BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: to where it comes to a report, the date of 30 December 1939 -- 30-12-39, and then after that there is an enclosure to the report to the Fuehrer of 30 December 1939.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Will you try to find it, SergeantMajor?
(A court attendant indicated the passage in the document to the witness). BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Would you look at paragraph IV, which says:
"With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement of further intensifications of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification of the war with an offensive in the west is of deciding importance."
Have you got that, paragraph IV?
A page?
A "Regarding the form --" yes.
"with regard to the form and the moment for the commencement of further intensifications of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification of the war with an offensive in the West is of deciding importance.
"1st Possibility:
"The decision of the Fuehrer is made in favour of a Western offensive, beginning very shortly, within the framework of the instructions issued for this to date while violating the neutrality of other states.
"In this case the intensified measures of the war at sea will in their political effect only represent a small part of the entire intensification of the war. The gradual change-over to the intensified form of waging the war at sea within the American restricted zones, with the ultimate aim of a ruthless employment of all means of warfare to interrupt all commerce with England is therefore proposed with the start of the offensive.
Immediate anticipation of individual intensificatory measures for the war at sea is not necessary. The start of the General intensi fication of the war will awaited. The benevolent neutrals -- Italy, Spain, Jap and Russia, as well as America, are to be spared as far as possible."
Isn't that right, that you contemplated that Hitler's violation of the neutrality of the Low Countries would cover, by being a more important matter, your adopting the most ruthless methods of war at sea? Isn't that right?
Q What does that mean if it does not mean that? What does that mean if it does not mean what I have put to you? a certain energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For that reason, he asked me that the intensification which I had considered ripe because of the attitude of the British forces -- he asked me to introduce them, but only at that stage The intensifications were very carefully considered in that memorandum, and they had been step by step following the corresponding steps taken by Britain.
Q I will deal with the memorandum. You need not be afraid that I will emit that, but what I am putting to you at the moment is this: That so far from disapproving of the violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, you on behalf of the Navy were quite prepared to accompany it by the intensification of submarine warfare; isn't that right?
A That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with the violation o neutrality. The only thing I was interested in was to carry out the submarine war step by step, intensifying it step by step so as to meet measures introduced by the British, which were also violations of international law. try to keep the compartments. That is only two more points on this aggressive war. I am now going to pass -- You can leave that document for the moment. I will come back to it; you need not be afraid, and I want you to help me on one not occupied, so long as you had protected channel up to Norwegian coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important point for you, to have a channel in neutral waters that not only your ships but also your submarines could go up and start out from neutral waters; is that right?
There was the danger that the British might occupy Norway, and information of all sorts confirmed that and proved that to us. Of course, if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, then, apart from all the numerous disadvantages which turned out to be existent, we had the advantage that we would have this or that base for our Atlantic submarines.
the British were going to occupy Norway?
A But most certainly. We had so much information of that typo that I had no doubt whatever. I couldn't have any doubt, and that was confirmed later on. reports. We won't refer to the document again, but we will start from there, just to get the time. diary that the Fuehrer was still looking for justification; Do you remember that? You remember that, don't you? "justification" is wrongly translated. The right word is "reason", but that, then, is untrue, and please will you let me finish. Even that is incorrect, because the Fuehrer had an abundance of reasons himself, and a code of instructions appeared on the 1st of March. I have said that by a special reason he meant that he hadn't yet had a diplomatic note compiled. He hadn't told the Foreign Minister anything about that at that stage. I told you under oath the other day that that is so, and I will repeat it under oath today.
Q I see. That is the meaning that you have given to it. Well now, will you look at your own Exhibit, No. 81, in Raeder Document Book 5, page 72.
A May I have Document Book 5? English into Norwegian territorial waters, and it says:
"An examination of the question as to whether a mass encroachment by the English into the Norwegian territorial waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent a danger to present German shipping produces the opinion that this is not to be expected at the present time. The ore transports are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred." territorial waters was to be expected on the 22nd of March?
A That wasn't at all my conception. It was the view of Captain Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the Operations Department. He didn't quite agree with me as far as this particular question was concerned. He was of the opinion that one ought to allow the British to enter Norway, and then one ought to chuck then out through Sweden, a completely twisted idea which I couldn't approve of in any way. second half of March, that there was no doubt whatever that within a reasonable time the British would interfere in a solid and massive way.
