In Raeder Exhibit 127 I should like to submit a short correction, because, Grand Admiral Raeder, in looking through the affidavit, observe that ViceAdmiral Lohmann made a mistake in one figure.
The mistake is unimportant, but in order to be absolutely fair and correct I thought it necessary to point it out to Vice-Admiral Lohmann. difference not of 53,750 tons but of 149,750. We were allowed to build 146,000, the final figure, so that the result is not changed. Thus, Admiral's Lohmann's mistake -- as the Tribunal knows -- is attributable to the fact that we were very limited in our statistical resources.
A May I add a sentence to what I said before? The indication of this displacement deviated from the terms of the treaty in so far as the original construction displacements were reported and not the draft and displacement which resulted in the course of the construction through these changes.
Q In addition, may I refer the Court to the following: The Naval Agreement of 1937 was changed by the Protocol of London, June 1938 -- I refer to Raedor Exhibit 16. My secretary has told me it isn't here at the moment; I will bring it up later. Court that Document C-23 is of February, 1938. This London Protocol at the suggestion of the British Government, the limitation for battleship tonnage to 35,000 tons was changed because the British Government as well as the German Government realized that 35,000 tons was too low. As the Protocol shows, effective 30 June, 1938, the battleship tonnage was raised to 45,000 tons. A few months later this difference in the battleships -- in Document C-23 -- was settled. in the planning and conspiracy to wage wars of aggression. This is the question of the so-called key documents which the Prosecution admitted. In these speeches of Hitler's to the commanders-in-chief, I must ask you to comment on these documents. The first document is 386-PS, US-25, in the document book of the British Delegation No. 10, page 18. It is Hitler's speech of the 5th of November, 1937.
Grand Admiral, did you ever see this document of Rossbach?
A No. I saw no document and no Protocol; and any speeches which Hitler made, no minutes were taken officially.
In later years -- I believe in 1941 -- stenographers were present who wrote down every word. These are really not minutes but a taking-down in indirect discourse. It was written down five days after the speech itself, as I have heard. contrast to other documents it has no distribution. It was written down five days after the speech and is not even marked "secret". Can you explain where these minutes were set down?
A I don't know; I can only imagine that the adjutant in question kept the minutes in his secret cabinet. or nine years. clearly seen, it contains references to a war of aggression. There is, for instance, a mention of "testament," of the problem of space, the enemies -England and France; it says that armament was almost completed; the first goal is to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria. happened that you did not ascribe such importance to the speech as, for example, Mr. von Neurath who was also present? And in spite of the speech how did you retain your opinion that Hitler would hold the old line and not seek a solution by force? influential group of Nazis met in order to examine the situation does not characterize the situation correctly. Hitler called together the persons mentioned in the document, to explain to them the political possibilities for development and in order to give them any instructions he might have.
And here I should like to say something general; There were a number of Hitler's speeches. I should like to comment on the type of his speeches. Hitler spoke a great deal. He went very far afield. Above all, in every speech he had a special purpose, that depending on the listeners. Just as he was a master of dialectic, he was also a master of bluff. He used strong expressions, depending on the purpose. He let his imagination play. He contradicted himself frequently in successive speeches.
One never knew what his last goal and intentions were.
At the end of such a speech it was very difficult to decide that. As a rule, his speech made a greater impression on people who heard him very seldom than on those who knew his manner of speaking on such occasions. It was never a question of a consultation but as has been said, always in giving of orders without discussion. Goering said at the beginning -
Q Excuse me, that is at the beginning?
A Yes, at the beginning of the speech. He told me he had spoken with the Fuehrer beforehand. The Fuehrer wanted to spur on the Army to be a little quicker in rearmament. It was going too slowly for the Fuehrer. the object of the speech was Austria and Czechoslovakia, which he said he wanted to overthrow. He said that the latest date would be 1943-1945, that after that our situation would become worse. But the case could come up earlier under two conditions: In the first place, if the internal unrest occurred in France, in the event of a Mediterranean war -- which in my opinion was fantastic -in which England, France, Italy and I believe Spain would participate.
The assertion that the armament of army, navy, and luftwaffe was practically concluded in November, 1937, I could not understand.
