if they only dealt with matters of principle I passed them on to the O.K.W.
Since I never let anything slip through in case it had been started by the Party the entire relation soon worked out very well and I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that soon none of them occured. In that respect, We were at an advantage in the Navy because there were no territorial questions. We were concerned with the sea and only in the coastal cities, port cities where practically everything was concerned with the Navy. I had difficulties, and that is essential, through the personality of Heydrich, whom I had to remove from the Navy in 1929 after an Honor Court had sentenced him for bad treatment of a young girl. That he held against me for a long time and he has tried several times, on various occasions, to denounce me with the leadership of the Party, and even the Fuehrer; but I could always counteract these attacks so there were no consequences for my relations in general. This attitude of Heydrich inflicted itself also on Himmler, so that here also, from time to time, I had to write a rather strong worded letter; but just the strong wording of these letters, in most cases, served as a remedy. I should not like to waste any more time by mentioning details, such as the one with the SD, but a direct attack on account of my position to the Church did not occur. There was only the statement made by Goebbels which I found out about through my co-defendent, Hans Fritsche, that I was disfavored with the Party on account of my attitude to the church; but as I have said, they did not make me feel it in any disagreeable way. Navy does not need any more explanation here by me. I will submit the affidavit without reading it. It was made by Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, who described it, and that will clarify great deal. In that connection, However, may I put one question: To Hitler, did you also emphasize that a clerical attitude was necessary of the soldiers of the Navy? the end without hesitation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I want to submit Raeder Exhibit No. 121. It is in my document book Raeder No. 60, page 523. I should not like to bother the Tribunal by questioning about the disputes in clerical matters between the Party and the Navy and their contrasting views. I believe that by this document it is made clear enough that a relation between church and National Socialism was not possible.
In this field Bormann is the most outstanding figure, and of the expose which I have submitted I should like to read only the first paragraph "National Socialistic and Cristian concepts are incompatible. Cristian churches are built on the ignorance of men and make it their business to preserve the ignorance of as extensive part of the population as possible, as only in this way can the Cristian churches maintain their power. In contract to this, National Socialism rests on scientific foundations."
The second paragraph, the last sentence: "If therefore in the future our young people do not learn anything more about this Cristianity, the teachings of which are far below our own, then Cristianity will disappear of itself."
And, on the second page: "Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers and other swindlers must be eliminated and suppressed by the State, so the possibilities for influence by the Church must also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened, will the State Leadership have full influence over the individual citizen. Only then will people and Reich be assured stability for all time." I believe this is enough to show the contrast between the Party and the Defendant in these matters. BY DR. SIEMERS: ed to the Secret Cabinet Council and the Defense Council. Will you please answer quite briefly, because these questions have been discussed so widely that I assume that nobody in this court will hear anything new about these things. Were you a member of the Reich Government?
Q According to Document 2098 PS. which is GB 206, Document Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Fuehrer of 25 February, 1938, according to that decree you were given the same rank as a Reich minister, such as the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army?
THE PRESIDENT: Is it 10 or 10-A?
DR. SIEMERS: 10.
THE PRESIDENT: 39 is a translation of C-170.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I just hear from Sir David that it is 89.
in rank to the Reich Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that therefore you were a member of the Cabinet and were permitted to participate in the meetings and did participate, is that correct?
A No. I was not a Reich Minister, but only equivalent in rank, and the reason that I believe until Keitel was made equal in rank with the Reich Minister because in the execution of the activities of the War Ministry he had very much to do with than and had to be on the same level with them in order to negotiate. And since Brauchitsch and myself were senior in rank to Colonel General Keitel we also received the same rank. I was not a member of the Cabinet at all. But it says in that directive that on the order of the Fuehrer I could participate in a Cabinet meeting. The intention probably was that when technical matters had to be explained I could come to the Cabinet; but it never occured, since after that time there were no Cabinet meetings. "Following my orders he shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet." that such as Hitler told me himself, that Secret Cabinet Council had only been formed in order to create some position for the Foreign Minister, von Neurath, who was leaving, and in order to retain the impression abroad and at home that von Neurath also will be consulted in foreign policy; but that Secret Cabinet Council never met.
Q The Prosecution has accused you that on the 12th of March, 1939. you gave a speech and that during that speech you mentioned the ruthless challenge of Bolshevism and International Jewry.
