Among us there was Lieutenant Raenkel, a specialist, who was to deal with all matters concerning guns. I myself was in Kiel.
Q Take the next period from 1923to 1927. From 1925 to 1928, you were Chief der Marine Station der Ostsee, were you not? independent armament measures taken behind the back of the Reich government?
A No; I had nothing to do with these affairs. I had already said that was done by another command. them. You knew all about them. the Reichskabinet, but behind the back of the legislative bodies. The legislative bodies would be the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, would they not?
A Yes. But I already said the other day that it was not a matter for the military supreme commander to discuss matters with the Reichstag. This was something for the government to do. Mr. Severing will testify.
Q We will hear Mr. Severing when he comes. At the moment I want you to tellthe Tribunal this -
A (Interposing): Yes, I have something to say.
Q I have not finished my question yet. What did you say to Captain Schustler? Did you tell him he was giving an entirely false picture in suggesting that the navy had anything to do with going behind the back of the Reichstag? Did you make any effort to correct what Captain Schustler was saying?
A No, I did not correct his book. I had not time for that.
Q Now, just before we come to No. 4, if you willlook at this passage, it will be helpful.
This is part of Captain Schustler's description of Section 2 dealing with economic rearmament, and it comes under the heading, "Difficult Working Conditions".Do you see that?
It is the heading, "Difficult Working Conditions".
Q Would you just look at the last part of that? Now, I want it quite clear, defendant, this is dealing with the period from 1923 to 1928, before you were head of the Navy; so I want to ask you about it. There were often many external difficulties besides these for Lohmann's company for Tebek -- the consummate task and amount of work, the distance from the navy command staff, the impossibility of settling any questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence, and of carrying it out in any case as disguised correspondence with false names and disguised expressions. on?
A No; I hardly knew anything about the Tebek, the name and everything it applied to. But I would consider it perfectly right that these people work like that, because at that time the attitude of a large portion of the German people wasunreliable. There was considerable danger of these things leaking out. And apart from that, the Tebek had been dissolved vhen I arrived. the English Book, and just look at Captain Schustler's description of the fourth period. 1933 to the period of restriction in 1935. your methods from 1933 to 1935?
A Let me see it., Where is that passage?
Q It is No. 4.
to 1935? of the state was very anxious to see that nothing exaggerated would be done so that his intentions regarding agreement with Great Britain would not in any way be disturbed by it. very little, in fact. He could have built armored ships, so many destroyers and so many submarines but he didn't do any of these things because he said, "We don't want to make an impression in this connection that we are carrying out large-scale armament." He only allowed -tiating the Naval Agreement you did not want anyone to know what steps you had taken contrary to the Treaty and how far you had gone. That is the plain fact of it -- you wanted, to get the Naval agreement without disclosing what you had done isn't that so?
A No, that is a misunderstanding, in turning my words around. e didn't want the announcement of these measures as such were justified and quite minor ones.
Q I will come to that in a moment. I only want, before we leave these naval works, to ask you one question about another book. You know that Oberst Scherf projected a history of the German Navy. I don't want any misunderstanding about it. As I understand the position, you permitted Oberst Scherf to have recourse to the archives of the Navy but beyond that you hadn't seen anything of his work isn't that right?
A I didn't see the book at all. I saw, an index of the book for the first time when I was interrogated, and I didn't give him the order which he received from the Fuehrer. And I permitted the Chief of the Navy Archives to assist him.
Q That is exactly what I put to you. I want you to turn to Book 10-A. It starts at page 1 in the English version and also page 1 in the German, And if you would look at page 3 you will find the proposed table of contents of Oberst Scherf's book, page 3 in the English version. I think it must be about page 3 in the German version, too. Make sure of it, Sergeant-Major (addressing his assista Now look at the heading of Section 2. It is, "Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State."
And then he describes," (a) National socialism in the Navy before 1933" -
A Where is that? I am afraid I havn't found it. duction of shipping and fishing.
This must be something quite different. I haven't got it.
