I refer the Tribunal to paragraph one of the agreement and to what it essentially contains:
"The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the of the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st May, 1935."
THE PRESIDENT: GB 20.
SIR MAXWELL-FYFE: I now have three documents which Mr. Alderman asked me to hand in with regard to Czechoslovakia. The first is TC 27, which the Tribunal will find two documents farther on from the one There agreement with Austria, to which I just referred. That is the German Assurance to Czechoslovakia, and what I am handing in is GB 21, which is the letter from M. Masaryk, M. General Masaryk's son, to the learned Viscount Halifax on the date of 12 March 1938, and again I think that Mr. Alderman did read this. He certainly quoted the statement made by the defendant Goering, which appears in the third paragraph. In the first paragraph the Field Marshall used the expression "ich gebe ihnen mein." That means, "I gave my word of honor." If you will look down to the third paragraph, the one in which the defendant Goering had asked that there would not be a mobilization of the Czechoslovak Army, and in the next paragraph:
"M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject, and today spoke with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925." So there I remind the Tribunal that in 1925 Baron von Neurath was speaking on behalf of Germany in an agreement voluntarily concluded;
had there been the slightest doubt of that question the defendant Neurath giving the assurance on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered itself bound by the German-Czechoslovakia Arbitration Convention on the 12 March 1938, six months before Dr. Benes made a hopeless appeal to it before the crisis in the Army in 1938. There is Czechoslovakia's difficult position in the Czechoslovakian Government, which is set out in the last paragraph that M. Mastny said, and of which the Tribunal may think is of great force in this last sentence:
"They can not however fail to view with great apprehension 1936, and yesterday, 11 March 1938."
most pregnant sentences relating to this period. Document TC 28, which I hand in as Exhibit GB 22. That is an Assurance of the 26 September 1938, which Hitler gave to Czechoslovakia, and again the Tribunal will take my remark with it that Mr. Alderman read this document.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't recall it.
SIR MAXWELL-FYFE: If it didn't, the Tribunal ought to have it before them, because it has many important points as to the alleged governmental assurance in getting Germans together and the right which the Nazi conspirators purposely asked for a considerable time as its citizens, which said:
"I have a little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I can not go back beyond the limits of our patience."
and the Munich Pact:
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities peacefully, and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs. But I must also declare before the German people that in the Sudetan German problem my patience is not at an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the realization of what he had already promised. He now has peace or war in his hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the Germans their freedome, or we will get this freedom for ourselves."
This is six months before 15 March. Hitler was saying in the second paragraph when he violated the terms, "He did'nt want any Czechs." I shall now ask, as I am asked by my friend Mr. Alderman this morning, the last document which I shall ask to put in, which I now ask the Tribunal to take the judicial notice of, and hand in is G.B.-23, which is the British document TC-23 a copy of the Munich Agreement of September 29 1938. That was signed by Hitler, later by Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. Daladier and Mussolino, and which is largely a procedural agreement by which the entry of German troops into Sudeten-Deutsche territory is regulated. That is shown by the preliminary clause:- "Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy", and "taking into consideration the agreement which has already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory as agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold them selves responsible for the steps necessary to secure fulfilment."
I don't think unless the Tribunal wants it, I shall go through the steps in Article 4. It states that "The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1 October.
The four territories marked on the attached map, "and by article 6, "The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission." And it provides also that there is the rights of option and the release from the forces -- the Czech forces of Sudeten Germans.
It provides also for various rights of option and release from "Annex to the Agreement:
"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French "When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia."
"The Polish and Hungarian minorities," not the question of Slovakia which the Tribunal heard this morning.
That is why Mr. Alderman submitted, and I respectfully joined him in his
THE PRESIDENT: We will now recess for ten minutes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
(A recess was taken from 15.30 to 15.40 hours.)
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: May it please the Tribunal, Count 2 of the treaty.
