Our information was so clear, so frequent and so clear, that we could certainly with clear conscience carry out our landing and in fact we did later, and there wouldn't be any point of discussing this; that the order on the part of the British so land in Norway -- not heard -- that that order had been given on the 5th of April, and during the night of the 7th or 8th, as the British informed us in a wireless message, the mine laying in Norwegian waters was carried out by British ships; on the 7th, troops were shipped on cruisers, the names of which I forgot. My conception was correct and not Mr. Brauer's, who was released because he was a failure, and so we carried out the landings. We carried them out on the strength of quite positive information which we could prove in detail. you do, there was no British order for an invasion at all; there was an order for laying mines, but you took this course, as I suggested, you knowing quite well that no British invasion was imminent, contrary to your own chief of operations, Captain Fricke, and contrary to all the information from your diplomatic representative inNorway. Now, I want to come to another point with regard to Norway and then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal that you, in you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember saying that?
A Yes; of course, that is the principle which strengthened our naval commands, that at the moment of firing you have to raise your own flag. warfare to use another country's colors in making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced attack on a neutral country? There was no war between you and Norway and there was no reason to be any ruse. You were at peace with Norway. Are you saying that? and put the German flag up. We didn't want to fight with the Norwegians. It says somewhere that there should first of all be a peaceful occupation. operation, has ever known of a country that has ever attacked a neutral country with which it was at peace, using enemy colors? You tell me when you did it before?
A I don't know whether any other navy did it. I can't tell you.
Q You can assume any other navy; I didn't ask you if you ever did it.
A No, we haven't known it and apart from that, we didn't do it because on the 8th of April, we gave the order by wireless -- and you know from our war diary -- that that was not done, so it is quite usless to talk here about what might have been done if it hadn't been done. warfare were. I want to come to one other point and then I am finished with this section of the case. With regard to the attack on the Soviet Union, I am not going to ask you about all your own views and what you said to Hitler because you told us that at length, but I just would like you to look at document book 10-A, page 252 of the English book and page 424 of the German book.
A Which document is it, please?
A I haven't got that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am so sorry, my Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the Tribunal's pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really wanted him to look at page 59 in document book 10, document C-170. I am very sorry, my Lord. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE
Q Now, that is the extract from the naval war diary; the one that I wanted you to look at is on page 59, for the 15th of June. "On the proposal of the chief of naval operations, SKL, the use of arms against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of Oerland warning area...." Have you got it?
Q "....it is permitted immediately that ruthless destruction is to be aimed at." Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back to document C-38, which is on page 11, which is page 19 of your document book, German document book C-38, page 11 of the British document bock, and page 19 of the German. That is an order of the same date, signed by defendant Keitel, to the highcommand of the navy, "Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel to the southern tip of Oerland authorized. If the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces, the reason to be given up to "B" Day -- that is Barbarossa -- is that our naval forces believe to be dealing with penetrating British submarines."
Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines six days before your own invasion when they wouldn't be expecting any attack and there was no question of any war? the 15th of June, that a submarine had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long way to the West, and then givenwrong position signals when the patrol boats near Bornholm struck it. If the wrong recognition signals are given, then that means that this could be a German submarine or must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it was a Russian boat. Apart from that, there had already been Russian submarines at that time, who had beenfound off German ports -- Memel, for instance -- and they had been reported. Consequently, we had the impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant and war ships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report and I had to propose that we should have submarines in these areas of German ports. That suggestion was passed on the same day and the appendix later which, in my opinion wasn't necessary at all but which was ----
Q That is still not an answer to my question. I will put it this way. You considered it right to attack and urge the ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines six days before you attacked the Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, to blame it on penetrating British submarines -- is that your view of proper warfare? beat the opponent to it, and this washappening under certain definite conditions. Point 2 was ordered by the Fuehrer. Of course, neither of the two points were ever carried out, and it is proper, in my opinion, to discuss this matter, to argue it. to discuss. and ruthlessly destroying them six days before you start the war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?
