BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q On that occasion you wrote: "At this time the Fuehrer had made known his 'unalterable decision' to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situationshad arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff I was never convinced of the 'Compelling necessity' for Barbarossa." Do you have to add anything to the statement you made in this regard at that time? been issued on the 18th of December, now at the end of December, as may be seen from document C-170, which I quoted yesterday on several occasions, this document shows that I gave a comprehensive speech and report in order to convince the Fuehrer about the inexactitude and incorrectness of this decision. This showed that I really over-stepped my bounds, so to speak, for if and when the Fuehrer had issued a directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical case, it was in general more or less impossible to step up to him and offer contradictory or other measures; everything else, I mentioned yesterday. proposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned that at the time it had been planned to carry through the action "Seeloewe", that is, to land in England? navy, was this possibility disposed of, when did you have to dispense with this plan? the landing could be carried through. I can add a consideration from the commander-in-chief of the army and it was on my part that we had told Hitler, and he realized this fully, that for a landing, superiority in the air would have to be on our side and therefore we were just waiting to see whether we could actually produce this air superiority for the landing which, according to weather conditions, could be carried out later at the beginning of October and if it hadn't been possible to carry it out at that time to land, it would have to be postponed until the month of May of the following year.
I came to pass that air superiority was not present in the proper degree and consequently, it was said that the landing would have to be postponed until the spring of the following year; further preparations were to be taken and they actually were taken, but in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was completely dispensed with and Hitler decreed that preparations on the coast along the channel should be carried on only to such a degree that the impression would remain to the English that this landing actually would take place -- in September, I had the impression that Hitler did not any longer have any great interest in carrying through the landing and that in his own mind he was completely sold on the Russian campaign and simultaneously with the Russian campaign, of course, he couldn't carry on a landing into England as well. prosecution, that you were active and demanded a war against America. The prosecution has stated in this connection and has submitted document C-152, equal to GB-122, which is to be found in the document book of the British Delegation, No. 10, page 23. This document deals with an extract from the war diary of the SKL, dealing with a speech of the commander in chief of the navy -- that is you -- to the Fuehrer, made on the 18th of March 1941 in which you gave a report to Hitler. Under Figure 11 of this document, it is stated and I quote: "The Japanese must act to take Singapore as soon as possible since we would never again have an opportunity as favorable as this. The entire English fleet and the United States are not ready to carry on a war against Japan. The United States fleet is inferior to the Japanese fleet. Japan is preparing for this action and according to the statements of Japanese officers, Japan will wish to carry through this matter only when Germany is attempting to land in England. All effort in Germany must therefore marshal themselves to bring about Japan acting immediately. When Japan has Singapore in her power, all other greater Asiatic problems relating to the United States and England will be solved -- Guam, Philippines, Borneo, and Dutch East Indies. Japan wants to prevent this war against the United States of America and it can be done so if it will take Singapore promptly."
The prosecution has construed this statement to this effect, that you wanted to instigate Japan to attack America. Is that correct? indictment against me. It is entirely clear when I am involved with a naval battle with England with my smaller German navy, I do not want under any circumstances to have America on my neck as well and it has been discussed repeatedly that my most urgent effort during the entire first fewyears of the war was not to involve the United States and do anything to incite them. Admiral Wagner showed explicitly which limitations I had imposed upon the German navy in order to prevent that any conflict with the United States should come about. I imposed limitations which ware almost impossible for me to account for when I carried on my U-boat warfare with the British with the small means at my disposal. On the other hand, the United States, beginning with the end of 1940 and during the entire year of 1941, pressed us in our naval warfare with all means and committed deeds which could be interpreted as completely not neutral. I should like to call your attention to the repairing of British warships at the United States of America. This is a matter which up until that time was completely unknown and unheard of and on the orders to shoot, on the part of Roosevelt, in June, July and September 1941, attacks by American destroyers in the Atlantic, attacks on our U-boats were in two cases in which U-boats were followed with depth charges for two hours until finally they surfaced and shot and in one case damaged the destroyer. Despire all of these provocations, in June 1941, I reported to Hitler that in the future the merchantmen of the United States should not be disturbed by us in any way and that the result and outcome was that United States merchantment were crossing the Atlantic completely undisturbed on sea lanes of their own choosing and that they were in a position to give reports about our U-boats and give reports about our sea warfare without our disturbing them in this connection or preventing them and that through this, the British were in a position to camouflage their ships as American ships. That, they did. For the first time when our armored ship "Sheer" or Battleship "Admiral Sheer" in crossing the Atlantic, saw a ship carrying the American flag, in searching this ship, it was found that this was a British ship, a Canadian Cruiser.