The Navy had notyet a single battleship in service. It was similar with the luftwaffe and with the army. We were in no way armed for war and a war against England, for example, would have been made necessary. As for me, the decisive sentences in his speech were that first, England and France, I believe, have already gotten rid of Czechoslovakia; and, second. I am convinced that France and England would not interfere. In the third place, the fact that a few months before, in July, 1937, the second naval agreement had just been construed. These three facts seemed to me to make it certain that Hitler would not seek a warlike solution of these questions, Austria and Czechoslovakia, under any circumstances; but that he would strive for a peaceful solution. time Hitler wanted to change his policy; that he wanted to turn from peace policy to a war policy. I could imagine that Mr. von Neurath, who did not know the purpose of this speech, received a different impression. But, as I now think back over the matter, I can imagine that this exaggerated character of the speech was intended to force von Neurath out of the cabinet because I have learned that at that time there was already an inclination in the Fuehrer to replace von Neurath with von Ribbentrop; but that is only an assumption which I have had afterwards.
I concluded from this speech as fellows: The construction of the fleet in the proportion of one to three to England was to be continued, and from the relationship with England was said to be maintained. The agreement which has just been construed was to be observed. from the end, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and General Oberst von Fritsch, in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies. And then it is said:
"One sees that Blomberg and Fritsch were disturbed and the case occurred that they contradicted Hitler."
After the speech you talked to Blomberg. Is it true that Blomberg, who can unfortunately not be examined, and Fritsch, who is also dead, that they saw through this exaggeration of Hitler's and, therefore, pointed out the misgivings and wanted to exert some influence on him.
What was your talk to Blomberg about after this speech?
THE PRESIDENT: You must try not to put leading questions, Dr. Siemers. You are putting into the witness' mouth what you want him to answer. If you want to -
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry I did so. It is a little difficult when the two men who were there, Blomberg and Fritsch, are dead. I only wanted to point out that they are not alive.
THE PRESIDENT: That cannot be helped, the fact that they are dead. But, if you want to get anything in about that, you must get it from the witness, not yourself. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q What impression did Blomberg have after this speech? What did he say to you afterwards? that when the military men leftthe room. Blomberg, who was with the Fuehrer most often, said that had not been meant so seriously and was not to be judged so seriously. He believed that the Fuehrer would settle these questions peacefully, too. And, beforehand, as Dr. Siemers said, Blomberg and Fritsch had both called the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that under no circumstances could England and France intervene since the German Wehrmacht would not be able to deal with them. objections because that was a daily occurrence. Whenever I met the Fuehrer, I told him, "We must remain on the course to avoid becoming involved with England." And the Fuehrer repeatedly confirmed this intention of his. It is typical that Hitler, at the moment when the chief of the army command, General Oberst von Fritsch, said that in the winter of '37-'38 he would not be able to take the vacation in Egypt which he had planned for his health. The Fuehrer immediately took it back and said that the affair was not that urgent; he could go ahead and go on vacation, which he then did.
This shows that it was again a question of exerting pressure. That was the speech of the 5th of November, 1937. He did not crush either Austria or Czechoslovakia. Butin 1938, the question was settled peacefully, without bloodshed, and with the agreement of the other powers.
Q In this connection may I submit the document from thenext year, Raeder Exhibit No. 23, document book 2, page 127.
On 30 September, '38 -I need not say anything further about Munich because the defendant was not directly participating. -- Hitler and Chamberlain jointly declared that the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German naval agreement are considered symbols of the desires of both the people never again to wage war against each other. The rest of the contents are known. L-79; document book 10 of the British delegation, on page 24. The document, in spite of its astonishing length, was also read in full by the Prosecution so that I will not read from it. May I remind the Court, though, that it mention further successes could no longer be achieved without bloodshed. On the 23rd of May, 1939, Poland and Danzig was not the object but lebensraum.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the reference? The reference we got was document book 10, page 24.
DR. SIEMERS: 74.
THE PRESIDENT: 74, was it?
DR.SIEMERS: Yes.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. It speaks of the extension of lebensraum. The Polish problem can not be separated from an altercation in the west. Thereupon Hitler said that the decision remained to attack Poland at the best opportunity. Unfortunately, this is again a document which is undated.
Do you know when Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt prepared this report?
A. No, I can not say.
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say it is undated?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, there is no date when the document was prepared. There is only the date of "Minutes of Conference of 23 May." In the case of Hossbach the conference was on 5 November, but it was written down five days later from memory, on 10 November. In the case of Schmundt, we do not know whether it was written down after one day, five days or four weeks.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in evidence that the document of 5 November was written down five days later?