(Addressing the Tribunal) May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately that speech has been quoted by the Prosecution only in an excerpt which was selected under a certain point of view, and I believe that it would be well to know the entire speech. Of course, I shall not read it. But I should like to submit it as Raeder Exhibit No. 46. In the document book, in my document book, No 30, page 228. On page 235 there is the sentence against which the Prosecution has objected -
THE WITNESS: May I in doing so quote a few short sentences which will characterize the entire speech?
Q I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit that. I only ask you to use only a few significant sentences, such as the Prosecution nave done.
Q Excuse me. That is on page 235, the sane page on which the quotation of the Prosecution is set out.
A Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we read line 6:
" He has returned self-confidence and confidence in their own ability to the German people and thereby enabled them to retake, out of their own strength, their divine right refused to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to approach with courage the tremendous present problems and to work on their solution.
Thus the German people and the Fuehrer have done more for the peace of Europe and of the world than some of our neighbors are able to recognizetoday." the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which has been quoted by the Prosecution, and I should like testate briefly in connection with that, after the experience during the years 1917 to 1919 Communism and international Jewry had undermined the resistance, had destroyed the resistance of the German people in a considerable measure and had gained an unpropertionately large influence in German affairs, and as far as the nation and state were concerned and as far as economy and justice were concerned. According to that, in my opinion one could not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried -- wanted to see that this large and fateful influence should be loosened and finally removed. If now the ilational Socialist Government in pursuing this course took rather severe steps which led to the Nurnberg Laws, the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course, I still could not in the course of the speech whichI held upon orders of the State Government before the public, I could not express any opinions which were principally different on that occasion. As much, of course, as I could find it compatible with my conscience. I also had to think about the fact that such a speech had to fit into a certain frame. That, however, was only one short sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the foreground. In that connection I ask for permission to read two more short sentences:
"And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and equal respect with all other people s which alone can guarantee peaceful living together of the nations with each other in this world."
Then the last sentence, on page 235:
"The Fuehrer within the framework of the German community of people has assigned our tasks to us soldiers as protectors of our homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction, as educators of the young men fit for military service who pass through our hands as one body."
spoke about the fact that we should not only have to give technical education to these young people but also educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology, that we had to march shoulder to shoulder with the Party. foreign body in the State, so that in a monarchic state there could not be a republican Armed forces or in a democratic State a monarchistic Armed Forces. And thus our Armed Forces had to be coordinated into the National Socialist State, to the extent that it would be necessary to create a real people's community, gemeinschaft, and therefore it was a task of the commanders of the Wehrmacht, of the Armed Forces, to educate their branches of the Forces in such a way that the good National Socialist ideals of National Socialism should be understood and appreciated and that they should live accordingly and act accordingly, just in the same way as I did it as Supreme Commander of the Navy. In this manner it was possible to coordinate theArmed Forces correctly, to keep all exaggerations from it, but at the same time to assure the forming of a people's community within the State.
And then on the bottom of page 236:
"This nation needs a new, true peace -- of justice and honor; a peace without hatred. The world also needs such a peace, because a weak Germany could not obtain such a peace, a strong one won it for herself. It is a proud task of the German Wehrmacht, Armed Forces, to secure this peace to the German nation against everybody." bottom of the page:
"But the soldier over there whom we respect as the chivalrous representative of his country may accept a soldier's word: What Germany needs and wants is peace:" The construction work of Germany requires a long -- full -- years of quiet development.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, on page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. That is: "Thus, Wehrmacht and Party become one indivisible entity." The Prosecution has submitted that. Other than that, nothing is underlined. In reality, in the original, many other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace. BY DR. SIEMERS: the political acitivities of National Socialism. Therefore, I am compelled to ask you briefly concerning your participation in actions in those countries where one would certainly be surprised to hear of any participation by the navy. annexation of Austria? It did not take part in any way.
Q Did you make any preparations?
A No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-157, but that dealt only with the directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that that is US 69, in the document book of the British Delegation, 10-A. The Prosecution stressed this document. in every state for every year, according to the political situation, of those cases which in the course of the year may arise and for which, of course, certain preparation have to be made. For the navy, however, that document had no consequences as far as Austria was concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference, to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, US 69, 10-A, and then I did not get the page.
DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?