Q You say that that was Admiral Fricke's view, and you didn't pay attention to it. Well, now, let me look -
A I didn't say that I didn't concern myself with it. historian, kept a headline diary, and on the next day he gives an account of a meeting between you and Hitler, and he says this. This is the same day. You may have read it, because he turned down your proposal to use U-boats off Halifax. It is the same day, the 23rd of February. Then, on that date, you are quoted as saying, "To ensure the supply of oil from Narvik, it would be best to preserve the neutrality of Norway." meeting between you and Hitler as follows. It is quite short:
"British landing in Norway not considered serious. Raedor suggests invasion by Germany, German forces, at the next now moon, to which Hitler agrees."
That is Admiral Assnann's report of the meeting between you and Hitler on the 26th of March:
"British landing in Norway not considered serious. Raeder suggests invasion by Germany, German forces, at the next now moon, the 7th of April, to which Hitler agrees."
Do you remember that?
A I haven't seen the document, but it is quite improbable. Captain Assmann compiled his notes from all sorts of war diaries and records, protocols. I most certainly never said that, because at that time I reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations would be complete, longterm preparations, at the end of January, and that that would be the time when the landings ought to be carried out.
A He wouldn't be intentionally dishonest, but he compiled the document from all sorts of papers and I can't imagine how he could have arrived at that statement, because I certainly never made it.
Q But the seoncd part of it, the second sentence, is right, isn't it:
"Raeder suggests invasion by German forces at the next new moon, the 7th of April."
That is right; that is when you did invade. That was when your armada started off to arrive there on the 9th, wasn't it?
A But yes, of course. I was in favor of Carrying out the landings in Norway at the earliest possible time, when ice conditions had improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered by Hitler. For that I assume responsibility. There was every reason for that.
Q Well. again I mustn't argue with you, but the point comes to this, that you are saying that Admiral Assmann, who is right in his second sentence, is not only wrong, but entirely wrong -- I mean, stating the opposite of the truth -- when he says British landing in Norway not considered serious." information available.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, what was that document of the 26th of March 1940?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: That was an extract from the Assmann Diary which I have used before, and I will have one made up and put in for identification. I haven't got it copied yer, my Lord, I'm sorry. I shall have it done.
THE WITNESS: I should be grateful if perhaps you could show me the document. You have showed me all the others, but not this one,the one I contest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is such a short extract I thought you would take it from me, but the last thing I want is not to show you any documents.
BY SIR DAVID MAXELL FYFE:
Q You see the entry for the 26th of March:
"British landing in Norway not considered serious. Raeder suggests invasion by German forces at next new moon, 7th of April, to which Hitler agrees. Further discussions about laying of mines at Scapa before German invasion of Norway. Hitler agrees with Raeder and will discuss with Luftwaffe Chief."
A May I come back to it now. Yes, the 26th of March, 1940.
"Occupation of Norway through British is imminent."
The war was imminent when the Russian-Finnish peace took place. That Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly urgent for us to carry out landings, because it was questionable whether the British wouldn't, under the heading of supporting the Finns, carry out that occupation of Norway. by the British in Norway might be imminent. All that was dependent on the acual situation, and it was summarized by the fact that the Fuehrer wanted to know whether, because the peace had been signed, the situation in Europe had changed. But it hadn't, because we knew in reality that the landings by the British weren't to be carried out to help the Finns, but for other reason. treaty, the British landings might be particularly imminent, was answered by me with "No". Everything remained as before, but there was this question whether because of this peace treaty we ought to land at once, and I answered no. That is completely different from what you have been telling me.
Q You read out the entry for the 26th of March. What is the entry for the 26th of March. You read it out in German and we can translateit. treaty was signed -- apparently because of the treaty, was postponed. Your question whether at that moment the British landing was imminent -- and that was answered by no -- it wasn't therefore that we would ask because of that. The supreme commander of navy suggests action for "new moon". The reason for our landing regained in force as before. Only the business regarding Finland couldn't be used by the British any more. March, that was off the map at that time?
A I was not responsible any more. Our arguments and other reasons remained in force.
