question at all, except for the fact that I had received this intelligence report. I cannot give you the exact date of the letter, but it was perhaps the last of September or the first of October; it must have been in that period of time. The arrival of this letter caused me to show the letter of the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him, with all dispatch, to deal with the question of the occupation of Norwegian bases on the part of England, and the other question which Admiral Karls had dealt with, and have the questions discussed in the SKL; the advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards the north, not only of an expansion on our part, but, above all, the expansion through England; what value would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages would result if we would have to defend the Norwegian coast. whichis GB-82 where the questions were asked; what places were to be used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be; whether these ports were to be developed further; and also, what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned.
as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the suggestion on the 10th of October. me that if we had intended to occupy these bases we would violate neutrality, but I knew, as well, the agreement which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of the 2nd of September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding fact stated in Aidemoire, which is document TC-31, GB-79, dated 2 September 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, Mr. President, that this document is found in the document book of the British Delegation at page 330. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q You have that document before you? sentence.
DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, at page 329.
A (Continuing) The last sentence: "Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interestsof the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate." I had the data submitted to me which the SKL had prepared on this entire complex of questions. Then, I asked to be permitted to report to Hitler on the 10th of October, because I considered this problem tremendously important. It was entirely clear to me that the best possible solution for uswould be that of having Norway maintain a reliable neutrality, and I expressed my opinion, as may be seen in document C-21, GB-82.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, that is GB-194.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?
THE WITNESS: This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.
DR. SIEMERS: It is in the document book of the British Delegation, 10-A, page 6.
THE WITNESS: It says here, on the third page of the German version, the next but last paragraph, under the date of 13 January, "Situation conference with the Chief of the SKL."
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not entirely translated by the prosecution. This document may be found in my document book under Raeder Exhibit No. 69, and I should like to submit it herewith.
THE PRESIDENT: Document Book III only goes to 64, is that right? It must be Document Book IV.
DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book then. In the table of contents, Document 64 was the last one mentioned, but since that time there has been a supplement added. It is in Document Book IV, page 317. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Pleas comment on this document.
A. In the next but last paragraph, it says:
"In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion that the most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance of the present situation, which if strictest neutrality is exercised by Norway will permit the safe use of Norwegian territorial waters for the shipping vital to German's war effort without the attempt being made on the part of England to endanger seriously this sea-lane."
I maintained this point of view with Hitler. In my report to the Fuehrer I mentioned the intelligence report which we had at our disposal. Then I pictured the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation of bases on the Norwegian Coast, which would affect our entire war effort, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that occupation by England would work out to the greatest detriment to our carrying on the war. of Norway, from those points they would have been able to dominate the entrance to the East Sea, as well as our naval operations out of the German Bay, and that was the second exit which we had. They would have hampered the operations of battleships as well as our merchantmen. air operations for reconnaisance in the North Sea for attacks against England. They could have hampered us in all of these operations. that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of ore would have been cut down or would have stopped entirely on the basis of politic pressure.
Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and since we know how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway, this was a very important point. They might have even gone so far -- and we learned about this subsequently when these things were discussed -- as attacking and destroying the ore deposits at Lunea, or bringing them into British possession. carrying on of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian Coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been lively naval operations near the Norwegian Coast, and if we were to occupy these bases, England would try to hamper our ore traffic from Norway and battles could result which we, with our inadequate supply of surface vessels, could not handle. Norway or that we should obtain baser in Norway. I only did my duty in telling the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht about this grave danger which was thre tening us, and against which we would have to use emergency measures in our defense. I also pointed out to him that operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases would be very expensive for us, and in the course of later discussion, I told him that we might even lose our entire fleet, and I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen later on. gain prestige, a point of which I have been accused by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite could result.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date from the time of the war, one of which is Raeder Exhibit No. 69, of the 13th of January 1940. fact that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the situation would be unbearable for the carrying on of the German war, and such a situation could be prevented only if we got ahead or England by occupying Norway ourselves.
to by the witness. Prosecution, C-66, GB-81, which may he found in British Document Book 10A, page 35. This document is dated 10 January 1944, May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that there, under "Weser Maneuver" -- that war the name for this action -- those explanations are set forth which the witness has just made. I do not wish to read all of this since we would lose valuable time thereby.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: No, the last page, under the heading "Weser Maneuver", page 39. The letter by Admiral Karls which was mentioned by the witness is mention. ed in here, and his thoughts in connection with this matter. In the German original there is the heading, "Appendix 2". January 1940, three months after this affair, and new reports had come in. This, on the other hand, is a picture dating from October 1939. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Grand Admiral, I must once more refer to Document C-122, which you have already mentioned. The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying, "The Chief SKL deems it necessary to tell the Fuehrer as soon as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility for expansion of operation, al maneuvers to the north."
was your primary thought, to expand the operational bases for the Navy. zone to the north was concerned, I meant that there might be an expansion on the part of the British as well as ourselves, that we should got ahead of the Englis and, in such a way, gain these bases, bases which would be of certain importance to us.
