It is unlikely that this can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore, forces upon us the necessity of making corresponding preparations for war."
Do you agree with that?
Q Now, let's take "3":
"War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, aga France, probably against Russia as well, and a large number of countries overseas -- in fact, against half to two-thirds of the whole world."
I needn't ask you about that, because the facts have shown it.
Now, look at the next:
"It can only be justified" -
A (Interposing): Yes, but I have to say something to that. I must be allowed to do that.
Q Oh certainly. We got on so quickly I thought we were not going to have any explanation.
A In 1938, as has been expressed quite often here, the Fuehrer's att tude towards Great Britain became more difficult in spite of all the efforts of Blomberg and myself to tell him what the situation was, and England was nothing to be worried about. part, never contemplated an aggressive war against Great Britain, and we in the Navy thought of it even less, and it has been proved that I did nothing but try to turn him from these ideas. studies of war -- which was a duty of the Command Staff -- we should also occupy ourselves with making a study of how a war with England might arise a what we needed for that purpose. Such a study was prepared, and I reported to the Fuehrer that we could never get to the top with our forces to such an extent that a war against England might be started with any promise of success. That would have been crazy. I told him repeatecly that until '44 or '45 we mistrat naval war against England and perhaps a little communication overseas, but again we would never be in a position really to win against England with that force. by me to Admiral Karls who had very clear judgment in all such questions. He considered in his duty that in the introduction to his reply, which tallied with our opinion, he should explain what consequences such a war against Great Britain would have against us, namely, that this would once more cause a world war, which, however, neither we in the Navy nor anyone else in the armed force:
desired. first of all access to the oceans, and secondly we must attack the communications of Great Britain. It wasn't that we, for our part, planned that. He was only concerned with such thoughts in the event that such a war might break out very much against our will.
Q You say that, "The war against it" -- that is the war against Engla --"can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and military."
Then you go on to say "waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean,"
A That is clear. It is quite right what he says.
Q Let's just look how you had begun to prepare economically. Let's take that first, as you put it first.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, hadn't we better break off now before going into this?
(A recess was taken) BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
question about document C-29, which is on page 8 of the English document book 10 and on pages 13 and 14 of the German document book. You will remember this document gives general directions for export given by the German navy to the German armament industry -you wanted your service not to be small-minded about matters of a not very high secrecy but in addition to that, your general policy was that the German armament firms should develop a foreign trade so that they would have the capacity to deal with the increased demands of the German navy as soon as possible. Is that right, is that a fair summary, or shall I repeat it? two places that at that time we hoped that the Treaty of Versailles would be loosened, because at that time it was a favorable period concerning the negotiations for disarmament and the government department and von Schleicher showed great understanding for the needs of the armed forces and therefore at the occasion of the disarmament conference, for it, so it was a definitely legal development which we could expect and on the other side, our entire industry was in a very small measure able to produce armament; therefore, it had to be increased. I point out and I emphasize again, that it had nothing to do with the Hitler regime but that decree came out by coincidence on the 31st of January; that decree came out by coincidence on the 31st of January.
Q I don't think you are really disagreeing with me that your policy, your broad economic policy for the German armament industry was to develop its export trade so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements in future years; that is what you advocated, isn't it, that the German armament industry should at once increase its export trade so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements when these requirements arose? Isn't that right?
A Yes, that Is right, but I don't know, I didn't hear that expression. Did you mean "eigenhandel" or "eisenhandel" -- internal trade or sea trade? I didn't understand your expression -- No, "aussenhandel", foreign trade? nations, so that the industry itself would getthe advantage of being strengthened. 20 of the English document book and page 73 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Book ten.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Book ten, my Lord, yes. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE:
Q Now, you remember that document, you dealt with it? the dates which I put to you a moment ago and you said to the Tribunal, in giving your evidence, that it was mere chance that the year 1938 was mentioned; that that was the same period as has been dealt with. repeatedly.
Q Has it been mentioned in some Weimar Republic document? Will you just look at the second paragraph; that will be on your page 74, page 21 of the English document. It is in the middle paragraph of paragraph three : "However, Reichschancellor Adolf Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, that is, by the first of April, 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power." Is that ture, that Hitler had made a clear political request? five year plan and now for that year 1938, by coincidence, with the date of 1938, which was from our previous plans and that directive he had given apparently for the entire armed forces because for the navy already in the year 1935, the naval treaty was the basis where we could only go according to the proportion "one to three" and not according to any other plan.