Q This will be GB-466. This is report from your diplomatic representative in Norway, dated the 29th of March, and at the end of the first paragraph you will see: "The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out warlike operations in them." That is quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then your diplomatic representativ says: "The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things quite right. It definitely appears, however, -- as I have frequently pointed out -- that the British have no intentions of landing, but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, perhaps -- as Koht thinks -- in order to provoke Germany. Of course, it is also possible that the British behavious last week, which I have pointed out as well, will grow into more or less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters...." And then the paragraph three: "The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to ensure that Norway's neutrality rules are respected can be accepted as a fact." Were you tol that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was reporting that the British had n intentions of landing?
A Yes. Dr. Brauer, the ambassador to Norway, had a completely wrong attitude. He believed Foreign Minister Koht, who assured him, regarding which our naval attache also reported,-- were perfectly reliable, and didn't realise where the work would lead -- at the same time, information had been received elsewhere, too, that the Norwegians were giving assurance on paper and then on the other hand, they said that they were doing that only as a subterfuge and that they would continue to cooperate with the British.
That is contained in the document which we have submitted.
Q Let us look at another document. Look at D-44. This is what your diplomatic representative in Sweden was saying at the same tine. That will be GB-467-GB-44. I gave the wrong number. That is from your representative in Sweden and you will notice that he quotes Foreign Minister Gunther of Sweden, as first of all -- about ten lines down, just after the none of "Weizacker," you w see "The Swedish government had no reason at all to believe in an impending acti by the Western powers against Scandinavia. On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other information, it considered the situation lately to be much calmer" and then he tells there is no prospect of a coup against Sweden, and then he goes on to deal with Norway. And if you look down two paragraphs, it says "In conclusion, Gunther requested re to report his statements to my government, and repeated that the Swedish government attached the greatest value to the German government not erroneously getting the impression of the existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility -- he would not use the word necessity at all -- of special measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia." And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign Minister had probably heard of the German preparations.
Now, would you Look at document D/845 which will be GB-468 -- that is the next day -- from your diplomatic representative in Stockholm: "Serious anxiety military "preventive measures in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of war measures by the Western Powers Swedish and Norwegian military government authorities consider it unlikely that military measures will be taken against Scandinavia by the Western Powers. Press reports on this subject by the Western Powers are attempting to provoke German," -- from your Naval Attache' in Stockholm. Were you told about these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that? assurances, because quite obviously Sweden had considerable interests in our not going to Norway because Sweden believed that by that we would come into a positio to exercise pressure upon Sweden. That was what the British wanted according to the information we received later. He was completely misinformed and the attache was misinformed, and as a result wasn't informed by us because he realised he was told by the Foreign Minister Koht.
Our information was so clear, so frequent and so clear, that we could certainly with clear conscience carry out our landing and in fact we did later, and there wouldn't be any point of discussing this; that the order on the part of the British so land in Norway -- not heard -- that that order had been given on the 5th of April, and during the night of the 7th or 8th, as the British informed us in a wireless message, the mine laying in Norwegian waters was carried out by British ships; on the 7th, troops were shipped on cruisers, the names of which I forgot. My conception was correct and not Mr. Brauer's, who was released because he was a failure, and so we carried out the landings. We carried them out on the strength of quite positive information which we could prove in detail. you do, there was no British order for an invasion at all; there was an order for laying mines, but you took this course, as I suggested, you knowing quite well that no British invasion was imminent, contrary to your own chief of operations, Captain Fricke, and contrary to all the information from your diplomatic representative inNorway. Now, I want to come to another point with regard to Norway and then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal that you, in you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember saying that?
A Yes; of course, that is the principle which strengthened our naval commands, that at the moment of firing you have to raise your own flag. warfare to use another country's colors in making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced attack on a neutral country? There was no war between you and Norway and there was no reason to be any ruse. You were at peace with Norway. Are you saying that? and put the German flag up. We didn't want to fight with the Norwegians. It says somewhere that there should first of all be a peaceful occupation. operation, has ever known of a country that has ever attacked a neutral country with which it was at peace, using enemy colors? You tell me when you did it before?
A I don't know whether any other navy did it. I can't tell you.
Q You can assume any other navy; I didn't ask you if you ever did it.
A No, we haven't known it and apart from that, we didn't do it because on the 8th of April, we gave the order by wireless -- and you know from our war diary -- that that was not done, so it is quite usless to talk here about what might have been done if it hadn't been done. warfare were. I want to come to one other point and then I am finished with this section of the case. With regard to the attack on the Soviet Union, I am not going to ask you about all your own views and what you said to Hitler because you told us that at length, but I just would like you to look at document book 10-A, page 252 of the English book and page 424 of the German book.
A Which document is it, please?
A I haven't got that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am so sorry, my Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the Tribunal's pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really wanted him to look at page 59 in document book 10, document C-170. I am very sorry, my Lord. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE
Q Now, that is the extract from the naval war diary; the one that I wanted you to look at is on page 59, for the 15th of June. "On the proposal of the chief of naval operations, SKL, the use of arms against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of Oerland warning area...." Have you got it?
Q "....it is permitted immediately that ruthless destruction is to be aimed at." Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back to document C-38, which is on page 11, which is page 19 of your document book, German document book C-38, page 11 of the British document bock, and page 19 of the German. That is an order of the same date, signed by defendant Keitel, to the highcommand of the navy, "Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel to the southern tip of Oerland authorized. If the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces, the reason to be given up to "B" Day -- that is Barbarossa -- is that our naval forces believe to be dealing with penetrating British submarines."
Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines six days before your own invasion when they wouldn't be expecting any attack and there was no question of any war? the 15th of June, that a submarine had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long way to the West, and then givenwrong position signals when the patrol boats near Bornholm struck it. If the wrong recognition signals are given, then that means that this could be a German submarine or must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it was a Russian boat. Apart from that, there had already been Russian submarines at that time, who had beenfound off German ports -- Memel, for instance -- and they had been reported. Consequently, we had the impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant and war ships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report and I had to propose that we should have submarines in these areas of German ports. That suggestion was passed on the same day and the appendix later which, in my opinion wasn't necessary at all but which was ----
Q That is still not an answer to my question. I will put it this way. You considered it right to attack and urge the ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines six days before you attacked the Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, to blame it on penetrating British submarines -- is that your view of proper warfare? beat the opponent to it, and this washappening under certain definite conditions. Point 2 was ordered by the Fuehrer. Of course, neither of the two points were ever carried out, and it is proper, in my opinion, to discuss this matter, to argue it. to discuss. and ruthlessly destroying them six days before you start the war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?
A Yes, if they appeared in our waters. If they interfered with our vesse in carrying out some other action, then I considered it right. I considered that better than that our ships should run into mines. warfare. Do you remember the document which I put to the defendant Doenitz abou the memorandum of the Foreign Office, D-851, which became GB-451?
Q Right Well, I will ask about that in a moment. This is what you said about it when you were answering Dr. Kranzbuehler, I think on Saturday. You said: "Since the war against England came quite asa surprise to us, we had not, up to then, dealt with detailed questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had not discussed the question of the so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which, in the previous war, played such an important part. And, from that fact, it developed that on the third of September, the officer who had recently been mentioned here was sent to the Foreign Office with a few points to be discussed concerning that question of unrestricted submarine warfare so that we should clarify with the Foreign Office just how far we ought to go."
A So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened. Unrestricted warfare had not been considered.
Q Have you got the document in front of you?
A You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Does Your Lordship have a copy? I don't think this is in any book, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when I was crossexamining the defendant Doenitz.
THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Doenitz papers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will allow me to just read it slowly, for the moment. The document says this:
"The question of an unlimited U-boat warfare against England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the Naval High Command. The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map. The Navy does not fail to realize that:
"(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regarding the prosecution of economic warfare.
"(b) A military operation of this kind could not be justified on the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of international law."
Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it before; it is the second last paragraph:
"Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using the military method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England gives us a justification by her method of waging war to order this form of warfare as a reprisal." BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Now, I want you to take it by stages. You see the paragraph that says:
"The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available can only be attained if U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning in the area." Is that your view? Was that your viewon the 3rd of September?
A No, it wasnot my view; it is a conditional view. We had given submarines the order to wage the merchant naval war according to the Prize Ordinance. We had planned it that if the British were to arm merchant ships that would do something like that, then certainly -
Q Will you please give me an answer to the question which I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.
Q Well, isn't it your view?
A No. In theory, of course, considering the small resources that we had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be determined through discussions with the Foreign Office, and just how far we could go with this justification. Out of the discussions with the Foreign Office arose the submarine memorandum, which shows, from beginning to end, that we were trying to adhere to the existing law as far as possible. The whole memorandum is nothing other than just that sort of a discussion.
Q Now, willyou answer my question? When this document says the Navy has arrived at the conclusion, is it true that the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?
Q Is that true or not?