A Yes, if they appeared in our waters. If they interfered with our vesse in carrying out some other action, then I considered it right. I considered that better than that our ships should run into mines. warfare. Do you remember the document which I put to the defendant Doenitz abou the memorandum of the Foreign Office, D-851, which became GB-451?
Q Right Well, I will ask about that in a moment. This is what you said about it when you were answering Dr. Kranzbuehler, I think on Saturday. You said: "Since the war against England came quite asa surprise to us, we had not, up to then, dealt with detailed questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had not discussed the question of the so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which, in the previous war, played such an important part. And, from that fact, it developed that on the third of September, the officer who had recently been mentioned here was sent to the Foreign Office with a few points to be discussed concerning that question of unrestricted submarine warfare so that we should clarify with the Foreign Office just how far we ought to go."
A So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened. Unrestricted warfare had not been considered.
Q Have you got the document in front of you?
A You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Does Your Lordship have a copy? I don't think this is in any book, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when I was crossexamining the defendant Doenitz.
THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Doenitz papers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will allow me to just read it slowly, for the moment. The document says this:
"The question of an unlimited U-boat warfare against England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the Naval High Command. The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map. The Navy does not fail to realize that:
"(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regarding the prosecution of economic warfare.
"(b) A military operation of this kind could not be justified on the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of international law."
Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it before; it is the second last paragraph:
"Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using the military method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England gives us a justification by her method of waging war to order this form of warfare as a reprisal." BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Now, I want you to take it by stages. You see the paragraph that says:
"The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available can only be attained if U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning in the area." Is that your view? Was that your viewon the 3rd of September?
A No, it wasnot my view; it is a conditional view. We had given submarines the order to wage the merchant naval war according to the Prize Ordinance. We had planned it that if the British were to arm merchant ships that would do something like that, then certainly -
Q Will you please give me an answer to the question which I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.
Q Well, isn't it your view?
A No. In theory, of course, considering the small resources that we had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be determined through discussions with the Foreign Office, and just how far we could go with this justification. Out of the discussions with the Foreign Office arose the submarine memorandum, which shows, from beginning to end, that we were trying to adhere to the existing law as far as possible. The whole memorandum is nothing other than just that sort of a discussion.
Q Now, willyou answer my question? When this document says the Navy has arrived at the conclusion, is it true that the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?
Q Is that true or not?
Now let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived at that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as the defendant Doenitz said when he gave evidence? that they should wage war according to the Prize Ordinance. We didn't ask wheth they wanted to raise unrestricted U-boat warfare, something which I didn't want in any case. First of all, I had to talk to the Foreign Office and find out how far we could go.
That wasthe purpose of this affair. The purpose and the aim was to give individual orders, such orders which we were entitled to give, step by step, in accordance with the behavior of the British. This was a question of international law, which I wanted to discuss with the International Law Expert inthe Foreign Office.
Q Isn't it correct that you continued to press this point of view, the conclusion of which you had arrived at, to the Foreign Office for the next three months? Isn't it correct that you continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare within the area for the next three months?
A I hardly think so; otherwise, the 15th of October memorandum would not have been issued. is contained in the memorandum and that, step by stop, was an intensification following British steps. Baron von Weizsacker, on the 25th of September, which you will see in document D-852, GB-469.
You see paragraph 3 of that document:
"The OKM will submit to the Foreign Office a proposal, asa basis for a communication to the neutral powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare will be communicated, the ordering of which has already taken place or is impending in the near future. This includes particularly a warning not to use wireless on being stopped, not to sail in convoy, and not to black out."
That wasyour first step, wasit not? That wasput up to the Foreign Office, with a number of other proposals? could be attacked, because as early as the 6th or 8th of September, submarines had stopped a merchant ship, had fired a warning shot, and had at once been fired on by the British steamer. Thereupon submarines started firing at the merchant ship These cases existed, and one could not recognize at once whether the ship was armed or not. Therefore, we said that if there was a case of that type, graduall all ships would have to be fired at.
stopped, and could also be shot at because this wireless activity was taking place by order of the Admiralty, which would lead to the fact that both naval and air forces would immediately appear on the spot and would shoot at the U-boat. steamers were excepted; and secondly, firing on blacked-out vessels and firing on those who were engaging in wireless activities.