Q What did Hitler reply at this discussion on the 10th of October 1939?
A Hitler had not concerned himself with this question at all. The question was Very far from his mind, for as far as matters of naval warfare were concern he knew very little about them. He always remarked that he did not have an overall picture of these things, and therefore felt somewhat uncertain. He said that he would concern himself with this question and that I should submit the notes which I had worked out together with the SKL, and leave the notes with him so he might use them as a basis for his deliberations on this problem. that at this occasion when Hitler was confronted with the problem of Norway, he did not say a single word about the fact that previously, perhaps in the summer of that year, he had already heard from Rosenberg about Norwegian questions. I gather from a document which I have only learned of here that Rosenberg on the 20th of June 1939, spoke to the Fuehrer and gave him a comprehensive report about his connections with Norwegian political circles. It would have been a matter of course for me if the Fuehrer had concerned himself with Norwegian strategical matters and had told me. "I have such and such information about Norwegian conditions." That did not take place, however. The Fuehrer told me that We should await the arrival of further reports and that he would concern himself with these questions. 11th of December, did you discuss this question with Hitler again? September Corvette Captain Schreiber had been made the highest attache in Oslo. and later on he had become the naval attache in Oslo. During this time, Schreiber as well as the intelligence service, gave me further reports about conditions in Norway, and told me of reports which were circulating about a possible landing of the British.
Later on. Schreiber was my chief collaborator in these Norwegian problems, and he showed a particular understanding for this special situation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the Tribunal Raeder Exhibit 107, an affidavit of the naval attache who has just been mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in my document book V, page 464. a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attache, He stated that since the autumn of 1939 he had been active in that capacity. this, under 1, on page 464, at the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, this is one of the documents which was objected to, is it not?
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon?
THE PRESIDENT: This is one of the documents which was objected to, was it not?
DR. SIEMERS: There is nothing coming through, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you hear now, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents which were objected to. We read this document, so it is necessary for you to read it allagain.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer to the first part of this affidavit, part I?
MR. President, I should like to point out a very insignificant error in translation on page 466. In the second paragraph, second line, the word "Deutsch", "German", is missing -- to clear the record., "on the part of the Foreign Office to maintain and respect Norwegian neutrality". In the English text it says, "foreign office". It should read "of the German Foreign Office"; and I should be very grateful if this mistake could be rectified. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Grand Admiral, you know the affidavit given by Schreiber. In this, reports were mentioned, and you have already referred to this point. During these two months, did special intelligence reports come in? Among other things besides reports which you have already mentioned, was Narvik mentioned also?
A Captain Schreiber mentioned Narvik for the first time expressly; that is, as far as I remember. Captain Schreiber very quickly had worked into conditions there, and he had very fine connections in Norwegian circles. The confirmation of all that I had known up until that point came about on the 11th of December. 1939. which I believe were submitted by the prosecution, may be used in this connection that is, the meeting record of the 11th and 12th, and an accompanying letter by Rosenberg referring to these meetings and similar matters?
Q Grand Admiral, we shall refer to this. I believe that you will be permitted to use th ese documents. But since they are known, just mention the points that you remember. On this occasion, I should like to ask only on documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS and 007-PS. You did not know those documents?
A No, I did not know those documents. I just learned about them here. But the reports contained in these documents may be proved by subsequent documents, according to the date. Quisling. Rosenberg -- not mentioning the fact that I saw him on occasion, or had seen him on occasion -- nor, above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had heard nothing up until that time.
On the 11th of December, my chief of staff, Mr. Schoulte-Moenting, reported to me that Major Quisling had arrived from Oslo, Quisling who had been Minister of War, since he was asking for a discussion with me, and this request was put by Mr. Hageling. His reason for the visit was given that Quisling wanted to tell me about Norwegian conditions.
