As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the article of 23 October 1939 from the Voelkischer Beobachter.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Number 3260-PS, GB 218, document book 10 of the British Delegation on page 97. BY DR. SIEMERS: U-30, on 3 September at dusk met an English passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it because he assumed by mistake that it was an auxilliary cruiser. the considerations which have been mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the Channel did not play any part in the Naval War Command and that this commanding officer could not have known anything about these deliberations. He knewonly that auxilliary cruisers had their lights dimmed out, and he assumed that that was an auxilliary cruiser.
He did not make any report. That was not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed the "Athenia" was broadcase by the British radio, and during the night of the third to the fourth, it was received also by us and was transmitted to the various services. Command, and I requested information as to how far our closest submarine was to the location of the torpedoing, and I was told 75 nautical miles. Office, who had been a naval officer in the first world war, had found out that these things had occurred, and he made a telephone call to the Naval War Command, asking whether that was true. He did not speak to me personally He did not call me.
be right. He thereupon called the American Legation Secretary -- I believe Mr. Kirk -- in order to speak to him about this matter because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans had been killed during that accident and that from the first world war it was clear to him how important it was that no incident should occur with America. Therefore, he told him what he had found out from the Naval War Command. I told the same thing personally to the American Naval Attache, Mr. Schrader, absolutely bona fides. I believe that I could tell him that in good faith because we had no other information. see me personally. We were very close to each other, and he told me that he had told the American Delegation Secretary; I believe he did. He had not called me personally. That concluded the case at first. not have had any hesitation in admitting it, giving the reason, and we would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations concerned, and the officer would have been punished.
I reported about the incident also to the Fuehrer's Headquarters, to the Fuehrer himself in his headquarters, to whom I reported that, according to our convictions, such a thing did not happen, and the Fuehrer ordered that it should be denied. That was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed by my press department.
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, is identified by document GB-221, submitted by the Prosecution in document book 13 on page 110. Excuse me. haven. Admiral Doenitz has already described how he received him and how he sent him to me immediately to Berlin in an airplane. that it was a pure oversight, that only in the course of all these messages which he had heard had he found out that it had not been an auxilliary cruiser but a passenger steamer, a passenger liner.
political consequences. He decided that since it had been denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only broad but also within official circles, government circles. Consequently, I was not in a position to tell State Secretary von Weiszaeker or the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. be kept secret upon orders of the Fuehrer, second, on my part, no courtmartial would be ordered because the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was an accident; third, the further political handling would be taken care of by the High Command of the Navy, as far as anything had to be handled. Doenitz has already reported that he was punished. the Voelkischer Beobachter in which Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I did not know a thing about that article beforehand. I would certainly have prevented its appearance because it was absolutely impossible that I know that our submarine had torpedoed that ship and that the opponent, the First Lord of the Admiralty, should be accused of that. issued by Hitler and came down via the Reich Press Chief to the Propaganda Ministry and that the Propaganda Minister, as much as I was told, had himself drafted that article.
Later I could not do anything against it any more; I could not prevent it I have not seen it again, but one of my officers -- any one of my officers who had seen that article before any of the officers in the High Command of the Navy would have come to me and told me that I should do everything to prevent its publication. Nothing could be done because four weeks had passed since th case was cleared up.
Q. Admiral, you just said that you had found out that Hitler knew about that article. When did you find out about that?
A. Here, from my co-defendant, Hans Fritzche.
Q. Not then?
A. No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past two.
(A recess was taken until 1415 hours.)