Q Well, now would you look at D-853. I only want you to look at the next document, which will be GB-407. I want you to come as soon as possible to this memorandum about which you talked. tary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September. This after going through these matters which you have just talked about now, the sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the assumption that they are armed. In paragraph 2 it is said:
"The Naval Operational Staff indicated anew that the Fuehrer will probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted area in the very near future. The previous anticipation of the Foreign Office remains guaranteed."
\ larger area to the west of Britain and around Britain?
A Yes. Inasfar as the attitude of enemy forces justified, we were intensifying step by step, particularly where intensification was perfectly justified, which was later on proved.
Q Would you look at Baron von Weizsaecker's minutes of the 14th of October which is D/85 , which will be GB-471. explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizaecker reports to the defendant von Ribbentrop:
"According to my information, the decision on unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least as much a political decision as it is a technicality of war.
"A short while ago I submitted my personal view that unrestricted U-boat warfare could bring new enemies upon us at a time when we still lack the necessa: U-boats to defeat England. On the other hand, the Navy's attitude of insisting on the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is backed by every convincing reason." my Lord, Is Document C-157, and will be GB-224. A First of all, may I say something about the previous document? Unrestricted warfare -
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to be allowed to say what he wants to say on that document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your Lordship please. Please go on, defendant, my fault.
A Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to say was that the expression "unrestricted submarine warfare" on the part of the Foreign Office originated from the previous world war. In reality, and during the entire war, we didn't wage unrestricted U-boat warfare in the sense of the unrestricted submarine warfare of the first world war. very restricted measures, which always were based on the fact that the British in turn had ordered something on their part. Mostly this on the part of the British was an action of militarizing the entire Merchant Navy. That is to say, the Merchant Navy was being armed, and they ordered -
Q I don't see how that arises out of the last document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, I think we might pass on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: Doesn't Your Lordship think so?
THE WITNESS: On both documents. not one document. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: noon. I am going to suggest to you what your real object was of the submarine warfare set out in the first paragraph of the memorandum. Could you just look at it? You see "Berlin 15, October -
A I wanted to go on to say that there wasn't such unrestricted U-boat warfare but merely an increase of measures which existed, something I have always emphasized. This always happened precisely when the British took some measures. document. Look at your own document, this memorandum. In the first paragraph: "The Fuehrer's proposal for the restoration -
A I am hot telling untruths. I don't do that sort of thing. this document.
"The Fuehrer's proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable peace and the new adjustment of political order in Central Europe has been turned down.
The enemy powers want the war, with the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and her rights, she must use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, at the same time fully respecting the laws of military ethics."
Now, let's see what you were suggesting.
"Germany's principle enemy in this war is Britain. Her most vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The nacal war at sea against Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with the aim of destroying Britain's fighting spirit within the shortest possible time and of forcing her to accept peace."
Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next:
"The principal target of the Directorate of Naval strategy is the merchant ship" --now, let's look--"not only the enemy's, but in general every merchant ship which sails the seas in order to supply the enemy's war industry, both by way of imports and exports. Besides this, the enemy warship also remains a military target," Now, wasn't that the object which you in the Naval Command were putting to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use the utmost ruthlessness to destroy Britain's fighting spirit, and to attack every merchant ship coming in or going out of Britain?
Wasn't that your object? and they were advised not to enter certain territories and areas. Are you seriously suggesting to the Tribunal that what you meant by that paragraph was that neutral ships were only to be attacked with warning?
A Of course. To begin with, we had warned them when our blockade was established. We warned them that they shouldn't enter this area because they would come under considerable danger. That I am saying, and I can prove it. document. Now, just turn to page -
Q If you will turn to Section C of the document, "Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain."
"Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our dis posal as expeditiously as possible.
Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea communications wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cub off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law."
Wasn't that the view that you were putting up to the Foreign Office and the Fuehrer, "Use international law as long as you can, but if international law conflicts with what is wanted for military success, throw international law over board." asn't that your view?
