of us saw any necessary to refuse that oath. did agree, did quite agree with the principles and aims of National Socialism. Is that correct? the principles of National Socialism and how far one could train one's soldi in these principles. Anything that went beyond that was rejected and speaking for the navy only, the question did not find any acceptance in the Navy. that group, did they ever get any information about the political situation and the intentions of Hitler so that one could speak about the participation or par ticipation in the conspiracy?
A No. It was generally prohibited to speak to anyone about speeches speeches in which Hitler spoke about intentions and plans. The officers below the level of commander-in-chief of the armed forces branches, were only inform when it had come so far that the directive was issued.
A I had to limit that. I have to qualify that. That directive was fir. issued, first written by the high command of the army, so they only received the information as soon as the directive of the individual branches of the armed forces was issued and that was sometime later. been experts but that they had known the intentions of aggression of Hitler and had cooperated. Can you name any military leaders who, before they had received orders took a positive attitude to aggressive action?
A I could not say that. I have explained yesterday how Admiral Karls pointed out to me the danger which was menacing in Norway but he did not do any thing further than give me the information and pointed out the existing danger to me and explained the situation there. von Fritsch, and that of chief of staff, Beck, concerning the question of a war was known. I just wanted to ask you, did the commander in chief of the army, Fi marshal von Brachitsch, have the same attitude concerning the war?
ken yesterday already in detail.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this class of ques desires me point out to you is, that there has been no cross examination by an member of the prosecution challenging any of these points, so this evidence is entirely repetitive and cumulative and is bound to be put by you to every military and naval witness who comes into the witness box and it is simply a waste of time to the Tribunal. When questions are answered by a witness and are not cross-examined to by the other side, it is practice to assume that the answer are accepted.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that, for me, is a very important ques which has just been touched upon. That is the question of whether a question inadmissible because in the opinion of the Court it is cumulative. I should li to make a short statement concerning that, as to whether or not the question is cumulative.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand what the Tribu nal has said to you, that it is new desired, in view of the directives of the Charter, that this trial is to be as expeditious as it can reasonably be but it does not desire to have the same evidence adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I may assume that the Tribunal accept the proof which I want to bring by my question as true, then I can forege these questions but I cannot find out whether that is the case and unless I know for sure that I have succeeded in bringing certain proofs, then I have to try to
THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that you asked the same questions of a great number of witnesses and that those questions have no been cross examined to and in such circumstances, you can assume that the answ
DR. LATERNSER: If I am able to draw that conclusion, then, of course, I shall not put such questions in the future. I have only a few more questions, Mr President.
BY DR. LATERNSER: and the OKW, two affidavits have been presented by the prosecution -- one by Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and one by Colonel General Blaskowitz. In these affidavits, both generals state that in general, among the generals, before the war, the opinion was maintained that the question of the Corridor eventually by force would have to be decided. Is that opinion stated by two generals correct? Was that the attitude in general at that time? never made any statement of that kind. The Polish question was discussed by us in the navy only as far as it has been mentioned during the last few days here; that is to say, that an attack of Poland against parts of Germany shou be prevented under all circumstances. The political treatment of that questi
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has vnever heard of this suggest
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that was the reason why I put the question to the witness.
THE WITNESS: The political question after 1933 was only handled by and decided by him and he has said expressly that he would make all policies. BY DR. LATERNSER: opinion which Blomberg and Blaskowitz have mentioned?
A Well, at any rate, I have never heard it from the generals. It didnt exist in the navy Yes.
Q You were present at the conference of the 23rd of November 1939? conference. Admiral, do you remember that in the course of that conference. Hitler reproached the generals because they still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these ideas should have to be rejected.
A That, I could not say with certainty. I believe that I can recall having heard such a statement, having heard that Hitler was of that opinion.
defense counsel has already put to you in the course of his examination. It is the document C-66, submitted by the British prosecution under GB-81. It is in the document book 10, on page 13, of 10-A, page 35. On pages five to seven, last paragraph of that page, you have said the following and I quote: "It can be seen from many statements and plans, the Fuehrer expected an end of the Russia campaign in the Fall of 1941, while the OKH was very sceptical." Admiral I wanted to ask you what was the scepticism? possible to conclude such a tremendous campaign in such a short period of time and many others shared that opinion, whereas the Fuehrer believed that on account of the new weapons and his strategy, he could conclude that campaign very quickly.
that is, the OKH - - any principal objections before the beginning of the Russian campaign? against it, but I could not say anything definite.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions.