Despite all of these reasons, I recommended to the Fuehrer and he approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures against American ships and we did not go to Halifax -Admiral Wagner already mentioned this and I need not clarify his statement. purpose of having an ally against England, England with whom we were already at war? the development which lead to this proposal. This was not anything that I did on my own initiative but in the beginning of the year 1941, political negotiations were carried on by the Fuehrer and by the Foreign Minister with Japan. I was not even called into these negotiations and I must say, regrettably so, for at these negotiations many things were discussed which were not correct and on the other side, we can see that this was no talk about a conspiracy. There was a way of approaching, so to speak, on the visit of the Foreign Minister Matsuoka, I believe, in March -- on the basis of this entire development, the Fuehrer on the 5th of March 1941, issued a directive No. 24 and that is the document C-75, equal to US-151. The date is the 5th of March.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to callethe attention of the High Tribunal to C-75, the same as US 151, to be found in the document Book of the British Delegation No. 10-a, Page 58. In this directive, No. 24, it says under Figure 3-a, "As the joint object of the carrying on of the war, it is important to conquer England, as soon as possible, and in that way to keep the United States out of the war."
And three paragraphs further down, under "b", it says: "The capture of Singapore -
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the right reference? That on page 58 is instruction No. 54, concerning collaboration with Japan.
DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised -- it was quite a surprise to me -- that of this directive, there is only a part of it to be found in the English translation, andI ask that the High Tribunal grant me the permission under these circumstances subsequently to submit the translation of the complete directive in this Raeder document.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your Raeder book, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: No, not up until now; for since did not know that only a fragment has been translated, I am asking for permission to have this document completely translated and submitted in toto as a Raeder document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. This may be found Figure 3-a, and the next quotation will be found under Figure 3-d, and it says: "The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England in the Far East, would be a decisive victory for the war effort of the three powers. Beyond that, attacks on other sea bases for the British sea power are to obtain only if the entrance of the United States of America cannot be prevented, andwill serve to hamper the war system of the enemy." March, which is the date of this directive, Hitler decreed the capture of Singapore. Consequently, the suggestion put by Grand Admiral Raeder since a Hitler decree was already existing at the time.
THE WITNESS: May I answer briefly? The same thing seems to apply to all cases which are being mentioned here:
first of all, the political decision of Hitler; that is, the head of the State; then the directive of the commander-in -chief of the Wehrmacht, for the Wehrmacht; then the results which accrued to the various branches of the Wehrmacht. how, if Japan was to enter the war, Japan could act most suitably and expediently. And in this connection we were concerned with the question of how we damage our main opponent, Engalnd, on water, and therefore I had to insist that Japan move against Singapore, since there were circles who were of the opinion that Japan should attack Vladiovstock, which would have been a grave mistake. that was Singapore, under the circumstances. But I as well believed that through the capture of Singapore, the United States of America would be intimidated and kept out of the war. BY DR. SIEMERS: which is mentioned in the special accusation against you. It is US 152, and may be found in the document book of the British Delegation No. 10, Page 320. It is a conversation between the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka.
I am just told now that 320 is incorrect. It should be 319.
THE PRESIDENT: It should be 10-A.
DR. SIEMERS: 10-A; that is correct, your Honor. I beg your pardon. and von Ribbentrop on the 29th of March, 1941. We have already discussed this matter.