Q Well, then, explain these words. Explain these words: "We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. However, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out even if they are not covered by international law."
What did you mean by that if you didn't mean to throw international law overboard?
A It says "If the existing-international law can't be applied." It is generally known that international law had not yet been coordinated with submarin warfare, just as in the use of aircraft at that time. It says pricipally that defeat of enemy resistence must be based on legal considerations, and no legislation for naval warfare--during the entire war, and continuously, new naval law did arise, particularly applying to neutrals. For instance, the Pan-American Security Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around the American Coast, which was a tremendous sea area for traffic. they themselves made on the 4th of November 1939, that it would be dangerous for neutral ships to enter it. It was then prohibited that their own ships and citizens should enter this area.
similarly, and then they would be damaged. Then only such neutrals travelled to Great Britain which had contraband aboard, and made money through that, or which were forced by the British through their ports of control to enter that area and nevertheless submit themselves to those dangers. airplanes or submarines from the time that Germany signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936 to the beginning of the war? You say that international law had to adapt itself to changes in weapons of war.
What changes had taken place between 1936 and 1939?
A The following change took place: The U-boat protocol of 1936 was signed by us because we assumed -
Q That is not an answer to my question. My question is quite clear. It is: What changesin weapons of war, either in the air of in the submarines, had taken place between 1936 and 1939? Now, there is a question. You are a naval officer of 50 years experience. Tell me, what were the changes? longer in a position on surface to investigate enemy ships or any other ships, particularly near the enemy coast where the U-boats -
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The question you were asked was, what changes had taken place in the weapons of war, either airplanes or submarines.
THE WITNESS: But Mr. President, the changes referred to aircraft. The possibility of escape decreased continuously, and their uses were increased above the water. That led to the situation that any examination of merchant vessels wasn't possible at sea without aircraft being called to threaten the submarine. That got worse and worse. Later on rescues had to be limited in the presence of enemy aircraft, and the entire submarine warfare was completely turned upside down in that manner. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: statement that international law was to be thrown overboard where it didn't fit in with military necessities? Is that the only change, the increase in the power of aircraft between 1936 and 1939?
A I have already said once it wasn't thrown overboard. It was to be limited, and that was done by others too.
Q Well, now, just would you look at the next paragraph. You talked about your consideration for neutrals. At the top of page 5 in the English text it is the paragraph that follows the one that I have just read. You say:
"In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.
"The Supreme War Council, after considering the political, military and economic consequences within the framework of the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measuresof military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfilment of military requirements, this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances, and under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of other countries, including the U.S. coming into the war, which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier willit show results and the sooner will the war come to an end."
expressed in the paragraph which I have just read to you? you are trying topresent it.
A (Interposing) This is the point. We had had the experience during the First world War that as soon as intensification had been oredered and as soon as the first neutral had raised a finder to object, there were at once reprisal measures, particularly when the United States participated. And now I am saying in this paragraph that under all circumstances it must be avoided, that we withdraw our measures at once; and what I mean is that we should consider our measures as carefully as possible. That is the reason for the discussion when the Foreign Office, and so on and so forth, namely to avoid the situation where later an there might be withdrawals, which would mean a considerable loss of prestige and effect.
That is the reason. Numerous protests came, too, from England, and in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the Document C-170, U. S. 136, where there are a lot of figures, Number 4, where it says, "The Soviet Russian note against the British blockade warfare of the 20th of October, 1939"; and Number 17, where it states, "on the 31st of October, where political measures and --"
Q (Interposing) All that I ask is, was that a proper procedure? at the point of doing it. The Red attack against the British blockade, which is a violation of international, -- these attacks were made by Mr. Molotov. There were objections which were always turned down. But I wanted to prevent objections, and the entire document shows that our objections were always aiming at considering our measures and introducing them in such a way that they could not be objected to, but were always legally justified.
objections if you suggest in this paragraph to us the most ruthless measures and disregard every protest that neutrals made? How is that going to prevent objections? not any interference. If I told you that this is a dangerous area, which they want to enter only because they want to make money or because they are being forced by the British, then I need not accept any pretest. They are acting for egotistical reasons, and they must pay the bill if they die.