DR. SIEMERS: No, the document of 5 November shows that it was prepared five days later. The document is dated at the top Berlin 10 November 1937, Notes on the Conference in the Reichschancellory on 5 November 1937.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is right, the; there is evidence. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. In the case of Schmundt, there is no indication?
A. No.
Q. You do not know when it was written down?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see this document before this trial?
A. No.
Q. Does this document contain a correct reproduction, in all points, of Hitler' speech, or is it true what you said about the Hossbach document?
A. It is even more true. In my opinion, it is the most unclear document on a Hitler speech which is at all available. A large part of the statements in my opinion have no sense at all, as I will show. The adjutant wrote down that only the sense of the statements was taken down.
DR. SIEMERS: This is on the first page in the center.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Please explain to the Court what impression this speech made on you at the time and why you believed, in spite of this speech, that Hitler was not planning any war of aggression.
A. I should like to point out that the trial brief says in this case it does not reproduce the character of the speech correctly. The whole first part of the speech, as I said, is extremely unclear. In the 1937 speech, 1943 to 1945 was given as the latest date, and the remote possibility was given of an earlier date, Here Hitler speaks of fifteen to twenty years in which solution would be necessary. He says that Poland is still on the side of the enemy, in spite of the Friendship Treaty. "Her intention is to take advantage of any opportunity against us." For that reason, he wanted to attack Poland at the first opportunity. The Polish problem was inseparable from the conflict in the west, but a simultaneous conflict in the west could not be permitted. In the course of a German-Polish conflict, a war with the west would remain impossible. Then the battle would be against England and France. Then he says that we could not allow ourselves to be drawn into a war with England through Poland. A war on two fronts seemed impossible then as in 1914. The, again, England -- and that is comparatively new here -- is the mortar driving against Germany. We should prepare for a long war, aside from a surprise attack, apparently with reference to England. It is astonishing that we were to endeavor at the beginning of such a war to strike a destructive blow against England. The goal is to drive England to he knees.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the defendant appears to be reading from a document an argument about this document. That is not giving evidence. If he can tell us anything about what happened at this meeting, it is open to him to do so.
DR. SIEMERS: He says that, with the aid of this document, on the complicated thoughts which Hitler expressed at that time, he is pointing out the contradictions contained in Hitler's speech at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the argument, to point out that there are conflicts between one part of the document and another. That is not the subject of evident He has already told us that Hitler's speeches -- that one speech generally contradicted another, but we can see for ourselves from the document if one part of it conflicts with another.
DR. SIEMERS: Is it not of importance, Mr. President, that the unclear statements of Hitler at that time had such an effect on the witness that he says so and so many points are false? Then the whole tendency which we read out of it cannot be true. As I understand the witness, Hitler must have had another though in the back of his mind if he said such unclear things to the Commanders, but I believe we can shorten it. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Grand Admiral, according to the wish of the Court. Just explain what the effect was on you and what the special thoughts are connected with this document was. At the end there is a second part in which a number of doctrinaire, academy thoughts on warfare are expressed, and they conclude by saying that it was also Hitler's wish that a study staff should be formed in the OKW which would work out all these plans for the preparation for war, evaluation of the various weapons, etc, eliminating the General Staffs, with which he did not like to collaborate. He wanted to have these things in his own hands. The formation of the study staff -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I have already told you that the Tribunal thi* that argument is not evidence. This seems to be purely argument upon this document. If there is anything in the shape of recollection as to what passed at this meeting, that would be evidence, but merely to argue upon the document is not in evidence.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, may the witness not say what effect Hitler's processes of thought had on him?
THE PRESIDENT: Can you say that he did not understand or did not think it was sincere?
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to point out to the witness referred to this point because this was the only place where the Prosecution did not read this document. In this document, the sentence about the study staff, noticed immediately, were not read.
This study staff was what Hitler wanted to achieve. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, after this speech, was anything changed in your department?