Q The point that I want to deal with is this: Did Hitler tell you that he wanted these forces to place in the balance as an instrument of political power, did he tell you that? an expression which was in common usage, that one wants to use one's armed forces as an instrument which could be put to the balance in political negotiations, not in the manner as we had to do it untilthat time, to be kicked around by the various nations.
That is my explanation for that expression.
Q To put it bluntly, Hitler was telling you "by 1938 I want armed forces that I can use in war, if war should become necessary." That is what it means, doesn't it, and that is what you understood it to mean, isn't that right?
A No, no. There was no word about the case of war, only about the fact that we had to stand among the other nations in such a manner that we couldn't be pushed over as it had been the case then.
Q If anyone tried to push you over, you could fight; that was it, wasn't it?
A That is clear, of course, if we would be attacked; that is the main thing. If we would be attacked, then we would be able to fight back and untilthen we could not do that. fighting. Will you look at document book 10-A, C-140, page 104 of the English translation and page 157 of the German version. You remember that is the directive of Fieldmarshal von Blomberg on Germany leaving the disarmament conference and League of Nations and there these is a pretty full general directive as to what military measures you would take if the members of the League of Nations applied sanctions against you; in other words you were quite prepared -
Q ----- for a war depending on that peace policy; what is so, isn't it, and that is what it says, it gives all preparations for fighting?
days after we had quit the League of Nations and it was quite clear that as a matter of course the Fuehrer believed that asa consequence of leaving the League of Nations, which as such was quite a peaceful undertaking, that it was possible that warlike measures or sanctions would be applied against us and that we had to fight against that, that we had to defend ourselves against it and if such attack was probable then we had to take these preparatory steps. of Hitler's foreign policy might have brought about an immediate war, did you not?
A No, I never expected that. I never did expect that such a measure as the secession from the League of Nations, where we had always been treated unjustly because we had no power backing us up, I had never expected that the consequence would be war with any other power. However, it was right, it was correct that one had to expect such eventuality?
Q I see. That is good enough for me. the English version and page 164 to 167 of the German version. That is, you will remember, your armament plan for the third armament phase and I would just like you first of all to look at paragraph 3.
In (a) and (b) of paragraph 3 you give the general basis for your arrangements:
(a) for the military Leaders a sound basis for their operations and (b) for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time. armed forces you had available for war, if necessary. That was what you were contemplating then, was it not?
A Yes, that is a matter of course. I reported to the Fuehrer that the military forces which I could muster during that year was so and so much. The Chief of State had to know that in order to know what he could count on. That hasnothing to do with warlike preparations. That is the case in every nation. On the other hand, I cannot influence the political leader as to what he wants to have.
I can only tellhim what I can muster for him. That has nothing to do with political things. I only did what wasnecessary and what is being done in every state. politics on things other than war but that is another argument.
"All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period." then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on an immediate war footing, isn't that right?
A No, no. This is concerned with the sequence of the actions which were to be taken. The armament plan contained what would be the most important for the Navy to acquire and there I said as far as weapons were concerned which could be acquired without preparation, that is to say in German "die Schwimmende Aktive Flotte", the floating active fleet, that had to be in a state of extreme readiness and had to get that which it needed. Then only all other matters, such as quartering and anything that had nothing to do with immediate fighting -and ready for war. However, you have given your account of it. page 285 of the German document book, C-189, My Lord.
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: No My Lord, I think it is page 66 in book 10, the other one. Yes, page 66 -- I am sorry I said 68 but it is 285 of the German document book. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: your examination and which I must challenge. You say in paragraph 2 of the English:
"C in C, Navy expresses the opinion that later on--" and I ask you to note words "later on" -- "the fleet must anyhow be developed against England and that therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be armed with a 35 centimeter gun".Now, are you telling the Tribunal that "gegen England" doesnot mean in antagonism or directed against England, are you?
planning according to other navies. We were planning up to that time according to the French Navy. Now England went beyond in taking 35.6 centimete: guns on her ships and then, asI said before, France went beyond England in putting 38 centimeter guns on her ships. Thus, I said to the Fuehrer that with our 28 centimeter guns, which we believed we could use against the Dunkirk class of France, I said that would not be sufficient but we had to take the next higher calibre, that is 35.6 such ason English ships. It did not come to it because the French took 38 centimeter guns and with our Bismarck type we followed the French. common usage. one; that this document in the original German when you say "gegen England" is exactly the same as in your song "Wir fahren gegen England". It means against, in antagonism and directed against and not in comparison. That is what I am putting to you and it is a perfectly short point.