In the 8th paragraph of this document, the following is said:
"The Reich Foreign Minister again in this connection referred to the problem of Singapore because of the fear on the part of the Japanese that there would be U-boats attacks from the Phillipines, and the use of the British fleet. He had discussed the situation once more with Admiral Raeder.
"Then I told him that the British fleet was in the home waters and in the Mediterranean, and she would have her hands full there, and she could not despatch even a single ship to the Far East.
"The American U-boats were considered to be so poor and insignificant by Admiral Raeder that Japan would not have to concern herself with them at all. BY DR. SIEMERS: 1946, declared that he had been mistaken. The statement was probably made by Hitler.
Will you please clarify this statement once and for all? Mr. von Ribbentrop, for I am sorry to say there was no connection between the Foreign Office and the O.K.M. especially since the Fuehrer had forbidden any information to be given to the foreign Office by the military regency. Hence, that statement would never have been made by him, especially since his statements were completely in contradiction to my opinion, and especially since he had no basis for any such statements at that time. frequently dealt with in the S.K.L. dealing with the economic, industrial, and military strength of the United States, and that an entrance of the United States should be worried about?
We were entirely clear about this up until the last detail. Did you at any time during the war see this document 1877 P.S., which is before you?
Q As far as these discussions between Mr. von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka were concerned, and the discussions with Oshima, were you advised about these?
A No; I was told by the Fuehrer. It is shown in the document C 17- what the outcome of this discussion with Matsuoka was. But I had no discussions with Mr. von Ribbentrop at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just been asked to correct a word which I have just used; and in order to be fair, I should like to do so.
I said, "Hitler, in his directive of the 5th of March, 1941, decreed to take Singapore. The manner of expression is not quite correct. He could not give orders to Japan. The mistake arises because the directive starts with the words, "The Fuehrer, in order to cooperate with Japan, has decreed the following." And under figure 3 it says, "The following basic principles or directives, apply". And among these basic, principles, or directives, the taking os Singapore is mentioned. BY DR. SIEMERS: suggest to anyone at all or tell anyone at all that Japan attack Pearl Harbour? Pearl Harbour?
A Never. It was a complete surprise to me and the S.K.L. that this attack actually did take place, and it is a mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese if one would assume that they would have told of such a plan to anyone not within Japan or to anyone who was not directly connected with this plan; and the same way in 1904. Out of the blue they attacked the Russian ships without anyon's suspecting anything like that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal; in this connection I should like to submit 3 documents which have been granted me, Raeder Exhibit No. 19, to be found in Document Book II, page 108. This document deals with the report by the American General Marshall which has been placed at my disposal for the assistance of the Court. stated the following, and I should like to refer to page 116:
"In order to determine when and how Germany and Japan failed, I asked General Eisenhower to question the highest military leaders who at present are prisoners of war. The outcome of these interviews is of extraordinary importance and interest. They give us a picture of the divergence of opinion among the hostile nations as well as the lack of comprehensive planning.
Both factors were evidenced in the critical moment of this world war, and were deciphered at the critical moment."
Two paragraphs further down, it says, "No proof has been found up to now tha the German Supreme command had an all-comprehensive strategic plan. The High Command, on general principles, approved of Hitler's policy, but his rather wild strategy was beyond the German military possibilities and capabilities, and brought about the collapse of Germany.
"The history of the German High Command, starting with 1933, shows constant personal conflicts in which increasingly Hitler's directives against military judgment dominated. The first clash took place in the year 1938, and in this, with the removal of Blomberg, Fritsche, and Beck, and the very effective conservative influence on the German policies ended with this removal.
"The campaign in Norway, France and the Netherlands brought about serious divergences between Hitler and the Generals, especially as pertained to the details of the carrying out of the strategic plans. In any and every case the General Staff was for he carrying through in an orthodox manner of the plan, but Hitler, on the other hand, stood for an unorthodox attack, the object and aims of which lay deep within hostile territory in each case.