DR. SIEMERS: C-175. BY DR. SIEMERS: ions for various eventualities?
A Yes; that is, cases mentioned here, for instance, th Rot and the special case, Case Gruen. All these had to be dealt with, without their having to have any consequences.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be seen that the same type of preparations, being necessary for strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the Allies--only to show the necessity. At this moment I should like to forego that because I can not determine so quickly which one of these documents are approved and which ones are admitted and which ones have been rejected. May I do that in the end, in order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my stating the wrong figures? DR. SIEMERS: cerning the Sudetenland? May I ask you to look at the document of the Prosecution 388-PS.
DR. SIEMERS: It is US 126--No, excuse me--US-26. It can be found in the document book of the British Delegation, 10-A, page 147. It is a draft for a new directive Gruen of 20 May 1938.
A Yes, I have the directive right here. It is of 20 May 1938 for the Navy.
"The Navy participates by the use of the Danube flotilla in the operations of the army. That flotilla is put under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary and have to be carried out independently."
of October made the special measures unnecessary, so the Danube flotilla, which we had taken over from Austria, was put under the command of the army.
Q That was the size of the Danube flotilla?
for the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia, asit is said in document C-136, US 104, document book of the British delegation, page 101. It is of 21 October 1938, and the Prosecution points out that, according to that, in October you had already been informed about Czechoslovakia; that is, in March, as it really happened -- that it was supposed to be occupied. Will youplease tell us something about that? it is drafted shows that that again is for eventualities. Point One is the securing of the border on the frontiers of Germany and protection against surprise air attacks. and occupation of the Memel land. contains as its first sentence:
"It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile toward Germany." therefore, it was not sure at all. occupation of the Memel Land where it says:
"The political situation, particularly complications between Poland and Lithuania, may make it appear desirable that the German armed forces should occupy the Memel Land."
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that, according to my document, this part that the witness has just read is missing in the English translation, so that you do not look for it and not find it. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q So here again this is an eventuality?
Q On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the war, the "Athenia" was sunk. From the military point of view, that case has already been clarified by Dr. Kranzbuehler, but I should like to hear your position and explanation of the incident as commander in chief of the navy and with special consideration for the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised a very severe and insulting accusation, the accusation that you purposely and in violation of the rules, made England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the "Athenia", although you knew perfectly well that the "Athenia" had been sunk by a German U-boat.
As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the article of 23 October 1939 from the Voelkischer Beobachter.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Number 3260-PS, GB 218, document book 10 of the British Delegation on page 97. BY DR. SIEMERS: U-30, on 3 September at dusk met an English passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it because he assumed by mistake that it was an auxilliary cruiser. the considerations which have been mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the Channel did not play any part in the Naval War Command and that this commanding officer could not have known anything about these deliberations. He knewonly that auxilliary cruisers had their lights dimmed out, and he assumed that that was an auxilliary cruiser.
He did not make any report. That was not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed the "Athenia" was broadcase by the British radio, and during the night of the third to the fourth, it was received also by us and was transmitted to the various services. Command, and I requested information as to how far our closest submarine was to the location of the torpedoing, and I was told 75 nautical miles. Office, who had been a naval officer in the first world war, had found out that these things had occurred, and he made a telephone call to the Naval War Command, asking whether that was true. He did not speak to me personally He did not call me.
be right. He thereupon called the American Legation Secretary -- I believe Mr. Kirk -- in order to speak to him about this matter because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans had been killed during that accident and that from the first world war it was clear to him how important it was that no incident should occur with America. Therefore, he told him what he had found out from the Naval War Command. I told the same thing personally to the American Naval Attache, Mr. Schrader, absolutely bona fides. I believe that I could tell him that in good faith because we had no other information. see me personally. We were very close to each other, and he told me that he had told the American Delegation Secretary; I believe he did. He had not called me personally. That concluded the case at first. not have had any hesitation in admitting it, giving the reason, and we would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations concerned, and the officer would have been punished.
I reported about the incident also to the Fuehrer's Headquarters, to the Fuehrer himself in his headquarters, to whom I reported that, according to our convictions, such a thing did not happen, and the Fuehrer ordered that it should be denied. That was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed by my press department.
