has had any practical results or could have had any practical results on the loss of allied sailors?
A That's very difficult to judge. At that time something like eighty per cent of all submarinesattacks took place under such conditions or may have taken place under such conditions which made rescue impossible. That is to say either there were convoys or these attacks took place very near the coasts.
submarines. Whether rescuing attempts were possible in all other cases is some thing which cannot be said for certain. Quite probably, the situation was that the Allied sailors in the lifeboats felt safer tha, for instance, aboard a submarine. They were probably glad when, after attacking, the submarine disappeared. case of the Laconia itself, because during resuing attempts two submarines were attacked by aircraft with bombs. direction or the other.
Q. What do you mean, "one direction or the other"?
A. I mean whether it meant an increased or decreased number of losses amongst enemy seamen.
Q. There is one trend of thought which I haven't quite understood. You pointed to the fact that there were 13 captains and chief engineers who had be made prisoners after this order was issued. Do you mean by that that only in some few cases was it possible, without endangering the submarine, to carry out the order that such officers whould be taken out of the lifeboats?
A. That it was only in these cases is too strong an expression, but it we give you an indication regarding the number of cases where it was possible.
Q. I shall now show you the wireless message which went to Naval Lieutan Schacht. It is in the British Document Book of the Prosecution on page 36. This message, too, was made a top secret command order. What reason existed for that?
A. It is emphatically a severe reprimand for the commander.
Q. How far was that reprimand justified? Schacht hadn't had any instruc ions previously regarding the rescuing of survivors?
A. No, but it had been assume that it was clear to submarines that in to first place it was important that implies should be rescued and saved to become prisoners. Apart from that, during actions which had happened, there had been several indications that commanders should be particularly cautious. Afterwar came Schacht's report from which it appeared at the time that he had infringed just these orders.
Seen retrospectively, Schacht's action must have taken place before the order of the BDU, so that at least some part of the accusations against him weren't justified.
Q. After this order of September 1942, were there still rescues carried out by submarines in certain cases?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the Flag Officer Submarines object to these rescues?
A. I have no recollection of that.
Q. To your knowledge, did German submarines deliberately kill survivors?
A. The only case of which I heard after capitulation is that of Naval Lieutenant Eck. On one occasion, we had heard an enemy broadcast about that, which indicated that something of that sort had occurred.
Q. I now submit to you a document of the Prosecution, GB-203, which the Prosecution consider proof of the shooting of survivors. This is the war diar the log of the U-247; and I have printed an extract on page 74 of my document book, second volume. ing steamer. You have already seen this log or war diary. After his return, did the commandant report on this action?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he report anything on that occasion regarding the shooting of survivors?
A. No.
Q. According to the statement of a survivor by the name of McAllister, fishing steamer, the Moren Mary, had a gun aboard. Do you know whether fishi steamers had mounted guns fore or aft?
A. They were almost always in the bows.
Q. Can you ascertain, on the basis of this war diary and on the strengths of your recollection of the report of the commander, just how this incident do actually happen?
A. The submarine, first of all, appeared to encounter a number of fished steamers. An attempt was made to -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Is the witness trying to DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I am asking him to tell us the story on the strength reconstruct thisfrom the document, reconstruct the incident?
of his own memory and on the strength of the report of the commander, and I am asking him to tell us just how much he remembers while he is looking at the diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, he hasn't said whether he ever saw the commander.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Oh yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, all he can tell us is what the commander told him.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, have him do that then.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: you can tell us after having seen the diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. If he remembers anything about what the commander told him, he can tell us that, but the diary speaks for itself and he can't reconstruct it out of that. He may tell us what he remembers of what the officer said.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well, sir. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
A This was the report of the commander. He said that in extreme proximity to the coast, considering the conditions of the time, he sighted a group of fishing steamers, and after having failed in his attempts to torpedo them, he sank one of them with gunfire. That was particularly remarkable because, first of all, this incident occurred so close to the coas and also because the commander risked this artillery fight in spite of the fact that other vessels were in the neighborhood.