A No. The conclusion which was drawn was, first, that the ship construction program was to be continued as in the past. Hitler said so himself. In the second place, he said that the armament programs were to be adapted to the year 1943-1944. That was the positive thing which I could take away from the meeting. himself made at the launching of the battleship "Bismarck" in Hamburg. There he said that the Wehrmacht, as the sharpest instrument of war, had to protect the peace of true justice. That was what made the greatest impression on me at that time. In regard to Hitler's intentions. It was completely incompetent , incapable -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, if there are any passages in this document which have not been read and to which you attach importance, you may read them now and for the rest, all that the Tribunal think you ought to do is to ask the defendant what his reaction was or what happened at that meeting and if he can supplement the document as to what happened at the meeting, he is entitled to do so. The Tribunal doesn't intend to prevent you reading anything from the document which has not yet been read nor from getting from the witness anything which he says happened at the meeting.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I understood the witness to mean that he recalled the Study-Staff which the prosecution did not mention; this is how it happened, that the witness, since he knows the document, too, and at the same time, points it out that the Study-Staff was also mentioned in the document. I believe that can explain the misunderstanding. Perhaps I may read this sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. SIEMERS: Under No. 3, towards the end of the document, it says: "To study weak points of the enemy, these studies must not be left to the general staff. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed. The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff; containing representatives of the three parts of the Wehrmacht and the three commanders-in-chief and chiefs of the General Staff. The staff will keep the Fuehrer informed. The planning staff is responsible for the planning of operations and the decisions."
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, a passage is left out in the English translation. The copy I have before me says "These studies must not be left to the General Staffs; secrecy would no longer be guaranteed," and then it goes on "This staff mill keep the Fuehrer informed and will report to him." I know it is very important. Go on.
DR. SIEMERS: This paragraph about the planning staff in the High Command was submitted in the English. "The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside the staff; however great by the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must at sometime come to the end of their resources and ours will be greater. We can recruit (?) one hundred twenty thousand men in each age class. We shall not be forced into a war but we shall not be able to avoid one. This planning staff, in effect, eliminated the commanders-in-chief.
That was what Hitler wanted to achieve. If I am correctly informed, the rest has been read by the prosecution --the purpose and the principle of the order to keep everything secret, and at the end, that the shipbuilding program should not be changed,--the armament program to be postponed until 1943 or 1944. he have had to force any particular part of the navy armament? ially?
Q How many submarines did you have at this time?
A I can't say exactly, I think about twenty-six. were fifteen capable of sailing in the Atlantic? with Sir Neville Henderson on relations between Germany and England?
A Yes, a very short talk at an evening reception at the Fuehrer's, where I talked to Ambassador Henderson and Mr. von Neurath, and where the question was discussed -- it was brought up by me whether Eng land would accept Germany's offer to set the proportion of strength at one to three and hadn't welcomed it and would not draw certain conclusions from this proportion. Ambassador Henderson answered, when no one else had brought up this question, "Yes, that would be shown in the future when the colonial question was settled." I later reported this answer to the Fuehrer in order to use it to maintain a friendly policy toward England.
Q We are new at the summer of 1939. Grand Admiral, in the course of the summer, after the speech of 23 May 1939, did you talk to Hitler on the generally known war danger, and what did he tell you? brought up the question of England. I urged him in that connection and I tried to convince him that it would be possible to maintain a peace policy with England which he, himself, at the beginning of his government had instituted. He always reassured me that it remained his intention to carry on a peace policy with England and he always convinced me that there was no danger of a clash with England. In any case, at this time there was no such danger.
Q Now, I come to the third key document, Hitler's speech before the supreme commanders on 22August 1939, at the Obersalzburg -- 1014-PS and 798-PS. 1014-PS is US-30 and document book 10-A, page 269 and 798-PS is US-29, and document book 10-A, page 266. In this document 1014-PS which I have here in the original, in the form submitted by the prosecution, I should like to make a formal request. This No. 1014-PS is on page 194 in the German minutes, in the English minutes page 371. I object to the use of this document. I request that this document be stricken from the minutes of the meeting and for the following reasons.
THE PRESIDENT: What document are you speaking about now, 1014-PS?
DR. SIEMERS: In document book 10-A, page 269, US-30.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, what are your reasons?
DR. SIEMERS: The things which were mentioned in the other minutes are much greater here. This document is nothing but two pieces of paper headed "Second Speech by the Fuehrer, on 22 August 1939". The original has no heading, has no number, and no notice that it is secret; no signature, no date.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the original. Yes, Dr. Siemers.
DR. SIEMERS: It has no date, no signature -- in the original in the folder, it has no indication of where the document comes from. It is headed "Second speech...", although it is certain that on this date Hitler made Hitler made only one speech, and it is hardly one and a half pages long.
THE PRESIDENT: When you say it has no date, it is part of the document itself which says that it is the second speech of the Fuehrer on the 22nd of August 1?39.
DR. SIEMERS: I said, Mr. President, it has a heading -
THE PRESIDENT: But it has no date.