DR. KRAUS: Dr. Kraus, defendant's counsel, representing Dr. von Luedinghausen for von Neurath.
BY DR. KRAUS: believe by the co-defendant Goering, that Fieldmarshal von Hindenburg had expressl desired that Herr von Neurath should be foreign minister. Do you know anything about that? that wish, and it caught my attention because Fieldmarshal von Hindenburg until that time had only been interested in the nomination of the War Minister and the Chief of the Army and Navy, and had considered it his privilege. It was the first time that he expressed that wish in the case of a foreign minister. regarding the appointment of ministers.
A No. He had expressed that wish about the Reich War Minister, also to other previous governments, or the Social Democratic Government. that exception in the case of Neurath? up to that time, which had been peaceful, should be continued in Germany. He was sure that von Neurath would continue these policies in his intentions. time? political principles, weren't you? What were the main principles, the main lines of his policies?
A Herr von Neurath endeavored to see a gradual recovery of the German people achieved, and he wanted to try to gain a quality of the German Reich with peaceful means.
also along the intentions of Hindenburg, and especially on this point both of us agreed easily. policy of understanding with England, and a peaceful policy of balancing.
Rhen I have another question to you, Admiral. A Fritz Wiedemann, who was the adjudant of Hitler from '35 to '39, has submitted an affidavit. The Prosecutio has submitted that affidavit under PS-3037. In that affidavit Mr. Wiedemann states that on the 28th of May 1938 a conference took place in the Wintergarten of the Reichs Chancellory with all important people of the Foreign Office, the Army, and the leading offices. That was a tremendous meeting, in the face of which one could almost doubt as to whether all these people would have found room in the Wintergarten. Brauchitsch. There had been present at the same time, also, von Neurath, von Ribbentrop, and of course you. stated it would be his definite will that Czechoslovakia should disappear from the face of the map. Do you know anything about that meeting? meetings, I have not the least recollection of that meeting. The composition seems very unlikely. I have never seen in the same meeting von Neurath and von Ribbentrop together. I should like to doubt whether von Neurath during that time was even in Berlin. He was certainly not present at that meeting, but I could not remember any meeting in which von Ribbentrop was present as the Foreign Minister when military matters were discussed. I believe this Mr. Wiedemann is mistaken, because I believe I have never seen him in a meeting in which such matters are alleged to have been discussed. The Fuehrer usually sent his personal adjudants out. I believe that is a mistake. You would have kept it in your mind.
A Yes. During that summer the opinions of the Fuehrer were changing greatly. I believe that in the month of May a mobilization took place in Czechoslovakia. I could not say it with certainly, but a meeting of that kind where a statement like that would have been made I believe I did not take part in
DR. KRAUS: No more questions. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant's counsel wish to ask any questions?
( No response)
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, I entirely agree.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 20 May 1946, at 1000 hours.)
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Horn wishes to ask some questions.
DR. HORN: Dr. Horn, for the defendant, von Ribbentrop. My Lord, and gentlemen of the Tribunal: May I please put a few more questions to the defendant and witness. BY DR..HORN: a so-called neutrality patrol of North American war ships, which went past the 300 mile limit and was extended to about 1,000 miles? place at some time or other. lished in the United States which referred to North American ports and the foreign ships therein which were thereby confiscated, amongst them 26Italian and two German ships? during the summer of 1941. Predominately there were Italian ships and a few German. I can't swear to the exact figures, though. prepared to give the Soviet Union every possible help. Did you speak about this to Hitler, and what was his attitude toward it?
A The fact is correct. I think there was a question of interest on the loan too, and very probably I did speak to Hitler about it. However, his Attitude I can't tell you anything about. I can only that all these measures at that time in no way deterred us from the course we had set for ourselves. to him that up to the present and for the future, too, we wouldleave American ships completely unnolested. We would continue, I said, to do so in spite, of the considerable disadvantages which would arise from that. That is something I mentioned here the other day.
Q In 1941, the American Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, with the aid of Mr. Knox, Mr. Forrestal, and Mr. Hull asked repeatedly that the United States fleet should be used to safeguard British transport of war material to Great Britain. That was done in a public speech. At the close of July, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox gave an interview for the purposes of the press, and informed them of the order to shoot at German ships. neutrality?