Are you telling this Tribunal that "gegen England" means in comparison with England?
A To that I will say yes because it is defensively "gegen England" and at that moment we had not even signed the naval agreement. At that time I could not think of promoting a policy which was against England. book, page 284 of the German document book. That is your conversation with Hitler on the 2nd of November, 1934, when you are discussing bigger naval estimates and the availability of more money. I want you to look at the end of the first paragraph which gives Hitler's reasons.
"He considered it vital the the Navy be increased asplanned --" now look-"asno war could be carried on if the Navy wasnot able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia."
contemplating war? If so why does Hitler say that? That is one of the most vital points of German naval strategy.
"No war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Sweden."
Were you not contemplating war in November?
A Hitler said that. A navy is built so that in case a war becomes necessary the Navy can be used to defend the country with her weapons. There is no other purpose to establish a navy and that was one of the general reasons for the existence of a navy for Germany. There were many people in Germany who believed that the navy was not at all necessary.
Q You see, what I am putting to you is this. You told the Tribunal that the navy was purely defensive, all your preparations were purely defensive. I am suggesting to you that Hitler there is contemplating a war and contemplating the task of a navy during a war a few months before he intended to denounce the military clauses of Versaille. Was that not the position?
A- That is an aboslute distortion of facts. Of course it is necessary during peacetime to contemplate what cases could occur where thearmed forces would have to be called upon for the defense. At that time nobody thought of aggressive war, and one has to consider the individual tasks. One task of the Navy was, beyond doubt, in case of war to protect t he ore imports fromSweden and Norway. That had to be considered.
Q Would you just look at the next sentence in paragraph 2: "Then I mentioned that it would be desirable to have U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political situation in the first quarter of 1945."
Q Let's look at what you were doing in 1936. Would you give the defendant and Dr. Siemers, Document D/806. dealing with the U-boat construction program, and after the first paragraph you say in the second paragraph:
"The military and political situation urgently demands that the extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand immediately and completed with the greatest energy and dispatch, as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament at sea and possesses special striking powers." sive and had no idea of the special striking powers that would be needed in a war? I don't remember it exactly -- I must have believed it necessary at that time to put the construction of submarines in the foreground. But I never expected or never counted on it that we would start a war. enterprises, and that no doubt could lead us into a war if the other powers were stadning against these political enterprises. I have been reproached that I did not stress the construction of submarines sufficiently.
Q You are stressing it sufficiently there, aren't you? "The military and political situation" -- you were kept fully informed of the political situation and were adjusting your naval armament accordingly; isn't that so?
which were to happen. I only knew that we had occupied the Rhineland during that year, and that Hitler after that, on account of the clouds he saw on the horizon after the occupation of the Rhineland, took a very careful attitude and told me that we had to expect complications sooner or later. There was a special directive that had come out at that time in 1936, and on the basis of these considerations I was particularly cautious. It was my main duty that I should take care, and after the consequences which I took from the political situation, I did my job. to me, wasin the same sense where I asked whether in the case of political tension at the beginning of 1939; at a time when we hadnot yet completed the Naval Treaty -- that came only in June -- whether at that time we should already establish U-boats. That was also for the eventuality of a conflict, and I knew at that time that in 1935 the Declaration of Freedom of the defense of the Rhineland was intended.
Q Well, now, you have told us what you knew in 1936. Now, let's pass on to 1937. I want to know exactly what you say. That of course, as you remember, turns to the Haszbach document, 386-PS,which is at page 81 of Document Book 10, page 314 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, did you give the number of that last document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:I am very grateful, my Lord. It is GB-462. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: German document book?
A Can you please tell me the paragraph? I could find it easier then. paragraph, the last sentence, where Hitler is recorded as saying:
"The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need forliving space." two pages to 316. My Lord, it is page 83 of the English document book.
That is repeated. My Lord, it is about seven lines down. There Hitler says:
"The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space."
And then he says: "The history of all times has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance."
And then in a separate paragraph; he says:
"The question for Germany is where possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost."
Do you see that, on page 316?
A May I begin with the last one, because it was wrongly translated? that that was the general problem, "the greatest possible conquest to be made at the lowest cost." ?
A No. In the English document it says "conquest", but that is not included in the German document. It says in the German text:, "the highest possible gain with the smallest risk."