Mr. Hageling had been sent to my chief of staff by Major Rosenberg, who knew both of these gentlemen, as I have already mentioned. Since reports from my secretary seemed to be of great value to me, I declared myself to be ready to receive Mr. Quisling. conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relation of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports on the intention of England to land in Norway, and characterized the whole situation as especially urgent; for according to his reports, the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to establish a date, and it seemed to me it should occur before the 10th of January, since then a favorable political situation would arise. but I could try to see to it that he could report this to the Fuehrer. B ut I was concerned only with the military and strategic situation, and in that connection, I could tell him right away that the possibility from the 11th of December until the 10th of January was not good because of the brevity of time and because of the fact that it was winter, and these efforts would be without success.
I would try to arrange for him to report to the Fuehrer personally so that these reports would reach him directly. him of our conversation , the conversation between Quisling and me, and I asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a personal impression of Quisling. documents -- that in cases of this kind, one should have to be especially cautious, since one could not know to what degree such a political and party leader would try to further the interest of his party. Therefore, our investigations would have to be especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway or the Norwegian coast would bring with it a great risk as well as disadvantages for the subsequent situation. In other words, I pictured the case in both aspects, and I presented it in a neutral manner following days. These two gentlemen then obviously were in connection with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, and Mr. Rosenberg then sent me in the form of a letter a record of a meeting of a session which had been taken down by Quisling and Hageling. by the prosecution, it said specifically that Rosenberg know the political conditions, but that, of course, he was not familiar with the military judgment of the situation, that he would leave the military judgment up to me, since I was the commandant for the sector.
DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit 67, to be found in my Document Book IV, Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder dated the 13th of December, 1939, which was not mentioned by the prosecution. The prosecution merely mentioned the points contained in the letter -- that is, a note in the files by Rosenberg, under No. C-65, the same as BG-85. C-65 and Raeder Exhibit 67 belong together according to their contents.
THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another document besides Raeder 67 which you were referring to?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder 67.
THE PRESIDENT: I know about that. But you said some other document, as well.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the prosecution, C-65. And that belongs with these letters; the two things belong together. The latter document, C-65, is to be found in the document book of the British Delegation 10-A, Page 33. If these two documents are considered together, it may be seen that the political side is not mentioned in either document; and from that we may see that the witness said that he was not concerned with the political side of the picture, but only with the military side.
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor, I think it would be a good time to break off.
(A recess was taken).
MR. DOD D: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the defendant, SEYSS-INQUART, counsel for SEYSS-INQUART, and representatives of the Prosecution have been conferring with respect to his application for documents. We have agreed on a great number, but there are twenty upon which we are unable to agree.
THE PRESIDENT: Twenty?
MR. DODD: Twenty. I think we could do it in thirty minutes if the Tribunal will set some time aside, it might take a little more. Sir David has reminded me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead with their translation work.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr.Dodd, I think the best time would be to take it tomorrow morning at teno'clock.
MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also that the case of SEYSS-INQUART precede that of VON PAPEN. I understand that is the wish of the British counsel, and very satisfactory to us as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Norway drafted? had with the Fuehrer on the 14th of December in my presence the Fuehrer ordered that the O.K.W. should now deal with the matter and should study it. The Fuehrer then had two more conferences with Quisling on the 16th and 18th of December where I was not present, and the matterthen according to the directives was treated by the O.K.W., and at first a study was made from the Document C-21, which I have mentioned before, We concede that the Study North on the 13th of January was received by S.K.S., and then in the course of January and the date of the 27th of January has been mentioned, the draft of a directive for the case North was made, and that draft was made in the O.K.W, and as expert for the Navy Captain Krenke took part in it. the three branches of the armed forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports had been received which could be used as a basis for the draft of the directive.
These reports now besides coming from Captain Schreiber also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the Fuehrer, and they concerned the preparatory work which had been done by the English and the French. The Navy Attache Kamering? was mentioned in the preparations which had been made in Norwegian ports for the possibilities of landing, measurements of docks and the heighth of the bridges on Norvik and on the Swedish border for similar things. able time a landing was intended. Besides, also political reports reached us, and Hageling throu hg his connections in Norwegian circleshad received reports which in part came directly from the representative Hageling andmembers of the Government. and Russia played a certain role, and the danger was discussed and considered that England under pretense of aid for Finland would consider a cold-blooded occupation of Norway. That directive for the case of Norway, therefore, came one the 1 March, was issued on the 1st of March, and in the further course of the month of March more reports were received. In themeantime, the Altmark incident had occurred, and it was reported by Hageling that the attitude of the Norwegian Commander was such that one could say that the Norwegian Government in the case of the preparation by the English would only protest on paper. correct? The Prosecution from the Document 1809 quoted the order of the 5th of March. That is an entry in the diary of Jodl, 1500 conferences about the case with the three Commanders in Chief, Field Marshal Canaris who was more concerned before about it. How is it possible, Admiral, that Reich Marshal Goering had not been consulted at a time when the directive was issued?