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, is identified by document GB-221, submitted by the Prosecution in document book 13 on page 110. Excuse me. haven. Admiral Doenitz has already described how he received him and how he sent him to me immediately to Berlin in an airplane. that it was a pure oversight, that only in the course of all these messages which he had heard had he found out that it had not been an auxilliary cruiser but a passenger steamer, a passenger liner.
political consequences. He decided that since it had been denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only broad but also within official circles, government circles. Consequently, I was not in a position to tell State Secretary von Weiszaeker or the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. be kept secret upon orders of the Fuehrer, second, on my part, no courtmartial would be ordered because the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was an accident; third, the further political handling would be taken care of by the High Command of the Navy, as far as anything had to be handled. Doenitz has already reported that he was punished. the Voelkischer Beobachter in which Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I did not know a thing about that article beforehand. I would certainly have prevented its appearance because it was absolutely impossible that I know that our submarine had torpedoed that ship and that the opponent, the First Lord of the Admiralty, should be accused of that. issued by Hitler and came down via the Reich Press Chief to the Propaganda Ministry and that the Propaganda Minister, as much as I was told, had himself drafted that article.
Later I could not do anything against it any more; I could not prevent it I have not seen it again, but one of my officers -- any one of my officers who had seen that article before any of the officers in the High Command of the Navy would have come to me and told me that I should do everything to prevent its publication. Nothing could be done because four weeks had passed since th case was cleared up.
Q. Admiral, you just said that you had found out that Hitler knew about that article. When did you find out about that?
A. Here, from my co-defendant, Hans Fritzche.
Q. Not then?
A. No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past two.
(A recess was taken until 1415 hours.)
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, in the meantime I have perused my documents and am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan and that is of submitting the documents during the examination. In connection with the documents which we demit with last, C-126, Strategic Planning, I should like to submit the following documents which are contained in the white Book, documents which have been granted me for my use and documents which also concern strategic planning on the part of the Allies. We are dealing with Raedar Exhibit No. 33. It is the document dated the 9th of November 1939, and also Raedar Exhibit No. 34, General Gamelin to General Lelong, November 1939; and also Raedar Exhibit No. 35, two extracts from the diary of Jodl, 1809-PS; which concerns the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would just like to call you attention to the fact, to the questions which I put to the witness Goering on the 18th of March, regarding the plans of the Allies in regard to the destruction of the Caucasian oil lands, and the testimony upon which the Marshal testified, and finally in this connection, Raedar Exhibit No. 41, to be found in the document book Roman III, page 205, following which is a report of the commander-in-chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, dated the 16th of March 1940, which deals with the war plans for the year 1940. It means a more critical stage of the blockade of the Scandinavian countries and beyond that, the plans for the destruction of the Russian oil wells in the Caucasus.
BY DR. SIEMERS: Norway, and so forth, I would like to ask you to answer a question which relates to you personally. What decorations did you receive from Hitler? mentioned, in the autumn of 1939; the Knight's Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941, on the occasion of my 65th birthday, I received a donation of 250,000 Marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he sent a document. On the very first occasion, I thanked him at which point he told me that he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their Generals, similar donations. These donations might have been some sums of money or through a country estate; then he emphasized that Hindenberg and Field Marshal von Mackensen had received donations from him as well.
Q Now, I shall turn to the passage "Greece", with special reference to Greece. The Prosecution has quoted document C-12, equal to GB -226. This is to be found in document book No. 10, page 1. This document deals with the decision on the part of Hitler which was transmitted through the OKW, dated the 30th December 1939, and it shows under No.1, "Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated as enemy vessels." This decision on the part of Hitler occured on the basis of a report put in by the SKL. What caused you to make this report even though Greece was neutral at the time?
submitted to us by our Intelligence Service, that there were Greek plans -it seems to have been done with the knowledge of the Greek Government -that Greek ships were used by England. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of England, and according to that were to be treated in the same way as we were treating the English merchantmen. to a much larger degree than had been the case in the beginning.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit 53, to be found in my document book III, page 258. This document deals with the War Diary kept by the SKL in the month of December 1939. is made:
"Greece has perhaps 20 vessels put at the disposal of the United States."