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, in the meantime I have perused my documents and am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan and that is of submitting the documents during the examination. In connection with the documents which we demit with last, C-126, Strategic Planning, I should like to submit the following documents which are contained in the white Book, documents which have been granted me for my use and documents which also concern strategic planning on the part of the Allies. We are dealing with Raedar Exhibit No. 33. It is the document dated the 9th of November 1939, and also Raedar Exhibit No. 34, General Gamelin to General Lelong, November 1939; and also Raedar Exhibit No. 35, two extracts from the diary of Jodl, 1809-PS; which concerns the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would just like to call you attention to the fact, to the questions which I put to the witness Goering on the 18th of March, regarding the plans of the Allies in regard to the destruction of the Caucasian oil lands, and the testimony upon which the Marshal testified, and finally in this connection, Raedar Exhibit No. 41, to be found in the document book Roman III, page 205, following which is a report of the commander-in-chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, dated the 16th of March 1940, which deals with the war plans for the year 1940. It means a more critical stage of the blockade of the Scandinavian countries and beyond that, the plans for the destruction of the Russian oil wells in the Caucasus.
BY DR. SIEMERS: Norway, and so forth, I would like to ask you to answer a question which relates to you personally. What decorations did you receive from Hitler? mentioned, in the autumn of 1939; the Knight's Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941, on the occasion of my 65th birthday, I received a donation of 250,000 Marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he sent a document. On the very first occasion, I thanked him at which point he told me that he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their Generals, similar donations. These donations might have been some sums of money or through a country estate; then he emphasized that Hindenberg and Field Marshal von Mackensen had received donations from him as well.
Q Now, I shall turn to the passage "Greece", with special reference to Greece. The Prosecution has quoted document C-12, equal to GB -226. This is to be found in document book No. 10, page 1. This document deals with the decision on the part of Hitler which was transmitted through the OKW, dated the 30th December 1939, and it shows under No.1, "Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated as enemy vessels." This decision on the part of Hitler occured on the basis of a report put in by the SKL. What caused you to make this report even though Greece was neutral at the time?
submitted to us by our Intelligence Service, that there were Greek plans -it seems to have been done with the knowledge of the Greek Government -that Greek ships were used by England. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of England, and according to that were to be treated in the same way as we were treating the English merchantmen. to a much larger degree than had been the case in the beginning.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit 53, to be found in my document book III, page 258. This document deals with the War Diary kept by the SKL in the month of December 1939. is made:
"Greece has perhaps 20 vessels put at the disposal of the United States."
The next entry, on the same page under the date of the 30th of December:
"On the basis of the sale and chartering of large Greek ships to England, with the agreement of the Fuehrer it has been decreed that Greek ships in the zone of 20 degrees West to 2 degrees East and 44 degrees North shall be considered as hostile craft by U-boats." Exhibit 54. This document is taken from the White Book. It is dated the 23rd of January 1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at the Hague to the Foreign Office. The heading is: "The contemplated charter of 50 to 60 ships to the British Government." It is not necessary for me to read that. I will be satisfied with the reading of the beginning of the first sentence:
"After the British press brought reports at the end of November last year" -- that is, 1939 -- "about the alleged lettings of Greek vessels," and so forth. It has been established that these 50 to 60 ships had now been chartered by British companies.
conclude the complex of Greece. In reality, in historical sequence Norway should be first, but I should like to deal with Greece and the occupation of Greece first. BY DR. SIEMERS: document book of the British delegation, number 10, page 23, the Prosecution has charged you with the figure 9 of this rather lengthy document, specifically figure 9, B-f. It says there:
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy wishes a confirmation for the fact that all of Greece is to be occupied even in a peaceful solution. Then a complete occupation is a stipulation for any regulation." What reason caused you to make this proposal? intentions of the Fuehrer as far as Greece was concerned, but I did know of his decree Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: I would like to mention for the assistance of the Court that we are dealing with 1541, equal to GB-13, document book of the British delegation, 10-A, page 270. This directive is dated the 13th of December 1940. 1, had as his intentions, as set forth in paragraph 2, that after the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupying of the North Coast by way of Bulgaria, and, if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek mainland, operation Marita. "The support of Bulgaria is to be expected." knowledge of the fact that the British, on the 3rd of March, had landed in the south of Greece. We had knowledge of this on about the 5th or 6th of March. in order to prevent the British from attacking us from the rear by air, putting up air bases at the same time so they could not hamper our war in the East and in the Mediterranean.