(Witness going through pages the while.)
I've got it now.
Q Would you look at section 2, which is, "Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State. "And you can see the proposed headings which were to cover some thirty pages, "National Socialism in the Navy before 1933." Then the taking ever of the oath; the taking over of insignia; alterations of the flag." Do you agree with Oberst Scherf's description that the proceedings could be described as the incorporation of the Navy and the National Socialist State?
A I explained it the other day. Of course, the Navy had to come into some connection with the National Socialist State. You can't have a democratic Navy in a monarchi State. The principles must tally. But how fir these tallies were adopted, that is something which I decided. It was always done in the proper proportion. The Navy was always independent but rightly disposed toward the National Socialist State. And apart from that, all 1 can see here are headings.
Q Yuo say that doesn't offend you as a description. That is all I wanted to get clear.
A But the headings don't mean a thing. It might say in the actual text tha the Navy did not fit into the National Socialist State properly. I don't know. Naturally, as far as internal matters were concerned -
Q I am not going to waste time on it. There were three matters which you dealt with in your examination-in-chief, and I am not going to deal with them in detail; but I just want to remind you of than and put one question. You can put that document away; I am not going to pursue it further. (A short pause.) Would you mind putting that document away and giving me your attention for the next question? September, 1933, and the question of disguised auxiliary cruisers as transport ships 0. Is this a fair summary of your answer:
That you admitted that these b broaches of the Treaty took place but you said in each case that the breach was only a little one. Is that a fair summary of your answer?
Q Now, let's take it in bits, then. Are you disputing that any of these matters with regard to the E-boats, the matters on the survey lists or the transport ships 0 -- are you disputing that any of these took place? as I understood you, you admitted they all took place -
A No, but they took place the way I described it. For instance, the absolu cruisers were not built but we were allowed to make changes, in the event of an outbreak of war, in the event of an attack on Germany, which would have been suitable to appear as off the leader cruisers. That wasn't any violation. If it were I would have admitted it. The construction office in Holland for submarines was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty, either. The situation was quite different; I can't remember the third case. took place, but you said "it is only little one."
A Yes, of course. Those were immaterial things, but they were in the interest of Germany's defense.
Q I want to ask you about an officer of yours, Vice-Admiral Assmann. Was he an officer in whom you had confidence?
Q Will you answer my question? Was he an officer in whom you had confidenc
Q That is what I wanted. Now, would you have a look at a new document, which is Document D-654, which is GB-460. Now, that is an extract from one of a series of essays on the operational tactical considerations of the German Navy and consequent measures taken for its expansion between 1919 and 1939, contained among the files of Vice-Admiral Assmann and Vice-Admiral Gladish, who were in the historical section of the German Admirality.
Now, would you mind not looking at it for a moment? I want to ask you some questions and then you can look at it with pleasure afterwards. Do you agree the in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit?
Do you agree with that?
A No, not in all sectors. In the chief sectors we were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained to you very clearly. In fact, possibly we vi violated it in the wrong direction, by doing not even what we could have done.
Q ill you look at this document. In the first quotation your officers say "But although -- as was stated -- in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in spirit -- or at least its violation was prepared -- a long time before the 16th of March, 1935" . . . Are your Admirals wrong in stating that? Is that what you are telling the Tribunal?
A May I please see which page this is on? I haven't quite seen it. This is it. In nearly all spheres of armament the navy was concerned; that isn't correct.
Q That's what I put to you; is that right?
A No, it's not right. We haven't built as many ships as we could have built, as I have explained repeatedly, -
Q You've explained that. You've given that explanation and it's a matter of discussion whether it's of any value. I am not going to argue with you. I am asking you this question: Are you saying that the admirals of your historical section are wrong in that sentence that I read out to you?
Q I see. Well, now let's pass on -- the Tribunal will judge that -to the statement of Admiral Assmann. It goes on:
"This probably took place in no other sphere on the one hand so early and on the other hand under such difficult circumstances as in the construction of a new submarine arm. The Treaty of Versailles had only been in force a few months (since the 10th of January, 1920), when it was already violated in this point."
