DR. SIEMERS:
In Raeder Document 113 I should like to refer to the heading:
"ARMY FORESAW JAPAN'S MOVE." Marshall says:
"Washington, Dec. 11.
"Ge neral George C. Marshall, former Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last night that the Army knew more than ten days before December 7, 1941, that a Japanese move toward Pearl HARBOR might take them past the deadline where the American chiefs believed the US should fight." gathered from the report by Marshall that the Japanese move toward Shanghai headed wouth was reported by the U.S. Army Intelligence November 25 and 26, 1941. And in addition to that Marshall testified that preparations had been worked out in the United States before the war for the construction of long range bombers to move toward Istanbul and Singapore.
In Raeder Exhibit No. 114, and I am also submitting Henry L. Stimpson's declarations under date lf 21 March, former German Minister of War of the U.S.A.
"Henry L.Stimpson, former U.S. Secretary of War, disclosed that the late President Roosevelt's War Cabinet had discussed and rejected nine days before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour - an American attack on the Japanese forces' without further warning."
"Stimpson recounted this in a statement that on the 28th November, 1941, he had received information of Japanes movements along the Asiatic Coast. On the same day, he said, the Cabinet met and discussed the possible meaning of the Japanese move."
He further said:
"That if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight, and that if the British fought, we would have to fight." these Japanese plans before you did?
DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the next accusation put forth by the Prosecution, and that concerns itself with you.
In this connection, the Prosecution has admitted Document 1807 P.S., which is the same as G.B. 227, to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegatic No. 10-A, page 288.
This Document concerns itself with Jodl's diary, and especially the entries of the 16th of June, 1942. I am sorry. I have to beg your pardon. I am told it is page 287 rather than 288. This Document reads:
"The operational staff of the Navy (SKL), applied on the 29th May, for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture, because defensive measures are still incomplete, because there is a possibility of achieving surprise, and because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea." international law because you made that proposal at a time when Brazil was neutral and I might call your attention to the fact that the war with Brazil occured on the 22 August, 1942, please tell me from your memory just how you come to make this proposal? The Germans were persecuted there. They were treated very badly. The economic interests of Germany were damaged heavily. The Brazilians had already been giving their ear to the United States. They had permitted United Radio stations and wireless stations had been established along the Brazilian coast, and also intelligence stations had been set up there. They confirmed themselves that they had destroyed a German U-boat, and on the other hand the German U-boats had attacked Brazilian ships, for the Brazilian ships had not had their lights on according to the regulations, and consequently could not be recognized as Brazilian ships. Before that Germany had asked all of the South American countries that their ships use their lights in such a way that they could be distinguished as to nationality at night. Then there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers which had taken place, and they could only have been carried on from Brazilian bases. At the request of the SKL to the Fuehrer, the Fuehrer decreed that once again we should ask the Italians for what intelligence reports they had received, and Italy in turn confirmed that some weeks before Italian U-boats, which had been operating together with ours, these Italian U-boats had been attacked near the Brazilian coast, and the Brazilian Air Ministry had made public the fact that hostile action by the Brazilian and United States air forces had attacked Axis U-boats.