Hitler of his own accord and without having asked anyone, I, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, from this political decision had to conclude my strategic decisions and then had to give him my proposals and suggestions as far as I and the Navy were concerned. have to be occupied, now, at this time, for me the case had actually arisen where I had to propose this thing to him, for the reason that I have already mentioned. When I said "all of Greece", that to me and the Navy meant the entire Greek coast, a space where the British fighting forces could land. had landed in Greece?
DR. SIEMER: In this same connection I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit 58, in my document book III, page 271. This is a document contained in the White Books, according to which on the 14th of January -May it please the High Tribunal, I beg your pardon. Sir David has corrected me. Document 58 has been turned down, and I withdraw my suggestion. In this connection I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit Number 59 instead. It is to be found in document book III, page 273. It is an extract from the White Book, minutes of the French War Committee on the 26th of April 1940.
Norway, the Caucasus, Roumania, and Greece.
I should also like to submit Raeder Exhibit No. 63, in Document Book III, page 285, which is an address of the British Secretary of State for India, 1 December, 1940. This document also shows plans regarding Greece, a year and a quarter before the time just mentioned by the witness. BY DR. SIEMERS: MR. Elwyn Jones, is considered a special case in the framework of aggressive wars on the part of the Nazi conspiracy. In this connection he pointed out that in this case Hitler did not have this idea by himself, but rather was persuaded by you. Since this point is very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event exactly.
First of all, I should like to ask you this. When was the first conversation about this matter between you and Hitler? question of Norway was on the 10th of October, 1939, and that was a discussion which I had requested. Who reasonfor this was because, through the work of Admiral Canaris, through our Intelligence Service, we had received reports at various times that the British intended tooccupy bases in Norway. Admiral Canaris, on one occasion, visited me himself, which was something he only did in very important cases. And, in the presence of my chief of staff, he gave me a rather comprehensive report on the intelligence reports Which we had had. In this connection air bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the South of Norway. Stavanga was mentioned constantly with the airport Skoval, and Trojndheim was usually mentioned as well. On occasion Christiansund was mentioned too. with Sdmiral Karls, who was the Commander-in-chief of Navy Group North, a man who was interested in carrying on the warfare in the Skagerrak and Kattega and in the North Sea. This man seemed to have had similar reports, and he informed me that he had composed a private letter, addressed to me, in which the question of the danger of the occupation of Norway on the part of the British fighting forces was being dealt with, and in whichhe was, in a general way, dealing with the question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and whether we should really have to got ahead of a step like that, and also what advantages or disadvantages occupation of Norway by us would have -- that is, the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases.
question at all, except for the fact that I had received this intelligence report. I cannot give you the exact date of the letter, but it was perhaps the last of September or the first of October; it must have been in that period of time. The arrival of this letter caused me to show the letter of the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him, with all dispatch, to deal with the question of the occupation of Norwegian bases on the part of England, and the other question which Admiral Karls had dealt with, and have the questions discussed in the SKL; the advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards the north, not only of an expansion on our part, but, above all, the expansion through England; what value would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages would result if we would have to defend the Norwegian coast. whichis GB-82 where the questions were asked; what places were to be used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be; whether these ports were to be developed further; and also, what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned.
as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the suggestion on the 10th of October. me that if we had intended to occupy these bases we would violate neutrality, but I knew, as well, the agreement which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of the 2nd of September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding fact stated in Aidemoire, which is document TC-31, GB-79, dated 2 September 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, Mr. President, that this document is found in the document book of the British Delegation at page 330. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q You have that document before you? sentence.
DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, at page 329.
A (Continuing) The last sentence: "Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interestsof the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate." I had the data submitted to me which the SKL had prepared on this entire complex of questions. Then, I asked to be permitted to report to Hitler on the 10th of October, because I considered this problem tremendously important. It was entirely clear to me that the best possible solution for uswould be that of having Norway maintain a reliable neutrality, and I expressed my opinion, as may be seen in document C-21, GB-82.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, that is GB-194.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?
THE WITNESS: This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.
DR. SIEMERS: It is in the document book of the British Delegation, 10-A, page 6.