Q Were these other ships also armed fishing steamers?
surfaced 50 yards from the fishing steamer. According to your recollection, and considering your experience, is this possible?
A I can't recollect the details, but it is out of the question that any submarine commander would do that.
Q McAllister's evidence also states -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Wait a minute. Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal thinks that the witness oughtn't to express opinions of that sort. He ought to give us his evidence of any facts which he has. He is telling us that in his opinion it is impossible that a naval commander would ever bring his submarine up within 50 yards of another vessel.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a matter for him to say.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was going to ask the witness next whether German submarines were shooting shells filled with wire, as Witness McAllister had stated. Is that a question which you will permit me to put?
THE PRESIDENT: What?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Shells which were filled with wire.
THE PRESIDENT: Wire?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Wire, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is your question: Were submarine commanders ever furnished with wire to be used in their guns? Is that the question?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Not quite, the President. My question would be whether German submarines were equipped with shells which were filled with wire.
THE PRESIDENT: Shells which are filled with wire?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, that is the question I want to put. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
A Such shells didn't exist at all. wireless immediately?
A Do you mean the report by the submarine?
was received, reporting a submarine attack in that area. 0127. It is addressed to Matschulat, that is to your from the commandant, and it states: "English steamer reports attack by German submarine west of Cape Wrath." message of a British steamer about a submarine attack in that area had been received. War Order-511. This is in Volume 1 of my document book on page 46. When I presented this order, theTribunal wasn't quite clear about the significance of what appears under Figure 2, which I shall read.
"No taking on board in allowed of captains and officers of neutral ships which according to standing order No. 101, may be sunk (e.g. Swedish ships outside of Goeteborg traffic), because internment of these officers would contravene international law."
Can you first of all tell me on the basis of which experiences that figure "2" was included in the order? Germany, who had been the captain of a ship that had been sunk. We were worried that if this captain were to be released he might tell stories about what he had seen while he was interned aboard the submarine. It was for reasons of this order that difficulties of that kind should be avoided in the future. The captain from Uruguay had to be freed and was in fact freed. to standing order No. 101 may be sunk?
A May I please see the order for a minute? In the standing war order No. 101, the sinking of neutral ships is referred to and the following is ordered: First of all, within the blockade area, and as a matter of principle all neutral ships can be sunk with two important exceptions or, shall we say, two general exceptions. First of all, not sinkable in blockade areas with shi of certain neutral countries with which arrangements had been made regarding certain shipping channels; and secondly, not sinkable with such ships of certain neutral states of which it could be assumed that they weren't exclusively travelling for the enemy. Regarding the sinking outside blockade areas, the order was applicable according to which neutral ships could be sunk; first of all, when they weren't recognizable as being neutral and therefore had appeared as enemy vessels to the submarine in question; and secondly, if they weren't acting as neutrals.
Q As, for instance, when they were travelling in convoy? the presence of our submarines, for instance, by means of wireless.
Q Did this figure "2" mean that the captains of neutral ships were to be worse off in the future than captains of enemy ships or were they to be better off?
A This isn't a question of letter or worse, it is a question of capturing. They weren't to be captured, weren't to be taken prisoners because they couldn't be kept as prisoners. Whether this meant that they would be better or worse off is at least an open question.
Captains of enemy ships tried whenever possible to escape being taken along by the submarine because they probably felt safer in life-boats.
ships during the beginning of the invasion? concerned, the order applied that hospital ships were not to be attacked. Commanders operating in the invasion zones then reported that there was very considerable traffic of hospital ships.
Q From where to where?
A Between theinvasion area of Normandy and the British Isles. The Flag Officer submarines then had an investigation made by the appropriate department to discover whether this hospital traffic in its report strength was in accordance with the comparative figures. That was confirmed.
Q What do you mean by that? corresponded to the number of wounded, as we had expected. Then there was a special order stating that in the future, too, hospital ships were not to be attacked. was that in accordance with any other interests? Geneva Convention wasn't being recognized by our enemy, so that we didn't have any interest in respecting and preserving hospital shipping. has been sunk by a German submarine?