Do you agree with Admiral Assman on that point?
A No, he's wrong. It wasn't violated in this point, and the reason why it started so early was because the old submarine commanders and submarine officers and technicians were all without a job, and they were offering their services to maintian the technique of submarines abroad; but that has nothing to do with me because I had no say in these matters. At that time I worked on the Navy Archives. Assman is wrong? I thought yousaid that he was a good historian. You needn't go back very far. You only go back twenty years. wrong. I have had--
Q Well, let's just see how far he was wrong. We needn't go into the first paragraph which deals with shipbuilding for Japan, but take the second line:
"In 1922 --"
Do you see the paragraph which begins "In 1922 three German shipbuilding yards founded a German U-boat Construction Bureau in Holland under a Dutch covering name with about thirty engineers and builders. In 1925 a Dutch shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for Turkey on the plans of this bureau which enjoyed the financial and personal support of the Naval Command. In the solution of this question, too, Captain Lehmann was concerned decisively."
Is that right?
AAll that's been admitted by us. That in no way is a violation if the Treaty.
Q We'll not argue that, but it's right anyway. Admiral Assmann's right about that. Then he deals with "Finland and with Spain. And, if you look at the end of the paragraph dealing with Spain, he says:
"Already in the autumn of 1927 the Naval Construction Department was commissioned to carry out the construction in Spain by the Chief of the Naval Command, Admiral Zenker, who accepted the responsibility despite all the difficulties in the field of home politics. The working out of the project and the drawing up of the construction plans took place in the Dutch Bureau. After completion in 1931, the ship carried out trial runs and diving exercises from Cadiz and Cartagena, under German direction, and with German personnel, consisting of officers, engineers, naval construction students and foremen."
That's quite right, is it? other persons, were released from the navy for this purpose and had to do it.
Q "This boat which is now the Turkish submarine 'Guer' became the prototype for the 'U-25' and 'U-26'".
A Now, the 250-ton submarines which were made in Finland. And, if you look at the last sentence of the next paragraph:
"The Finnish U-boat was the first plan to be worked out in Germany and to be executed; only for the working out of the details was what the Dutch bureau still called upon.
"The Finnish 250-ton vessel became the prototype for U-1 to U-24."
Q And now the next paragraph:
"The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel made it possible to obtain the parts for 'U-1' to 'U-24' in 1933/35 long before the order for assembling the vessels, to make preparations for this assembly to the exte: possible while maintaining secrecy".
Q Now, would you turn on to page 156. You see where the next quotation is from.
"At the beginning of 1935" -- that is six months before the Anglo-German Treaty -- "there were probably six 250-ton boats ready for assembly and six 275-ton and two 750-ton boats on which preparatory work was being done. About four months were needed for assembling the small ships and about ten for the big ones, dating from the 1st of February 1935, but everything else was still quite uncertain."
Now, look at the next words:
"It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty. Considering the quantity of U-boats which had already been ordered, about fifty-five U-boat could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality 118 were ready or ordered The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so early, so thoroughly and secretly that already eleven days after the conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, which permitted the construction of U-boats, the first German Uboat could be commissioned on the 29th of June 1935."
Now, take that sentence, which is written by Admiral Assmann, and we've seen what your connections with Assmann were through about one hundred document He said:
"It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty."
Now, you've told this Tribunal for about several hours of your evidence that that was a freely negotiable treaty of which you were proud and which you were ready to support. Are you telling the Tribunal that your admirals were wrong in saying that in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adher the least to the restrictions of that treaty?
A It's a perfectly erroneous judgment. I have explained that, as long as there were no negotiations with Great Britain regarding the pending Treaty, we only gave such things abroad as were necessary preparations. Those were-
Q We'll take it in this order, and don't get cross about it. You answer my question, and then you can make your explanation. Now answer my question first. Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in saying in that first sentence: "It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty"? Is Admiral Assmann wrong when he says that, and is that what you're telling t Tribunal?