A Your facts are correct. Hitler did subsequently express the order that under no circumstances would we on our part be allowed to fire. Later on, with the episodes involving two destroyers, this situation finally did arise.
DR. HORN: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE MARSHAL: Your Honor, the report is made that Defendant Goering is absent this morning. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Captain Schustler, "The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles", had you not?
Q Would you look at a certain section? It is an page 26 of Document Book 10. he not?
A Yes. And I might add that this book was written because we in the Navy were part of the National Socialist program and had been accused that after 1933 we had notdone enough to strengthen the navy. That is why all these matters were mentioned in that book. not?
A Yes; at any rate, everyone who wanted it could have it. Book, which givesthe preface? You will see at the end of the first pragraph that it says, It is to give a reliable picture of the fight of the navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.
clearly the services of these men who, without being known in wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal and responsibility to the service of the fight against the peace treaty. that actually few in the navy fought with regard to invading the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles? necessary to improve our defenses, which I explained during the recent days here. It was a matter of honor for every man to do it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: It is Page 28, My Lord, and it is Page 126 of your copy. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q It gives a summary of contents. You see, it is in four sections. The first section deals with the first defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, and then enumerates what they were doing. The second is independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich government and legislative bodies.
Q Just let us see. From 1922 to 1924 you were inspector of naval training at Kiel, were you not?
Q You were asked whether you were inspector of training. The answer was "yes", wasit not? have a very complete knowledge of the weapons available for your service? transfer of guns from the North Sea to the Baltic, all of which was done by a special command, which in turn was directly under the ordersof the commander of the navy.
Among us there was Lieutenant Raenkel, a specialist, who was to deal with all matters concerning guns. I myself was in Kiel.
Q Take the next period from 1923to 1927. From 1925 to 1928, you were Chief der Marine Station der Ostsee, were you not? independent armament measures taken behind the back of the Reich government?
A No; I had nothing to do with these affairs. I had already said that was done by another command. them. You knew all about them. the Reichskabinet, but behind the back of the legislative bodies. The legislative bodies would be the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, would they not?
A Yes. But I already said the other day that it was not a matter for the military supreme commander to discuss matters with the Reichstag. This was something for the government to do. Mr. Severing will testify.
Q We will hear Mr. Severing when he comes. At the moment I want you to tellthe Tribunal this -
A (Interposing): Yes, I have something to say.
Q I have not finished my question yet. What did you say to Captain Schustler? Did you tell him he was giving an entirely false picture in suggesting that the navy had anything to do with going behind the back of the Reichstag? Did you make any effort to correct what Captain Schustler was saying?
A No, I did not correct his book. I had not time for that.
Q Now, just before we come to No. 4, if you willlook at this passage, it will be helpful.
This is part of Captain Schustler's description of Section 2 dealing with economic rearmament, and it comes under the heading, "Difficult Working Conditions".Do you see that?
It is the heading, "Difficult Working Conditions".
Q Would you just look at the last part of that? Now, I want it quite clear, defendant, this is dealing with the period from 1923 to 1928, before you were head of the Navy; so I want to ask you about it. There were often many external difficulties besides these for Lohmann's company for Tebek -- the consummate task and amount of work, the distance from the navy command staff, the impossibility of settling any questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence, and of carrying it out in any case as disguised correspondence with false names and disguised expressions. on?
A No; I hardly knew anything about the Tebek, the name and everything it applied to. But I would consider it perfectly right that these people work like that, because at that time the attitude of a large portion of the German people wasunreliable. There was considerable danger of these things leaking out. And apart from that, the Tebek had been dissolved vhen I arrived. the English Book, and just look at Captain Schustler's description of the fourth period. 1933 to the period of restriction in 1935. your methods from 1933 to 1935?
A Let me see it., Where is that passage?
Q It is No. 4.
to 1935? of the state was very anxious to see that nothing exaggerated would be done so that his intentions regarding agreement with Great Britain would not in any way be disturbed by it. very little, in fact. He could have built armored ships, so many destroyers and so many submarines but he didn't do any of these things because he said, "We don't want to make an impression in this connection that we are carrying out large-scale armament." He only allowed -tiating the Naval Agreement you did not want anyone to know what steps you had taken contrary to the Treaty and how far you had gone. That is the plain fact of it -- you wanted, to get the Naval agreement without disclosing what you had done isn't that so?