DR. SIEMERS: It has no date as to when these notes were taken down. It has only the date of when the speech is supposed to have been made. Mr. President, on all documents which the prosecution submitted, you will find the date of the session and the date on which the minutes were set up; also the place where the minutes were set up, the name of the person who set it up, or reference that it is secret. It is certain that Hitler spoke for two and a half hours. I believe it is generally known that Hitler spoke very fast. It is quite out of the question that the minutes could be one and a half pages long, and if it is to give the meaning and the content to any extent, it is important. Then I should like to refer to another point. I will submit the original afterwards. I am no expert on handwriting but I notice that this document, which is also not signed, we do not know where it comes from, but it is a captured document.
THE PRESIDENT: You say we don't know where it has come from -- it is a captured document covered by the affidavit which was made with reference to all other captured documents.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I would be grateful to the prosecution, if in the case of such an important document, the prosecution would be so kind -- in order to settle the really accurate contents -- as to indicate exactly from where it originates. If it wasnot taken down by Schmundt or Hossbach or anyone and has no number, it is only loose pages,
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know whether the prosecution can do that but it seems to me to be rather late in the day to ask for it.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I don't know what the exact origin of this document is offhand but I expect that we could probably get some information before the Tribunal if the Tribunal wishes us to do so but as the President pointed out, it is a captured document and everything that counsel says about it seems to go to its weight rather than to its admissibility.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know where the document was found, if that is possible.
MR. DODD: I willmake an effort to find that out.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, Mr. Dodd just pointed out that my objection comes rather late. I believe I recall correctly that objections
THE PRESIDENT: I think it was I who pointed it out, not Mr. Dodd.
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. I believe I recall correctly that the defense on several occasions raised objection during the Prosecution's case, and they were told that all statements could be made during the defense case at a later time, during the case of the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: I only meant that it might not be possible at this stage to find out exactly where the document came from, whereas if the question had been asked very much earlier in the trial, it might have been very much easier. That is allI meant. Have you anything more to add upon why, in your opinion, this document should be stricken from the record
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I should like to point out, Mr. President, that I do not do it for formal reasons. It is a very important reason. by the Prosecution in the past. The words, "destruction of Poland in the foreground," "aim is removal of living forces, not arrival at a certain line"-- these words were not spoken, and such a war aim the German High commanders would not have agreed to. is genuine or not. version of this speech as mentioned in this court com, L-3, which is even worse than these and which was published by the world press. Wherever one spoke to anyone this grotesque, brutal speechwas brought up. For that reason it is in the interest of historical truth to ascertain whether Hitler in this horrible way spoke at this time. not use such words. For the reputation of the commanders who were present, this is of great significance.
Lot me Point out the next words. They say expressly, "Have no pity," "brutal attitude." Such words were not used. I will be in a position to prove this by another witness, General Admiral Boehm. this document from the records. I should like to point out that the document at many points is mentioned in the record. In case the Court wishes, I shall have to look for all the points. I have found only four or five in the Germanrecord. If necessary, I would have to give all the points in the English record. It was submitted on page 371.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't hink you need bother to do that. You are only now upon the question of whether the document should be stricken from the record. If it were to be stricken from the record, we could find out where it is.
Is that all you wish to say?
DR. SIEMERS: One question to Grand Admiral Raeder. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q The words which I just read, "brutal attitude," "elimination of living forces" -- were these words used in Hitler's speech at that time?
A In my opinion, no. I believe that the version which General Admiral Boehm submitted on the afternoon of the same day he wrote it down is the version nearest to the truth.
DR. SIEMERS: High Tribunal, in order to achieve clarity on this question, I submit as Raeder Exhibit Number 27, Document Book 2, page 144, an orderly reproduction of this speech.
THE WITNESS: May I have Document Book II?
DR. SIEMERS: The manuscript of General Admiral Hermann Boehm. General Admiral Boehm was present at Hitler's speech on 22August, 1939, at the Obersalzberg. He made the notes during the speech. He transcribed them in the present form on the same evening -- that is, on 22August, 1939 -in the Vier Jahreszeiten Hotel in Munich, I have certified the correctness of the copy.
The original is in the handwriting of General Admiral Boehm.