A He is wrong. I have said that. I've already said so.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for defendant Raeder):Mr. President, I object. The are not questions relating to facts. They are questions regarding legal decisions. It is a legal argument as to just how Article 191 of the Versailles Tr ty is to be interpreted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the question is proper. In his explanation, of course, he can explain that in his view it was not a breach o the Treaty and he has already explained that. He can give us his opinion about it. He was the head of the German Navy. BY SIR DAVID "---" FYFE.
A But, if I may, can't I finish? I desire to make a statement. All these things were preparations which were made outside Germany. This is menti ing that in the case of the Finnish submarine there was support through German designers, something which is not prohibited. It was permissible that German designers and constructors might assist finished engineers to make plans for submarines. It is also true -
Q I don't want to interrupt you, but this isn't dealing with the ear period. This is dealing with the period after the Anglo-German Treaty in 1935 and that's what I want you to answer me about. That Finnish matter was long before that.
A I must give the period before the conclusion. There we are being accused of manufacturing U-boat parts abroad and -
Q Yes, but don't you see that -
A I haven't denounced that yet.
Q I am not asking you about that. I want you to answer the right question. I'm not asking you about the question of Versailles any longer. I'm asking you about Admiral Assmann's statement that you did not adhere the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty in 1935, and what you did in Finland in the 20's has nothing to do with that. Now, that's all. You can give your explanation later.
A It's perfectly wrong, particularly as far as construction of submari nes was concerned.
We kept back quite a lot and, in 1938, we still didn't have the forty-five per cent which we could have built. So that at that time we were making an application that we could go to the one hundred per cent expressed. According to the wording of the English Treaty, this was done after a friendly discussion with the British Admiralty in the last days of 1938; it was agreed and it was carried out. At the beginning of the war we still didn't have one hundred per cent. We were always behind with the construction of submarines. It is a completely erroneous quotation of Admiral Assmann, who probably didn't pursue this matter well enough. I can certify to that.
Q Just look at the next sentences. This is dealing -
A Which page are you on?
Q Page 156. I will read it very slowly again:
"Considering the quantity of U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality 118 were ready or ordered."
Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong when he states that?
A I am awfully sorry; I still have not got the passage where you are reading Which line?
(Court attendant indicates passage to witness.)
Q Have you got the sentence, Defendant?
Q Do you see what Admiral Assman says that "Considering the quantity of Uboats whaich had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938."
"In reality 118 were ready or ordered."
Are you saying that Admiral Assman is wrong in giving these figures? is either a misprint or a quite incredible figure. We started the war with, as you know, I think 26 U-boats capable of sailing into the Atlantic, and there was some smaller boats over and above that. What happened at the beginning of the war I caanot tell you for certain now, but there was no intention of this kind. That is just what I have been accused of--that I did not have sufficient U-boats ready in good tine. I deny this entire sentence.
Q Yuo agree, then defendant, that Admiral Assman's figures are quite incompatible with what yo have told the Tribunal about the number of U-boats with whi you started the war?
Yes, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Dr President, I should be grateful to Sir David if he would read the entire sentence. This refers to Note 6, where the 118 could have been ordered. There is a note six and I just see that this is not contained in the English translation, and it is worded as follows:
"Chief of the Budget Department of the Navy. B, No. E.311/42, from November 1942."
The figure, Mr. President, refers to a much later period, not 1938 at all. I could in the future have not only the German document but also the English fro Sir David. I should be very grateful to Sir David if he could have this done.
DR. SIEMERS: Could you not have the passage you want translated from the German into English by the time you want to re-examine? As I understand it, you are referring to some note which is an addition to what has been translated into English. Will you read it again, the passage again?
DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has been reading the following words:
"In reality 118 were ready or ordered to be built."