THE WITNESS: It says here, on the third page of the German version, the next but last paragraph, under the date of 13 January, "Situation conference with the Chief of the SKL."
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not entirely translated by the prosecution. This document may be found in my document book under Raeder Exhibit No. 69, and I should like to submit it herewith.
THE PRESIDENT: Document Book III only goes to 64, is that right? It must be Document Book IV.
DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book then. In the table of contents, Document 64 was the last one mentioned, but since that time there has been a supplement added. It is in Document Book IV, page 317. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Pleas comment on this document.
A. In the next but last paragraph, it says:
"In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion that the most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance of the present situation, which if strictest neutrality is exercised by Norway will permit the safe use of Norwegian territorial waters for the shipping vital to German's war effort without the attempt being made on the part of England to endanger seriously this sea-lane."
I maintained this point of view with Hitler. In my report to the Fuehrer I mentioned the intelligence report which we had at our disposal. Then I pictured the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation of bases on the Norwegian Coast, which would affect our entire war effort, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that occupation by England would work out to the greatest detriment to our carrying on the war. of Norway, from those points they would have been able to dominate the entrance to the East Sea, as well as our naval operations out of the German Bay, and that was the second exit which we had. They would have hampered the operations of battleships as well as our merchantmen. air operations for reconnaisance in the North Sea for attacks against England. They could have hampered us in all of these operations. that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of ore would have been cut down or would have stopped entirely on the basis of politic pressure.
Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and since we know how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway, this was a very important point. They might have even gone so far -- and we learned about this subsequently when these things were discussed -- as attacking and destroying the ore deposits at Lunea, or bringing them into British possession. carrying on of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian Coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been lively naval operations near the Norwegian Coast, and if we were to occupy these bases, England would try to hamper our ore traffic from Norway and battles could result which we, with our inadequate supply of surface vessels, could not handle. Norway or that we should obtain baser in Norway. I only did my duty in telling the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht about this grave danger which was thre tening us, and against which we would have to use emergency measures in our defense. I also pointed out to him that operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases would be very expensive for us, and in the course of later discussion, I told him that we might even lose our entire fleet, and I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen later on. gain prestige, a point of which I have been accused by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite could result.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date from the time of the war, one of which is Raeder Exhibit No. 69, of the 13th of January 1940. fact that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the situation would be unbearable for the carrying on of the German war, and such a situation could be prevented only if we got ahead or England by occupying Norway ourselves.
to by the witness. Prosecution, C-66, GB-81, which may he found in British Document Book 10A, page 35. This document is dated 10 January 1944, May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that there, under "Weser Maneuver" -- that war the name for this action -- those explanations are set forth which the witness has just made. I do not wish to read all of this since we would lose valuable time thereby.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: No, the last page, under the heading "Weser Maneuver", page 39. The letter by Admiral Karls which was mentioned by the witness is mention. ed in here, and his thoughts in connection with this matter. In the German original there is the heading, "Appendix 2". January 1940, three months after this affair, and new reports had come in. This, on the other hand, is a picture dating from October 1939. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Grand Admiral, I must once more refer to Document C-122, which you have already mentioned. The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying, "The Chief SKL deems it necessary to tell the Fuehrer as soon as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility for expansion of operation, al maneuvers to the north."
was your primary thought, to expand the operational bases for the Navy. zone to the north was concerned, I meant that there might be an expansion on the part of the British as well as ourselves, that we should got ahead of the Englis and, in such a way, gain these bases, bases which would be of certain importance to us.
Q What did Hitler reply at this discussion on the 10th of October 1939?