That is a phraseology of playing a game. It has nothing to do with conquest. quite some detail, because I don't want to select anything out of the intext. Did you appreciate that Hitler there was saying, "The only possibility for Germany is to get extra living space.", and that had to be got at the expense of othernations? He said that, didn't he? be understood. He spoke mainly of Austria and Czechoslovakia, that is, the Sudeten area, and we were all of the opinion that a change of that policy was not expected, and it did not take place. There was neither war against Austria nor against Czechoslovakia. same way as all other political questions, in a peaceful way. That I have explained in detail.
Q Well, now, that is what I was going to ask you about. You have taken my second point yourself. The rest of the document deals with action agai nst Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Would you look at page 86? and General von Fritsch rather poured cold water on Hitler's ideas. Isn't that a fair way of putting it? They rather showed a certain antipathy? would we dare to start a war with England and France, and he always agreed. But I explained that that entire speech had a definite purpose. It was made for a definite purpose, and therefore he exaggerated greatly. He withdrew that exaggeration at once when a hint wasgiven to him about the danger of a war with France and England.
Q That was what I was going to ask you. That was in November. By January, Fieldmarshl von Blomberg had made his unfortunate carriage, hadn't he?
A I believe it was in January. I don't remember.
Q And you took the view, didn't you, that he had been encouraged to do that by the defendant Goering?
Q Oh, didn't you?
A No, not that I knew about. I wasn't convinced of that at all.
Q You remember making a statement in Noscow on this point? Let me read it to you.
A To whom, please?
"The year 1938 had at its beginning experiences of a personal nature, which though not concerning the Navy, directly caused me to lose confidence not only in Goering but also in the sincerity of the Fuehrer. The unfortunate matrimonial situation of Fieldmarshal von Blomberg made his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces impossible. Belatedly I came to the conclusion that Goering with all his might strove for the post of commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht in place of Blomberg.
He favored the marriage, inasmuch as it made Blomberg ineligible for this post, while Blomberg believed and even expressed himself to this effect, that such a marriage was possible under the present system. Goering had him shadowed in the past, as I learned from later remarks."
Didn't you say that?
experiences about the causes for that collapse. I wrote these documents under the conditions of that time with the treatment that these was very chivalrous and that I had no objection to make these things know to the Commissar.
Q All I want to know,is, is that true, what you said?
A Yes. I wrote these notes, and it is also true that afterwards I had the thought that Goering may have severed that marriage. I believe that he himself stated that here, that he helped Blomberg, because I believe that he did not know all the details of how bad the case was. encouraging the marriage because he knew that it would put Blomberg off the map as commander-in-chief, because he, Goering, wanted the position. Was that the view that you held last summer?
A I believed that last summer, yes. And it is also true that Goering doubtless had a desire to become commande-in-chief of the armed forces, but the Fuehrer himself prevented that.
Q Now, that was von Blomberg. We know what happened to him. Your second choice, after von Blomberg, was von Fritsch, was it not? You thought that von Fritsch would have been the best commander-in-chief if von Blomberg went, did you not?
Q You mentioned that to Hitler? at the time he asked me. But then the Fuehrer told me that that could not be done.
Q Yes. But there were some of them bringing a charge of homosexuality against von Fritsch; isn't that right? That was why it could not be done?
A Yes. Generally, he said that there was a sexual crime of some kind. you not? Goering , as president, you, and General von Brauchitsch?
against von Fritsch was a frame-up by the Gestapo, did you not? Do you know what I mean? I am afraid "frame-up" is rather difficult to translate.
A Yes. The whole thing gave me that impression, indeed. character who you thought was a "hang-around" of the Gestapo; and at the trial, the cooperation of the Gestapo with the accuser was brought to light; that is right, is it not?
You were satisfied,from sitting at the trial? that the guilty party was a calvary captain, Rittmeister von Fritsch, and not this general at all; isn't that right?
A Yes, I agree. We acquitted Baron von Fritsch because his innocence was proven. There was no suspision of any kind that remained.
Q You acquitted him, but his reinstatement did not follow? His reinstatement in command did not follow?
A No. I went to him, since I was close to him, and asked him whether he would agree that I should go to Hitler and suggest to Hitler to reinstate him, Baron von Fritsch. But von Fritsch replied that he considered that quite impossible. He was of the opinion that his authority was so far impaired that he could not remain in the position as commander-in-chief of the army, and I could not do anything about that. The Fuehrer only in a large meeting of generals and admirals confirmed the absolute innocence of Baron von Fritsch.
