just one thing: Among the few officers who dared to face the Fuehre openly in a tone, in a form, that made the listeners hold their breath during a catastrophe -- among those few officers was myself.
tionship with Hitler. I opposed Generaloberst Halder because of unjustified opposition. It was an operational problem, which won't interest the Court. Never in my life did I experience such an outbreak of anger from any human being. From that day on, he never appeared to cat at the common meal, never for the duration of the war. The report on the situation no longer took place in my map room but in the Fuehrer's shelter. At every report on the situation from that day on, an SS officer took part. Eight stenographers were order to be there. From that day on, they took down every word. The Fuehrer refused to shake hands with me any more. He hardly greeted me. This condition lasted until the 30th of January, 1943, when he told me through Field Marshal Keitel that he could no longer work with me and I would be replaced by General Paulus as soon as Paulus had taken Stalingrad.
the OKW? see to it that I might be sent to Finland with the mountain troops in Finland, but this did not happen. trace of the Fuehrer and that the Fuehrer poured out his favor on you. What is true in that?
A I do not need to waste many words on that. What I said is the truth. What the Prosecution said I unfortunately have to say is imagination.
Q It was said that you were a career soldier. How about that? I was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general in my fiftieth year. This is quite normal. In July 1940 when I was appointed General of Artillery it is true I skipped a grade of Lieutenant General, but that was only a coincidence. A much younger General of the Air Force, Jeschonek, has become Chief of the General Staff, on the Luftwaffe and become General of the Luftwaffe. I was told the fuehrer thought that might hurt my feelings. Then shortly before the Reichstag session the Fuehrer decided to promote me to General of Artillery. This Jeschonek who is much younger than I became Colonel General much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my subordinate, became Colonel General at the same time I did.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30. BY DR. EXNER: ceived the favor of the Fuehrer, and so far as you mention, it wasn't more than average. Did you receive any decorations from Hitler? was concluded on the 30th of January 1943, I received the Golden Party Emblem; and that was the only decoration which I received from the Fuehrer.
Q In the entire 5 1/2 years of war?
Q Did you receive a gift or *onation from Hitler, or from the Party?
A Not a cent; not a button. I can mention the fact that in the Fuehrer headquarters we received from the fuehrer at Christmas time a package of coffee. or gift in the occupied countries?
A Not one piece. In the indictment in a rather summary manner the sentence is set down: "the defendants profited and aggrandized themselves from the occupied countries." I can say as far as I am concerned I can characterize my position with one word, and I can say this openly: This is the libel of a decent German officer. as an officer. How did you invest this money? Can you tell me?
THE PRESIDENT: He said that he couldn't save a penny. He has not yet been cross-examined about it.
DR. EXNER: Very well. BY DR. EXNER: and therefore you must really knew him very well, and therefore I should like to ask you a little more in detail about the personality of theFuehrer; but the Court is not vary fond of repetition. Therefore, tell us, but briefly, what influenced you in Hitler and what did you like especially well and what were the things you disliked.
A Hitler was a leader; he a leader's personality, and a leader's personality of tremendous scope. His knowledge and his intellect and his sense of rhetoric and his will power, all of these qualities in the last analysis triumphed in every spiritual conflict; and this applied to everyone, every person. In a very strange way, in him, logic and forecast were mixed in with his thought. Scepticism was mixed with a very intensive power of imagination, and this power of imagination very frequently foresaw the things to come, but very frequently were wrong. I marveled at him when in the winter of 1941 to '42 in his firm belief and with his energy he brought to a standstill the vacillating eastern front. At this time on the eastern from a catastrophe was imminent, to compare with that in the year 1812.
The modesty in his manner of life was very impressive. There was not one day which, during this war -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) One moment, As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had to listen to this sort of thing over and over again already. We are not interested in it. BY DR. EXNER: heard less frequently, which you disliked in the personality of Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can't he get on with his own case? BY DR. EXNER:
Q Did you have the feeling that you were close to the Fuehrer?
Q And your connections with the Fuehrer were essentially official?
A Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private, or personal, circle; and he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and because of my name, that I probably came from Bavaria.
Q Who belonged tothe private inner-circle?
A Chiefly the "old guard" from the told time, when the party was beginning: Dormann, first of all, the old secretaries, his personal physicians, and the political, or SS adjutants. an enthusiastic follower and adherent of the Fuehrer. Tell us, how did you actually receive this characteristic? ordered it. Even though I reluctantly made this report, chiefly because of lack of time. But generally that was the wish in this period of crisis.
Q And when was this report, or this speech? When was it? About?
A In November 1943. The Italian decline had preceded it. It was the time of the serious bombing attacks. In this period of time, there was the conceivable necessity to have the political leadership at home shown a completely unembroidered picture of the situation, but at the same time, to create a certain amount of confidence at home and to have this confidence rest with the higher leadership.
This speech, which had the title, "The Strategic Situation of Germany at the Beginning of the Fifth Year of the War" could actually not be made by a Block leader. A speech like what could only be made by an officer of theWehrmacht leadership staff, the operational staff. And that is the background of this speech, given by me.
Q What were the contents of this speech? the strategic situation. Here, before the High Tribunal, only the introduction was read; and the introduction paints a picture in retrospect about those things which were behind us, but not from the political point of view, rather from the strategic angle. for so-called wars of aggression. In no way did I identify myself with the National Socialist Party; but as is quite for an officer of the General Staff I identified myself with my Supreme Commander; for at that time we were no concerned with the question of National Socialism or democracy. That was no longer the question. At that time, the question was the "to be or not to be" of the entire German people. And in Germany as well there were patriots, not only in the neighboring states. And I considered myself to be one of the patriots as long as there was breath in my body. On the whole, it is not decisive, thequestion of to whom one is speaking, but it is important and decisive what oneis speaking about. I can say also that I gave that same speech to the Kreisbefehlshaber and to the high officers of the replacement armies.