A Hitler had not concerned himself with this question at all. The question was Very far from his mind, for as far as matters of naval warfare were concern he knew very little about them. He always remarked that he did not have an overall picture of these things, and therefore felt somewhat uncertain. He said that he would concern himself with this question and that I should submit the notes which I had worked out together with the SKL, and leave the notes with him so he might use them as a basis for his deliberations on this problem. that at this occasion when Hitler was confronted with the problem of Norway, he did not say a single word about the fact that previously, perhaps in the summer of that year, he had already heard from Rosenberg about Norwegian questions. I gather from a document which I have only learned of here that Rosenberg on the 20th of June 1939, spoke to the Fuehrer and gave him a comprehensive report about his connections with Norwegian political circles. It would have been a matter of course for me if the Fuehrer had concerned himself with Norwegian strategical matters and had told me. "I have such and such information about Norwegian conditions." That did not take place, however. The Fuehrer told me that We should await the arrival of further reports and that he would concern himself with these questions. 11th of December, did you discuss this question with Hitler again? September Corvette Captain Schreiber had been made the highest attache in Oslo. and later on he had become the naval attache in Oslo. During this time, Schreiber as well as the intelligence service, gave me further reports about conditions in Norway, and told me of reports which were circulating about a possible landing of the British.
Later on. Schreiber was my chief collaborator in these Norwegian problems, and he showed a particular understanding for this special situation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the Tribunal Raeder Exhibit 107, an affidavit of the naval attache who has just been mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in my document book V, page 464. a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attache, He stated that since the autumn of 1939 he had been active in that capacity. this, under 1, on page 464, at the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, this is one of the documents which was objected to, is it not?
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon?
THE PRESIDENT: This is one of the documents which was objected to, was it not?
DR. SIEMERS: There is nothing coming through, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you hear now, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents which were objected to. We read this document, so it is necessary for you to read it allagain.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer to the first part of this affidavit, part I?
MR. President, I should like to point out a very insignificant error in translation on page 466. In the second paragraph, second line, the word "Deutsch", "German", is missing -- to clear the record., "on the part of the Foreign Office to maintain and respect Norwegian neutrality". In the English text it says, "foreign office". It should read "of the German Foreign Office"; and I should be very grateful if this mistake could be rectified. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Grand Admiral, you know the affidavit given by Schreiber. In this, reports were mentioned, and you have already referred to this point. During these two months, did special intelligence reports come in? Among other things besides reports which you have already mentioned, was Narvik mentioned also?
A Captain Schreiber mentioned Narvik for the first time expressly; that is, as far as I remember. Captain Schreiber very quickly had worked into conditions there, and he had very fine connections in Norwegian circles. The confirmation of all that I had known up until that point came about on the 11th of December. 1939. which I believe were submitted by the prosecution, may be used in this connection that is, the meeting record of the 11th and 12th, and an accompanying letter by Rosenberg referring to these meetings and similar matters?
Q Grand Admiral, we shall refer to this. I believe that you will be permitted to use th ese documents. But since they are known, just mention the points that you remember. On this occasion, I should like to ask only on documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS and 007-PS. You did not know those documents?
A No, I did not know those documents. I just learned about them here. But the reports contained in these documents may be proved by subsequent documents, according to the date. Quisling. Rosenberg -- not mentioning the fact that I saw him on occasion, or had seen him on occasion -- nor, above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had heard nothing up until that time.
On the 11th of December, my chief of staff, Mr. Schoulte-Moenting, reported to me that Major Quisling had arrived from Oslo, Quisling who had been Minister of War, since he was asking for a discussion with me, and this request was put by Mr. Hageling. His reason for the visit was given that Quisling wanted to tell me about Norwegian conditions.
Mr. Hageling had been sent to my chief of staff by Major Rosenberg, who knew both of these gentlemen, as I have already mentioned. Since reports from my secretary seemed to be of great value to me, I declared myself to be ready to receive Mr. Quisling. conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relation of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports on the intention of England to land in Norway, and characterized the whole situation as especially urgent; for according to his reports, the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to establish a date, and it seemed to me it should occur before the 10th of January, since then a favorable political situation would arise. but I could try to see to it that he could report this to the Fuehrer. B ut I was concerned only with the military and strategic situation, and in that connection, I could tell him right away that the possibility from the 11th of December until the 10th of January was not good because of the brevity of time and because of the fact that it was winter, and these efforts would be without success.