Q And did you say this with regard to the von Fritsch incident: "I became convinced that Goering had a hand in this well prepared situation, since in order to attain his goal it was necessary to eliminate any possible successor to von Blomberg?" Do you remember saying that?
A I do not remember it now, but I believe that I was of that opinion. E I have to say, to be quite just, that the acquittal of Baron von Fritsh first of all was due to the fact of Goering's chairmanship during the proceedings. The wi ness who was brought up lied so much and changed his statements to such an exten every ten Minutes, that only Goering could take care of him. After I had experie ced that, I was grateful that I had not been the chairman, as the Minister of Ju tice had suggested. I could not handle the people. And it was only thanks to Goe ring that I concluded that the acquittal could take place. the authority of von Frirsch in the German army was in his own view destroyed by the fact that this charge had been brought against him. That was the result of i was it not?
A Baron von Fritsch was of that opinion. I would have insisted to be reinstated after I had been acquitted in that manner. November had tried to head Hitler off from a course that night have meant war were both disgraced in two months? Didn't it strike you as curious?
A That did not strike me as curious in any way; and there is certainly no connection. If Hitler was of the opinion that non in high position who contradieted him in such a matter had to be removed, then he would have had to have me removed a long time ago. But he never said anything like that to me, and I have never felt that simply because I contradicted him on that question of England and France, and also pointed out that no war should be started there, I never felt th he held that against me.
Q Now, just let us take it very shortly. Within six weeks of the disgrad of von Blomberg and the removal of von Fritsch, the anschluss with Austria took place. military preparations for the anschluss with Austria, the ones described by Gene ral Jodl in his diary and also by Fieldmarshal Keitel?
Did you know that these threats of military action would have been made? the anschluss of Austria, because I had nothing to do with it. But once and for all, I should like to emphasize that such enterprises, as for instance the annexation of Austria I found out by a decree which was issued by the Fuehrer, and no sooner, because one copy of these decrees, regardless of whether the Navy had anything to do with it, was sent to me as commander-in-chief of the navy. So, of course, in that case also a decree must have come to my knowledge Unfortunately without having the file, I cannot tell you the date. But I think that a decree came, to my knowledge. time on it -- is this: That on the 5th of November Hitler said that he was goint to get Austria, in 1943 to 1945 at the latest, and earlier if an opportunity arose. Four months later, in March 1938, he took Austria, after having got rid of the people who threw cold water on his plans. But if you did not know about it, we shall not waste the time, but shall look at Czechoslavakia, becaus there you did get the decree. German Document Book. That is the distribution of the directive for operations against Czechoslavakia. It is bringing up to date the one of the 24th of June, and you will see that it said its execution must be assured as of the 1st of Oc tober 1938, at the latest, and Copy No. 2 goes to you as C-in-C of the Navy. English Document Book, 277 to 278, you see the first sentence of Paragraph 1, "Political Pre-requisites":
"It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslavakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically or military suitable moment.
A May I ask where it is? I can't seem to find it. -- sentence 1: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslaovakia by military action in the near future."
Q I am sorry. Page 277, 278.
A Yes. Now I have found it. Of what date was that? which you had attended at which Hitler had said he would attack Czechoslovakia at the earliest opportunity he could. Didn't that make you think that Hitler's speech in November was not merely froth but was stating his plans?
A No, because all through the summer he changed his decisions. Every month there was a different decision. That can be Seen in the document, 388-PS. And it was so, I believe, on the 10th of September. Certain troops were concentrated and on the same day the negotiations, and on the 1st of October the peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland took place, after the other powers had agreed to that in Munich.
Q We all know that. The point is perfectly clear -speeches: That it was his determination at the end of May to smash Czechoslovakia by military action. Are you telling the Tribunal that you read that directive and still took the view that Hitler had not got aggressive intentions? That is the question.
Q What more proof could you want than his own determination to sm sh it? What clearer proof could you want?
A He said frequently that he would like to smash something. That question was solved later, after the 30th of May, and I should like to add that that was a date just after the mobilization had taken place in Czechoslovakia, and for that reason he used these words, and I believe he was justified in doing so, because that mobilization of Czechoslovakia could only be directed against Germany, and as I said, his opinion, in the course of the summer, changed at least three or four times, where he said again that he would reserve the decision or he would not like to do it with war-like means.