the Versailles Treaty was operative, regarding an aggressive war? the years 1932 until 1939? those maneuvers? have considered anything like that impossible and nonsensical. I do remember that at the beginning of the year 1933 Raeder issued a directive to the commanders at the front regarding manuevers, where a maneuver directed against England was considered an impossibility, and it was prohibited to carry on a maneuver like that.
Q Mr. Admiral, it is known that the Navy, in the 20's, and with the knowledge of the then parliamentary regime, violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions have been discussed a great deal here, and we can be brief. I should like to question you generally, therefore. violations?
A No, I can say that is completely out of the question. The violations were so insignificant and were based only on protection and defense, so I believe it would be impossible to construe them as aggressive intentions. violations took place? defense, coastal batteries, flak batteries, the laying of mines. All of that was based on defense or protection. shall we say, the slight deviations -- make known to the Inter-Allied Commission in whole or in part, and did this commission in part overlook these things since these violations were really trifles?
Q I should like to ask you, Mr. Admiral, to pause between question andanswer so that the interpreters can keep up.
Will you pause just a moment after my questions. of carrying through an aggressive war, the Prosecution has submitted several times the fight of the Navy against Versailles, submitted it as Document C-150. I shall have this document submitted to you in the original. with details, I should like to ask you not to go into detail. I should like to ask you only: What do you know about this document and what is the background of this document? When did itarise, and what is your opinion?
A I know this document. It originated on the basis of the attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and 1935, and the prior regime and the Navy were accused of not having done enough previously to defend the nation, and not exhausting the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, at that time it was planned to bring out a document of justification, and this document is to be considered in that light, that it is a source of justification for something that was omitted.
This document actually never was published. It was withdrawn andnot put into circulation because it was, as I would like to say, a rather weak attempt, for there are no definite points which you might classify as rearmament.
Q Was this memorandum disseminated within the Navy later on?
A No. As I have already said, it was withdrawn from the agencies which had this memorandum, and it was intensely criticized.
Q Did the withdrawal of this document originate with Raeder? the accusation has been made that the efforts of the construction firm in Holland took place under Raeder's direction, and in Finland and in Spain U-boats were being built for Germany.
Is that correct?
A That is not correct. The U-boats which were designed by the Dutch firm and which were built abroad were not built for the German Navy, but for foreign countries.
built in Finland? foreign country? the construction? construction which we had gained in the First World War, and therefore the Navy was interested in seeing that anyone who would construct U-boats should be active along these lines. of Versailles? foreign countries along those lines. first report to Hitler on behalf of the Navy. Do you know what Hitler, on that occasion, laid down as being the basic points for the rebuilding of the Navy, what he told Raeder? which the then chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, made to the Reichschancellor Hitler. to live in peace with England and he wanted to try to reach a naval agreement with England. He said, further, that he wanted the German Navy to remain relatively small; he wanted to recognize Britain's naval superiority because of her position as a world power, and in accord with that he would try to suggest a relationship. He said that he wanted an understanding for the construction of our Navy, and he wanted us to take into consideration his political points of view. Raeder was impressed with the statements, for the agreed completely with his basic attitude.
Agreement was concluded. Looking at it generally and specifically, was the Navy, and specifically Raeder, pleased with this agreement, or did they see certain advantages in it? even though, within a reasonable length of time, we were voluntarily taking upon ourselves a limitation. This agreement could be compared to the Washington conference, and we belonged to the smallest sea power. Even so, this agreement was generally hailed, for friendly relations to the British Navy were desired and we believed that if we were to follow a wise and measured naval policy, we would receive, in return, good will and faith on the part of England. that form and approved it and whether he was pleased about it?
A Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I happened to be together with Hitler at Hamburg while this pact was concluded,and when he learned of this agreement he said this to Raeder, "This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, and now, this afternoon I receive this very glad political news."