That is as far as Sir David has read. After the word "ordered" there is a figure (6). This refers to a note at the bottom, Number 6, and that note is worded as follows;
"Chief of the Navy Budget Department, B. No.E.3111/42. G-KDOS. Dated 19 November 1942. (Page 19)." number 118 must have been mentioned. a letter addressed to the Budget Department. The figure therefore does not refer to the year 1938 but a much later time.
THE WITNESS: I can add another explanation to that which is quite plausible
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, I will look into that, but the text says --and there is no difference in the German text--exactly what I read--that" about 55 could have been provided up to 1938 and that in reality 118 were ready or ordered." That is Admiral Assman's text.
DR. SIEMERS: But not 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: I think that my friend, Dr. Siemers, will have ample opportunity. If there is any point, I shall consider it, but this is the text, and the text includes that. What the footnote says Dr. Siemers can be put in re-examination.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr Biddle) Sir David, will you lock at the note and see if the report was made in 1942 rather than the construction? I suggest that you ask him whether or not the note could not show that the report was made in 1942 rather than the construction.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My translation of this note is "Chief of the Navy Budget Department." Then it gives the reference to his note, dated 19 November 1942. It seems entirely to bear out the suggestion of the learned American Judge that this is the reference to the report, nothing more. It is only suggesting that the date of construction was 1942, and I think it really would be a matter of convenience that, unless Dr. Siemers has got something to say on the text that I am putting, if he reserved these argumentative points to re-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you can raise it all in re-examination. You can have a translation of this note before us by that time.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am perfectly agreeable. I have merely stated the request that one copy of the Mr. President, you will admit, I hope, that it is a considerable burden on me that during the cross examination I should now have to ascertain where translations are incomplete and translate everything that is missing myself, although the British Delegation have an English translation in their hand.
I think that Sir David might, if he would be good enough, let me have an English
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you will be able to let him have an English translation of any new document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. The Tribunal has ordered that. That is prepared. Surely you got the English Translation? Certainly, My Lord. An I put each document, a translation will be given to Dr. Siemers.
THE PRESIDENT: There may have been some mistake.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will certainly get it. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q Now, we will pass to another gentleman of your staff. You have told us a good deal about the naval budgets. Do you remember a Flottenintendant in your department, Secretary Flottenintendant Thiele, of the OKM Department E, the Budget Department, of the German Admiralty? Do you remember?
A Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, may I just say one more thing about the 118 business? I have just remembered the connection regarding this number 6 note of the Budget Department. This is perfectly possible -- that in this case Assman has summarized two matters. Every ship was, of course, passed through the Budget. That is to say, it was sanctioned. At the end of the year the budget was published with reference to the year for which it would apply. Since this large figure appears now in this document, it is perfectlypossible that the figure 118 originates on the basis of the British agreement made on 30 or 31 December 1938. It is perfectly natural that we should include in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed to build with reference to the 100 per cent. This, by no means, means that we started the construction of the U-boats in 1938, and I think I should show this. It also means that in a certain year, you would only have so-and-so many completed submarines. word "Budget Department" is perfectly probable.
Q The Tribunal has the wording; that is, "up to 1938", and I am not going to argue the point with you. The words speak for themselves.
I would now like you to look at document D/855, which becomes GB 416,and it is an extract from a lecture by the gentleman I have just mentioned, Herr Thiele, which was given at the German Naval Training Centre for Administrative Officers in Prague on 12 July 1944. The extract I want to put to you is on Page 22, and it is headed "Ship Construction Plan". Have you got that -- Page 22, and the heading is "Ship Construction Plan"? You see the paragraph beginning, "The era of the very large development of the Navy had therefore come at the moment of the seizure of power. Already in the first year after this, in March 1935, the construction of battle cruisers with a displacement of 27,600 tons was proceeded to. Such a vessel was ordered to be constructed. Thus one of the classes of the Treaty of Versailles which were the most important for us --"
"The clauses" that should be. I am so sorry. It is a misprint.
"Thus one of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which were the most important for us was at once violated in the naval sphere in a manner which in a short time could no longer be camouflaged."