A No, that is a misunderstanding, in turning my words around. e didn't want the announcement of these measures as such were justified and quite minor ones.
Q I will come to that in a moment. I only want, before we leave these naval works, to ask you one question about another book. You know that Oberst Scherf projected a history of the German Navy. I don't want any misunderstanding about it. As I understand the position, you permitted Oberst Scherf to have recourse to the archives of the Navy but beyond that you hadn't seen anything of his work isn't that right?
A I didn't see the book at all. I saw, an index of the book for the first time when I was interrogated, and I didn't give him the order which he received from the Fuehrer. And I permitted the Chief of the Navy Archives to assist him.
Q That is exactly what I put to you. I want you to turn to Book 10-A. It starts at page 1 in the English version and also page 1 in the German, And if you would look at page 3 you will find the proposed table of contents of Oberst Scherf's book, page 3 in the English version. I think it must be about page 3 in the German version, too. Make sure of it, Sergeant-Major (addressing his assista Now look at the heading of Section 2. It is, "Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State."
And then he describes," (a) National socialism in the Navy before 1933" -
A Where is that? I am afraid I havn't found it. duction of shipping and fishing.
This must be something quite different. I haven't got it.
(Witness going through pages the while.)
I've got it now.
Q Would you look at section 2, which is, "Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State. "And you can see the proposed headings which were to cover some thirty pages, "National Socialism in the Navy before 1933." Then the taking ever of the oath; the taking over of insignia; alterations of the flag." Do you agree with Oberst Scherf's description that the proceedings could be described as the incorporation of the Navy and the National Socialist State?
A I explained it the other day. Of course, the Navy had to come into some connection with the National Socialist State. You can't have a democratic Navy in a monarchi State. The principles must tally. But how fir these tallies were adopted, that is something which I decided. It was always done in the proper proportion. The Navy was always independent but rightly disposed toward the National Socialist State. And apart from that, all 1 can see here are headings.
Q Yuo say that doesn't offend you as a description. That is all I wanted to get clear.
A But the headings don't mean a thing. It might say in the actual text tha the Navy did not fit into the National Socialist State properly. I don't know. Naturally, as far as internal matters were concerned -
Q I am not going to waste time on it. There were three matters which you dealt with in your examination-in-chief, and I am not going to deal with them in detail; but I just want to remind you of than and put one question. You can put that document away; I am not going to pursue it further. (A short pause.) Would you mind putting that document away and giving me your attention for the next question? September, 1933, and the question of disguised auxiliary cruisers as transport ships 0. Is this a fair summary of your answer:
That you admitted that these b broaches of the Treaty took place but you said in each case that the breach was only a little one. Is that a fair summary of your answer?
Q Now, let's take it in bits, then. Are you disputing that any of these matters with regard to the E-boats, the matters on the survey lists or the transport ships 0 -- are you disputing that any of these took place? as I understood you, you admitted they all took place -
A No, but they took place the way I described it. For instance, the absolu cruisers were not built but we were allowed to make changes, in the event of an outbreak of war, in the event of an attack on Germany, which would have been suitable to appear as off the leader cruisers. That wasn't any violation. If it were I would have admitted it. The construction office in Holland for submarines was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty, either. The situation was quite different; I can't remember the third case. took place, but you said "it is only little one."
A Yes, of course. Those were immaterial things, but they were in the interest of Germany's defense.
Q I want to ask you about an officer of yours, Vice-Admiral Assmann. Was he an officer in whom you had confidence?
Q Will you answer my question? Was he an officer in whom you had confidenc
Q That is what I wanted. Now, would you have a look at a new document, which is Document D-654, which is GB-460. Now, that is an extract from one of a series of essays on the operational tactical considerations of the German Navy and consequent measures taken for its expansion between 1919 and 1939, contained among the files of Vice-Admiral Assmann and Vice-Admiral Gladish, who were in the historical section of the German Admirality.
Now, would you mind not looking at it for a moment? I want to ask you some questions and then you can look at it with pleasure afterwards. Do you agree the in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit?
Do you agree with that?
A No, not in all sectors. In the chief sectors we were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained to you very clearly. In fact, possibly we vi violated it in the wrong direction, by doing not even what we could have done.
Q ill you look at this document. In the first quotation your officers say "But although -- as was stated -- in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in spirit -- or at least its violation was prepared -- a long time before the 16th of March, 1935" . . . Are your Admirals wrong in stating that? Is that what you are telling the Tribunal?