The next entry, on the same page under the date of the 30th of December:
"On the basis of the sale and chartering of large Greek ships to England, with the agreement of the Fuehrer it has been decreed that Greek ships in the zone of 20 degrees West to 2 degrees East and 44 degrees North shall be considered as hostile craft by U-boats." Exhibit 54. This document is taken from the White Book. It is dated the 23rd of January 1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at the Hague to the Foreign Office. The heading is: "The contemplated charter of 50 to 60 ships to the British Government." It is not necessary for me to read that. I will be satisfied with the reading of the beginning of the first sentence:
"After the British press brought reports at the end of November last year" -- that is, 1939 -- "about the alleged lettings of Greek vessels," and so forth. It has been established that these 50 to 60 ships had now been chartered by British companies.
conclude the complex of Greece. In reality, in historical sequence Norway should be first, but I should like to deal with Greece and the occupation of Greece first. BY DR. SIEMERS: document book of the British delegation, number 10, page 23, the Prosecution has charged you with the figure 9 of this rather lengthy document, specifically figure 9, B-f. It says there:
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy wishes a confirmation for the fact that all of Greece is to be occupied even in a peaceful solution. Then a complete occupation is a stipulation for any regulation." What reason caused you to make this proposal? intentions of the Fuehrer as far as Greece was concerned, but I did know of his decree Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: I would like to mention for the assistance of the Court that we are dealing with 1541, equal to GB-13, document book of the British delegation, 10-A, page 270. This directive is dated the 13th of December 1940. 1, had as his intentions, as set forth in paragraph 2, that after the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupying of the North Coast by way of Bulgaria, and, if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek mainland, operation Marita. "The support of Bulgaria is to be expected." knowledge of the fact that the British, on the 3rd of March, had landed in the south of Greece. We had knowledge of this on about the 5th or 6th of March. in order to prevent the British from attacking us from the rear by air, putting up air bases at the same time so they could not hamper our war in the East and in the Mediterranean.
Hitler of his own accord and without having asked anyone, I, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, from this political decision had to conclude my strategic decisions and then had to give him my proposals and suggestions as far as I and the Navy were concerned. have to be occupied, now, at this time, for me the case had actually arisen where I had to propose this thing to him, for the reason that I have already mentioned. When I said "all of Greece", that to me and the Navy meant the entire Greek coast, a space where the British fighting forces could land. had landed in Greece?
DR. SIEMER: In this same connection I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit 58, in my document book III, page 271. This is a document contained in the White Books, according to which on the 14th of January -May it please the High Tribunal, I beg your pardon. Sir David has corrected me. Document 58 has been turned down, and I withdraw my suggestion. In this connection I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit Number 59 instead. It is to be found in document book III, page 273. It is an extract from the White Book, minutes of the French War Committee on the 26th of April 1940.
Norway, the Caucasus, Roumania, and Greece.
I should also like to submit Raeder Exhibit No. 63, in Document Book III, page 285, which is an address of the British Secretary of State for India, 1 December, 1940. This document also shows plans regarding Greece, a year and a quarter before the time just mentioned by the witness. BY DR. SIEMERS: MR. Elwyn Jones, is considered a special case in the framework of aggressive wars on the part of the Nazi conspiracy. In this connection he pointed out that in this case Hitler did not have this idea by himself, but rather was persuaded by you. Since this point is very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event exactly.
First of all, I should like to ask you this. When was the first conversation about this matter between you and Hitler? question of Norway was on the 10th of October, 1939, and that was a discussion which I had requested. Who reasonfor this was because, through the work of Admiral Canaris, through our Intelligence Service, we had received reports at various times that the British intended tooccupy bases in Norway. Admiral Canaris, on one occasion, visited me himself, which was something he only did in very important cases. And, in the presence of my chief of staff, he gave me a rather comprehensive report on the intelligence reports Which we had had. In this connection air bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the South of Norway. Stavanga was mentioned constantly with the airport Skoval, and Trojndheim was usually mentioned as well. On occasion Christiansund was mentioned too. with Sdmiral Karls, who was the Commander-in-chief of Navy Group North, a man who was interested in carrying on the warfare in the Skagerrak and Kattega and in the North Sea. This man seemed to have had similar reports, and he informed me that he had composed a private letter, addressed to me, in which the question of the danger of the occupation of Norway on the part of the British fighting forces was being dealt with, and in whichhe was, in a general way, dealing with the question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and whether we should really have to got ahead of a step like that, and also what advantages or disadvantages occupation of Norway by us would have -- that is, the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases.