"Un Pacte avec Hitler," and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with respect to Anschluss between Germany and Austria.
Again that doesn't seem to the Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any helpful bearing upon the issues here, whatever the Yugosalvs thought about it.
Number 31 is an extract from the "Neue Zeitung" of the 11th of January 1946, where Gordon walker states that the celebration in Austria after the Anschluss was genuine.
Well, that is Mr. Walker's opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on the other side. We doubt very much that his opinion is material here or competent.
THE PRESIDENTL Who is he?
MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in Great Britain, and a writer.
Number 39 is an extract from the Archiv of 1938. This sets forth a statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to do with the Unites States. This was not a speech made by the late Senator Borah in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does not seem to us that it would be very helpful. Some later opinions of Senator Borah were not so helpful, and this doesn't seem to be very likely to be helpful to the Tribunal with respect to this issue.
Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto's book, "The Truth about Austria". Zernatto was one of the State Undersecretaries of Austria, as the Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss and went to the United States, and wrote this book. He makes a number of statements, I might say, about the defendant Seyss-Inquart. documents 48, 50, 54, 55, 60, and 61 are all extracts from the same book, that would have bearing and relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his opinion, we have more doubt about its relevancy.
This one statement, number 47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn't cite any conversation or anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart disassociated himself from Leopold's efforts. originally though we would object, on reviewing them they appeared to set out actual conversations between Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart, and it might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do not object to the next three.
However, 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto's book that, in Zernatto's opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and was double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object to that for the reason that I have stated, it is the author's opinion. He is deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any event, we do not think his opinion can be very helpful.
Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto's book, which sets out a conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that was altogether too vague and would not be of value or helpful. Inquart was afraid of Shouldering responsibility.
I don't want to stress our objections too heavily to these extracts. I don't think they are very harmful, certainly, but I rather object because we would like to cut down some of this printing, and I do not think they will be very helpful to Seyss-Inquart. from the publication entitled, "The Elements of National Socialism", by Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal has heard very much about through other defendants, the disproportionate position of the Jewish population in Germany, and so on. We object to it as not being helpful and not material.
Again, 69 is another extract from Zernatto's book on the causes, as some of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion and does not seem to be helpful or material here.
Number 71 is on the Slovak question. I doubt that there has been any serious claim made anywhere in this case that at various times the Slovaks have not claimed autonomy. This extract from the Archiv of 1938, in so far as we can discover, seems to establish that they did want autonomy. Well, we don't think that is very important here, and it will not be helpful to the Tribunal or to Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of State?
MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the Archives, and in that sense it is a public document.
THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the Reich?
MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, in 1938, and it preceded the taking over.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.
MR. DODD: Those are our objections, Mr. President. I do think we have tried to be rather -
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering now the question of objections to publication, or rather, to translation. We are not considering the question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to object to them after they have been translated.
MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We tried to be, I think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most of them, are not too long. We did think we would have to call a halt somewhere, and I do not think our 17 objections out of the 87 listed are very strict or are pinching, really, the defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for defendant Seyss-Inquart): Your Lordship, High Military Tribunal. I know that you value my small country, Austria, not only because of its ancient culture, and not only because of its scenic beauty, but also for the reason that it was the first country which lost its freedom through Hitler.
cannot expect of you that, as representatives of the larger powers, you know the history of my country to the last detail. it is of the utmost importance, in fact-- that you understand fully out of what background and out of what motive this man acted the way he did. in 1918, ran like a red thread, up until the year 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual documents as soon as possible, because, you will remember, we are only discussing the question of whether they should be translated or not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. Party. my documents. the Weimar Assembly, and I am of the conviction that it is important in judging that the Anschluss was not only a wish of the Austrian population, but of the entire German people, and I request that this document be granted me. who lived in Vienna and who was a friend of our country. He knows the economic background and economic conditions in Austria, conditions which led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my including this document.
Chancellor Dr. Schober, who had world reknown and who, in this speech, referred to the difficulties and the burdens which were imposed on Austria, which were tremendous and almost impossible of being shouldered by Austria. Karl Renner, from a speech which was delivered in 1922.
At that time Dr. Seipel went again and, with great difficulty, put through a loan which was of great importance to us because, at the same time, it was demanded o f Austria, that we should forego independence for ten years' duration. That meant that we would not take any steps to change the demands for an Anschluss. document 33, I only described the economic situation as it obtained in the year 1938. the strong political propaganda for the Anschluss.
No. 21 is irrelevant. I consider it extemely important, since this new, young party, which arose on the fertile soil of economic disunity in the years 1931 and 1932, grew tenfold, and in that way it was widespread and active political opposition to the existing regime.
The next document, No. 22, is an extract from an article which again shows the economic situation at a period of time which was very important to history, when Chancellor Dollfuss traveled to Lausanne in order to receive another loan from the League of Nations, and we again were restricted to refuse thoughts of an Anschluss for another ten years.
This document, No. 22, as well as No. 23, is not cumulative, since one shows the plitical and the other the economic position of the members of Parliament with respect to the League of Nations' loan in the year 1932. various surrounding states of Austria in relation to the Anschluss. I selected only Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country that was most strongly in favor of the Anschluss. addition to the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon Walker is not only a member of the Labor Party, but -- and this point is much more important -- during the entire war years he was head of the British Radio Division Austria, and in the year 1938 he was in Austria personally and personally lived through and experienced the Anschluss. His opinion and his judgment, therefore, are of extraordinary importance, since they are the opinion and judgment of a prominent foreigner. made by the American Senator Borah, who for 25 years was the head of the Committee of Foreign Affairs. His opinion seems of great importance and should be listened to. Dr. Zernatto. I should like to add that Dr. Zernatto was Austrian Minister, General Secretary of the Home Front, as well as being the right hand of Schuschnigg during the period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual fathers of the Schuschnigg plebescite.
I am sorry to say that he died abroad in emigration in 1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness here, but his book is a document and reproduces, infact, those thoughts and those experiences which he lived through in those critical days. be granted me.
The next two documents concern anti-Semitism. I only decided with regret to submit them, since I want to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic propaganda. I did include them because in the trial brief my client is accused of being a member of an anti-Semitic group. This accusation is unjustifiable since these societies were very insignificant and they should not be considered more important than they actually were. If this matter is not emphasized by the prosecution, I will not put any particular stress on it myself.
The last document which is being objected to, No. 71, contains an agreement whichwas concluded between Massaryk and Klinka, the Slovak leader, at which occasion Massaryk solemnly promised autonomy to the Slovaks, a promise which was not kept according to the letter of the agreement. A strong movement for autonomy resulted, and this movement was supported by Hitler. For the reasons just mentioned, I ask that I be granted this document as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider the question of these documents.
Yes, Dr. Siemers.
DR. SIEMERS: If it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection with the Norwegian problem, on one occasion I mentioned Documents 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86, and submitted those documents. I beg your Lordship's pardon, this omission.
The document has already been granted me. It is Raeder Exhibit No. 88, which I would like to submit at this point, a document which is an extract from the White Book.
It may be found in my Document Book V, on page 392. This document shows the British order of April 1940, regarding the plans for the occupation of Swedish ore fields, to be taken from the base of Narvik. necessary for me to read from it. BY DR. SIEMERS: had stopped with that. I had put a question about the directive No. 8421-PS. You had answered that question to the effect that the Navy did not participate and collaborate in thesetting up of this directive. You further stated that the Navy, in January, curried out those preparations according to command and order. I believe you made a mistake when you said that this directive was signed by Hitler, Keitel and Jodl. Hitler signed it, but Keitel and Jodl only initialed it. That is, we are not concerned with the signature of the other two gentlemen since when these directives were issued they were signed only by Hitler, and the others could only countersign. straight on this matter.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to refer to Document C-35, US-132. This document is found in the document book of the British Delegation, No. 10A, on page 16. It is an extract from the War Diary with the date of the 30th of January 1941. It deals with the preparations on the part of the Navy in accordance with the Hitler decree of the 18th of December, where Hitler, under No. IV of the directive, decreed that precautionary measures were to be taken in case Russia should alter her present position toward Germany, that is, only in case Russia should change her attitude toward Germany. BY DR. SIEMERS: situation, the Prosecution has mentioned Document C-66, and has submitted this document, GB-81.
This is your report of January 10, 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical archives of the Navy.
DR. SIEMERS : Thesdocument will be found in the document book of the British Delegation, No. 10, page 13. There you will find the basic position taken by Raeder with respect to the Case Barbarossa, and this is set forth under "a" of the document. Book 10A, on page 35.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q On that occasion you wrote: "At this time the Fuehrer had made known his 'unalterable decision' to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situationshad arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff I was never convinced of the 'Compelling necessity' for Barbarossa." Do you have to add anything to the statement you made in this regard at that time? been issued on the 18th of December, now at the end of December, as may be seen from document C-170, which I quoted yesterday on several occasions, this document shows that I gave a comprehensive speech and report in order to convince the Fuehrer about the inexactitude and incorrectness of this decision. This showed that I really over-stepped my bounds, so to speak, for if and when the Fuehrer had issued a directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical case, it was in general more or less impossible to step up to him and offer contradictory or other measures; everything else, I mentioned yesterday. proposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned that at the time it had been planned to carry through the action "Seeloewe", that is, to land in England? navy, was this possibility disposed of, when did you have to dispense with this plan? the landing could be carried through. I can add a consideration from the commander-in-chief of the army and it was on my part that we had told Hitler, and he realized this fully, that for a landing, superiority in the air would have to be on our side and therefore we were just waiting to see whether we could actually produce this air superiority for the landing which, according to weather conditions, could be carried out later at the beginning of October and if it hadn't been possible to carry it out at that time to land, it would have to be postponed until the month of May of the following year.
I came to pass that air superiority was not present in the proper degree and consequently, it was said that the landing would have to be postponed until the spring of the following year; further preparations were to be taken and they actually were taken, but in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was completely dispensed with and Hitler decreed that preparations on the coast along the channel should be carried on only to such a degree that the impression would remain to the English that this landing actually would take place -- in September, I had the impression that Hitler did not any longer have any great interest in carrying through the landing and that in his own mind he was completely sold on the Russian campaign and simultaneously with the Russian campaign, of course, he couldn't carry on a landing into England as well. prosecution, that you were active and demanded a war against America. The prosecution has stated in this connection and has submitted document C-152, equal to GB-122, which is to be found in the document book of the British Delegation, No. 10, page 23. This document deals with an extract from the war diary of the SKL, dealing with a speech of the commander in chief of the navy -- that is you -- to the Fuehrer, made on the 18th of March 1941 in which you gave a report to Hitler. Under Figure 11 of this document, it is stated and I quote: "The Japanese must act to take Singapore as soon as possible since we would never again have an opportunity as favorable as this. The entire English fleet and the United States are not ready to carry on a war against Japan. The United States fleet is inferior to the Japanese fleet. Japan is preparing for this action and according to the statements of Japanese officers, Japan will wish to carry through this matter only when Germany is attempting to land in England. All effort in Germany must therefore marshal themselves to bring about Japan acting immediately. When Japan has Singapore in her power, all other greater Asiatic problems relating to the United States and England will be solved -- Guam, Philippines, Borneo, and Dutch East Indies. Japan wants to prevent this war against the United States of America and it can be done so if it will take Singapore promptly."
The prosecution has construed this statement to this effect, that you wanted to instigate Japan to attack America. Is that correct? indictment against me. It is entirely clear when I am involved with a naval battle with England with my smaller German navy, I do not want under any circumstances to have America on my neck as well and it has been discussed repeatedly that my most urgent effort during the entire first fewyears of the war was not to involve the United States and do anything to incite them. Admiral Wagner showed explicitly which limitations I had imposed upon the German navy in order to prevent that any conflict with the United States should come about. I imposed limitations which ware almost impossible for me to account for when I carried on my U-boat warfare with the British with the small means at my disposal. On the other hand, the United States, beginning with the end of 1940 and during the entire year of 1941, pressed us in our naval warfare with all means and committed deeds which could be interpreted as completely not neutral. I should like to call your attention to the repairing of British warships at the United States of America. This is a matter which up until that time was completely unknown and unheard of and on the orders to shoot, on the part of Roosevelt, in June, July and September 1941, attacks by American destroyers in the Atlantic, attacks on our U-boats were in two cases in which U-boats were followed with depth charges for two hours until finally they surfaced and shot and in one case damaged the destroyer. Despire all of these provocations, in June 1941, I reported to Hitler that in the future the merchantmen of the United States should not be disturbed by us in any way and that the result and outcome was that United States merchantment were crossing the Atlantic completely undisturbed on sea lanes of their own choosing and that they were in a position to give reports about our U-boats and give reports about our sea warfare without our disturbing them in this connection or preventing them and that through this, the British were in a position to camouflage their ships as American ships. That, they did. For the first time when our armored ship "Sheer" or Battleship "Admiral Sheer" in crossing the Atlantic, saw a ship carrying the American flag, in searching this ship, it was found that this was a British ship, a Canadian Cruiser.
Despite all of these reasons, I recommended to the Fuehrer and he approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures against American ships and we did not go to Halifax -Admiral Wagner already mentioned this and I need not clarify his statement. purpose of having an ally against England, England with whom we were already at war? the development which lead to this proposal. This was not anything that I did on my own initiative but in the beginning of the year 1941, political negotiations were carried on by the Fuehrer and by the Foreign Minister with Japan. I was not even called into these negotiations and I must say, regrettably so, for at these negotiations many things were discussed which were not correct and on the other side, we can see that this was no talk about a conspiracy. There was a way of approaching, so to speak, on the visit of the Foreign Minister Matsuoka, I believe, in March -- on the basis of this entire development, the Fuehrer on the 5th of March 1941, issued a directive No. 24 and that is the document C-75, equal to US-151. The date is the 5th of March.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to callethe attention of the High Tribunal to C-75, the same as US 151, to be found in the document Book of the British Delegation No. 10-a, Page 58. In this directive, No. 24, it says under Figure 3-a, "As the joint object of the carrying on of the war, it is important to conquer England, as soon as possible, and in that way to keep the United States out of the war."
And three paragraphs further down, under "b", it says: "The capture of Singapore -
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the right reference? That on page 58 is instruction No. 54, concerning collaboration with Japan.
DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised -- it was quite a surprise to me -- that of this directive, there is only a part of it to be found in the English translation, andI ask that the High Tribunal grant me the permission under these circumstances subsequently to submit the translation of the complete directive in this Raeder document.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your Raeder book, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: No, not up until now; for since did not know that only a fragment has been translated, I am asking for permission to have this document completely translated and submitted in toto as a Raeder document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. This may be found Figure 3-a, and the next quotation will be found under Figure 3-d, and it says: "The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England in the Far East, would be a decisive victory for the war effort of the three powers. Beyond that, attacks on other sea bases for the British sea power are to obtain only if the entrance of the United States of America cannot be prevented, andwill serve to hamper the war system of the enemy." March, which is the date of this directive, Hitler decreed the capture of Singapore. Consequently, the suggestion put by Grand Admiral Raeder since a Hitler decree was already existing at the time.
THE WITNESS: May I answer briefly? The same thing seems to apply to all cases which are being mentioned here:
first of all, the political decision of Hitler; that is, the head of the State; then the directive of the commander-in -chief of the Wehrmacht, for the Wehrmacht; then the results which accrued to the various branches of the Wehrmacht. how, if Japan was to enter the war, Japan could act most suitably and expediently. And in this connection we were concerned with the question of how we damage our main opponent, Engalnd, on water, and therefore I had to insist that Japan move against Singapore, since there were circles who were of the opinion that Japan should attack Vladiovstock, which would have been a grave mistake. that was Singapore, under the circumstances. But I as well believed that through the capture of Singapore, the United States of America would be intimidated and kept out of the war. BY DR. SIEMERS: which is mentioned in the special accusation against you. It is US 152, and may be found in the document book of the British Delegation No. 10, Page 320. It is a conversation between the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka.
I am just told now that 320 is incorrect. It should be 319.
THE PRESIDENT: It should be 10-A.
DR. SIEMERS: 10-A; that is correct, your Honor. I beg your pardon. and von Ribbentrop on the 29th of March, 1941. We have already discussed this matter.
In the 8th paragraph of this document, the following is said:
"The Reich Foreign Minister again in this connection referred to the problem of Singapore because of the fear on the part of the Japanese that there would be U-boats attacks from the Phillipines, and the use of the British fleet. He had discussed the situation once more with Admiral Raeder.
"Then I told him that the British fleet was in the home waters and in the Mediterranean, and she would have her hands full there, and she could not despatch even a single ship to the Far East.
"The American U-boats were considered to be so poor and insignificant by Admiral Raeder that Japan would not have to concern herself with them at all. BY DR. SIEMERS: 1946, declared that he had been mistaken. The statement was probably made by Hitler.