A May I please see which page this is on? I haven't quite seen it. This is it. In nearly all spheres of armament the navy was concerned; that isn't correct.
Q That's what I put to you; is that right?
A No, it's not right. We haven't built as many ships as we could have built, as I have explained repeatedly, -
Q You've explained that. You've given that explanation and it's a matter of discussion whether it's of any value. I am not going to argue with you. I am asking you this question: Are you saying that the admirals of your historical section are wrong in that sentence that I read out to you?
Q I see. Well, now let's pass on -- the Tribunal will judge that -to the statement of Admiral Assmann. It goes on:
"This probably took place in no other sphere on the one hand so early and on the other hand under such difficult circumstances as in the construction of a new submarine arm. The Treaty of Versailles had only been in force a few months (since the 10th of January, 1920), when it was already violated in this point."
Do you agree with Admiral Assman on that point?
A No, he's wrong. It wasn't violated in this point, and the reason why it started so early was because the old submarine commanders and submarine officers and technicians were all without a job, and they were offering their services to maintian the technique of submarines abroad; but that has nothing to do with me because I had no say in these matters. At that time I worked on the Navy Archives. Assman is wrong? I thought yousaid that he was a good historian. You needn't go back very far. You only go back twenty years. wrong. I have had--
Q Well, let's just see how far he was wrong. We needn't go into the first paragraph which deals with shipbuilding for Japan, but take the second line:
"In 1922 --"
Do you see the paragraph which begins "In 1922 three German shipbuilding yards founded a German U-boat Construction Bureau in Holland under a Dutch covering name with about thirty engineers and builders. In 1925 a Dutch shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for Turkey on the plans of this bureau which enjoyed the financial and personal support of the Naval Command. In the solution of this question, too, Captain Lehmann was concerned decisively."
Is that right?
AAll that's been admitted by us. That in no way is a violation if the Treaty.
Q We'll not argue that, but it's right anyway. Admiral Assmann's right about that. Then he deals with "Finland and with Spain. And, if you look at the end of the paragraph dealing with Spain, he says:
"Already in the autumn of 1927 the Naval Construction Department was commissioned to carry out the construction in Spain by the Chief of the Naval Command, Admiral Zenker, who accepted the responsibility despite all the difficulties in the field of home politics. The working out of the project and the drawing up of the construction plans took place in the Dutch Bureau. After completion in 1931, the ship carried out trial runs and diving exercises from Cadiz and Cartagena, under German direction, and with German personnel, consisting of officers, engineers, naval construction students and foremen."
That's quite right, is it? other persons, were released from the navy for this purpose and had to do it.
Q "This boat which is now the Turkish submarine 'Guer' became the prototype for the 'U-25' and 'U-26'".
A Now, the 250-ton submarines which were made in Finland. And, if you look at the last sentence of the next paragraph:
"The Finnish U-boat was the first plan to be worked out in Germany and to be executed; only for the working out of the details was what the Dutch bureau still called upon.
"The Finnish 250-ton vessel became the prototype for U-1 to U-24."
Q And now the next paragraph:
"The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel made it possible to obtain the parts for 'U-1' to 'U-24' in 1933/35 long before the order for assembling the vessels, to make preparations for this assembly to the exte: possible while maintaining secrecy".
Q Now, would you turn on to page 156. You see where the next quotation is from.
"At the beginning of 1935" -- that is six months before the Anglo-German Treaty -- "there were probably six 250-ton boats ready for assembly and six 275-ton and two 750-ton boats on which preparatory work was being done. About four months were needed for assembling the small ships and about ten for the big ones, dating from the 1st of February 1935, but everything else was still quite uncertain."
Now, look at the next words:
"It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty. Considering the quantity of U-boats which had already been ordered, about fifty-five U-boat could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality 118 were ready or ordered The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so early, so thoroughly and secretly that already eleven days after the conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, which permitted the construction of U-boats, the first German Uboat could be commissioned on the 29th of June 1935."
Now, take that sentence, which is written by Admiral Assmann, and we've seen what your connections with Assmann were through about one hundred document He said:
"It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty."
Now, you've told this Tribunal for about several hours of your evidence that that was a freely negotiable treaty of which you were proud and which you were ready to support. Are you telling the Tribunal that your admirals were wrong in saying that in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adher the least to the restrictions of that treaty?