"Hitler's opinion dominated, and the most surprising result of each of these successive attacks raised Hitler's prestige to such a point where one did not dare any longer to contradict his opinion.
"Hits military self-confidence became unlimited after the success and victory in France and from now on he started to criticize the opinions of the higher generals, even in the presence of junior officers, until it came about that the General Staff could not resist when Hitler resolved on his fateful decision to attack Russia." and I quote:
"In addition, there is no proof on hand showing a close strategic plan between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff realized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia, but hoped that the Japanese would meet many forces of land sea and air.
"Since there is no proof to the contrary, it is assumed that Japan acted on her own initiative and not in accordance with previously laid and coordinated plans." 113 and 114, could be found in the Document Roman Numeral VI, p. 494 and p. 497:
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the witness whether he agrees with General Marshall's opinion.
DR. SIEMERS:
Q You agree with the opinions of the American,General Marshall?
A I do not absorb these thoughts. They were processes of thought which we had as well, but I cannot vouch for each thought. In order to speak with surety, I would have to look at these proposals or they would have to be read to me.
DR. SIEMERS:
In Raeder Document 113 I should like to refer to the heading:
"ARMY FORESAW JAPAN'S MOVE." Marshall says:
"Washington, Dec. 11.
"Ge neral George C. Marshall, former Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last night that the Army knew more than ten days before December 7, 1941, that a Japanese move toward Pearl HARBOR might take them past the deadline where the American chiefs believed the US should fight." gathered from the report by Marshall that the Japanese move toward Shanghai headed wouth was reported by the U.S. Army Intelligence November 25 and 26, 1941. And in addition to that Marshall testified that preparations had been worked out in the United States before the war for the construction of long range bombers to move toward Istanbul and Singapore.
In Raeder Exhibit No. 114, and I am also submitting Henry L. Stimpson's declarations under date lf 21 March, former German Minister of War of the U.S.A.
"Henry L.Stimpson, former U.S. Secretary of War, disclosed that the late President Roosevelt's War Cabinet had discussed and rejected nine days before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour - an American attack on the Japanese forces' without further warning."
"Stimpson recounted this in a statement that on the 28th November, 1941, he had received information of Japanes movements along the Asiatic Coast. On the same day, he said, the Cabinet met and discussed the possible meaning of the Japanese move."
He further said:
"That if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight, and that if the British fought, we would have to fight." these Japanese plans before you did?
DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the next accusation put forth by the Prosecution, and that concerns itself with you.
In this connection, the Prosecution has admitted Document 1807 P.S., which is the same as G.B. 227, to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegatic No. 10-A, page 288.
This Document concerns itself with Jodl's diary, and especially the entries of the 16th of June, 1942. I am sorry. I have to beg your pardon. I am told it is page 287 rather than 288. This Document reads:
"The operational staff of the Navy (SKL), applied on the 29th May, for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture, because defensive measures are still incomplete, because there is a possibility of achieving surprise, and because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea." international law because you made that proposal at a time when Brazil was neutral and I might call your attention to the fact that the war with Brazil occured on the 22 August, 1942, please tell me from your memory just how you come to make this proposal? The Germans were persecuted there. They were treated very badly. The economic interests of Germany were damaged heavily. The Brazilians had already been giving their ear to the United States. They had permitted United Radio stations and wireless stations had been established along the Brazilian coast, and also intelligence stations had been set up there. They confirmed themselves that they had destroyed a German U-boat, and on the other hand the German U-boats had attacked Brazilian ships, for the Brazilian ships had not had their lights on according to the regulations, and consequently could not be recognized as Brazilian ships. Before that Germany had asked all of the South American countries that their ships use their lights in such a way that they could be distinguished as to nationality at night. Then there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers which had taken place, and they could only have been carried on from Brazilian bases. At the request of the SKL to the Fuehrer, the Fuehrer decreed that once again we should ask the Italians for what intelligence reports they had received, and Italy in turn confirmed that some weeks before Italian U-boats, which had been operating together with ours, these Italian U-boats had been attacked near the Brazilian coast, and the Brazilian Air Ministry had made public the fact that hostile action by the Brazilian and United States air forces had attacked Axis U-boats.