Brazilian coast arms or force might be used against Brazil, and then a plan was worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats left the French coast in order to clear the Atlantic and go to the Brazilian coast. The Fuehrer had agreed that this was not to be a needling but rather a serious enterprise. This operation was later stopped and I am sorry that I am not able to say for what reason this operation was not carried through, but it can be seen from our documents that all of these things are laid down in the war diary.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Court, I believe that the entire accusation as far as we are concerned would not have been raised if the document 1807-PS, Jodl's diary entry of the 16th of June had been admitted in toto. Only the first part was admitted, and, therefore, I should like to read this entry as Raedor Exhibit No. 115, to be found in Document Book, Roman Numeral 6, page 500, from the further statement made by Colonel General Jodl, and in the diary we may conclude that the situationwas investigated quite thoroughly. quoted that part. That is the first two sentences. The rest of the wording of this diary is as follows:
"Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declarcs that an intensification of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable, with regard to the attitude of Argentina and Chile, and that previous to measures of war against Brazil, consultations are to be held with Italy and Japan. Upon the proposal of the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, the Fuehrer ordered on the 30th of May, that the Naval Operational Staff (SKL) is to ascertain by inquiring in Rome whether the Brazilian reports about warlike actions against Axis U-boats are correct. The verification by the Naval Operational Staff (SKL) has shown that Italian U-boats were attacked on the 22 and 26 May at the North-East corner of Brazil by airplanes which beyond doubt had started from a Brazilian air base. The Naval Operational Staff (SKL) transmit, moreover, the text of the official comminique of the Brazilian Air Ministry about the fighting actions, and proposes to order the 10 U-boats, due to sail during the period from 22 June to 4 July from ports in Western France, for duty off the principal Brazilian ports in the period 3-8 August, and detailing the tanker U-460 for that purpose. The order for execution must be given to the U-boats until 15 June at the latest. After the Commander in Chief of the Navy had reported this in the afternoon of 15 June to the Fuehrer at the Bergderf, the Fuehrer declared himself in agreement with the intentions of the Naval Operational Staff (SKL) ordered, however, before any definite decision, that the political situation at once again be examined by the Foreign Office."
I believe that this is so that we were careful enough: and I further would like to refer to Raeder Exhibit Number 116 which I should like to submit herewith, in the same document book, page 503, which is an extract from the War Diary; where under date of the 6th of June there is an entry that the development has led that a latent state of war is practically in existence with severe damage to all German interests. Individual Brazilian steamer sunk by U-boat because they were not lighted according to regulations. Increasing agitation in Brazil. Brazilians claim ti have already sunk German U-boat while petrolling the coast. like to submit herewith, to be found in the same document book, page 509. I should like to ask the High Tribunal to take official notice of this document. and its contents and would like to refer only to figures 3 and 4. Under Figure 3 "When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with camouflage paint and to arm, the authority was given on Lay 15 1942 to use arms aginst recognizable armed South Americans." And under Figure 4 it says: "Based on the fact that axis submarines were attacked by vessels along the Brazilian coast and that the Brazilian Air Ministry officially made public that attacks Were being made by Brazilian airplanes, the Naval Operational Staff on 29 May 1942 in 12938/42 Top Secret of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff asked that authority be granted to use arms aginst Brazilian military forces and merchant marine." book VI. page 510. I ask the High tribunal to take official notice of this document. I do not wish to quote any part of it since it seems to have the same contents as the matters already mentioned. I believe that the Figure 4 which I have just read from document 117 reproduces completely the fact, but this is clarifying the situation and it refutes any accusation against the Navy.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q To these extracts from the War Diary do you have anything to be added?
A No, there is nothing to be added. It is entirely clear. with this I am coming to the conclusion of my examination -- to tell us how it came about that in January 1943 you resigned?
DR. SIEMERS: Shall we have our recess first or shall I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on so that you may finish your examination.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps ten minutes, Your Honor. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Please picture how it came about that in January of 1943 you resigned; but before you come to that answer I would like to ask you one more question. In previous times had you ever had the idea to resign? That is, before you actually did resign? told the Fuehrer to please relieve me of my cost; or I put an ultimatum to him. And in order to picture these facts I should like to give two examples. In Nov: of 1938 I had in the presence of Keitel made a report to the Fuehrer about the type of our ships and as to further development along these lines. On this occasion the Fuehrer began to tell us about everything that we had planned and were planning, including the plan of the Bismarck, and for a rather unexplained reason he attacked these plans and declared them as wrong. Later I found out that things like that arose for the reason that some person from his entourage, people who knew very little about such things, had given him their opinion; and as a result, he agreed, and perhaps, as I was told later, he wanted to check these matters to see whether the things he had been told were actually correct. plans, put them in my brief-case, and leave the room. Keitel was there, The Fuehrer followed me to the door, asked me to remain, mitigated his accus tion and asked me not to resign my post under any conditions now. situation. His naval adjutant had just been appointed. This admiral wanted to marry a young girl who had had rather unsavoury reputation, I told him I would never consent to the marriage. The Fuehrer had the girl brought to him and decided he would have nothing against the marriage, I left and sent the Fuehrer a letter in which I told him that I would refuse my consent, that the officer would not remain in the Navy should he decide to marry, or I would not remain. I told the officer who acted as my courier to bring back the answer. The Fuehrer had the officer wait two days and then sent him back to me with a letter, He said: "Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy and he will not be.