Q Can you tell us this, please? The beginning and the end of the speech contained an eulogy on the party and the Fuehrer. Why did you do that? Why did you include that in an objective and purely military speech? a critical polemic on the party, or my Commander-in-Chief. It was necessary in order to create confidence between the officer and the leader of the party--for this confidence was not only a stipulation or requirement--so that the speech would actually serve its purpose.
This confidence was the requirement for victory.
At any rate, I should like to say something of decisive importance. The material which is admitted by the prosecution as Document No. 172 is not the speech delivered by the Gauleiter; it is not that speech which I delivered. That is nothing else but the "waste basket" of this speech; for at first there was a rough draft, which this is, which-was completely changed, for it contained many things which were not true, and which were inexact. And there is lacking the entire nucleus of the speech, which concerned itself with the situation at hand, and the part dealing with the enemy, the means at his disposal, and his intentions. The things contained in this document are many hundreds of notes for the speech, which were sent to me by my staff. I compiled my speech with some of these notes. All this material was returned to my staff by me.
Q Then it is not the manuscript of your speech?
A In no way is it the manuscript. The manuscript locks entirely different.
Q Noe we shall turn to a different point. Which leaders of the party did you meet from the assumption of power until the outbreak of the war?
A If I am not to mention the soldiers, Reichminister Frick. I was with him twice when the questions of Reich reform were to be dealt with and discussed. or before the beginning of the war? Admiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and Minister Frick; no one else. National Socialism?
Q Did you participate in the party rally? last three days in Nurnberg of the Nurnberg rally, when the Wehrmacht, the SA and the Labor Front were reviewed.
Q Did you participate in the Memorial Services at Munich; that is, on the 9th of November?
A No. I did not belong there, in reality. the para-military units of the party?
A. These pari-military organizations sprang up from the eath like mushrooms after the assumption of power. Only the SA and Roehm wanted all power. The Witness Gisevius said here that there had been no Roehm Putsch. That is correct, but it was just imminent. At that time, in the Reich's War Ministry, we were armed to the teeth, and Roehm was an actual revolutionary, not a "Gehrock Putschist". When the Fuehrer intervened in June of 1934, from that moment onward there were no conflicts of any sort between the Wehrmacht and the SA. The Wehrmacht became increasingly suspicious of the organizations of the SS, which from that moment onward multiplied in an extraordinary fashion. The Army, one can very well say, was never quite convinced and saw the necessity of this dualism of two armed units within the country.
Q. Now I should like to quote various excerpts from your War Diary, Document 1718-PS, Page 2 of the first volume of the Document Book, in order to show that Jodl again and again worked and concerned himself with the SS into the armed forces. On the 9th of April -- that is the second paragraph -- or rather, on the 22nd of March there is an entry to this effect. Then on the 19th of April: "H. visits Chief of Armaments Office; talks about his ideas concerning development of the SS; gives his misgivings."
In the French translation this "H", standing for Henry, is replaced by "Heydrich", and that, of course, is utter nonsense, for Heydrich certainly had no misgivings on the development, of the SS; but the "H" stands for "Halder", who was the Quartermaster General. I do not know whether this correction was made in the French document book, but I am sorry to say I noted quite a few mistakes in translation in the English and French document books and applied to the General Secretary in this connection, to have these corrections made. I must say this large number of errors in translation makes me a little doubtful, especially if for an "H" the word "Heydrich" is substituted and the Chief of the Armament Office is brought together with one of the most unfortunate figures in the SS. I must saythis, that I am filled with misgivings in this direction because in the course of the last few months the Tribunal has received hundreds of documents, documents which were submitted and whose translation we could not check on, and when we do check on the translation we find that there are quite a few inadequacies, as Dr. Siemers said.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you are supposed to be asking the questions. You are making some long statement now.
DR. EXNER: I should like to read this.
THE PRESIDENT: We can't have counsel making long statements which are not in evidence. You can't make statements of that sort about -- if there is any mistranslation you can draw our attention to it, but that is not the way to do it, making general statements about the translation of the documents.
DR. EXNER: Yes, Mr. President. I do not wish to give another explanation but I should like to quote an extract from my document book referring to the 3rd of February.
THE PRESIDENT: You have corrected one apparent mistranslation or misinterpretation of the letter "H". Well, you can do so again if necessary in other places. You can't make general statements about it.
DR. EXNER: Very well. I should like to read, Mr. President, may I? I should like to read extracts from my document book without trying to criticize. I have no further statements along that line. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. In this spot it says, on the 3rd of February, I quote: "General Thomas informs that the Liaison Officer to the Ministry of Economics and to the General Plenipotentiary Colonel Drews has visited him by order of Schacht. He was of the opinion that the SS employed all means to implicate the Army and to press her against the wall in its present weak state." Then it says, under the date of 10th of February: "Himmler is supposedly distressed that high officer of the armed forces had made unheard of accusations against him." Then perhaps one other passage to be found in the next document on page 4 of the document book, again the same Diary, PS-1780, the entry of the 26th of February: "The unlimited plan for expansion of the SS sounds generally suspicious." Did you, even at that time, have misgivings about the dangers of this dualism that you just mentioned a few minutes ago?
A. I had many, many thoughts about this and I am very well versed in history, but not only did I have misgivings but even during the war I quite openly expressed these misgivings to Himmler and Bormann.