Q Did it happen the other way around?
A The German hospital ship Tubingen (Tuebingen) was, I think, sunk by a British aircraft in the Mediterranean, presumably because of mistaken identity.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the question of German hospital ships which were sunk isn't relevant, is it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I was going to show by it, Mr. President, that the possibility of mistaken identity does exist and that in fact because of such mistaken identity, a hospital ship has been sunk.
My proof is to mean therefore that you can't draw the conclusion from the sinking of a ship that it shouldn't have been sunk.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite realizes that mistakes may be made in sea warfare. It is a matter of common knowledge. Should we adjourn now?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. Admiral, you have known Admire Doenitz since the year 1934, and you have know him well since that time. You had many business dealings with him during that time. Did he participate in any political activity during that period of time?
A. Before he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, not at all, to my knowledge. As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on occasion he gave speeches outside the Navy matters, however. He addressed dock workers. He spoke to the Hitler Youth at Stettin once. He spoke over the radio when we had an anniversary for heroes, and he spoke on the 20th of July. I remember no other occasions.
Q. Did these speeches have a direct connection to the tasks of the Navy, that is, when he addressed the Navy workers?
A. When he spoke before the ship workers, yes.
Q. And before the Hitler Jugend as well?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the connection the?
A. At that time, as far as I recall, the speech was concerned with recruitment for the Navy.
Q. Did he select his staff officers according to ideological points of view or according to their military point of view?
A. Their military and personal capacity was the decisive point. Political considerations played no role at all.
Q. The question of whether Admiral Doenitz knew certain happenings outside the Navy, whether he had knowledge of these facts or whether he had to have knowledge, that is an important question before the Tribunal. Can you tell me in what circles he traveled?
A. Almost exclusively he remained within the circle of his own officers and officers of his own age, but, over and above that, as far as I know he had no other contacts.
Q. Does this hold true after his appointment to Commander-in-Chief of the Navy? Was there any change in that?
A. No. Then he was in contact more with people from other states, but on the whole his circle remained the same.
Q. Where did he live at that time, that is, since his assumption of the title as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
A. When he assumed this office, in Berlin and in the vicinity of Berlin, at the Wavy headquarters.
Q. Did he live with his family, or did he live with his staff?
A. He lived with his family, but his life was with his staff for the greater part.
Q. And after the staff, in the autumn of 1943, was transferred to Berlin to the so-called underground corridor -
A. At that time in the headquarters itself, but his family lived there for part of the time as well, but official conversations for the most part took place until late in the evening.
Q. And that means from that period of time on he lived in a Marine officer's quarters?
A. Yes.
Q. You, among all officers, could from a close proximity follow the course of the Admiral's life. Can you tell me what his motives were, that is, in your opinion, which were the decisive motives when he save out his military orders?
THE PRESIDENT: You can't speak about the motives of people. You can't give evidence about other people's minds. You can only give evidence of what they said and what they did.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I do believe that an officer who lived with another officer for years has a vertain knowledge of the motives, basing his knowledge on the actions of the officer and of what the officer told him. However, perhaps I mau put my question in a little different way.
THE PRESIDENT: He can give evidence about his character, but he can't give evidence about his motives.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I shall ask him about his character, your Honor.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. Can you tell me, please, whether Admiral Doenitz when he formulated his orders and in all of his actions showed egotistical motives that came to your knowledge?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, that is the same thing again, isn't it? That is the same question again really.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I meant it to be a different question.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody is charging him with being egotistical or anything of that sort. He is charged with the various crimes that are charged against him in the indictment.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I shall ask a question regarding the opinion of the Prosecution. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. The Prosecution judged Admiral Doenitz as cynical and opportunistic. Is that in line with your own judgment?