It is our purpose now to present to the Tribunal the evidence Under Paragraph B. of the particulars to that Count 2, reference in particular those allegations will be found in Paragraph F-4. But, My Lord, with the Tribunal's approval I would propose first to deal Paragraph C. of the particulars, and of which the details are set out in Appendix C. Those sections of Appendix C. which relate to the don't propose, with the Court's approval, to say more than that.
Section 3 of Appendix C. and Section 4 charge breaches of the other Hague Conventions of 1907.
Section 5 (sub-section 4) charges other Sections of Appendix C: Section 10, which charges a breach of on the 16th of October, 1925, and Section 15 of Appendix C., which No. 2, I will desribe in a moment how the remaining parts are divided.
The Document Book is divided into six parts. The Tribunal will look at Part 1 for the moment.
The Document Books which have been handed to Tribunal's documents are bound for convenience.
of Appendix C. is Document TC-15 and it is the end document in the book.
It has already been put in under the number GB-16.
"THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE and THE PRESIDENT OF THE
POLISH REPUBLIC:
"Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries;
"Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals;
"Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent;
"And considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between States;
"Have decided..."
Then, go on to Article 1:
"All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter."
I go straight to Article 2:
"Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the Parties, be submitted, with a view to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission, styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in accordance with the present Treaty." and for conciliation.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in the same terms, is it not, as the arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia and Germany and Belgium?
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: Well -- yes, it is, My Lord, both signed at Locarno.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: The wording, however, of the charge in Section 10, it will be noted, is that Germany did, on or about the 1st of September 1939 unlawfully attack and invade Poland without having first attempted to settle its disputes with Poland by peaceful means.
of the 26th of January 1934, will be found as the last document in Part 1 of the Tribunal's Document Book, which is the subject of Section 10 of Appendix C.
"The German Government and the Polish Government" -- this, of course, was signed on the 26th of January, 1934.
"The German Government and the Polish Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new era in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between the States. They have therefore decided to establish by the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those relations.
"The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential condition for general peace in Europe."
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it's necessary to read all this? We're taking judicial knowledge of it.
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: I'm very willing to oblige. I'm willing to shorten this, if I can. ticularly draw attention to the last paragraph in that declaration.
"The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of ten years counting from the day of exchange of instruments of ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two governments six months before the expiration of that period of time, it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by either government at a time of six months and at any time in advance." evidence upon the planning and preparation of these wars and in support of the allegations that they were wars of aggression. For convenience, as I say, the documents have been divided into separate parts and if the Tribunal would look at the index, the total index to their document which is a separate book, on the front page it will be seen how these documents have been divided, Part 1 is the "Treaties"; Part 2 is entitled "Evidence of German Intentions Prior to March 1935 in '39". It might perhaps be more accurately described as "Pre-March, 1939, Evidence", and it will be with that part that I would now deal.
Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation for further aggression, and I only now--dealing with the early history of this matter-wish to draw the court's particular attention to those parts of the evidence which show that even at that time, before the Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly prepared to fight England, Poland and Prance, if necessary, to achieve those aims; that they appreciated the whole time that they might well have to do so. And, what is more, that, although not until after March, 1939, did they commence upon their immediate and specific preparations for a specific war against Poland, nevertheless, they had for a considerable time before had it in mind specifically to attack Poland once Czechoslovakia was completely theirs. of the Nazi regime in Germany, as afterwards, while they are making their preparations and carrying out their plans, they are giving to the outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull them out of any suspicion of their real object. yesterday--the dates in this case almost more than the documents speak for themselves. The documents in this book are arranged in the order in which I will refer to them, and the first that I would refer to is document TC-70, which will go in as GB-25.
It's only interesting to see what Hitler said of the agreement with Poland when it was signed in January, 1934.
"When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the relations between the two countries seemed to me more than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences which were due to the Territorial Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom Would gradually crystalize into a state of hostility which, if persisted, might too easily acquire the character of a dangerous traditional enmity."