used as a Naval aujutant, there will be someone else in his place. He will remai with me, he will have a position and will serve as one of my party adjutants." A typical result for the Fuehrer was that up to a certain degree he wanted to make his will known, but this man was out of the way of the Navy, and I could make my convictions felt in this case, Under these circumstances I was ready to continue to serve. That was the beginning of 1939. In the course of Spring I asked again whether I could not be relieved of my position since I had served for many years in the Navy and I did not believe I should be able to remain in the dignity of my office. I suggested to him that perhaps at the first of October I should leave my post. The Fuehrer refused, and on the 1st of October we were in the war, and he said it was extremely urgent, that I could not and should not leave the Navy under any circumstances; and especially since I considered myself totally responsible for the preparation and the training of the Navy in the course of war, our working together at that time with Very few exceptions had to be in good order and, sympathetic for the Fuehrer, I always tried to show my respect in the course of the war. However, the relationship gradually was darkened and hampered, and for the reason that the Fuehrer became nervous and more nervous, and at meetings when there were divergences of opinion he flared up, and if there was any technical trouble or if one of my ships was not success ful, he became rather abusive, and again and again it came about that his surrounders got to him before I could actually explain matters to him and I was called in subsequently and could only set him straight on these matters subsequently. In that way, scenes resulted; scenes which were very depressing to me.
A point on which the Fuehrer was especially sensitive: That was the large ship. He was uneasy when our large ships were out on the high seas and were carrying on war actions. And if we lost a ship, such as the Graf Spee, or perhap later the Bismarck, any loss like that he considered a trmendous loss of prestig and matters like that flustered him trmendously. Things like that went on until at the end of the 1942 additional forces came into play, and this was something which made an impression on me. There was my failure in the consultation with the Fuehrer in the questions dealing with the matters of Norway, France, and, above all, Russia. In the final analysis, he constantly relied on Party people and listened to them much more than to an old officer. That was a fact which caused a situation which could not be tolerated for any length of time. One of the basic characteristics of the Fuehrer was a tremdous suspicion toward anyone and every one, but especially directed against old officers who had come to him from the old Wermacht and of whom he assumed -- about whom he assumed always, even though they treated him very well and with respect, that in their heart of hearts they did not have the thoughts that he expected and had to have.
Especially the case of Russia had brought about many conflicts with him as to me and my relationship to him was influenced to a large extent through those clashes, And the man who sat up the war diary, Admiral Ossmann, who put together the minutes of these meetings, on one occasion in connection with one of these discussions said "The Commander in Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete contradiction to the Fuehrer in this matter." incident occured which brought about the end, There was to have been an attack on a convoy which was going to Murmansk, starting from England. It was in December at a period of time where in those northern regions there is just one or two hour: of daylight where there is any favorable weather for the fighting by large ships, especially if they find themselves facing a large number of destroyers. The ships together with the destroyers had started on their journey and in the period of light had reached the convoy. Since the period of light disappeared Very quickly and darkness fell and the convoy was guarded by many destroyers, the Commander considered it expedient to take these ships out of this enterprise, and that was the only decision, because otherwise these large ships might have been attacked. This formed later on a remarkably violent connection between this Admiral, and the S.K.L. was hampered through disturbing circumstances and had in some instances been severed altogether. These two facts led to the fact where the Fuehrer had it where I had to report everthing to him. The Fuehrer became extrmely excited. There were questions of pro and can which were discussed all day long and even in the evening I could not give him a clear picture. This excited him tremendously.