Boehm has been called by me as a witness for various other questions. He will confirm that the speech was made in in this form as I have submitted here. A comparison of the two documents show that the words, "brutal attitude," are not contained in this speech. It shows further -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: (Interposing) Surely this part of Dr. Siemers' argument must go to weight. He has said that a comparison of the two documents shows such and such. I have just looked at the end of Admiral Boehm's affidavit, and it contains, I should argue, every vital thought that is contained in Document 1014. But whether it does or not, that is a matter of weight, surely. decide the admissibility of the document. As I say, on that I should have a great deal to say by comparing the documents in detail. That is not before the Tribunal now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal was only wanting to hear whatever Dr. Seimers has got to say upon the subject.
DR. SIEMERS: A comparison of the document with 798-PS, also the longer and better version which the Prosecution submitted -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Dr. Siemers, as Sir David Maxwell Fyffe has just pointed out, a more comparison of the two or three documents doesn't help us as to its admissibility. We know the facts about the document. It is a document in German, captured among German documents.
DR. SIEMERS: I understand. I made the statement only in order to show that I am not raising objections for formal reasons but because the thing is actually of great importance.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you will be able to urge that when you make your speech in criticism of the document as to its weight. You will be able to point out that it doesn't bear comparison with a more full document taken down by Admiral Boehm or with the other document.
DR. SIEMERS: To explain my formal request, I refer to my statement on the formal character of the document which I submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Does counsel the prosecution understand that the Tribunal wishes to have information as to where that document was found?
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: Yes, My Lord; we will do our best to get it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and also the other document, 798.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases. BY DR. SIEMERS: version, to you. You have read the speech in this version. Is this reproduction correct on the whole, in your recollection?
A Yes. In my opinion, this version is that one which corresponds most closely to reality. I remember especially that Hitler devoted a large part of his position to the point that England and France would not intervene, and he also cited the reasons for their non-intervention. I was missing just that point, in its entirety, in the other reproductions of the speech.
Q In the version of the speech in US-29 it says, verbatim: "I am only afraid that at the last moment some dog will give me some plan of arbitration. Were those words used in the speech at that time?
A In my recollection, certainly not. The Fuehrer was not accustomed to using words like that in speeches which he made to the generals. had, from that time, decided to attack. I am asking you to give us the impression, briefly, which the speech made on you at the time. Tell me also why, despite this speech -- that is, this version -- you remained as Commander-in-Vhief of the Navy. and tremendously tense. The fact is, however, that Hitler, in his speech, put great stress on two f acts: first, to prove that France and England would not intervene; and second, that Mr. von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, left for Moscow on the same day to sign a pact there, as we were told. Thes things filled not only me, but other listeners as well, with the strong hope that here again a large political play was present on the part of Hitler and that in the end he would be successful insolving this problem in a peaceful way.
Therefore, I saw no reason to resign my office at that moment. I would have considered a step like that pure desertion.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, in this connection I would like to submit my two documents, Raeder Exhibit 28 and 29, and I ask tha the High Tribunal kindly take judicial notice without my quoting from these documents. BY DR. SIEMERS: through this document -
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: My Lord, the documents to which Dr. Siemers has just referred -- Raeder's documents numbers 28 and 29 -- the first is a memorandum of General Gamelin and the second is a letter from General Weygand to General Gamelin of the 9th of September 1939. documents as being irrelevant, and, My Lord, the prosecution maintains that objection.
I don't wish to interrupt Dr. Siemer's examination any more than is necessary. If at the moment he is merely asking the Tribunal to take judici notice of the documents and does not intend to use them, it would probably be convenient, in order not to interrupr the examination in chief, that I should merely indicate formally that we are maintaining cur objection to the document
THE PRESIDENT: Is the position that they were allowed to be translated and put in the document book, but no further order of the Tribunal has been given?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No further order has been given and therefore, My Lord, it is still open to us to object, as I understand the position.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better deal with it now then.
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
DR. SIEMERS: May I make a few remarks on this point?
THE PRESIDENT: Well certainly, but we had better hear the objection first, hadn't we? And then we will hear you afterwards.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, as you wish. This is a rather forma point.
I believe that Sir David erred slightly in referring to document number 28. There was no objection to this document, Your Honor; only against 29 was there an objection by the prosecution.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My friend is quite right; we did not object to the translation of 28. However, My Lord, it falls into the same category as 29, and I would still raise an objection. made an objection before.
My Lord, number 28 is a letter from General Gamelin to M. Deladier, on the 1st of September, 1939, in which General Gamelin gives his views as to the problem of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, and contrasts that view with the view of the French Government. General Gamelin is in itself intrinsically too remote from the issues of this trial to be of any relevance or probative value.