Brazilian coast arms or force might be used against Brazil, and then a plan was worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats left the French coast in order to clear the Atlantic and go to the Brazilian coast. The Fuehrer had agreed that this was not to be a needling but rather a serious enterprise. This operation was later stopped and I am sorry that I am not able to say for what reason this operation was not carried through, but it can be seen from our documents that all of these things are laid down in the war diary.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Court, I believe that the entire accusation as far as we are concerned would not have been raised if the document 1807-PS, Jodl's diary entry of the 16th of June had been admitted in toto. Only the first part was admitted, and, therefore, I should like to read this entry as Raedor Exhibit No. 115, to be found in Document Book, Roman Numeral 6, page 500, from the further statement made by Colonel General Jodl, and in the diary we may conclude that the situationwas investigated quite thoroughly. quoted that part. That is the first two sentences. The rest of the wording of this diary is as follows:
"Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declarcs that an intensification of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable, with regard to the attitude of Argentina and Chile, and that previous to measures of war against Brazil, consultations are to be held with Italy and Japan. Upon the proposal of the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, the Fuehrer ordered on the 30th of May, that the Naval Operational Staff (SKL) is to ascertain by inquiring in Rome whether the Brazilian reports about warlike actions against Axis U-boats are correct. The verification by the Naval Operational Staff (SKL) has shown that Italian U-boats were attacked on the 22 and 26 May at the North-East corner of Brazil by airplanes which beyond doubt had started from a Brazilian air base. The Naval Operational Staff (SKL) transmit, moreover, the text of the official comminique of the Brazilian Air Ministry about the fighting actions, and proposes to order the 10 U-boats, due to sail during the period from 22 June to 4 July from ports in Western France, for duty off the principal Brazilian ports in the period 3-8 August, and detailing the tanker U-460 for that purpose. The order for execution must be given to the U-boats until 15 June at the latest. After the Commander in Chief of the Navy had reported this in the afternoon of 15 June to the Fuehrer at the Bergderf, the Fuehrer declared himself in agreement with the intentions of the Naval Operational Staff (SKL) ordered, however, before any definite decision, that the political situation at once again be examined by the Foreign Office."
I believe that this is so that we were careful enough: and I further would like to refer to Raeder Exhibit Number 116 which I should like to submit herewith, in the same document book, page 503, which is an extract from the War Diary; where under date of the 6th of June there is an entry that the development has led that a latent state of war is practically in existence with severe damage to all German interests. Individual Brazilian steamer sunk by U-boat because they were not lighted according to regulations. Increasing agitation in Brazil. Brazilians claim ti have already sunk German U-boat while petrolling the coast. like to submit herewith, to be found in the same document book, page 509. I should like to ask the High Tribunal to take official notice of this document. and its contents and would like to refer only to figures 3 and 4. Under Figure 3 "When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with camouflage paint and to arm, the authority was given on Lay 15 1942 to use arms aginst recognizable armed South Americans." And under Figure 4 it says: "Based on the fact that axis submarines were attacked by vessels along the Brazilian coast and that the Brazilian Air Ministry officially made public that attacks Were being made by Brazilian airplanes, the Naval Operational Staff on 29 May 1942 in 12938/42 Top Secret of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff asked that authority be granted to use arms aginst Brazilian military forces and merchant marine." book VI. page 510. I ask the High tribunal to take official notice of this document. I do not wish to quote any part of it since it seems to have the same contents as the matters already mentioned. I believe that the Figure 4 which I have just read from document 117 reproduces completely the fact, but this is clarifying the situation and it refutes any accusation against the Navy.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q To these extracts from the War Diary do you have anything to be added?
A No, there is nothing to be added. It is entirely clear. with this I am coming to the conclusion of my examination -- to tell us how it came about that in January 1943 you resigned?