Q You have already stated, Mr. Admiral, that the naval agreement was hailed by the Navy. Do you recall that in the year 1937 a qualified naval agreement was concluded with England? At that time, was the attitude of the Navy the same as it had been?
A Yes, absolutely. The naval agreement of 1937 was only a supplementary agreement. It was an exchange of reports, and even on the U-boat tonnage we had agreed with the British.
Q Mr. Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, in the year 1935 there was an agreement on 100 per cent of the U-boats of the British U-boat tonnage, but Germany limited herself to 45 per cent and reserved the right to perhaps increase the tonnage to 100 per cent, but in that case she would be obligated to notify England and to discuss it with the British Admiralty. tonnage take place, and in what way did it?
Berlin, and on that occasion it was discussed once more. Just how far there was written confirmation of this matter, I do not recall, but I assume that it actuallydid take place, for such was the sense of the agreement of 1937. of 1938, he explicitly gave the British agreement on the final equality of U-boats, that is, 100 per cent versus 100 per cent? Admiral Cunningham and Raeder in connection with this visit, whether any conversation took place where Admiral Cunningham rather generally discussed the relations between the German and British Navy? on amicable terms. At Cunningham's departure there was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, and on that occasion Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the conclusion of the naval agreement, and concluded his speech by saying that now that this question had finally been settled, in the future there should be no possibility of a war between both our navies.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?
DR: SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral.
THE WITNESS: As far as I remember, December 1938.
DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given by Grand Admiral Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?
DR. SIEMERS: I am not a naval expert to that extent. Perhaps the Admiral can tell us. Do you understand the question? Which Admiral Cunningham is involved?
THE WITNESS: The present Lord Cunningham. The older one of the two.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I refer to the fact that it was the 30th or 31st of December 1938, which was the date in volved, as that is as far is Raeder recalls. BY DR. SIEMERS: war?
A Yes. Rader was confident of that 100 percent, and I believe as proof for that that I can state t hat actually in our building program in the period mentioned nothing was changed. It would have been necessary if one had entertained the thought of a conflict. been changed if you would have had desires for aggressive wars? preferential treatment. it clear to you, that a war started by Germany and a war of aggression would perforce bring about a conflict with England?
A Yes. From this fact we can see the proof that a war of aggression was not planned.
which perhaps might have caused a justifiable sceptism. I should like to have you remember the crisis in the year 1938 in the autumn, the Sudeten crisis, in which a war almost broke out, and which was prevented only through the Munich agreement at the last moment. occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, which was contradictory to the Munich agreement.
What was the attitude of Raeder to this incident? You should really know his attitude since you were together with him practically every day. was interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia, and even though perhaps to the outside he was ready for negotiation, Raeder believed, and the leading circles in the Navy, that these things would be cleared politically. restlessness arose without doubt among us, but we had always believed that Hitler would not put forth any extravagant demands or exaggerated demands, and that he would be ready to clear these matters politically and solve them politically, for we could not imagine that he would expose the German people to the danger ofa second world war. strange circumstances, did you know anything about the fact that allegedly a bombardment of Prague had been threatened, and did Raeder know anything about this? this I am hearing about this for the first time now.
Q Now I shall turn to the document L-79. This is a speech delivered by Hitler on the 23rd of May 1939.
A DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is US 27, and is to be found in the document book of the British delegation, Number 10, page 74.
I am submitting this document to the witness. BY DR. SIEMERS: 1939 was recorded by the adjutant Lt. Colonel Schmundt. As far as I know, Raeder on the same day discussed this speech with you in detail. At that time for a period of about six months you had been chief of staff. From your later activity do you know the way in which the record was laid down? Can you tell me, please, is this a record as it is customary for military speeches?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question was very much leading. You didn't ask him a question. You put into his mouth what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You ought to have asked him, if you wanted to prove a conversation he had with Raeder, whether h e did have a conversation with Raeder. You have told him he had a conversation with Raeder. The purpose of examination is to ask questions, and then he could tell us if he had a conversation with Raeder. He can't tell us whether this is a true account or a true form of the account when he wasnt'at the meeting himself.
DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall try to put the questions properly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal cannot listen to this witness' account or his opinion as to whether this is a true account of a meeting at which he was not present.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the regular records dealing with important incidents were put to the witness, as chief of staff, at his disposal. Since this document is of a decisive nature, I should like to determine whether Schulte Moenting as Chief of Staff received this record or whether he just had knowledge of the contents through the immediate report by Grand Admiral Raeder.
I was aski my question to that effect.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean you want to ask him whether he ever saw this document? Yes, you may certainly ask him that. Ask him if he saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, your Honor. The answer of the witness I believe was lost, and if I am correct -
THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer. Put the question to him. Put the question to him, whether he ever saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: I shall put the question. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Admiral, did you see this document at that time?
Q How did you hear about the contents of the speech of the 23rd of May? How were you informed about the contents? and after this speech Raeder gave me his impressions. These impressions of his contradicted the so-called minutes. Reader did not have these impression--I should say, this exaggerated war-like impression which this piece of paper has. But, on the other hand -
THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder said to him. BY DR. SIEMERS: of a conflict with Poland, and that this was in contradiction to those things which he had discussed with him alone; and the speech in itself and per se was contradictory, self-contradictory. Those were his impressions which he told me at that time, and he told me further that he, in connection with this speech, he had a conversation with Hitler alone at which occasion he called his attention to the contradictions contained in the speech, and, on the other hand, were also contradictory to the words which he had told him, with specific reference to clearing the matter of Poland in a peaceful manner.
In this case he was considering a war-like solution of this question. There, upon Hitler had pacified him completely and had told him that he had the politic situation firmly in hand. contradiction and asked him just what he really intended to do, he had answered to this effect. This is the conversation as told to me by Raeder:
"I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets, First of all, when both of us are speaking alone. The second, I, Hitler, will keep to myself. and the third those are problems of the future, the end of which I cannot foresee." Then Hitler replied: "These things may be interpreted as such." And this is what Raeder told me. "It might be that both of us were dealing with a comparison I, Hitler--and a Mark is involved-I, Hitler, have already 99 pfennig. Do you believe that because of this one lacking Phennig you will call me to account?" And Raeder said "No". Then Hitler said "Now you will see. I have what I want, and I received it politically, and I do not believe that because of this last political question"--as we called it, the solving of th Polish corridor question --"that we shall be involved in a war,with England. speech was made?
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. SIEMERS: one final question. which were sent to Raeder? Did you receive them? and presented to Raeder. question differently.
What was the position of Raeder concerning Navy and politics? politics. He took that point of view over as a directive and a testament from the old Reich President von Hindenburg, who, at the time he called him to head the Navy, had made it his duty.
Q I now come to Norway. What were the reasons or the causes for Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider possible occupation of Norway?
intentions of an occupation of Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, from Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our counter-intelligence service; about once a week he reported to Raeder as to recent information in my presence: Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attache is Oslow, Kervettenkapitaen Schrieber and which indicated that the rumors were intensified that the Allies intended to drag Scandanavia into the war so that, if possible, the imports from Sweden to Germany could be stopped. cause we had documentary evidence from the last World War that Churchill had had similar considerations concerning the occupation of Norway.
Q Was there another source of reports of that kind? north had received similar reports and orally and in writing he reported them to Raeder. us, briefly? lians who were supposedly in Oslo. There were reports about Allied officers measuring along Norwegian bridges, viaducs and tunnels all the way to the Swedish border, which would indicate that one intended to use heavy equipment, tanks and guns. And last but least, there was news about silent mobilization of Swedish troops and the basis of alleged danger to the ore areas.
Q What danger arose to Germany because of that? the north would have become almost impossible and would have been very difficult in the Baltic. The are imports would have been stopped most probably. The danger from the air for north Germany and eastern territories North Sea and theBaltic would have been blocked completely, which would have led in the long run to the total loss of the war.
Q What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of these considerations?
Q When was that report made?
A If I remember correctly, the fall of '39
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you go very slowly because owing to the power of the electrical recording being off what is happening here in Court is impossible to take and therefore we have got to rely solely upon the shorthand notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording. Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather mere slowly than usual.
BY DR. SIEMERS: the first time pointed out these dangers? offhand you could not remember, on the 10th of October. At any rate you probably mean that conference. on the part of Hitler? that subject?
A No. First there were no further conferences until perhaps the end of the year concerning these subjects. Only when the reports, which I mentioned before, were received in increasing numbers, in more severe forms was that subject taken up again. spoke to Raeder?
Q What did Quisling tell Raeder? important news of a military and political nature. He confirmed, on the whole, all the facts which we know already.
Q During that conference did you speak only about these military dangers? very short one.
Q One did not discuss political questions?
Q Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the first time? At the occasion of that visit did Raeder have any closer connection to Rosenberg?
Quisling? Had he informed him before that time about it? from Canaris and other sources? assumed, Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler.
Q Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?
Q And that happened? 1939? should be taken for such a landing in Norway. To my knowledge a final directive came out only by the middle of March. a risky one or did one think it absolutely safe to do so? commanders of combat units saw the tremendous risk in that undertaking. May I remind you of the speech of Churchill in the House of Parliment where, after he had been questioned about that fact, he said that he did not believe that the German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy.
Q Do you know when Churchill made that statement, approximately?
Q 1940?
Q What was your estimation in the Naval Command as to risk of losses? loss of the fleet and that if the operations were to be carried out according to plan he would have to anticipate the less of about 30 per cent of the forces used.
Q And how much was lost? the beginning in spite of everything, in favor of that operation?
A No. He considered a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as much better than having to occupy that country. have recommended the occupation of Norway out of the desire for glory and conquest. What do you say about that?
A The desire for glory was not in Raeder's character. The plans for occupation which came from his desk bore the mark of daring, but also thorough planning, even to the most minute details. With the distance it was the German ports all the way to Narwik, it can be compared with the distance from Nurnberg to Madrid. And one does not use a Navy, just out of a desire for glory, to combat the entire British fleet. there was a compelling necessity to do so. Naval War Command? coning in continuously from the sources you have mentioned?
of the landings discernible or didn't you see the details an that?
Q Did Raeder -- excuse me; I want to put the question differently: What was the basis which Raeder put to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway? Germany had occupied Norway.
peace; and he suggested in several instances making peace with Norway.
He was in agreement in that respect with the German commander-in-chief in Norway, General Admiral Boehm. Terboven, who was steering political matters, was of a different opinion. his civil administration on the one side, and Raeder and Boehm and their assistants, especially Korvettenkapitaen Schreiber, on the other? conflicts which were fought out all the way up to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway out of consideration for France.
Q Admiral, you said, "out of consideration for France," Wasn't it possible to conclude the peace with France also, and what was Raeder's position in that regard?
Q And what did he say? to push these matters. He told Hitler when the Atlantic Coast was fortified he had pointed out to him that it would be better and more correct to conclude peace with France than to make sacrifices which would still be inadequate in the way of defense. And Hitler replied that he understood that but out of consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace with France.
Q Did the conversations between Raeder and Darlan take place?
Q Were you there? Were you present? were favorable?
Q Did Raeder report on that to Hitler?
Q And in spite of that, Hitler refused?
Q According to your knowledge, did the Party or the Leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?
disfavor through derogatory statements to Hitler. He took reports which were removed from their context and presented them fraudulently. Against these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.
Q Why was the Party against Raeder?
A That is a question which is very difficult to answer. I believe that essentially because first of all there were differences in the religious field. Many commanders, commanding officers, before they put to sea for combat turned to Raeder to see that during their absence their relatives would not be impeded in their freedom of religion.