"In the spirit of this Treaty the German Government is willing and prepared to cultivate economic relations with Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful cooperation. It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with its Polish neighbor."
That was in 1934. Three years later, again on the 30th of January, speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said -- this is document PS-2369, which will be G3-26. I will, if I may, avoid so far as possible repeating passages which the Attorney General quoted in his speech the other day. The first paragraph, in fact, he quoted to the Tribunal. It's a short paragraph, but perhaps I might read it now, but I will -- dealing with this evidence -- so far as possible avoid repetition.
"By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage of both sides. True statemanship will not overlook reality but consider them. The Italian nation and the new Italian state arc realities. The German nation and the German Reich are equally realities, and to my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish state have also become a reality."
On the 24th of June, 1937, we have a "Top Secret Order", C-175, which has already been put in as "US-69". It is a "Top Secret Order" issued by the Reich Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, signed "Von Blomberg". There is at the top, "Written by an Officer.
Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it in principle are to be written by an officer." So it's obviously highly secret. And with it is enclosed a Directive for the Unified Preparation for War of the Armed Forces to come into force on the 1st of August 1937. The directive enclosed with it is divided into Part 1, "General Guiding Principle"; Part 2, "Likely Warlike Eventualities"; Part 3, "Special Preparations". opening passages. The general position justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side.
It goes on--the second paragraph:
"The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces. To counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur." and I would particularly draw the Tribunal's attention to paragraph 2b:
"The further working on mobilization without public announcement in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time."
On the next page, under paragraph 4:
"Special preparations are to be made for the following eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike entanglement with Red Spain." time that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve them in war, "England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us." of that document: "Probable warlike eventualities - Concentrations.
"1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West.
"Suppositions. In the West France is the opponent. Belgium may side with France, either at once or later or not at all. It is also possible that France may violate Belgium's neutrality if the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of Luxembourg." and I particularly refer to the last paragraph on that page under the heading "Special Case - Extension Red-Green." It will be remembered that Red was Spain and Green was Czechoslovakia.
"The military political starting point used as a basis for concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents. Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland." the discussion. Before I leave that document, the date will be noted, June 1937, and it shows clearly that at that date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability of fighting England and Poland and France, and were prepared to do so if they had to. On the 5th of November 1937, the Tribunal will remember that Hitler held his conference in the Reichschancellory, the minutes of which have been referred to as the Hoszbach notes. I will refer to one or two lines of that document for the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler said in respect of England, Poland, and France. On page 1 of that Exhibit, the middle of the page :
"The Fuehrer then stated: 'The aim of German policy is the security and preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space:" "participation in world economy", and at the bottom of page 2 he said:
"The only way cut, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of nations."
And at the end of that first paragraph, on page 3:
"The history of all tines, Roman Empire, British Empire, has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable. Neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner.
The attacker always comes up against the proprietor."
THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) It has been read already.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: But my object was only to try to collect, so far as England and Poland were concerned, everything that has been given. If the Tribunal thought that it was unnecessary, I would welcome the opportunity ...
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would wish you not to read anything that has been read already.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES : I would pass then to the next document in that part of the document book. I put that document in. It was referred to by the Attorney General in his address yesterday, and it shows that on the same day as the Hoszbach meeting was taking place a communique was being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador's audience with Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the conversation, "It was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulty because of the Danzig question." That document is TC 73. It put it in as GB-27. On the 2nd of January ...
THE PRESIDENT: That hasn't been read before, has it?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the Attorney General in his opening.
THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2nd of January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Fuehrer. This document was one of the seven foreign office documents of which a microfilm was captured by Allied troops when they came into Germany. has headed, "Very Confidential Personal Only", and is called "Deduction on the report, Germany Embassy, London, regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations: "With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among Germaphile British politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them.
Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march against each other one day? To answer this question, one must realize the following:
"Change of the status quo in the east in the Gentian sense can only be carried out by force. So long as France knows that England, which so to speak has taken on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her side, France's fighting for her eastern allies is probable in any case, always possible, and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then even if England does not want war. England, believing she must attend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who could bring about such a war between Germany and England by war of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore that war between Germany and England on account of France can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England's forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-France coalition would never tolerate.
"This position would arise for instance if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by a superior coalition of powers, e.g. Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe." ship between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from my quotation to the next page where the writer is summarizing his ideas.
Paragraph five: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.
"1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to the protection of the interests of our friends.
2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a tightening of our friend ship with Italy and Japan; also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours directly or indirectly.
great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is going to be a hard, astute opponent in this game of diplomacy. in central Europe ( I am afraid the translation of this is not very good) The particular question whether, in the event of a war in central Europe France and thereby England would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military considerations which cannot be gone into here." fairly high level, because he concludes by saying, "I should like to give the Fuehrer some of these viewpoints verbally." That document is G.B.-28. Well, I am afraid the next two documents have gotten into your books in the wrong order. If you will refer to PS-2357--you will remember that the document to the Fuehrer, which I have just read, was dated the 2nd of January.
THE PRESIDENT: February, you said?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, February 1938. That is PS-2357, and will be G.B.-30. In that speech he said "In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the state, with which we had had perhaps the greatest difference, not only has there been a 'detente,' but in the course of the years there has been a constant improvement in relations.
This good work, which was regarded with suspiciaon by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to an understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation.
"To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us -- peace." document books, the one before that, L-43, which will be G.B. 29. This is a document to which the Attorney General referred yesterday. It is dated the 2nd of May 1938, and is entitled, "Organizational Study 1950." It comes from the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said to be: "The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly-conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force. The result gained is termed, "Distant Objective." From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942, this will be called, "Final Objective 1942." This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions, etc."
various sections, and Section I is entitled, "Assumptions." Under the heading "Assumption I, frontier of Germany", see map, enclosure one. will be seen that on the 2nd of May, 1938, the Air Force was in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, all coming within the boundaries of the Reich. The original map is here attached to this file and if the Tribunal will look at the original exhibit, it will be seen that this organizational study has been prepared with the greatest care and authority, with a mass of charts attached to the appendages. Tribunal's copy of the translation.
"Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section 1:
"1. Attack Forces:
"Principal adversaries: England, France, and Russia." And it then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-four Geschwader employed against England, very much concentrated in the Western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that they, by making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down to the last corner.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it is involved in the map. I think you should refer to the organization of the Air Forces, with group commands at Warsaw and Koenigsberg.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged. Under the paragraph "Assumption" double heading 2, "Organization of Air Force in peacetime," seven group commands: 1 Berlin 2 Brunswick, 3 Munich, 4 Vienna, 5 Budapest, 6 Warsaw, and 7 Koenigsberg."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. And lastly, in connection with that Document, on page four of the Tribunal's translation, the last paragraph:
"The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have locally bound commands****" I only emphasize the opening, "The more the Reich grows in area, the mere Air Force grows in strength***"but I would say one word on that document. The original, I understand, is signed by an officer who is not at the top rank in the Air Force and I, therefore, don't want to over-emphasize the inferences that can be drawn from it, but it is admitted that it at least shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that time. Ribbentrop succeeded von Neurath as Foreign Minister. We had another document from that captured microfilm, which is dated the 26th of August, 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and it is addressed to him as "The Reich Minister, via the State Secretary." It is a comparatively short document and one that I will read the whole of.
"The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente. (TC 76-GB 31). Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, is she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves.
This process, however, would have to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexion of territory.
"The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired developments."
I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can leave out the intervening lines, paragraph five.
THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph "for this purpose".
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: "For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudetan - Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the choice of nationality was being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly decided by this: but would nevertheless be definitely sealed.
"This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the south east and their transfer to the east and north east must make the Poles sit up. The fact is**** -- I put in an "is" because I think it is obviously left out of the copy I have in front of me. -- "The fact is that after the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn.
"But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor, the better.