DR. SIEMERS: Shall we have our recess first or shall I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on so that you may finish your examination.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps ten minutes, Your Honor. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Please picture how it came about that in January of 1943 you resigned; but before you come to that answer I would like to ask you one more question. In previous times had you ever had the idea to resign? That is, before you actually did resign? told the Fuehrer to please relieve me of my cost; or I put an ultimatum to him. And in order to picture these facts I should like to give two examples. In Nov: of 1938 I had in the presence of Keitel made a report to the Fuehrer about the type of our ships and as to further development along these lines. On this occasion the Fuehrer began to tell us about everything that we had planned and were planning, including the plan of the Bismarck, and for a rather unexplained reason he attacked these plans and declared them as wrong. Later I found out that things like that arose for the reason that some person from his entourage, people who knew very little about such things, had given him their opinion; and as a result, he agreed, and perhaps, as I was told later, he wanted to check these matters to see whether the things he had been told were actually correct. plans, put them in my brief-case, and leave the room. Keitel was there, The Fuehrer followed me to the door, asked me to remain, mitigated his accus tion and asked me not to resign my post under any conditions now. situation. His naval adjutant had just been appointed. This admiral wanted to marry a young girl who had had rather unsavoury reputation, I told him I would never consent to the marriage. The Fuehrer had the girl brought to him and decided he would have nothing against the marriage, I left and sent the Fuehrer a letter in which I told him that I would refuse my consent, that the officer would not remain in the Navy should he decide to marry, or I would not remain. I told the officer who acted as my courier to bring back the answer. The Fuehrer had the officer wait two days and then sent him back to me with a letter, He said: "Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy and he will not be.
used as a Naval aujutant, there will be someone else in his place. He will remai with me, he will have a position and will serve as one of my party adjutants." A typical result for the Fuehrer was that up to a certain degree he wanted to make his will known, but this man was out of the way of the Navy, and I could make my convictions felt in this case, Under these circumstances I was ready to continue to serve. That was the beginning of 1939. In the course of Spring I asked again whether I could not be relieved of my position since I had served for many years in the Navy and I did not believe I should be able to remain in the dignity of my office. I suggested to him that perhaps at the first of October I should leave my post. The Fuehrer refused, and on the 1st of October we were in the war, and he said it was extremely urgent, that I could not and should not leave the Navy under any circumstances; and especially since I considered myself totally responsible for the preparation and the training of the Navy in the course of war, our working together at that time with Very few exceptions had to be in good order and, sympathetic for the Fuehrer, I always tried to show my respect in the course of the war. However, the relationship gradually was darkened and hampered, and for the reason that the Fuehrer became nervous and more nervous, and at meetings when there were divergences of opinion he flared up, and if there was any technical trouble or if one of my ships was not success ful, he became rather abusive, and again and again it came about that his surrounders got to him before I could actually explain matters to him and I was called in subsequently and could only set him straight on these matters subsequently. In that way, scenes resulted; scenes which were very depressing to me.
A point on which the Fuehrer was especially sensitive: That was the large ship. He was uneasy when our large ships were out on the high seas and were carrying on war actions. And if we lost a ship, such as the Graf Spee, or perhap later the Bismarck, any loss like that he considered a trmendous loss of prestig and matters like that flustered him trmendously. Things like that went on until at the end of the 1942 additional forces came into play, and this was something which made an impression on me. There was my failure in the consultation with the Fuehrer in the questions dealing with the matters of Norway, France, and, above all, Russia. In the final analysis, he constantly relied on Party people and listened to them much more than to an old officer. That was a fact which caused a situation which could not be tolerated for any length of time. One of the basic characteristics of the Fuehrer was a tremdous suspicion toward anyone and every one, but especially directed against old officers who had come to him from the old Wermacht and of whom he assumed -- about whom he assumed always, even though they treated him very well and with respect, that in their heart of hearts they did not have the thoughts that he expected and had to have.