Now let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived at that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as the defendant Doenitz said when he gave evidence? that they should wage war according to the Prize Ordinance. We didn't ask wheth they wanted to raise unrestricted U-boat warfare, something which I didn't want in any case. First of all, I had to talk to the Foreign Office and find out how far we could go.
That wasthe purpose of this affair. The purpose and the aim was to give individual orders, such orders which we were entitled to give, step by step, in accordance with the behavior of the British. This was a question of international law, which I wanted to discuss with the International Law Expert inthe Foreign Office.
Q Isn't it correct that you continued to press this point of view, the conclusion of which you had arrived at, to the Foreign Office for the next three months? Isn't it correct that you continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare within the area for the next three months?
A I hardly think so; otherwise, the 15th of October memorandum would not have been issued. is contained in the memorandum and that, step by stop, was an intensification following British steps. Baron von Weizsacker, on the 25th of September, which you will see in document D-852, GB-469.
You see paragraph 3 of that document:
"The OKM will submit to the Foreign Office a proposal, asa basis for a communication to the neutral powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare will be communicated, the ordering of which has already taken place or is impending in the near future. This includes particularly a warning not to use wireless on being stopped, not to sail in convoy, and not to black out."
That wasyour first step, wasit not? That wasput up to the Foreign Office, with a number of other proposals? could be attacked, because as early as the 6th or 8th of September, submarines had stopped a merchant ship, had fired a warning shot, and had at once been fired on by the British steamer. Thereupon submarines started firing at the merchant ship These cases existed, and one could not recognize at once whether the ship was armed or not. Therefore, we said that if there was a case of that type, graduall all ships would have to be fired at.
stopped, and could also be shot at because this wireless activity was taking place by order of the Admiralty, which would lead to the fact that both naval and air forces would immediately appear on the spot and would shoot at the U-boat. steamers were excepted; and secondly, firing on blacked-out vessels and firing on those who were engaging in wireless activities.
Q Well, now would you look at D-853. I only want you to look at the next document, which will be GB-407. I want you to come as soon as possible to this memorandum about which you talked. tary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September. This after going through these matters which you have just talked about now, the sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the assumption that they are armed. In paragraph 2 it is said:
"The Naval Operational Staff indicated anew that the Fuehrer will probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted area in the very near future. The previous anticipation of the Foreign Office remains guaranteed."
\ larger area to the west of Britain and around Britain?
A Yes. Inasfar as the attitude of enemy forces justified, we were intensifying step by step, particularly where intensification was perfectly justified, which was later on proved.
Q Would you look at Baron von Weizsaecker's minutes of the 14th of October which is D/85 , which will be GB-471. explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizaecker reports to the defendant von Ribbentrop:
"According to my information, the decision on unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least as much a political decision as it is a technicality of war.
"A short while ago I submitted my personal view that unrestricted U-boat warfare could bring new enemies upon us at a time when we still lack the necessa: U-boats to defeat England. On the other hand, the Navy's attitude of insisting on the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is backed by every convincing reason." my Lord, Is Document C-157, and will be GB-224. A First of all, may I say something about the previous document? Unrestricted warfare -
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to be allowed to say what he wants to say on that document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your Lordship please. Please go on, defendant, my fault.
A Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to say was that the expression "unrestricted submarine warfare" on the part of the Foreign Office originated from the previous world war. In reality, and during the entire war, we didn't wage unrestricted U-boat warfare in the sense of the unrestricted submarine warfare of the first world war. very restricted measures, which always were based on the fact that the British in turn had ordered something on their part. Mostly this on the part of the British was an action of militarizing the entire Merchant Navy. That is to say, the Merchant Navy was being armed, and they ordered -
Q I don't see how that arises out of the last document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, I think we might pass on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: Doesn't Your Lordship think so?
THE WITNESS: On both documents. not one document. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: noon. I am going to suggest to you what your real object was of the submarine warfare set out in the first paragraph of the memorandum. Could you just look at it? You see "Berlin 15, October -
A I wanted to go on to say that there wasn't such unrestricted U-boat warfare but merely an increase of measures which existed, something I have always emphasized. This always happened precisely when the British took some measures. document. Look at your own document, this memorandum. In the first paragraph: "The Fuehrer's proposal for the restoration -
A I am hot telling untruths. I don't do that sort of thing. this document.
"The Fuehrer's proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable peace and the new adjustment of political order in Central Europe has been turned down.