Q That is true. They are to pay the bill if they die. That was what it came to, was it not? They had considerable objection to exposing themselves to that risk, and that was their business to decide.
THEPRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I thought about a half hour, my Lord. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that is, the sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big area around England.
A (The witness made a gesture with the microphone.)
Q Didn't you hear?
Q Sorry. In this document the Naval Command suggests what is called the siege of England, on pages 10 to 13. And that is the sinking of all merchant shipping, including neutrals and tankers which come into areas around England. Isn't that so?
A No, that is not true. The Commander of the Navy does not suggest that, but discusses it, since the blockade had been discussed and rejected. It discusses also the term of siege and comes to a conclusion why it should not be undertaken, that the siege until that time had not been accepted by international law but should be introduced; and it draws the conclusion from all these conclusions on the last page before the last as to what shall now be considered the final conclusion -- and there, only those measures which can be justified by the actions taken by the British are to be taken. And the entire discussion about blockage and siege was in the foreground always, whether the neutrals wouldn'to be damaged too much by that. And the entire subject of siege is based upon the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already said -- on the 26th of December -- that between a blockade on the seas and a siege on the continent there wouldn't be any difference and the commander of a siege would try to prevent with all means the entry of anything into the fortress. in the same situation as a fortress under siege.
of a siege but you do not want any siege area declared. Will you look at paragraph 2 of the conclusions, and then I will leave the document to the Tribunal. That is the point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of the conclusions you say, "For the future conduct of economic warfare, the basic military requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment of the siege by sea as a most intensified form of economic warfare meets this demand. Without the publie announcement of a state of siege, after it has been clearly defined as a concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks militarily and from the point of view of international law and even without the declaration of a prohibited zone, it seems perfectly possible at the moment -- as has been explained in this memorandum -- to take military measures to introduce the intensect form of economic warfare. And to achieve what is at present the greatest possible effectiveness in the interruption of enemy trade -- now the last words -- "without directors of naval strategy being bound down in all cases in special forms and areas." effective a siege without proclaiming any area. Isn't that so?
A That is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that we cannot carry out the siege and that that would be a matter of political leadership to decide. The political leadership of the State has never suggested a siege by decree, but it can beseen here quite clearly what on the basis of the memorandum is suggested and then how the intensification took place by and by.
Q Let me finish. My suggestion is -- and there I leave it -- that you rejected a formal siege but you claimed the right to sink at sight without warning all neutral vessels in an area which the Higher Command may choose. afraid time is getting on.
A That is no siege, however. That was an individual directive issued after neutral ships did not hoed our warning and continued to enter the sea around England in order to support England in the economic warfare which England with her ruthlessness and severity was conducting against us. the attention of the Tribunal has been drawn to it. I want to come to another point: You have mentioned certain matters, in answer to Dr. Horn this morning, with regard to the treatment of American ships in the summer of 1941. In April, 1941, you were pressing for German Naval Forces to operate freely up to three miles of the American Coast instead of the 300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were you not? Well, to save time I hand you Document 894, GB-472. That says you couldn't got in touch with the Defendant von Ribbentrop and therefore you asked Baron von Weizsaecker to get a decision on these points: "I, concerning the German Naval Forces in the western part of the Atlanti Ocean being allowed to operate freely as far as the international] customary three-mile boundary; 2, the cancellation of the preferential treatment which American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our warfare at sea."
Now, I hand you No. 850 -- which is GB-473. Your suggestion, which had been made in April, was turned down by Hitler in June. It is from Ritter in the Foreign Office, a memorandum, and it reads:
"General Jodl informs me that at the recent interview which Grand Admiral Raeder had with Hitler, the more extensive orders issued to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection with the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further notice.
"Also, permission to attack U. S. merchant vessels with in the framework of the prize laws, has not been granted." and attack up to the three-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another point -