Especially the case of Russia had brought about many conflicts with him as to me and my relationship to him was influenced to a large extent through those clashes, And the man who sat up the war diary, Admiral Ossmann, who put together the minutes of these meetings, on one occasion in connection with one of these discussions said "The Commander in Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete contradiction to the Fuehrer in this matter." incident occured which brought about the end, There was to have been an attack on a convoy which was going to Murmansk, starting from England. It was in December at a period of time where in those northern regions there is just one or two hour: of daylight where there is any favorable weather for the fighting by large ships, especially if they find themselves facing a large number of destroyers. The ships together with the destroyers had started on their journey and in the period of light had reached the convoy. Since the period of light disappeared Very quickly and darkness fell and the convoy was guarded by many destroyers, the Commander considered it expedient to take these ships out of this enterprise, and that was the only decision, because otherwise these large ships might have been attacked. This formed later on a remarkably violent connection between this Admiral, and the S.K.L. was hampered through disturbing circumstances and had in some instances been severed altogether. These two facts led to the fact where the Fuehrer had it where I had to report everthing to him. The Fuehrer became extrmely excited. There were questions of pro and can which were discussed all day long and even in the evening I could not give him a clear picture. This excited him tremendously.
A (Continued) Through Admiral Krenke he had many insults transmitted to me. He asked that I report to him immediately and I could see that there much friction would result. I did bring it about that only had to report to him after six days, that is on the 6th of January, so that the atmosphere could cool off a little bit. On the 6th of January I could travel there with a complete report at my disposal and in the evening we had a discussion with him and Field Marshall von Keitel was present also. He gave us a speech of about ar hour's duration in which he made derogatory remarks about everything that the Navy had done so far, and this was in complete condradition to what he had said before. From this I saw that he was anxious to bring about a break. I personalas I saw more and more that the war was turning into a pure U-boat war, and I felt that I personally could leave at this moment with a clean conscience. Afte the Fuehrer concluded this speech I asked to be permitted to speak with him alone. Field Marshall Keitel and the stenographers left and I told him that I was asking for my resignation as I could see from his words that he was entirely dissatisfied with me and this I considered to be the proper moment for me to leave. He tried to tie me down a little bit, as always, but I remained adamant and told him that I knew a Chief would have to be appointed who would hav complete authority and responsibility, but he told me that this would be a gre burden on him if I were to leave now. He said for one thing, the situation was very critical; we were just before Stalingrad, and that he had already been accused of dismissing so many generals that to the outside world this would incrminate him if I were to leave at this point. I asked him what could I do so tha this would not happen, that I would do everything to prevent him being incriminated, and that if he wanted to save face with the outside world, if he did not want it to seem that I left on account of his dissatisfaction he could have an "out" by making me a general inspecter, give me a nominal title which would recreate the impression that I was still with the Navy and that my name would remain connected with the Navy. This seemed to appeal to him, and I told him on the 6 th of January. that I wanted to be dismissed on the 30th of January. At this point I had concluded ten years of service as Commander in Chief of the Na under Hitler. He agreed to this proposal and asked me to suggest two successors so that he could make a choice.
On the 30th of January he personally dismissed me by appointing me the General Inspector of the Navy, and he said that he woul on occasion, consult me, ask me for advice; but that was something which never took place. I was sent out twice, once to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria had died and was being buried, and, in the second case, I was sent to Hungary to the Reich A ministrator to bring him a gift from the Fuehrer.
Q Grand Admiral, you had no actual duties as Inspecter?
Q Then my last question: Did you have the impression, in your conversation of the 6th of January, 1943 when you talked with Hitler, that he in a way wanted to be rid of you especially on the basis of your many-differences of opinion, since you contradicted him frequently on Naval technical and political matters, Norway, france, and so forth? rather disagreeable and uncomfortable with him at this time. This one case which I put through and in which I had made my will felt he never forgot.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, herewith I shall conclude my examination of Grand admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT The Tribunal will sit today until half past one. It wil adjourn now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)