A I cannot explain that at all. I can't understand it. I had no authority to speak about it and I can't say why he was not consulted. highest man in the Reich would not be in it from the beginning? Hasn't he ever spoken to you about that matter?
pecially around the Fuehrer, one could speak of a conspiracy. The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during any one of the conferences or receptions of Quisling, and I had no authority to speak to him about these matters. on the 13th of March, in which he stated the Fuehrer had not given the order?
May-17-A-RT-19-1 "Q" Having it read in entirely,
A Yes. In the English translation as much as I remember he says "Looking for excuse;" but he had neither justification nor he needed neither justification nor excuse, because in the directive of the first of March -- that is to say, two weeks before that, in the first paragraph he has stated what circumstances made it necessary we receive permit to occupy Norway and Denmark, conduct operations in Scandinavia, secure provisions with Sweden and secure provisions for the Air Force against England.
DR, SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document C. 174; that is, G.B. 89, Document Book of the British Prosecution 10-A, page 113. That is the directive for the plan from the first March '40 which the witness has mentioned contains already the justification or the reasons for it. came through the information service of Captain Schreiber and so on, and that also, objectively, according to the facts I may be permitted to submit Several documents -- and that is Raeder Exhibit Number 75 from the White Book with the date of the 17 February 40, containing Mention of the landing of British Troops in Trondheim and Narvik, and several appendages to it, from which the considerations in force at that time can be seen concerning the Swedish ore; Document Raeder 77, Exhibit 77 -
THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?
DR SIEMERS: Beg your pardon. Not page, out Raeder Exhibit 75. It is page 340. Document Book 4.
Document 44, Page 352. I have seen in the English document book a mistake. On page 353 the heading is missing. That is to say, under page 354. And I may point out that this document has the date of the 23rd of February 1940. That is contained in the original document. The heading "Intervention in Scandinavia." It concerns the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports, and so on. It mentions again the question of the Swedish ore.
Then I come again to the document Raider Exhibit 78; page of the Document book,4, 357, an excerpt from the war diary of the war Navy Command of the 4th of march, in connection with the case of the Altmark. It is explained that its sending against British military action against Norway wasn't possible.
in-chief of the French army, General Gamelin. He also finds mistakes in the translation. The heading of the document was left out, was omitted. On page 360 I would be grateful to the Tribunal if it would note that the original Document has the date of the 10th of March 1940. It is top secret and is based on the fact that since 16th of January the general plan of armed intervention in Finland existed, and therefore as a matter of prc ution the ports and airports of the Norwegian coast should be occupied. the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied Study Commission of the 11th of March 1940, top secret, concerning landing at Narvik. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Then, Admiral, we are finished with Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased in the month of March. When aid Hitler give the final order for the occupation?
A The end of March or beginning of April. I couldn't recall the exact date. that in February Quisling informed us that Mr. Halifax had told the Norwegian. ambassador in London that an operation on the part of the British for the acquisi tion of bases in Norway was intended for the near future, and that report at that time reached us. Needless to say, in addition to that I have emphasized before that in all conscience I always tried to show to the Fuehrer both sides of the picture because I was conscious of the responsibility that on the basis of the material presented by me. the Fuehrer would have to take or refuse that decision. But that does not mean to say that in any way I refused the responsibility for having pointed out to the supreme commander of the Armed Forces that particular danger, and therefore of course I am in some way responsible for the whole thing; because, after all, I have been accused that in a letter which has also been submitted here, C. 155, that I had expressed to my Officers Corps that I was proud of the execution of this extraordinary dangerous enterprise. I should like to confirm this, because I believe I should be proud that the Navy, with such limited means, carried out that operation in the face of the entire British fleet; and I remain of that position.
Q. In the month of March did messages come to the SKL about violations of the neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in Norwegian waters?