A (Continued) Through Admiral Krenke he had many insults transmitted to me. He asked that I report to him immediately and I could see that there much friction would result. I did bring it about that only had to report to him after six days, that is on the 6th of January, so that the atmosphere could cool off a little bit. On the 6th of January I could travel there with a complete report at my disposal and in the evening we had a discussion with him and Field Marshall von Keitel was present also. He gave us a speech of about ar hour's duration in which he made derogatory remarks about everything that the Navy had done so far, and this was in complete condradition to what he had said before. From this I saw that he was anxious to bring about a break. I personalas I saw more and more that the war was turning into a pure U-boat war, and I felt that I personally could leave at this moment with a clean conscience. Afte the Fuehrer concluded this speech I asked to be permitted to speak with him alone. Field Marshall Keitel and the stenographers left and I told him that I was asking for my resignation as I could see from his words that he was entirely dissatisfied with me and this I considered to be the proper moment for me to leave. He tried to tie me down a little bit, as always, but I remained adamant and told him that I knew a Chief would have to be appointed who would hav complete authority and responsibility, but he told me that this would be a gre burden on him if I were to leave now. He said for one thing, the situation was very critical; we were just before Stalingrad, and that he had already been accused of dismissing so many generals that to the outside world this would incrminate him if I were to leave at this point. I asked him what could I do so tha this would not happen, that I would do everything to prevent him being incriminated, and that if he wanted to save face with the outside world, if he did not want it to seem that I left on account of his dissatisfaction he could have an "out" by making me a general inspecter, give me a nominal title which would recreate the impression that I was still with the Navy and that my name would remain connected with the Navy. This seemed to appeal to him, and I told him on the 6 th of January. that I wanted to be dismissed on the 30th of January. At this point I had concluded ten years of service as Commander in Chief of the Na under Hitler. He agreed to this proposal and asked me to suggest two successors so that he could make a choice.
On the 30th of January he personally dismissed me by appointing me the General Inspector of the Navy, and he said that he woul on occasion, consult me, ask me for advice; but that was something which never took place. I was sent out twice, once to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria had died and was being buried, and, in the second case, I was sent to Hungary to the Reich A ministrator to bring him a gift from the Fuehrer.
Q Grand Admiral, you had no actual duties as Inspecter?
Q Then my last question: Did you have the impression, in your conversation of the 6th of January, 1943 when you talked with Hitler, that he in a way wanted to be rid of you especially on the basis of your many-differences of opinion, since you contradicted him frequently on Naval technical and political matters, Norway, france, and so forth? rather disagreeable and uncomfortable with him at this time. This one case which I put through and in which I had made my will felt he never forgot.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, herewith I shall conclude my examination of Grand admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT The Tribunal will sit today until half past one. It wil adjourn now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
(The Defendant Raeder resumed the witness-stand.)
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask questions? BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: October, concerning possibilities for more severe actions in the war against merchant shipping. That is in the book of the British Prosecution, No. 10, on page 96 and 97 of the British text. Admiral Wagner has already testified about it here. Can you add anything to that statement concerning the task and the meaning of that memorandum? had not up to then dealt with detailed questions of submarine warfare. Among other things we had not discussed the question of the so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which in the previous war played such an important part. And from that fact it developed that on the third of September the officer who has recently been mentioned here was sent to the Foreign Office with the few points to be discussed concerning that question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we should clarify with the Foreign Office just how far we ought to go. And that is the document which recently was discussed here, D-851, GB-451, of the 3rd of November -Office and in the OKM -- the High Command of the Navy -- that submarine memorandum was drafted which you have mentioned and which was issued under the date-line of the 15th of October. I believe on the 15th of October I presented it to the Fuehrer who principally agreed with its text. But just that fact, that a memorandum about submarine warfare mentioning possibilities of increasing the severity of submarine warfare, was issued only on the 15th of October, shows how little we were prepared for that eventuality. Prosecution concerning our position with respect to international law, where it is said, ". . . highest morals, ethical standards in the fight, according to international law and supporting of all military measures by reference to international law.
But if it should be possible by a deviation to get decisive results and if we can take the responsibility to deviate, then eventually one has to deviate from international law. That means that a new form of international law would have to be developed." search for possibilities, involving the least damage to neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to international law, to conduct submarine warfare in such a manner that it would become a decisive factor in the outcome of the war. Cases are discussed as to how it would be possible to use severer measures, but it always deals with the fact that one should seek counter-measures against enemy measures, such measures as blockades or the new concept -- seige of England by submarine warfare. These are examined in all directions but the draft always comes to the conclusion that in view of the number of submarines and other conditions it was not yet possible to conduct such operations. that document can be found on the two last pages. Unfortunately I have only the German copy in front of me, where under D, Conclusion -- that is the last paragraph, D, Conclusion, the following sentences are significant, which I should like to quote -
THE PRESIDENT: That is the 15th of October, 1939?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is page 28, 10A?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is in the document book of the Prosecution on page 96 and 97 -
THE PRESIDENT: Which one, 10?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Ten.
THE PRESIDENT: Those aren't right, these numbers. That reference isn't right.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 99 and 100, I am just told. The witness has the whole document in front of him.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: On page 99 and 100 in the document book 10 of the Prosecution. The number is GB-22.
Mr. President, another excerpt from thes ame document has already been mentioned and that is in the document book Doenitz 3, on page 199 until 203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to refer to it because the witness will only read one or two sentences.
A (Continuing) Well, the last paragraph "final solution" of the entire discussion under Figure 1, I quote:
"The manner in which warfare against merchant men has been conducted, according to prize regulations, so far is not according to military necessity. A major part of enemy merchant vessels among others, the entire support going through neutral ships, cannot be caught. The legal political demand to stop neutral merchant ships and to examine them, in viewof the strong protection by air and submarine defense in front of the enemy coast, can no more be done. War against merchant men, according to prize regulations, therefore, has to be limited and, as far as the North Sea and the Baltic are concerned, has to be left to surface vessels. In the Atlantic the submarines have to limit themselves off the enemy shores, to attack without warning on convoys, troop transports, armed ships, and all enemy merchant ships, and they conduct war against merchant shipping according to prize regulations only in particular cases.
"The use of operational air force in war against merchant men is not possible. War against merchant men is conducted according to International Law. The possibility for a conflict with neutrals does not exist."
Then one more sentence:
"If the Supreme War Command for political reasons could not decide more more severe forms of merchant shipping at the present moment, then by maintaining the forms heret fore used in war against merchant shipping by increased and more ruthless use of mines and aerial attack on enemy port installations, an increase of the effectiveness of measures against enemy trade can be obtained. A decisive effect, however, cannot be expected by war against merchant shipping such as it is conducted now."
report to the Fuehrer was the order of the 17th of Octobe r? be torpedoed and, secondly, that passenger ships also in convoy could be torpedoed a short time after a proclamation to that effect had been made; that, therefore, was within an increase of severity of measures, step by stop, such as we had answered up to then to enemy measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, that long passage that the defendant has just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet, it must be offered in evidence by you. I understand it is not inevidence as present
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I can help, I shall be using this document and I shall put it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Only part of it, not the part that the defendant has referred to. But, in viewof that, I shall refer to it later
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. KRANZBUEHIER: were taken for the reconstruction of German submarine weapons. Did Admiral Doenitz participate in these preparations?
A In no way whatsoever. As it was said before, he was abroad; but, even before that, he had nothing to do with it. of the Navy. Would you like to tell me how it cam that Admiral Doenitz became your successor? successors. I suggested in writing -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, how does this arise? I mean, what relevancy hasit to anything we have to decide as to how Admiral Doenitz became head of the Navy?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That has importance, Mr. President, because the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Doenitz, on the basis of political relations, had become the successor of Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
A I'll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Karls, who was the senior and had a background concerning naval warfare; and in case the Fuehrer wanted it manifest that he wanted to put the U-boat warfare into the foreground, I suggested Doenitz, who had the requisite of authority and competence in that field. Any political considerations of any kind did not play any part; so that it was purely a technical suggestion, depending on the experience.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no more questions.
DR. NELTE (Counsel for defendant Keitel): Mr. President, the Tribunal, by letter of 26 March, has permitted that an affidavit for the defendant Keitel by the co-defendant Raeder could be submitted if the Prosecution has an opportunity to question Admiral Raeder in cross examination concerning his statements. raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this affidavit, which is concerned with the function and position of Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit K-19, after Admiral Raeder had confirmed that he signed this affidavit and that he agrees with its being submitted. BY DR. NEITE: after a conference with your Counsel, you answered and signed, on 19 March?
A That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel in the OKW?
DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution has a copy of it.
I have a few more questions to Admiral Raeder. The answers, however, can be Much simplified with the permission of the Court. We are confronted here with the same question which, on 9 May -- that is a week ago -- I put to Admiral Doenitz and which refer to the assertion made by the witness Dr. Gisevius about the tremendous influence of Keitel and about the ring of silence which Keitel had erected ground Hitler. I merely want to ask the witness Admiral Raeder, with the permission of the Tribunal, whether he has heard the answers which Doenitz gave in his presence to my questions and whether he considers them right also for the time before 1943; that is, for the period during which Raeder was commander in chief of the navy, and Whether he can confirm the answers given by Admiral Doenitz. I ask for the decision of the Tribunal whether I should be permitted to put these general questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
BY DR. NELTE: confirm the answers given by Admiral Doenitz to my question on 9 May also for the period before 1943?
Q Now, I have one final question. During your testimony Document L-79, the small Schmundt file, was treated. probative value?
Q Yes. Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document which the Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document, had not read. In that part of the document we hear about a study staff with the OKW. I ask you now to tell me whether such a staff with the OKW was ever formed.
A Not to my knowledge. The work was done in the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab, the Armed Forces Leadership Staff, where there were officers representing the three branches of the armed forces.
Q So there was no change in the field of tasks and competence? operations fields between OKW and Armed Forces Leadership Staff on one hand, the General Staff of the Armed Forces Branches, excluding the SKL, on the other side?
A Yes. As far as SKL, the Naval war Command is concerned, of course, there was no change.
Q Now, as far as the other branches, was there?
A That I can not say. I do not know about that.
Q Von Brauchitsch and Halder would have to tell us?
DR. NELTE: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred to contained in your document book?
DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number 19 of my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to the Tribunal?
DR. NEITE: Yes. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW): Staff and OKW, and you belonged to that alleged group for the longest time?
Q In what manner did you become a member of that so-called group? as Chief of the Navy Command. I did not enter that group by doing so. became Chief of the Navy. One did not know anything about any group of that kind. one had to do it voluntarily. Was there any possibility at all that military leaders could apply for any posts?
A No, it was only a question of military capabilities. It was a military order. There was no word of any possibility of volunteering. of the group at the time when you belonged to it? of the armed forces. Certainly not. A large number, yes. conference about a an with the purpose of starting aggressive wars?
A No, there was never such a conference; such a conference never took place. It has been mentioned frequently here, and it has also been explained how the various enterprises came about -- the political decision of the Fuehrer, a directive issued by him, and then the draft of the final order. meetings which took place under the leadership of Hitler. I mean purely a meeting of military officials.
A What do you mean, within the various branches?
questions, but not about aggressive war.
Q Yes, that is what I meant by my question. The Prosecution assorts furthermore, that that group which has been accused was only established by the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct?
A In no way whatsoever. There was no group in existence, but the organizationwas such, as has been frequentlyexplained here.
Q And such as has always existed in all armies of the world? of power by Hitler, the high military leaders had the choice of either cooperating or of accepting the consequence that the new regime would establish new armed forces, that is, armed forces of their own, and that on the basis of these facts, the generals decided to cooperate. Is that assertion by the Prosecution correct?
A No. It is not true that any joining of forces had taken place. I know that such intentions existed. For instance, once in 1934 I reported to the Fuehrer that I had been informed that the Sa Gruppenfuehrer Killinger, who had come out of the navy, had the intention of becoming the Chief of the Navy, but any further intentions I did not experience, I did not notice. First of all, there has never been a joing action of generals against such intentions.
Q So the assertion made by the Prosecution is not correct?
A No, not correct. That wasnot a method which would have been in accordance with the sentiments of the soldier -- that such a joining of forces could be brought about. in that group would have been bribed by the regime because of the chance of conquest. Is that correct?
intentions of the Party to come to power in Germany?
A I do not know that that ever happened. Do you mean the seizure? sole power in Germany, sole domination of Germany, was the Party supported in that direction by military leaders, as far as you know? in which it came to your oath to Hitler. If such an intention existed in the mind of one of the commanders in chief, was there any possibility of refusing the oath?