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right when he says that in his lecture? this was not the construction of battle cruisers but that it was important that the two armored ships which had been permitted us should be utilized, and I said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me permission to enlarge somewhat the plans for these ships so that the armor could be stronger. This shows that as late as March 1935 when the conclusion of the treaty was a certainty, that a few months later England would allow us to build such ships through this treaty, that at that time already plans for the 20,500 ton ships had been passed by the Fuehrer, and the offensive weapons could be included.
Q Let me see. This gentleman seems to agree with you more than the other. Just look at what he says about U-boats two sentences further on.
"The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to the outside. These parts were stored in sheds for the time being and only needed to be assembled after the declaration of freedom to rearm."
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that point?
A Yes, he is right. We have admitted that.
Q Do try to keep it as short as you can. I don't want to cut you out, but keep it as short as you can. we bring then in and put them together. That was at the time when the Treaty was a certainty.
Q I see. You say you were anticipating the treaty. Just look at what he says after that:
"The third one also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles that were the most disadvantageous for us, the limiation of personnel to 15,000 men was immediately ignored after the seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was already 25,000 in 1934 and in 1935, the year of the London Naval Agreement, 34,000 men."
Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that? Is that right?
A Yes. It was clear that we had to train personnel in good time so that the increased ships could be manned.
which is on page 3 of Document Book 10, which you did refer to in your examination-in-chief. That is Document C-23, about the displacement of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and the Tirpitz and the Bismarck and the other ships.
Now, you are familiar with that document; we have discussed it.
Q Well now, that is dated the 18th of February 1938. Germany didn't denounce the Anglo-German Naval Treaty until after the British guarantee to Poland in April 1939, which is 14 months later. Why didn't you simply send a notification to Great Britain that the displacements had come out 20percent bigger because of defensive matters in construction? Why didn't you do it?
A I can't tell you that today. I explained the other day how it was that the displacements increased through some change and through no fault of our own.
Q Yes, Mr. Defendant, I have got that well in mind. We have got the reason why the displacements came out bigger, and I don't think you are prejudicing yourself if you don't repeat it, but just look at the bottom of that page, won't you, because I think you will find there the reason which you can't remember:
"In the opinion of AMT IV, it would under no circumstances be right to report a larger tonnage that that, for instance, England, Russia or "Japan will probably publish shortly, in order that we may not put upon ourselves the blame for a race in armaments."
Isn't that the reason?
A Yes. It was planning for the future because we didn't want to lose the defensive power of our ships. to put quite shortly and bluntly, as you will appreciate, the point the Prosecution puts to you, that for 20 years, from 1918 to 1938, you and the German Navy had been involved in a course of complete, cold, and deliberate deception of your treaty obligations. That is what I am putting to you. Do you understand?
After these documents, do you deny that that is so?
A Of course, It wasn't a cold-blooded affair. In all the cases of violations of the Versailles Treaty it was our aim that we should be able to defend our country more efficiently than we had been allowed to. I have proved that in the Versailles regulations only those points were restricted which were unfavourable for the defense of our country, and which, on attack from the outside, were favorable. complete a small number of ships, and consequently we wanted the ability of these ships increased as far as possible. At no time did we increase the offensive power above what it was submitted to be. questions are directed to. I don't want there to be any misapprehension. I am now going to suggest to you that these breaches of treaty and your naval plans were directed towards the possibility, and then the probability of war. I would just like you to take the same document that I have been dealing with, C-23. We will use that to pass from one to the other. that there is a memorandum, I think of the Planning Committee to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Admiral Karls. We have heard your view of Admiral Karls, that you thought he was a very good officer, and in fact he was your first choice for your successor. strategic study of naval warfare against England, and you see "a" says:
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the study."
Now,look at paragraph 1:
"If,according to the Fuehrer"s decision, Germany is to acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions, but also secure naval communications and secure access to the oceans."
Do you agree with that, Defendant?
A Yes, that is correct. I know the whole document.
Q Now, look at "2":
"Those requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests, and would limit their opposition as world powers.