A. Yes. In the second half of the month of March statements about action of British planes against our merchant shipping repeatedly occurred, ships which brought the Swedish ores from Narvik.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit some more documents? Raeder Exhibit 81, Document Book 5, page, of the original, 372, War Diary of the Naval War Command, containing several entries according to which these incidents became more and more frequent, in which the Norwegian neutrality was violated by British ships and planes. Since that document is known I do not have to read anything from it. March, also concerning violations of neutrality. 6th session of the Supreme Council, dated 20 March, 1940, which has already been mentioned yesterday and where the justification concerning the vital interests with respect to international law is mentioned and the laying of mines from 5th day of April on. like the previous one, is a document from the White Book. May I only point out that it mentions that the first transport is to leave on the 5th of April; in other words, four days before the occupation by Germany. to take official notice, which reports the chartering of over ninety per cent of Norwegian tankers and merchant fleet by England. from C-151 and C-115. Those are documents GB-91 and GB-90, Document Book of the British delegation 10-A, on pages 106 and 162. The dates are 30 March of 1940 and 4 April, 1940. The documents show that the ships which would carry out the landing, for camouflage reasons, should carry the British flag, and from that the prosecution has concluded an accusation. BY D.R SIEMERS:
Q. What do you say about it?
A. That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships carry a foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that ruse, however, is that at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is opened, their own flag has to be opened in time. That has always been done in the German Navy, especially with our cruisers, which frequently sailed under a foreign flag to be taken as merchant ships, but who always have lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of honor. But it must be added that in this case, such as the War Diary shows on the 8th of September -
Q. 8th of April.
A. 8th of April, yes -- that on the 8th of April, on account of certain considerations, we rescinded that order because we had these reports that an English action was under way and we feared that complications would arise from that. So this order was not carried out in the long run. I believe the document can be found which contains that.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in that connection, Raeder Exhibit No. 89, Document Book 5, page 400, where we find, under the 8th of April, that the previous order is rescinded; the British flag is not to be used.
A. You also asked about Document C-115, which says that the blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships should enter Oslo Fjord. That has always been a quite regular ruse of war against which, from the legal pointof view, no objection can be made. Likewise, concerning signals of identity if English names are given; there is nothing to be said against that.
I did not quite answer one question because I was interrupted. That was the question concerning the expression "justification" or "excuse" in the War Diary of Colonel-General Jodl. As I have shown, it was not a question of justification which Hitler had expressed a long time before that, but I believe that I can be quite sure that it was a question as to the diplomatic note which, at the moment of the execution of the enterprise, had to be presented, had to presented to the Norwegian and Danish government to give cause for his actions, that this note was not yet drafted, especially since he had not spoken to the Foreign Minister at that time at all. The Foreign Minister received the information, as he has said himself, only on the 3rd of April or -- yes, on the 3rd of April.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe with that we can conclude the question of the occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document, Raeder Exhibit 66, which was approved for the purpose of argument? Those are the files of Dr. Mosler and it can be found in volume 4, page 291, and in that connection, concerning the use of flags, may I specially emplasize Figure 70, page 304, from which we can see the legal reasoning behind it. and the series of documents as far as they are approved, Raeder Exhibit 91, Admiral Darlan to the French Minister Daladier on the 12th of April, 1940; Raeder Exhibit 92, page 412. This document contains the English-French note to the Norwegian government on the 8th of April, 1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses the same legal point of view as the statement by Dr. Mosler. Raeder Exhibit No. 97 and Raeder Exhibit No. 98; No. 97 concerns the White Book and the planning of the 7th of February, 1940, concerning the bases of the Allies of Norway; and No. 98 is an excerpt from the War Diary concerning the orders which, at the time of the occupation of Norway, were found and from which it could be seen that an English landing had been imminent and the so-called plan under the camouflage name "Stratford Plan", which was prepared by the British Admiralty. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Concerning Norway, may I ask you the following: During and after the occupation did you intervene to see that the Norwegian population should be treated decently and what was your attitude with regard to the political question in Norway; what about the attitude of Germany to Norway?
A. From the very beginning I was for good treatment of the Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter Terboeven, -- whom he had unfortunately appointed Reichcommisser for Norway and charged with the civil administration on the occasion of his appointment -- had given him instructions that he, Terboeven, should bring the Norwegian people to him; that is to say, make them inclined to follow him, and that he had the intention in the end to maintain Norway as a sovereign nation in connection with the North German Empire.