A. No.
Q. How would you judge him?
A. I would judge him to be a man who wanted to do only his work and his duty, and who was interested about his arms and about the men who were carrying these arms.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you other members of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
(No response)
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, might. I first mention the documents that I put in the cross examination this morning, or rather it was a document which had been in before. It was D-658, GB-229.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the letter. G or D?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: D, my Lord, the D series. That is the document dealing with Bordeaux, and there was a dispute as to whether it was from the Bordeaux Commando Raid, The dispute was as to whether it was from the SKL, that is the Naval War Staff Diary, or from a war diary of some lower formation. My Lord, I have had the matter confirmed with the Admiralty, and I will produce the original to defense counsel. from one Abteilung, Toil A--that is part A,-- for December 1942. So it is from the War Diary of the Defendant Raeder and the witness. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q You have said, Witness, that you don't recollect protesting against this order of the 17th of September 1942.
A. Yes.
Q. I will try and refresh your memory. Would you lock at a document, D-865?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that is an extr on from an interrogation of Admiral Doenitz on the 6th of October I should anything the record was kept in English, and, therefore, the translation into German not represent necessarily the Admiral's actual words. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE: first paragraph. It is the end of the first paragraph on page 207 in the English text. The Admiral is dealing with the order of the 17th of September 1942, and in that last sentence in that paragraph he says:
"I remember that Captain Godt"--the spelling in English was wrong--"Captain Godt and Capt in Hessler were against this telgram. They told me that expressly because they said "That can be misunderstood," But I said "I must tell that now to these boats to prevent the losses in this one percent. I must give them a reason so they don't feel obligated to do that."
Do you remember protesting now, saying "That can be misunderstood"? of the page of the German:
"Thus I sent the second telegram in order to avoid that I should have futur losses. The second telegram happened on my instigation. I am completely and personally responsible for it, because Captains Godt and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or liable to be misinterpreted." Do you remember that new? the English, first paragraph; page 4 of the German text, third paragraph. age that I read to you before--My Lord, that is the bottom of page 4: "--that his most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating ships and crews are contradicted by efforts to rescue members of the crews." It is the last clause of the first sentence, He answere:
"These words do not correspond to the telegram. They do not in any way correspond to our actions in the years of 39, '40, '41, and 42, as I have plainl shown you by the Laconia incident. I would like to emphasize once more that the Captains Godt and Hessler both were violently opposed to the sponsor of the telegram."
Do you still say that you don't remember protesting spirit the sending of that telegram?
A. I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember this.
Q. I did not get that.
A. I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember this.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, did you get the English? I am afraid I did not.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
THE INTERPRETER: The witness said, "I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember this". BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. I will show you one more extract, the document D-866, which will become GB-459. That is a further interrogation, on the 22nd of October.
The first question on the document is: "Do you consider this order to be contract to the prize rules of the German Navy pursued in the beginning of the war?"
And the last sentence of the first paragraph of the answer is: "Godt and Hessler told me, 'Don't make this wireless; you- see, one day there can be a wrong appearance about it. There can be a misinterpretation of that'."
You don't remember using those words?
A. No.
Q. You were an experienced staff officer, were you let?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew the importance of drafting an operational order with absolute clarity, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. These orders you were issuing were going to young commanders, between 20 and 30 years of age, were they not?
A. 20 years I would say was too young. They might have been at the end of their twenties, perhaps.
Q. Yes. Do you say that this order is not ambiguous?
A. Yes. Perhaps if you take one sentence out of the context, you might have some doubt, but not if you read the entire order.
Q. What was the point of the words, "Rescue runs counter to the rudiments.
demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews."?
A. (No response)
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Show it to him, will you?
(A document was handed to the witness.)
BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. What was the point of those words., if this was merely a non-rescue order?
A. It was the reason and the motivation for the rest of the order, and a coordination of ships and crews which were fighting against our U-boats.
Q. You see, all your other orders were so clear, were they not?
Have you got the defense documents there in the witness box?
A. I believe yes,
Q. Look at the defense document, Doenitz Number 8 on page 10,
A. I do not have those documents before me.
(A document was handed to the witness.) BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. It is on page 10 of that book. Let me just read you the second paragraph:
"U-boats may attack at once enemy merchant vessels on which armament is evidence.