Will you please clarify this statement once and for all? Mr. von Ribbentrop, for I am sorry to say there was no connection between the Foreign Office and the O.K.M. especially since the Fuehrer had forbidden any information to be given to the foreign Office by the military regency. Hence, that statement would never have been made by him, especially since his statements were completely in contradiction to my opinion, and especially since he had no basis for any such statements at that time. frequently dealt with in the S.K.L. dealing with the economic, industrial, and military strength of the United States, and that an entrance of the United States should be worried about?
We were entirely clear about this up until the last detail. Did you at any time during the war see this document 1877 P.S., which is before you?
Q As far as these discussions between Mr. von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka were concerned, and the discussions with Oshima, were you advised about these?
A No; I was told by the Fuehrer. It is shown in the document C 17- what the outcome of this discussion with Matsuoka was. But I had no discussions with Mr. von Ribbentrop at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just been asked to correct a word which I have just used; and in order to be fair, I should like to do so.
I said, "Hitler, in his directive of the 5th of March, 1941, decreed to take Singapore. The manner of expression is not quite correct. He could not give orders to Japan. The mistake arises because the directive starts with the words, "The Fuehrer, in order to cooperate with Japan, has decreed the following." And under figure 3 it says, "The following basic principles or directives, apply". And among these basic, principles, or directives, the taking os Singapore is mentioned. BY DR. SIEMERS: suggest to anyone at all or tell anyone at all that Japan attack Pearl Harbour? Pearl Harbour?
A Never. It was a complete surprise to me and the S.K.L. that this attack actually did take place, and it is a mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese if one would assume that they would have told of such a plan to anyone not within Japan or to anyone who was not directly connected with this plan; and the same way in 1904. Out of the blue they attacked the Russian ships without anyon's suspecting anything like that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal; in this connection I should like to submit 3 documents which have been granted me, Raeder Exhibit No. 19, to be found in Document Book II, page 108. This document deals with the report by the American General Marshall which has been placed at my disposal for the assistance of the Court. stated the following, and I should like to refer to page 116:
"In order to determine when and how Germany and Japan failed, I asked General Eisenhower to question the highest military leaders who at present are prisoners of war. The outcome of these interviews is of extraordinary importance and interest. They give us a picture of the divergence of opinion among the hostile nations as well as the lack of comprehensive planning.
Both factors were evidenced in the critical moment of this world war, and were deciphered at the critical moment."
Two paragraphs further down, it says, "No proof has been found up to now tha the German Supreme command had an all-comprehensive strategic plan. The High Command, on general principles, approved of Hitler's policy, but his rather wild strategy was beyond the German military possibilities and capabilities, and brought about the collapse of Germany.
"The history of the German High Command, starting with 1933, shows constant personal conflicts in which increasingly Hitler's directives against military judgment dominated. The first clash took place in the year 1938, and in this, with the removal of Blomberg, Fritsche, and Beck, and the very effective conservative influence on the German policies ended with this removal.
"The campaign in Norway, France and the Netherlands brought about serious divergences between Hitler and the Generals, especially as pertained to the details of the carrying out of the strategic plans. In any and every case the General Staff was for he carrying through in an orthodox manner of the plan, but Hitler, on the other hand, stood for an unorthodox attack, the object and aims of which lay deep within hostile territory in each case.
"Hitler's opinion dominated, and the most surprising result of each of these successive attacks raised Hitler's prestige to such a point where one did not dare any longer to contradict his opinion.
"Hits military self-confidence became unlimited after the success and victory in France and from now on he started to criticize the opinions of the higher generals, even in the presence of junior officers, until it came about that the General Staff could not resist when Hitler resolved on his fateful decision to attack Russia." and I quote:
"In addition, there is no proof on hand showing a close strategic plan between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff realized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia, but hoped that the Japanese would meet many forces of land sea and air.
"Since there is no proof to the contrary, it is assumed that Japan acted on her own initiative and not in accordance with previously laid and coordinated plans." 113 and 114, could be found in the Document Roman Numeral VI, p. 494 and p. 497:
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the witness whether he agrees with General Marshall's opinion.
DR. SIEMERS:
Q You agree with the opinions of the American,General Marshall?
A I do not absorb these thoughts. They were processes of thought which we had as well, but I cannot vouch for each thought. In order to speak with surety, I would have to look at these proposals or they would have to be read to me.