As far as circumstances permit; measures shall be taken U-boat is excluded."
Now, no commander could go wrong with that order, could he? It is perfectly clear.
Look at another one, D-942, at page 13. It is the last paragraph of the order, on Page 15. Now, this is a non-rescue order.
Have you got it? Paragraph E, Standing Order 154:
"Do not rescue crew members nor take them along, and do not bother about boats of ships, Weather conditions and proximity of land are of no consequence. Concern yourselves only with the safety of your own boat, and try to achieve additional successes as soon as possible.
"We must be hard in this war. The enemy started it in order to destroy us; and we have to act accordingly."
Now, that was perfectly clear, was it not? That was a non-rescue order?
A. It was just as clear as the three other orders about whcih we are concerned.
Q. Look at one or two more and then let me come back to that order; Page 45, another order:
"Order from Flag Officer, U-boats" -- reading the third line -- "to take on board captaions with their papers of ships sunk, if it is possible, without endangering the boat or without impairing the fighting capacity".
It is perfectly clear to anybody exactly what was intended, is it not?
A. That is not an order at all; it is just an extract from the War Diary
Q. Yes. Reciting the words of the order, them, on the next page in Paragraph 4:
"Try under all circumstances to take prisoners if that can be done without endangering the boat". -- again, perfectly clear. June, 1944, the last sentence;
"Therefore, every effort must be made to bring in such prisoners far as possible without endangering the boats" intended to be a non-rescue order; that is right, is it not?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. I ask you again, what was meant by the sentence, "Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews."?
A. That is a reason for the rest of the order, and it deals with ships and their crews which had been armed and had to fight U-boats in order to give them equal advantage.
Q. Why do you speak about the destruction of crews if you do not mean the destruction of crews?
A. We are concerned with the fact of whether the ships and their crews were to be destroyed, which is something entirely difference from the destruction of the crews after they had not been on the ship any longer.
Q. And that is something entirely difference from merely not rescuing the crews; isn't that a fact?
A. I do not quite understand that question.
Q. Destruction of crews is quite different from non-rescue of crews?
A. Destruction when the ship and crew are together.
Q. You are not answering the question, are you? But if you want it again, Destruction of crews is quite different from non-rescue of crews?
A. The destruction of the crews is different from the non-rescue of survivors, yes.
Q. Were those words merely put in to five this order what you described as a lively character which an order should have?
A. I cannot give you the details, I have already said that I do not remember the antecedents of this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal has already said to the witness that the document speaks for itself.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Yes. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. Would you just look at the next document in the prosecution book; that is D-663, on the last sentence of that document? In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, are you saying that it was not your intention at this time to destroy the crows if you could? they are torpedoes, became survivers?
Q Will you now answer the question? Was it not your intention at this time to destroy the crows or survivers if you like, if you Could?
Do you remember the case of Kapitaen leutnant Eck? American and British officers here. "Filius" and then machine-gunned the survivers? Do you know that? briefing the commanders, had he not?
Q Yes. Now, if instead of taking the whole blame upon himself for the action which he took, if he had defended his action under this, order of the 17th of September 1942, are you saying that you could have court-martialled him for disobedience?
Q In view of the awarding of your order, do you say that? to decide. Eck, as far as I know, did not refer to this order. on briefing that this was an annihilation order, from September 1942 to the end of the war.
a way. He certaibly did not ask me about this, in any event. admitting that he briefed as he did, don't you?
Q You also know, don't you, that another commander he briefed was subsequently seen either by yourself or by Admiral Doenitz before he went out?
Q Again when he came back?
Q In general. Are you seriously telling the Tribunal that none of these officers who were briefed that this was an annihilation order, that none of them raised the question either with you or with Admiral Doenitz? any event. to be ambiguous; deliberately; so that any U-boat commander who was prepared to behave ashe did was entitled to do so under the order. Isn't that right? issued?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination? Do you wish to examine, Dr. Kranzbuehler? BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Tribunal that he only informed very few officers about his interpretation of the Lakonia order?